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INFERENCE AND CONVERSATIONAL INTERACTION 
Pragmatic language disturbances related to stroke 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Language use at a discourse level, or in conversational interaction, puts high demands on human 
cognition. Brain damage can often result in pragmatic language disturbances, even if different 
language functions taken separately seem to be intact. In this thesis, post-stroke pragmatic ability in 
inferencing and in conversational interaction is explored. 
 
The ability to make inferences for comprehension and its association with sustained attention and 
verbal working memory capacity are studied in two experimental group studies with 14 right-
hemisphere-damaged (RHD) individuals, 14 left-hemisphere-damaged (LHD) individuals, and a 
control group consisting of 14 non-brain-damaged individuals, matched for age, sex, education and 
reading habits. Change in the ability to interact in conversation and the degree of negative impact of 
this change are also investigated in a group study, using a questionnaire distributed to the brain-
damaged individuals and their conversational partners (CP). The impact of pragmatic language 
disturbances at the individual level is explored in four case studies where the quantitative and 
qualitative results of the experimental cognitive tasks and the questionnaire are supplemented by an 
analysis of video-recorded natural conversation. 
 
The key findings show that the groups have somewhat different patterns of results in the inference 
tasks. The LHD group primarily had trouble with tasks requiring an ability to revise inferences, and 
their results on those tasks tended to be associated with verbal working memory. The RHD group 
also had problems with tasks requiring the ability to revise inferences, but their results were 
associated with sustained attention. The RHD subjects also had problems making inferences about 
characters’ attitudes or motives but no associations were seen between results on these tasks and 
verbal working memory or sustained attention. It was found that the LHD individuals and their CP 
tended to report more post-stroke changes and negative impact of these changes in conversational 
interaction than the RHD subjects and their CP. However, several of the RHD subjects and their CP 
who did report changes perceived a high degree of negative impact of these changes. The LHD and 
RHD groups often reported similar pragmatic areas as being affected in conversation and this was 
observed in the video-recorded conversational interaction as well. It is inferred from the results that 
expressions of pragmatic disorders post-stroke may be subtle and expressed in ways that are not 
traditionally related to language disturbances. Furthermore, even subtle pragmatic language 
disorders have an impact on, and also depend on, the role of the conversational partner.  
 
The results are approached from a perspective in which pragmatic ability in association with brain 
damage is seen as the outcome of interaction between several different cognitive functions, 
personality and compensatory strategies in the brain-damaged individual as well as in his or her 
conversational partners. 
 
KEY WORDS: Right-hemisphere brain damage, Pragmatics, Cognition, Subtle language disorder, 
Attention, Working memory, Inference, Conversational interaction 
 
The thesis is written in English. 
  
INFERENS OCH SAMTALSINTERAKTION 
Pragmatiska språkstörningar i samband med stroke 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Språkanvändning på diskursnivå, eller i samtalsinteraktion, ställer höga krav på mänsklig kognition. 
Hjärnskada kan ofta resultera i pragmatiska språkstörningar, även om olika språkfunktioner var för 
sig tycks vara intakta. I denna avhandling undersöks pragmatisk förmåga i form av förmåga att dra 
slutsatser om betydelse och att interagera i samtal efter stroke. 
 
Sambanden mellan förmågan att dra slutsatser för förståelse, att bibehålla uppmärksamheten över 
tid (sustained attention) och verbalt arbetsminne studeras i två experimentella gruppstudier med 14 
högerhemisfärskadade (HHS) individer, 14 vänsterhemisfärskadade (VHS) individer och en 
kontrollgrupp med 14 icke hjärnskadade individer, matchade med avseende på ålder, kön, 
utbildning och läsvanor. Förändringar i förmåga att interagera i samtal och grad av negativ 
påverkan av denna förändring undersöks också i en gruppstudie med hjälp av ett frågeformulär som 
distribuerades till de hjärnskadade individerna och deras samtalspartners (SP). Påverkan av 
pragmatisk språkstörning på individnivå undersöks i fyra fallstudier, där kvantitativa och kvalitativa 
resultat från de kognitiva uppgifterna och frågeformuläret kompletteras med analys av 
videoinspelad samtalsinteraktion. 
 
De viktigaste fynden visar att gruppernas resultat på förståelseuppgifterna skiljer sig åt. VHS-
gruppen hade primärt problem med uppgifter som krävde förmåga att revidera en slutsats och deras 
resultat på dessa uppgifter tenderade att korrelera med kapacitet i verbalt arbetsminne. HHS-
gruppen hade också problem att revidera slutsatser, men deras resultat korrelerade med förmåga att 
bibehålla uppmärksamhet över tid. HHS-gruppen hade även problem med att dra slutsatser om en 
karaktärs attityd eller motiv men det fanns ingen korrelation mellan resultat på dessa uppgifter och 
verbalt arbetsminne eller förmåga att bibehålla uppmärksamhet. Det visade sig att VHS-individerna 
och deras SP tenderade att rapportera fler förändringar efter stroke och mer negative påverkan från 
dessa förändringar på samtalsinteraktionen än HHS-individerna och deras SP. Samtidigt upplevde 
flera av de HHS-individer och deras SP som rapporterade förändring en hög grad av negativ 
påverkan från dessa förändringar. VHS-gruppen och HHS-gruppen rapporterade i hög utsträckning 
samma pragmatiska områden som påverkade och detta kunde också observeras i den videoinspelade 
samtalsinteraktionen. En slutsats som dras utifrån dessa resultat är att symtom på pragmatiska 
störningar efter stroke kan vara subtila och ta sig uttryck som traditionellt inte har relaterats till 
språkstörning. Det kan också konstateras att även subtila pragmatiska språkstörningar påverkar, och 
är beroende av, den roll samtalspartnern tar i interaktionen. 
 
Fynden i dessa studier betraktas utifrån ett perspektiv där pragmatisk språkstörning i samband med 
hjärnskada ses som resultatet av interaktion mellan flera olika kognitiva funktioner, personlighet 
och kompensatoriska strategier hos den hjärnskadade individen såväl som hos hans eller hennes 
samtalspartners. 
 
NYCKELORD: Högerhemisfärskada, Pragmatik, Kognition, Subtil språkstörning, Uppmärksamhet, 
Arbetsminne, Inferens, Samtalsinteraktion 
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 1 
1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE THESIS 
 
The main topic of this thesis is pragmatic language disturbances related to stroke. It 
comprises four studies investigating the effects of brain damage on comprehension 
and conversational interaction. The main aim of the studies was to explore certain 
aspects of the elusive problems affecting right-hemisphere-damaged individuals’ 
communication. The thesis adopts an interactional approach to cognition and 
communication. This means that the production and comprehension of discourse are 
believed to emerge from the interaction of different language-specific and non-
linguistic cognitive processes and also from the interaction between conversational 
partners.  
An experimental method is used to investigate possible associations between 
inferences in the comprehension of discourse, verbal working memory and sustained 
attention. To investigate possible effects on conversational interaction, a 
questionnaire about post-stroke changes in communication was distributed to a group 
of brain damaged individuals and their conversational partners. Those results were 
complemented by case studies including analyses of video-recorded conversational 
interactions. Although the main focus is communication disorders associated with 
right hemisphere damage, left-hemisphere-damaged and neurological healthy 
individuals are included for comparison. 
This introduction to the thesis will provide basic definitions and describe the 
topic investigated. This is followed by a presentation of the theoretical background 
where acknowledged cognitive models and relevant current research on this topic are 
presented. The chapter concludes with an outline of how the four studies that 
compose the thesis will be presented. 
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1.1 Pragmatic aspects of language  
 
Traditionally, language has been considered as a human cognitive function, along 
with others such as memory, attention and thought. Still, as stated by Deacon (1997), 
for example, language has evolved over the course of human evolution and it has also 
affected the development of the human brain and cognition. This means that brain 
structures involved in language processing are anatomically intertwined with various 
other structures that handle the other cognitive functions of the brain. Research into 
the functions of the brain has come to question any attempt to try to separate 
language functions from other cognitive abilities, (McNeil and Pratt, 2001). In light 
of what we know today about human cognition, is it wise to consider language 
functions as separate modules or domain-specific systems in relation to other 
cognitive functions? This question is especially relevant when it comes to the actual 
use of language in social interaction.  
Language is often defined as a system of symbols used for communication. The 
concepts of language and language ability can be described and analysed in terms of 
different aspects such as phonetics, syntax, lexicon and pragmatics. Phonetics 
describes the production and perception of phonemes and prosody. Syntactic aspects 
include grammar and structure in language, for example, word order at the sentence 
level. The lexicon and semantics deal with the meaning and use of language at the 
word level. Pragmatics comprises and describes the principles of language use in 
context. However, the boundaries between semantics and pragmatics are not at all 
clear-cut. For example, metaphors, proverbs, idioms and more or less idiosyncratic 
expressions and slang are considered to be expressions of pragmatic aspects of 
language, as the production and interpretation of this kind of language is especially 
dependent on the context.1 Other pragmatic aspects of language are the intrinsic 
                                                 
1 The term ‘nonliteral-language’ is sometimes used to summarise the types of expressions and 
meanings that are considered to be especially dependent on pragmatic aspects of language. The 
term is avoided here as the nature of those kinds of expressions, for example metaphors and irony, 
is considered to be full of nuances and more complex than what is conveyed by the term ‘non-
literal’.  
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regulations, for example in turn-taking, that make conversational interactions smooth 
and the adaptation of language use to facilitate communication in social interaction.  
Penn (1999) suggested that pragmatic ability consists of three types of 
knowledge which are fundamental for the adaptation of communication in context: 
 
1. knowledge of language and its structure,  
2. knowledge of the world and objects as well as events and actions within the 
world,  
3. social knowledge of the rules for conversation and behaviour in the speaker’s 
society.  
 
The ability to adapt one’s use of the language system to specific contexts, specific 
conversational partners and general world knowledge is essential for the successful 
use of language for social interaction.  
This view of the pragmatic aspects of language calls for recognition of the role 
played by cognitive capacities such as memory, attention, inference and theory of 
mind in language use. Consequently, pragmatics has been an object of study not only 
in linguistics but also in psychology and philosophy. Over the years, there has been a 
growing interest in the function of pragmatic aspects of language within the science 
of neurolinguistics. However, as stated by Perkins (1998, 2005a, 2005b), clinical 
pragmatics needs to focus on the cognitive and neurological factors in addition to 
more theoretical perspectives.  
Still, there is no agreement on how to conceptualise pragmatics in relation to 
language. Pragmatics does not necessarily have to be considered as an essential 
component of language: as discussed by Myers (2001) and Tirassa (1999), some 
researchers consider that only language used for intentional communication is 
dependent on pragmatic ability. From that particular viewpoint language is not 
always a necessary element, in association with to pragmatics, in communication. 
Myers (2001) describes the cry of an infant as an example of intentional 
communication that is dependent on pragmatic ability but not on language. Myers 
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(2001) also mentions body communication such as rolling the eyes or shrugging as 
examples of communication that are dependent on pragmatic ability but not on 
language. However, those examples are not valid if one considers that the definition 
of language as ‘a system of symbols’ might very well include body communication 
like gestures and facial expressions.  
Language and communication at the discourse level often make high demands 
on pragmatic ability. In the context of this thesis, discourse is defined as extended 
verbal expression in speech or writing. When one participates in conversation, reads 
a book or listen to the news, there are requirements for fast and simultaneous 
processing and the interaction of numerous cognitive systems. The recognition of 
pragmatics as an important element of human language abilities has also revealed 
problems related to the pragmatic aspects of language that affect communication in 
people with neurological brain damage. Individuals with well-defined left-or right- 
hemisphere damage, as well as individuals with more diffuse traumatic brain damage 
or progressive neurological diseases may have well-preserved language abilities in 
several linguistic components, such as phonetics and syntax, but may nevertheless 
experience problems with both comprehension and language production in more 
complex communicative situations.  
 
1.1.1 Subtle and pragmatic language disorders 
 
As discussed by McNeil and Pratt (2001), new knowledge of how the human brain 
works has consequences for the definition of the concept of language as well as of 
language deficits like aphasia. If it is not possible to separate language from other 
cognitive functions, then how should aphasia best be defined? And what about the 
pragmatic aspects of language, which are so obviously dependent on other cognition? 
How should pragmatic deficits be defined in relation to aphasia? Joanette and 
Ansaldo (1999, 2000) proposed that these deficits should be termed ‘pragmatic 
aphasia’, but there is no agreement on the matter (see, for example Myers, 2001). 
Aphasic individuals can depend on their pragmatic language ability to support 
communication when other components of language, e.g. phonetic, semantic and 
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syntactic abilities, are disturbed. Still, the distortion of semantic and phonetic aspects 
of language has consequences for the pragmatic aspects.  
More subtle language disorders associated with left-hemisphere damage (LHD) 
and subcortical lesions are sometimes termed higher-level language (HLL) disorders; 
however, the assumption that different aspects of language can be separated into 
different hierarchically ordered levels may be questioned. Those more subtle 
language disorders have been described by Crosson (1996) as interfering with these 
individual’s social and professional lives because of difficulties in assimilating more 
complex, or large, units of information as well as in conveying personal thoughts and 
needs to others. The subtle language deficits described in association with, for 
example, LHD can often be related to the lexical and syntactic aspects of language 
and communication, although the impairment becomes noticeable when one 
considers the pragmatic aspects of language and it affects the ability to participate in 
communicative activities. Research in aphasia has made it possible to look upon these 
problems as a consequence of dysfunctional semantic or phonological processing or 
deficits in other cognitive systems involved in language, for example, verbal working 
memory. That is, a dysfunction in certain linguistic or other aspects of cognition 
manifests itself at the pragmatic level in language. For example, difficulties finding 
the correct word for an intended meaning result in the choice of a word that creates 
an un-intended nuance of the meaning expressed. In another example, limitation on 
the capacity of verbal working memory makes it difficult to comprehend long 
sentences with many subordinate clauses. There are also certain effects on the 
pragmatic aspects of language of certain adaptations and compensatory strategies 
associated with language disturbances, for example, syntax, turn-taking and body 
communication.  
The concept of pragmatic deficit is often used to label impaired ability to 
maintain theme and topic, to appreciate context relevance and to adjust to socially 
appropriate language use in discourse, despite well-functioning phonetic, syntactic 
and general semantic aspects of language (Myers 1999b). Pragmatic deficits may 
involve deviant use and interpretation of the lexicon. An inability to understand 
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humour and irony and other more complex uses of language, such as proverbs and 
idioms, might also be described as pragmatic deficits, as would the dysfunctional 
production and interpretation of prosody and body language.  
All the manifestations of pragmatic deficits mentioned above have been 
described in right-hemisphere-damaged (RHD) patients by, for example, Tompkins 
(1995), Myers (1999b), and Martin and McDonald (2003). It is difficult to assess the 
incidence of language disturbance associated with RHD. The number of patients 
affected presumably varies across different estimates, as does the number of 
individuals suffering from aphasia, depending on the definitions and methods of 
assessment used. In a study performed by Benton and Bryan (1996), the incidence 
was estimated at about 50% in the patients with well-defined RHD (see also Joanette 
and Goulet, 1994). Pragmatic deficits like the ones described above have also been 
described in association with traumatic brain injury, dementia and other progressive 
neurological diseases and in association with autism; however, the scope of this thesis 
is pragmatics in association with RHD.  
The emergent perspective described by Perkins (2005a and 2005b) has been 
adopted in this thesis. Perkins (1998, 2005a, 2005b) addresses the problem of 
grasping the concept of pragmatics in association with dysfunction. He calls for a 
holistic and emergentist account of pragmatic ability and disability. The term 
‘emergence’ is used to describe a process in which a complex entity comes out of 
interactions between ‘lower-level’ entities. Although the approach proposed falls 
within an ‘interactionist’ tradition, it emphasises that pragmatics is not a discrete 
entity that exists independently of other entities such as language, social cognition, 
memory, attention and inferential reasoning. Instead pragmatics is described as what 
emerges when such entities come together in a socio-culturally situated human 
interaction. This view of pragmatics focuses on the processes within the individual as 
well as between the individuals in interaction. The emergent perspective also claims 
that there is often no direct link between an underlying deficit and a resulting 
pragmatic impairment. The symptom may very well be the consequence of 
compensatory adaptations. Furthermore, Perkins (2005b) describes the entities 
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between which interactions take place as belonging to linguistic and non-linguistic 
cognitive systems and sensorimotor systems. Cognitive linguistic elements in the 
model are phonology, prosody, morphology, syntax, discourse and lexis. Examples of 
cognitive non-linguistic elements are inference, memory, attention, social cognition, 
theory of mind, executive function and affect. Sensorimotor elements, Perkins’ 
(2005b) concept, take the form of either motor output like voice, gesture, gaze and 
posture, or sensory input like auditory and visual perception.2 In the emergentist 
perspective, pragmatic impairment is the result of a restriction on the choice of 
elements available for encoding or decoding meaning. Perkins (2000) also proposes a 
classification system for pragmatic disorders depending on whether they are due to a 
solely non-linguistic cognitive function (primary pragmatic disability), or due to a 
linguistic or sensorimotor dysfunction (secondary pragmatic disability), or due to 
both linguistic and non-linguistic dysfunctions (complex, or compound, pragmatic 
disability).  
In this thesis, both linguistic and non-linguistic abilities are investigated. The 
ability to make inferences at a discourse level is investigated along with basic aspects 
of non-linguistic cognitive functions like sustained attention and verbal working 
memory. Furthermore, production and comprehension in discourse are viewed as the 
result of a process that emerges out of the interaction of different cognitive functions 
within the individual, as well as from the interaction between the individuals involved 
in conversation.  
Since the expression and interpretation of meaning in discourse involve the use 
of lexical and semantic aspects of language, the analysis of reported changes in 
conversational interaction in study 3 and the analysis of natural conversational 
interaction in study 4 touch upon the status of those aspects of language in 
association with brain damage. As described by Tompkins (1995) and Myers 
(1999b), deficits of the lexicon and semantics might play a role in pragmatic 
performance in association with RHD. However, standard methods for evaluating the 
                                                 
2  Elements of motor output such as gestures and gaze, might in some views, equally well be 
included among the linguistic elements. 
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lexicon in association with LHD may not capture the problems affecting 
communicative ability in association with RHD. When access to the dominant and 
common meanings of words is evaluated in RHD individuals with standard aphasia 
batteries, those individuals’ semantic processing is usually considered to function 
well. Nevertheless, anomia is a common symptom associated with any kind of brain 
damage. Clinical experience shows that many individuals with RHD also experience 
word-finding difficulties, especially when specific word nuances are desired. 
Performance on semantic processing tasks that require the activation of a wide range 
of alternate meanings and associations to a single concept (sometimes called 
divergent semantic processing) can be affected. This kind of task might, for example, 
depend on sensitivity to relationships among items. RHD individuals might have 
trouble producing appropriate category names for groups of objects and making 
lexical judgements and they might also have reduced verbal fluency; see Myers 
(1999b) for an overview. While tasks in standard aphasia batteries usually require 
activation of the denotation of a word, that is, its exact meaning, divergent tasks 
might require the activation of associations to a specific word, or that word’s 
connotations. For example, the words skinny and slim used in describing a person’s 
appearance might both denote the shape of his or her body, but the connotations of 
the word skinny might differ from the connotations of the word slim, and perhaps 
have a more unpleasant ring. Connotations can be quite personal. A connotation of 
the word dog might be ‘loyal friend’ or ‘slobbering beast’ depending on one’s 
personal experiences with the animal signified. At present, the extent to which 
deficits in semantic aspects of language can be considered as a common cause of 
some of the pragmatic language deficits seen in both RHD and LHD individuals with 
subtle language disorders has not been sufficiently investigated. The scope and 
methods used in this thesis were developed to study language use at a discourse level 
in natural conversational interactions. Therefore, the results of these studies do not 
permit one to draw any conclusions about specific lexical and semantic aspects of 
language associated with RHD, although certain speculations are unavoidable: any 
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deficit in lexical-semantics inevitably manifests itself at a discourse level and in the 
pragmatic aspects of language.  
In an individual, functions that depend on more effortful cognitive processing, as 
well as more automatic cognitive processes, for example, activation of a semantic 
system, might be affected if more fundamental aspects of cognition are dysfunctional. 
Attentional disorders, e.g. sustained attention, have been proposed as a cause of the 
pragmatic and other deficits seen in association with RHD; see Tompkins (1995) and 
Myers (1999b) for a review. The pragmatic deficits seen in association with RHD are 
often referred to as cognitive-communicative impairments. Sustained attention might 
be considered as an essential and basic cognitive ability underlying understanding 
and interaction in social contexts. Level of arousal is even more basic for all 
cognitive activity. There may also be lack of awareness of deficits or anosognosia in 
RHD. Anosognosia is comprehended as a somatosensory agnosia and has mostly 
been described in association with a motor disability, which the patient is unaware of 
or denies, following large right-hemisphere parietal-lobe lesions. The actual cause of 
the syndrome is not known although there are theories; see, for example, 
Ramachandran (1995).  
Several of the symptoms described in the communication of RHD individuals 
can be viewed as reflecting an impaired ability to draw adequate inferences from the 
context or an inability to grasp the communicative intentions of a conversational 
partner, as discussed by Sabbagh (1999). Socially inappropriate or off-topic remarks 
may result from an incorrect inference about the actual topic of the conversation or 
the conversational partner’s intent. Humour, irony, metaphors and the use of idioms 
as well as prosody and facial expressions receive their intended meaning in a certain 
context. RHD has sometimes also been associated with dysfunctional processing of 
expressions of emotional and attitudinal content, which is often an important element 
in human interaction; see Borod (2000) for an overview. Prosody and body language 
often also convey unintended information about an individual’s attitude and 
emotional state.  
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Problems in making appropriate inferences about the intentions, attitudes or 
motives of others have also been described as a deficit in theory of mind, (Brownell 
and Martino, 1998, Happé, Brownell, and Winner, 1999). General world knowledge 
and knowledge of the conversational partner are part of the context that one must 
infer from, as well is knowledge of the language system, for example, in the form of 
multiple word meanings, their associations and the relations between them.  
In the study of pragmatic language disorders, linguistic pragmatic theories have 
contributed useful instruments and labels to analyse and describe the symptoms. Still, 
as discussed by Perkins (1998), Body, Perkins, and McDonald (1999) and Martin and 
McDonald (2003), there is now a call for an understanding of the mechanisms that 
cause those pragmatic dysfunctions, and this requires a contribution from cognitive 
theories. The processing of information for understanding and interacting with 
language in complex communicative contexts is dependent on more basic cognitive 
functions, such as sustained attention and verbal working memory, as well as on more 
complex and compound cognitive abilities such as inference and adaptation of 
language use at a discourse level. Although basic cognitive functions are exercised in 
all language and communication activities, at least to some extent, more complex 
communicative contexts can be expected to make higher demands on those functions. 
The methods used in the studies that constitute this thesis are applied in the goal of 
contributing to the search for an understanding of the cause and consequences of 
pragmatic language disturbances in association with RHD. 
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1.2. Theoretical background 
 
The studies in this thesis focus on pragmatic aspects of communication. They 
examine comprehension, in the form of the ability to draw inferences from implicit 
information in discourse, and the ability to interact in conversation. In the context of 
this thesis, discourse is defined as extended verbal expression in speech or writing. 
Since pragmatics is viewed as the outcome of the interaction between several 
different elements within the individual, an attempt is made to integrate different 
important theoretical aspects of cognition and communication in discussing the 
results of the studies. This chapter presents the theoretical background to the methods 
used and the discussion of the results in the thesis.  
First Kintsch’s (1988, 1998) construction-integration model of comprehension 
will be described and the concept of inference will be defined. This is followed by a 
presentation of current research on inference in association with RHD, subdivided 
into research on revised inference and on social inference. Theories of the processing 
of social cognition, theory of mind and affective information are also presented, as 
are current theories of sustained attention and verbal working memory. A review of 
concepts related to the pragmatic aspects of discourse is also presented and the 
chapter concludes with a brief presentation of current research on the consequences 
of pragmatic disabilities for discourse production and conversational interaction in 
association with RHD. 
 
1.2.1 Kintsch’s model of comprehension  
 
This section presents Kintsch’s construction-integration model and the term 
inference. RHD individuals often show symptoms of comprehension deficits. Those 
deficits often become marked in situations where the individual has to generate 
inferences from information. Those inferences might take the form of filling in any 
missing parts, as in bridging inference, or working out which of several different 
possible interpretations is correct. To understand the inference problems described in 
RHD individuals, Kintsch’s (1988, 1998) model of comprehension will be used and 
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the notion of inference will be defined, starting with Kintsch’s viewpoint of the 
concept. 
 
1.2.1.1 The construction-integration model  
 
Although it has not been fully explored, Kintsch’s (1988, 1998) construction-
integration model has often been referred to in discussions of comprehension in 
discourse and in some studies of RHD individuals’ inferencing ability (Chantraine, 
Joanette, and Cardebat, 1998, Beeman, Bowden, and Gernsbacher, 2000, Lehman and 
Tompkins, 2000, Harris Wright and Newhoff, 2001). The benefit of this specific 
model of comprehension is that it is a cognitive model that makes it possible to 
consider all the different elements involved in the comprehension process including 
perception, concepts, ideas and emotion (Kintsch, 1998). These different elements 
may come from perceptions of the external world as well as from the perceiving 
organism itself in the form of memories, knowledge, beliefs, body states or goals. 
Compared to, for example, the theory of capacity-constrained comprehension, 
introduced by Just and Carpenter (1992), Kintsch involves long-term memory (LTM) 
in the actual processing of working memory for comprehension. Kintsch’s notion of 
working memory and its relation to LTM will be further discussed in sections 1.2.1.2 
and 1.2.3.2.  
According to Kintsch (1988, 1998), traditional models’ account of 
comprehension often includes a control process guided by a pre-existing schema. The 
schema in these models is supposed to work like a perceptual filter that accepts 
material that fits and blocks out inconsistent information. At the same time, such 
schema can work as an inference machine, filling in any gaps in the stimulus material 
that prevent it from matching the pre-existing schema. Kintsch (1998) rejects such a 
top-down process. Instead, he conceives of comprehension as a loosely structured 
bottom-up process that is sensitive to context and flexibly adjusts to shifts in the 
environment. In this view, comprehension might be chaotic in the early stages and the 
coherence and order we experience is achieved only by the time it reaches 
consciousness.  
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Kintsch’s (1988, 1998) model of comprehension, like several other models, for 
example, those of van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) and Gernsbacher (1990), views the 
comprehension process as structure building. Comprehension involves the building of 
a mental model. A mental model is constructed by forming connections between 
disparate information in the ideas expressed and relevant prior knowledge in an 
associative net. Kintsch (1998) describes a step-by-step process by which spoken or 
written language is transformed into a mental representation in the mind of the 
listener or reader. One important adaptation of the model, compared to, for example, 
the model presented by van Dijk and Kintsch (1983), is the increased role of 
knowledge stored in LTM in the comprehension process. 
Knowledge representations in discourse are often analysed as idea units called 
‘propositions’. A proposition, in Kintsch’s view, includes one predicate and one or 
more concepts called arguments. Arguments can take the form of agents, patients or 
instruments, which all fulfil distinct semantic functions in that proposition. In natural 
discourse, though, not all semantics is in the form of complete sentences including 
propositions. Comprehension in natural conversation also includes the processing of 
contributions that in isolation do not involve complete explicit propositions. 
However, the comprehension process in discourse involves the integration of 
implications from several contributions to the current conversation as well as LTM 
knowledge. 
The process of comprehension of stimuli is modelled by a construction process, 
only weakly controlled, where all potential significant information and even 
contradictory associations are activated. This view of activation in the comprehension 
process can be compared to that of Glucksberg, Kreuz, and Rho (1986), who argue 
that context can constrain lexical access in word recognition. In a strong application 
of this notion, only the contextually appropriate meaning of an ambiguous word is 
processed at all. According to the construction-integration model, however, all 
possible interpretations of an ambiguous word are activated but meanings irrelevant 
to the context will then be suppressed or inhibited, as the activation of these meanings 
will not be strengthened to the same extent as context-relevant meanings. The 
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comprehension of the contextually appropriate meaning results from the integration 
process where inappropriate constructions will be deactivated, leaving the majority of 
elements activated in the process meaningfully related to one another. The benefit of 
such sometimes apparently irrelevant activation is, according to Kintsch (1988), that 
the process can be both context-sensitive and flexible at the same time. 
In the construction phase, a coherent propositional network is constructed. 
Besides the propositions, or idea units, explicitly expressed in the discourse, it 
includes associations with those ideas, activated knowledge and inferences and 
generalisations that contribute to the coherence of the ideas expressed. Once a 
network of propositions has been constructed, the integration phase follows and 
activation is accumulated and strengthens in those propositions that are most 
interconnected with one another. Inconsistencies and contextually inappropriate 
concepts are deactivated. This modified propositional network now creates an LTM 
representation of the text.  
From each of the repeated construction-integration cycles, some important 
elements of the current clause or propositions are held active in the capacity-limited 
working memory for further processing. The items that are held in working memory 
might also activate idea units retrieved from LTM knowledge through association, 
and in this way extend the limited working memory capacity. This elaboration of 
working memory capacity is referred to by Kintsch (1998), Ericsson and Kintsch 
(1995) and Ericsson and Delaney (1999) as long-term working memory.  
The comprehension process described above ends up in the episodic text 
memory, which is a mental representation of the discourse. The episodic text memory 
consists of two components: the text base, which consists of those elements and 
relations that are directly derived from the text itself, and the situation model. The 
situation model consists of the text base together with the listener’s or reader’s own 
knowledge and personal experience. The extent to which a reader will actually 
perform the work of transforming a text base into a situation model varies. The text 
base may be more or less coherent and complete, and the situation model may be 
more or less adequate and precise. If the information expressed in the discourse is 
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perfectly explicit, the text base is also a good situation model. In some cases, the 
reader or listener may have understood the discourse well and formed a good 
situation model without being able to remember the text itself. The opposite case, 
where subjects remember the text without having been able to understand it and to 
form a situation model, is also possible. 
Kintsch’s theory of comprehension, like most theories of comprehension, 
focuses on reading comprehension. This is where most of the empirical work on 
comprehension has been done. Conversational interaction involves a completely 
different situation than reading a text. For example, conversational discourse allows 
consistent revision of the speech plan and theme of the conversation to adapt to the 
listener’s comprehension or perhaps simply because an absentminded speaker. 
Spoken discourse also diverges from a visually presented text in many other ways, 
for example, in being a transient medium but also, when it comes to conversational 
interaction, in the conveyance of other sources of information such as body 
communication and other sources of information in the immediate context of the 
conversation. Although Kintsch (1998) seems to recognise those types of elements as 
part of the comprehension process, he does not present empirical data that support the 
applicability of the model in analysing that kind of discourse. With those 
reservations, Kintsch’s construction-integration model is here considered as a useful 
tool in the understanding of pragmatic dysfunctions in association with RHD.  
 
1.2.1.2 Inference in comprehension 
 
Kintsch’s (1993, 1998) construction-integration model, calls for a classification of 
inferences according to their function and the processes involved. Kintsch (1998) is 
actually rather reluctant to use the term inference for the process of making LTM 
contents available via automatic or controlled retrieval structures. In cognitive 
science this term has not been well defined and the global use of the term has yielded 
more questions than answers, in Kintsch’s view (1998). Many classification systems 
for inferences have been proposed but Kintsch (1993, 1998), favours an analysis 
performed and presented by Guthke (1991) who characterises inferences both by their 
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end results and by the nature of the processes involved. Kintsch follows Guthke’s 
analysis and distinguishes between inferences that add information through retrieval 
from LTM versus inferences that generate new information. Both retrieval of 
information from the LTM and generation of new information can be differentiated 
according to whether the process involved is automatic or controlled. These should be 
considered as the end points of a scale rather than discrete categories. Kintsch (1998) 
elaborates Guthke’s analysis by differentiating between inferences that add 
information and those that reduce it. Bridging inferences, or coherence inferences, 
add information by retrieving information that already exists in LTM. This takes 
place in either an automatic or a controlled manner. In the case of automatic 
knowledge elaboration, the text contains the necessary cues to link up with relevant 
information in LTM. One example of this, cited from Kintsch (1998), is John nailed 
down a board as a sufficient retrieval cue for hammer. In controlled knowledge 
elaborations, there are not enough retrieval cues in the text so they must be supplied 
by a search for bridging knowledge in LTM. Consider another example from Kintsch 
(1998): Danny wanted a new bike. He worked as a waiter. In this case, automatic, 
associative knowledge elaboration alone would not necessarily produce the inference 
that Danny worked in order to obtain money to buy the bike. Instead, the controlled 
search for a causal connection between the two statements may evolve the retrieval of 
the information that working may bring in money to buy things with. In understanding 
narratives, one routinely searches for causal links between actions and events and this 
memory search is a strategic, controlled and resource-demanding process. Context 
and personal experience influence it and what is automatic for one person might 
require controlled search for another. Although in some situations two concepts 
together may form a compound cue for the automatic retrieval of a linking relation, 
under other conditions more elaborate controlled processes would be required to 
detect some underlying coherence relationship between different components of a 
text.  
Generating new information instead of retrieving of existing information from 
LTM may also be automatic. This is the case in making inferences from the following 
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example quoted by Kintsch (1998): the sentence Three turtles rested on a floating 
log, and a fish swam beneath them results in the inference that the turtles are above 
the fish. This information cannot be retrieved from LTM but has to be computed 
through the transitivity of terms like above and beneath. This computation is done 
from the information given in the text and certain generation rules. When the rules for 
generating new information from a given text become very complex, they may 
require controlled resource-demanding processing. This is what Kintsch calls a true 
inference and it includes analogical inferences in the same way as the inferences 
discussed in logic include inductive and deductive inferences. However, the 
generation of new information may also require the retrieval of information from 
LTM in addition to textual information.  
As stated by McKoon and Ratcliff (1992) and Graesser, Singer, and Trabasso 
(1994), elaborative inference that expands upon or embellishes the information 
presented has been shown to be time-consuming and demanding of processing 
resources. Theme generation, outcome predictions and character attitude or 
motivation attributions are examples of elaborative inferences. Recency of mention is 
also related to the time course of inference generation. Those kinds of inferences 
correspond to what Kintsch (1993, 1998) refers to as either a retrieval process in the 
form of controlled bridging inference or, on some occasions, inference generation. 
Controlled bridging inference and inference generation may be influenced by the 
contextual bias. Consistency of contexts affects the reliability of the inferences made. 
An inconsistent context is more resource-consuming in making predictive or 
coherence inferences.  
Kintsch (1998) argues that a controlled process of adding information, 
information accretion, may occur any time during and after the original 
comprehension of a text. It may occur in response to specific task demands such as 
test questions. A test question may suggest the retrieval of additional knowledge not 
previously considered. It may also require the use of rules for generating new 
information or condensing old information.  
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According to the long-term working memory model, presented by Ericsson and 
Kintsch (1995), large portions of LTM are turned into an expanded working memory 
in all kinds of cognitive processing, including text comprehension. All items in LTM 
can become functional parts of working memory, the long-term working memory. 
When a concept is contained in working memory, the associated concepts in LTM 
become potential knowledge elaborations without having to be transferred from one 
memory store such as LTM, to another such as working memory.3 No inference 
needs to be made because the information is already part of working memory.  
 
* 
In studies 1 and 2 in this thesis, parts of the stimuli consist of spoken discourse in the 
form of an audio recording of narratives read aloud to the subjects. The term 
‘inference’ is used for the conclusions drawn about meaning or implications in the 
narratives or, as in Kintsch’s terminology, elaborative inferences that are presumed to 
require controlled retrieval processes. However, these are not restricted to the 
generation of new information and are therefore not necessarily what Kintsch would 
call ‘true inferences’.  
 
1.2.2 Inference and right-hemisphere damage 
 
In this section, the research on inference and comprehension in association with RHD 
will be presented. Inference is often discussed in association with RHD and also 
constitutes part of the current theories about the cause of pragmatic language 
disturbance that will be presented here. Studies 1 and 2 in this thesis investigate the 
ability to revise inferences and to make inferences about attitudes and motives for 
action. Research on the ability to revise inferences and on inferences involving 
emotional or affective stimuli, or what is sometimes referred to as mental inference or 
social inference, will be presented separately. First, a review will be given of some 
                                                 
3 Kintsch’s notion of long-term working memory is further discussed in section 1.2.3.2 
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methodological issues concerning the research methods involved in the study of 
inference in association with RHD. 
 
1.2.2.1 How to study inference 
 
In Kintsch’s (1993, 1998) classification of inference, only what is commonly 
considered as logical inference is a true inference. RHD individuals’ ability to handle 
logical inferences has been examined by Hamel, Giroux, and Joanette (2003), and the 
RHD subjects usually do not show any impairment in their processing of syllogisms 
at the sentence level. However, in the research on inference, this term is often used 
for both controlled and automatic retrieval processes. 
Lehman and Tompkins (2000) criticise studies of inference abilities in RHD 
individuals for not always controlling for inference type and stimulus characteristics 
in the tasks used. In a study with RHD individuals, Lehman-Blake and Tompkins 
(2001) showed that their participants managed minimal inference, e.g. pronoun 
mapping. Furthermore, the RHD individuals also generated elaborative inferences if 
the stimuli facilitated the target inference in short written passages.  
It seems that problems affecting RHD individuals’ ability to make inferences are 
not revealed if the stimuli require simple automatic inferences. Nor do they appear if 
complex elaborative inferences, like logic syllogisms, are requested at the sentence 
level.  
Beeman (1993) investigated the ability to make coherence inferences in a group 
of RHD individuals and a control group of non-brain-damaged elderly men. He 
concluded that the RHD individuals’ problems were not due to an impaired ability to 
build a macrostructure or mental representation of a text. Rather, he suggested that 
they lacked semantic activation of the information they needed to draw the 
inferences.  
Several studies using lexical decision tasks have shown that RHD individuals do 
seem to activate several different meanings of ambiguous words, such as Tompkins 
and Baumgaertner (1998). These authors also criticise the method used in Beeman’s 
study (1993), where subjects had to divide their attention between several tasks 
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simultaneously, and suggest that the mixture of these tasks might overload the 
subjects’ processing systems, preventing them from performing well on one or more 
of the tasks. 
Tompkins and Baumgaertner’s (1998) criticism is well-founded. In the drive to 
use experimental settings where possible to control for what is actually measured, it 
is necessary to single out specific processes and reduce the demands on limited 
cognitive resources. This, and procedures using on-line measures, for example, in the 
form of reaction time in lexical decision tasks, can tell us a lot about specific 
functions in the comprehension process, for instance. On the other hand, those 
situations and settings do not have much in common with communication in real life. 
In everyday conversations, or when reading a newspaper or a novel, there are 
demands for simultaneous, flexible processing of different kinds of information 
which do tax the individuals’ processing systems. The impact of limited processing 
resources in RHD individuals have been examined by Monetta, Champagne, 
Desautels and Joanette (2003) in a study where the subjects performed a dual task. 
The results were found to be compatible with the suggestion that impaired ability to 
process ‘non-literal’ utterances could be caused by limited cognitive resources. 
The issue here is not whether RHD individuals can generate inferences, because 
they obviously often do, but the fact that in certain conditions some individuals with 
RHD seem to have difficulties doing this.  
 
1.2.2.2 The coarse semantic coding theory and coherence   
 
The problems seen in RHD individuals, for example in grasping the inferred meaning 
in discourse, understanding the punch line of a joke or identifying the central theme 
of short narratives, have been conceptualised by Hough (1990) as deficits in the 
ability to integrate information and infer from context. Beeman (1993, 1998) puts 
forward a theory, based on Rumelhart and McClelland (1986) and Gazzaniga (1995), 
that the right hemisphere might be necessary for drawing coherence inferences. The 
coarse semantic coding theory proposes that the right hemisphere perform relatively 
coarse semantic coding while the semantic processing in the left hemisphere is 
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performed as relatively fine semantic coding in small semantic fields. Processing in 
the left hemisphere is focused on a few concepts that are closely related to the input 
words in that given context. 
The notion of asymmetrical semantic coding between the right and left 
hemispheres have been questioned by Livesay and Burgess (2003). In their 
experiment with mediated priming, which involves two-step priming where the 
relation between the prime and target is distant, the results suggested that the lexical 
representation of the two hemispheres is equivalent.  
However, the coarse semantic coding theory is supported by research of, for 
example, Chiarello (1998). Beeman (1993, 1998) argues that the left hemisphere 
rapidly restricts access to one possible meaning, either the dominant one or the one 
most consistent with the preceding words. This is functional in an individuals’ aim to 
rapidly integrate the meaning of successive words, as in an utterance. Conversely, the 
right hemisphere maintains activation of many possible meanings for a longer period 
of time. As a result, the right hemisphere increases the semantic overlap among 
multiple semantic fields. It may also function to maintain activation for peripherally 
related information, already eliminated by the more selective left hemisphere’s 
semantic processes. This information might either facilitate or interfere with other 
processes, depending on the task requirements. It is ineffective for the process of 
understanding straightforward language but useful when there is a need to integrate 
parts of discourse that are distantly related. To generate inferences in discourse, 
comprehenders may have to observe less salient semantic features of words in order 
to detect semantic overlap and draw the inferences for coherence. According to 
Beeman, Bowden and Gernsbacher (2000) the RHD individuals’ comprehension 
problems may arise when multiple interpretations are possible or when an initial 
interpretation must be revised. In a study with non-brain-damaged young individuals, 
Beeman et al. (2000) propose that although the information necessary to draw correct 
inferences may be primarily active in the right hemisphere, the left hemisphere may 
capitalise on this information to actually generate or connect it with the 
representation of discourse and complete the coherence inference. That means that 
 22 
when the left hemisphere’s discourse representation lacks coherence, it can adopt 
information from the right hemisphere to restore coherence.  
This is in line with the notion of a left-hemisphere interpretive system, first 
introduced by Gazzaniga and LeDoux (1978). Gazzaniga and Cooney (2003) describe 
the interpretive system lateralised in the left hemisphere as being dependent on access 
to information from both hemispheres to draw adequate and coherent conclusions 
about the world as it is experienced. This also corresponds to Ramachandran’s (1995) 
notion of the right hemisphere as functioning as the ‘devil’s advocate’ by questioning 
the consistency imposed by the left hemisphere. Those notions have both been 
proposed to explain the syndrome of anosognosia in association with RHD. The basic 
thought behind Ramachandran’s (1995) suggestion is that the left hemisphere is 
inclined to create a coherent interpretation of the experienced world to ensure 
consistency and avoid uncertainty and indecisive behaviour, which in this context is 
considered to be inefficient from a cost-benefit perspective of cognition. Doing this 
might involve rationalisation and discarding and distortion of evidence that does not 
fit into the pre-existing model. The right hemisphere, having the capacity for holistic 
processing, then functions as an anomaly detector that monitors the level of 
discrepancy and reacts with the appropriate paradigm shift when the discrepancy 
reaches a given threshold.  
 
1.2.2.3 Revised inference and suppression deficit hypothesis 
 
Several studies have indicated that RHD individuals may have trouble with 
inferences that require resolving an initial interpretation. Brownell, Potter, Bihrle and 
Gardner (1986) proposed that RHD individuals have difficulty revising previously 
acquired knowledge in light of new information. They suggest that this deficit might 
impair several components of discourse. But, as discussed by Brownell and Martino 
(1998), since RHD individuals are able to integrate information across sentences and 
to draw many inferences, it is not sufficient to characterise their impairment as a 
general inference deficit. Brownell and Martino (1998) support Beeman’s (1993) 
perspective that the RHD individuals’ problems revising an inference might be 
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caused by insufficient access to the weaker associations normally provided by the 
healthy right hemisphere. The correct interpretations might rely on interpretations 
that are suppressed. 
On the other hand, Tompkins, Lehman, and Baumgaertner (1999), basing 
themselves on the work of Gernsbacher and Faust (1991), formulated a suppression 
deficit hypothesis. The results of studies by Tompkins, Baumgaertner, Lehman, and 
Fassbinder (2000) and Fassbinder and Tompkins (2001) using ambiguous lexical-
semantic stimuli supported the hypothesis, since RHD individuals showed prolonged 
interference by context-irrelevant meanings of the stimulus words. The RHD group’s 
comprehension problems might, according to the authors, be related to difficulties 
suppressing contextually incompatible meanings due to limited working memory 
capacity. Larger working memory capacity would allow them to maintain 
simultaneous, competing inferences without compromising their ultimate 
interpretations.  
 
1.2.2.4 Right hemisphere hypothesis and inferences of affective information 
 
‘Affect’ can refer to an inner emotional state as well as an outward manifestation of 
that state. In communication, emotional or affective behaviour may manifest itself in 
facial expressions, gestures and tone of voice. Furthermore, as argued by Van 
Lancker and Pachana (1998) emotional and attitudinal nuances tinge most linguistic 
expressions used in discourse. ‘Attitude’ here denotes a mental position, involving 
both affect and cognition, held by a person toward some idea, or object, or another 
person. The emotional information associated with the words chosen signals the 
speaker’s attitude and adds implicit information to the referential meaning. 
Tompkins, Bloise, Timko, and Baumgaertner (1994) investigated the ability to 
generate inferences about a character’s attitude in narratives two to four sentences 
long. Half of the narratives used as stimuli were worded in a way that made the last 
sentence inconsistent with the preceding narrative. To make the whole narrative 
coherent, the subjects had to make correct inferences about the attitude of the main 
character and, for example, interpret a statement as a sarcastic utterance. However, it 
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turned out that performance of the RHD individuals did not differ from the 
performances of a group of LHD individuals or healthy controls.  
It has been hypothesised, for example, Borod, Bloom, Brickman, Nakhutina, and 
Curko (2002), that the right hemisphere organises its lexicon according to contextual 
and affective principles. In a retrospective analysis of literature on emotional 
processing deficits, Borod et al. (2002) find support for the hypothesis that the right 
hemisphere plays an important role in the processing of emotion. One reason for this 
is that emotional processing, at the behavioural level, is thought to be dependent on 
non-verbal aspects of communication, ability to synthesise information, holistic 
processing strategies and visuospatial organisation. These are strategies and functions 
that the right hemisphere is considered to be well suited for. Although some studies 
put forward a left hemisphere involvement, Borod et al. (2002) conclude that the 
majority of studies showed selective deficits in individuals with RHD relative to 
individuals with LHD or non-brain-damaged controls. This pattern is, according to 
Borod et al. (2002), consistent in studies of perception and expression of emotion in 
terms of lexical items, prosody and facial expressions.  
The impairment of the ability to process emotion in facial expressions and 
prosody in RHD individuals is well confirmed, (Borod et al., 2002; Brownell and 
Martino, 1998). This impairment may of course, affect an individual’s ability to 
interact in conversation. However, there is also evidence, for example, from a study 
by Brownell, Carroll, Rehak, and Wingfield (1992), that RHD individuals might have 
an impaired ability to identify affective information in linguistic descriptions of the 
emotional state of a character, such in a narrative. According to Brownell and 
Martino (1998), RHD individuals show less than normal use of affective information 
to generate inferences in short narratives. Cicero et al. (1999) also found that RHD 
individuals had problems in identifying emotional content in words and sentences.  
In studies by Bloom, Borod, Obler, and Gerstman (1992, 1993) using picture 
story tasks, RHD individuals showed a selective deficit in using emotional content in 
their discourse production.  
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Several of the participants in the studies presented in this thesis have brain 
damage involving subcortical structures (see section 2.2.1). Individuals with LHD or 
RHD involving subcortical structures might, according to Karow, Marquardt, and 
Marshall (2001), be especially vulnerable when it comes to processing affective 
stimuli in the form of facial expressions, prosody and words. In the Karow et al. 
(2001) study, the subcortical lesions involved were lesions to the basal ganglia. The 
notion that subcortical structures play a role in language processing is not entirely 
new and was discussed by for example Crosson (1999), Nadeau and Crosson (1997) 
and Crosson and Nadeau (1998). The role of basal ganglia in the processing of 
prosody is well confirmed; see Myers (1999b) for an overview. However, the Karow 
et al. (2001) study also included stimuli consisting of affective facial expressions as 
well as verbal linguistic material. The groups of brain-damaged participants with 
lesions including the basal ganglia in general had more trouble with the tasks than the 
control group and the groups with brain damage restricted to cortical areas of either 
hemisphere. Importantly, though, none of the participants in the study had lesions 
restricted to subcortical areas and the authors suggest that the connection between 
cortical and subcortical structures may be important in processing messages that are 
affectively coded. 
According to Crosson and Nadeau (1998), the language processing problems 
seen in association with damage to the basal ganglia are likely to be related to either 
the involvement of white matter pathways surrounding the basal ganglia or a 
dysfunction in other non-linguistic cognitive systems. However, as always, these 
conclusions are partly dependent on the view of language in relationship to other 
cognitive functions, as well as on methods used to investigate any presumed language 
disturbance. Still, according to Crosson and Nadeau (1998), numerous studies have 
demonstrated aphasia after left-hemispheric thalamic lesions. One common symptom 
of aphasia after thalamic lesions is word-finding problems with semantic paraphasias 
and, according to Crosson and Nadeau (1998) the thalamus may play a significant 
role in semantic processing, perhaps in the translation and selection between a 
specific lexical output and the stored semantic information. However, research on the 
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role of subcortical structures, as well as the cerebellum, in language and 
communication is evolving and will surely provide new insights and better 
understanding of different aspects of pragmatics in association with different types of 
brain damage.  
 
1.2.2.5 Social inference and theory of mind 
 
Understanding or being able to make predictions about the behaviour or intentions of 
others requires social inferences, as discussed by Brownell and Martino (1998) and 
Martin and McDonald (2003). The ability to form representations of other people’s 
mental states in judging utterances and understanding of their behaviour might be 
referred to as theory of mind (ToM) and is thought to be an essential component of 
social inference. This ability is essential to an individual’s ability to engage in 
functional communication. Traditionally ‘false belief tasks’ have been used to assess 
ToM in normally developing children and adults diagnosed with autism. The ability 
to infer the mental states of others has also been studied in individuals with RHD, for 
example by Winner, Brownell, Happé, Blum, and Pincus (1998). In that study some 
RHD individuals were found to have difficulties in processing another person’s belief 
about the world (first-order belief); they were even more likely to have difficulties in 
apprehending another person’s belief about a third party’s knowledge (second-order 
belief). 
According to Brownell, Pincus, Blum, Rehak, and Winner (1997) and Brownell 
and Martino (1998), RHD individuals’ problems in the use of personal reference can 
be interpreted as problems using ToM as guidance on how to refer in a certain social 
context. To refer appropriately to another person requires consideration of the status 
and knowledge of both the person referred to and the listener. RHD individuals’ 
deficits in the ability to draw more complex mental inferences from short stories have 
also been described by Happé et al. (1999) as a specific impairment related to ToM.  
Siegal, Carrington, and Radel (1996) did in a study using traditional ToM tasks 
with short vignettes where the subjects are required to represent the false belief of a 
character and predict the actions of that character accordingly. A typical vignette 
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might be worded as follow: Sam thinks his puppy is in the garage, but his puppy 
instead really is in the kitchen. Where will Sam look for his puppy? Based on the 
results of this study, Siegal et al. (1996) hypothesised that at least some of the errors 
produced by the RHD individuals in the false belief tasks might be the effect of a 
misinterpretation of the questioner’s intentions. When the question was worded 
Where will Sam look first for his puppy? several of the participants managed to 
respond correctly.  
In association with this proposal, it is worth mentioning that Joanette, Boeglin, 
Goulet, and Hannequin (1990) also discuss the significance of general motivation 
among RHD individuals participating in research studies. The subjects’ interpretation 
or apprehension of the meaning of the tasks they are supposed to carry out is 
important for the outcome.  
In a study by Surian and Siegel (2001), subjects were given a test of their ability 
to assess pragmatic violations in utterances. In addition, traditional ToM vignettes 
included in the study were adapted and completed with visual cues to enhance 
visuospatial memory and facilitate the encoding of the relevant information. That is, 
instead of using the traditional names of the potential locations of actions, e.g. the 
garage or the kitchen, these locations were named the blue room and the white room. 
While saying the test sentences, the test leader demonstrated the verbal information 
visually by pointing to a blue and a white piece of cardboard and also by putting a 
picture of a dog under the cardboard that was the same colour as the appropriate 
location. In these conditions, the RHD individuals performed well on the ToM tasks, 
supported by the visual aids. The results indicate, according to the authors, that an 
important source of RHD subject’s errors in traditional ToM tasks evaluating first-
order belief might involve difficulties in interpreting the stimuli owing to 
impairments of visuo-spatial buffers in working memory. The results on the task 
evaluating of communicative adequacy that was also administered nevertheless 
showed reduced sensitivity to pragmatic violations, although the reduction in 
sensitivity was not dramatic. The authors conclude that RHD individuals’ failures in 
communicative situations may be more related to deficits in attentional and working 
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memory mechanisms than to a specific loss of knowledge of pragmatic constraints or 
mental representational deficit. 
There are several different hypotheses concerning which cognitive structures are 
involved in ToM. Plaut and Karmiloff-Smith (1993) consider that language provides 
a structure that is essential for reasoning about mental states. Shallice (2001) and 
Stuss, Gallup, and Alexander (2001), emphasise the involvement of bilateral frontal 
lobe structures in the solving of ToM tasks. The frontal lobes are associated with 
executive function, which can be defined as the mental operations, including 
planning, flexibility and attention, that guide an individual’s behaviour. On the other 
hand, Happé et al. (1999) stressed the potential role of the right hemisphere as a 
whole. 
Executive function in RHD individuals has been examined by, for example, 
McDonald (2000) without finding any correlations with pragmatic performance. 
However, in a study presented by Champagne, Desautels, and Joanette (2003), two 
individuals with pragmatic deficits, in addition to having problems with tasks 
evaluating the ability to form a ToM, were also impaired in tasks evaluating 
executive functions, especially flexibility. 
In a review of findings from imaging and lesion studies, Siegal and Varley 
(2002) conclude that ToM reasoning is not dependent on language, at least not when 
language is defined as the possession of grammar. Nor can it be reduced to executive 
function. However, according to Siegal and Varley (2002), there is converging 
evidence that the amygdala system and its interconnections with prefrontal and 
temporal lobe structures may provide the basis for a variety of socio-cognitive 
behaviours and that this system is at the core of the capacity to interpret other 
people’s mental states. The integrity of the amygdala system’s circuitry is, according 
to Siegal and Varley (2002) a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for ToM. 
For the development of ToM in children and the performance of a particular ToM 
task by adults, the amygdala system is supported by a widely distributed neural 
system. For example, language functions, executive function and specific visuospatial 
functions should be viewed as functional, co-operative components in a compound 
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system for the computation of mental states. In this view, a ToM impairment in brain-
damaged adults may be the result of deficits in the amygdala core system or the 
failure of one or more parts of the compound system that is necessary for 
performance on a particular task. 
Another theoretical perspective, presented by Adolphs (1999), views the ability 
to make social inferences, or to recognise and reason about other people’s state of 
mind, as an example of experience projection, through simulation or empathy. To 
imagine what it would be like to be another person via simulation is a way to obtain 
information about that person’s internal state. According to Adolphs (1999), the ToM 
theory might be best suited to explain the processing of information that is lexically 
encoded. The notion of simulation might be an alternative when the stimulus is 
idiosyncratic or when it is not easily encoded in language. In those cases, an 
individual might, by imagining what it would be like to be the other person, run the 
cognitive processes that the other person is running in his or her own brain. Adolphs 
(1999) refers to infants’ ability to mimic facial expressions and to the findings 
regarding ‘mirror neurons’, which appear to participate in simulating the actions of 
other individuals, to support his theory of social cognition. He describes three 
structures that are supposed to play a key role in guiding social behaviour: the right 
and left amygdala and ventromedial frontal cortex and the right somatosensory-
related cortex and the insula. These structures are thought to operate in parallel: the 
amygdala provides a first automatic contribution to the evaluation of a potentially 
threatening situation and/or the allocation of processing resources to stimuli that 
might be important but are ambiguous. The ventromedial frontal cortex associates the 
perceived situation with the person’s previous experience of elements in the situation 
and triggers the corresponding emotional state. The right somatosensory-related 
cortex is necessary to provide a comprehensive representation of the body state 
associated with the emotional or social behaviour that needs to be made available in 
this process. The notion of the importance of the right somatosensory-related cortex 
is further discussed in the work of Adolphs and Damasio (2000) and Damasio (2003). 
 30 
Although Adolphs (1999) and Siegal and Varley (2002) diverge in their 
description of the processes involved in social inference, at least they seem to broadly 
agree on the anatomical base for the process. 
 
* 
Although the primary concern in the theories described up to now is comprehension 
in RHD individuals, those theories might also be extended to explain deficits in the 
production of discourse. The theories concerning the cause of the pragmatic 
dysfunction described here focus on either of two different main issues. The first 
group comprises theories that try to explain general deficits in comprehension in 
RHD individuals by postulating a general deficit in coherence, or a general 
dysfunction in more complex inference processes. This group includes coarse 
semantic coding theory (Beeman, 1993, 1998; Beeman et al., 2000), and the 
suppression deficit hypothesis presented by Tompkins et al. (1999). The other group 
might be described as primarily occupied with the emotional or attitudinal problems 
described in RHD individuals’ communication: the right hemisphere hypothesis 
(Borod, 2000; Borod et al., 2002) and theories of social inference, such as ToM. 
Happé et al. (1999) and Siegal et al. (1996) belong in this group. Adolphs’ (1999) 
theory of social cognition has not yet been used as the theoretical background for an 
analysis of pragmatic communication problems in association with RHD.  
In the studies presented here brain-damaged individuals’ ability to produce 
adequate inferences from implicitly stated information in discourse is investigated. 
The experimental tasks require either more complex inference processes, such as the 
revision of an earlier inference, or inference of a character’s attitude or motive. The 
stimuli and method used in these studies are elaborations and adaptations of methods 
used and discussed, primarily by Tompkins and colleagues (Tompkins et al., 1994 
and 1999; Tompkins and Baumgaertner, 1998). For example the narratives used in 
the present studies have been extended to make higher demands on cognitive 
processes involved. The stimuli used are also controlled with reference to the type of 
inference process required. Kintsch’s (1998) definition of the concept of inference 
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was used as guidance in constructing the stimuli used in the discourse comprehension 
tasks and his construction-integration model is used to apprehend the cognitive 
processes involved in the processes of comprehension. 
Although the results of studies 1 and 2 will be discussed in relation to the current 
theories of pragmatic deficits described here, the main purpose of these studies is not 
to verify any of those theories. Instead, the intention is to investigate associations 
between the ability to infer from complex discourse and cognitive measures such as 
verbal working memory and sustained attention. Those basic cognitive functions 
might be essential in when it comes to the pragmatic aspects of language and might 
also play a crucial role in the mechanisms involved in the various theories presented 
above. 
 
1.2.3 Verbal working memory  
 
In this section, current views of the concept of working memory will be described, 
and in particular Kintsch’s notion of long-term working memory. The problem of 
how to measure the capacity of verbal working memory will also be introduced. 
 
1.2.3.1 The concept of working memory 
 
Working memory is a theoretical construct which, according to Shah and Miyake 
(1999), refers to the mechanisms or processes underlying the maintenance of task-
relevant information during the performance of a cognitive task. It might be viewed 
as a separate concept from short-term memory (STM), which has been described as a 
more passive storage mechanism, but this distinction is not always made.  
In studies of aphasia, Baddeley’s (1986, 1992a, 1992b) model of working 
memory has been widely applied. In Baddeley’s view, the concept of working 
memory refers to a system with a limited capacity which is used for the temporary 
storage and manipulation of information. He describes working memory as a 
compound system which in Baddeley’s classical model of working memory can be 
divided into three component parts: a central executive, which functions as an 
 32 
attentional controller, and two sub-components referred to as the visuospatial sketch 
pad, which processes visual stimuli, and the phonological loop. 
The phonological loop is involved in storing and rehearsing verbal speech-based 
stimuli and this component of working memory has made it particularly interesting 
for research on aphasia. As suggested by, for example, Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 
(2002), a left hemisphere network consisting of the lateral frontal and inferior parietal 
lobes is thought to subserve the phonological loop. Deficits in working memory for 
auditory verbal stimuli might, according to Caspari, Parkinson, Lapointe, and Katz 
(1998), be involved in some symptoms of language deficits following left hemisphere 
brain damage. 
Although there are many different models of working memory with different 
perspectives, there seems to be an emerging general consensus regarding the 
fundamental nature of working memory. Miyake and Shah (1999) recognise six 
common themes that cut across ten well-established models of working memory, 
where there appears to be some agreement about the nature of working memory. One 
theme is the view that working memory or short-term memory is not a certain ‘place’, 
or a structurally separate ‘box’ in the mind or in the brain. Rather, various areas, 
including the prefrontal cortex, work together to produce working memory 
phenomena. There is also agreement that working memory is not only relevant to 
memory, but also to the regulation and control of cognitive action. Executive control 
or some kind of controlled attention is considered as an essential part of working 
memory. Another point of agreement seems to be that the capacity limitations of 
working memory reflect multiple factors instead of one single mechanism. On the 
other hand, there are still disagreements about what those capacity-limiting factors 
are, e.g. interference, limits in speed of processing, lack of long-term knowledge, or 
skills or information decay; some theories emphasise one factor above the others. 
One other point of agreement is that working memory is not a completely unitary and 
domain-general mechanism. That is, processes involved in working memory are at 
least partly dependent on domain-specific factors, like properties of the stimuli 
processed. Finally, there is also agreement that long-term memory knowledge and 
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skills play an important part in working memory performance. Even Baddeley (2000) 
has now complemented his classical working memory model with a complementary 
episodic buffer.  
Engel, Kane, and Tuholski (1999) define working memory as STM, consisting 
of long-term memory units activated above threshold, plus controlled attention. In 
their view, the capacity of working memory is constrained by the individual’s 
capacity for controlled sustained attention, required for maintaining temporary goals 
in the face of distractions and interference. Even though Engel et al. (1999) also 
consider some aspects of LTM in the working memory process, they focus on the 
attention mechanisms in working memory. Kintsch and colleagues, on the other hand, 
focus on the LTM mechanisms and retrieval structures in their model of working 
memory.  
 
1.2.3.2 Long-term working memory 
 
Ericsson and Kintsch (1995; see also Ericsson and Delaney, 1999) consider 
Baddeley’s (1986) classical definition of working memory as the temporary storage 
of activated information, to be insufficient to account for the role of working memory 
in cognitive processes. Kintsch (1998) argues in favour of a role for what is referred 
to as long-term working memory (LT-WM) in language comprehension.4 Kintsch 
argues that although the capacity of working memory is limited it can be elaborated 
since nodes in a knowledge network in LTM are connected with links in working 
memory. Through such retrieval structures, information in LTM is quickly activated 
and becomes part of the processes involving working memory.  
Kintsch (1998) defines LTM as consisting of semantic, episodic and procedural 
memory. Everything a person knows and remembers is stored in LTM. Based on 
research on expert performance in, for example, chess and mental calculation, 
Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) infer that working memory processes involve an LTM 
component. This LTM component is not viewed as an expanded temporary storage in 
                                                 
4 Kintsch’s concept of long-term working memory was mentioned in sections 1.2.1.1 and 1.2.1.2 
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short-term memory. Instead, they argue, parts of LTM can be used as working 
memory.  
LT-WM is considered as the part of LTM that at a given time is linked to 
activated items in STM by certain retrieval structures. The activated items in the 
capacity-limited STM serve as cues for the retrieval of that information in LT-WM. 
The information available in working memory consists of items already in STM and 
items reachable in LTM.  
To be able to build retrieval cues and use LT-WM, the individual must have 
certain knowledge and encoding skills in the suitable specific domain. Skills required 
for building retrieval structures in comprehension do not have to be acquired 
specifically, contrary to the encoding strategies necessary in specific domains like, 
for example, in playing chess. Kintsch (1998) considers stories about human goals 
and actions to be domains where most people have good knowledge. In this view, 
comprehension constitutes structure building and thus entails generating a coherent 
mental structure that represents the meaning and message of the text. This mental 
representation serves as a retrieval structure and generates LT-WM. The text 
representations are built from the explicit information in discourse paired with the 
contribution made by the comprehender’s LTM. To construct a coherent mental 
representation during comprehension, certain knowledge of language and general 
world knowledge must be available in the process.  
In the process of understanding discourse, an LT-WM is created as a result of a 
construction-integration cycle, letting a new proposition enter into the STM. The new 
proposition is linked to other propositions that are already in working memory, 
through different types of relationships. They may be associated through the sharing 
of an argument or because of temporal or causal associations. In this way, the new 
proposition is associated with previously processed elements in working memory 
which in turn are already linked to items in LTM. By association through this 
network, the new proposition can now retrieve propositions, or activate idea units, 
that have been generated earlier in the process, and that now remain as parts of a 
network stored in LTM.  
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1.2.3.3 The Hemispheric Encoding Retrieval Asymmetry model 
 
Kintsch’s (1998) model of comprehension places great demands on the ability to 
retrieve information stored in LTM.  LTM includes episodic memory and a model of 
encoding and retrieval processes in the brain, first presented by Tulving, Kapur, 
Craik, Moscivitch, and Houle (1994), emphasises the role of the right hemisphere in 
the process of retrieval.  
According to the Hemispheric Encoding Retrieval Asymmetry model (HERA), 
as presented in Habib, Nyberg, and Tulving (2003), the right pre-frontal cortex is 
biased for the retrieval of verbal and non-verbal materials from episodic memory5. 
Lepage, Ghaffar, Nyberg, and Tulving (2000) accounted for this right lateralisation of 
episodic retrieval in terms of ‘retrieval mode’. Retrieval mode is conceptualised as a 
basic and necessary condition for remembering past experiences. Lepage et al. (2000) 
conducted a multi-study analysis of data from PET studies, and found active areas 
correlating with maintenance of episodic memory retrieval in both the right and left 
hemispheres. However, there was an asymmetry that, according to the authors, 
supports the role of the right hemisphere in the retrieval of episodic memory. On the 
other hand, it has been proposed that many of the activations seen in neuro-imaging 
and attributed to specific cognitive processes, such as retrieval, might actually reflect 
general cognitive operations, such as attention (Cabeza, 2003).  
 
1.2.3.4 Measuring verbal working memory capacity in studies of inference 
 
How to measure and assess working memory capacities depends on the model of 
working memory chosen. Working memory mechanisms may be considered as more 
or less domain-specific. That is, different activities imply specific demands on the 
processes involved in working memory. According to Miyake and Shah (1999), there 
seems to be general consensus on this point in current working memory models. 
                                                 
5 The HERA model was first introduced by Tulving, Kapur, Craik, Moscovitch and Houle (1994), 
and Nyberg, Cabeza and Tulving (1996) but has been slightly modified since then. The version of 
HERA referred to in this context follows the model presented in Habib et al. (2003). 
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Although Engel et al. (1999) actually do highlight a unitary nature of working 
memory, their unitary view is restricted to the attention-related component of 
working memory mechanisms. 
Tompkins et al. (1994) examined the association between ability to revise 
inferences and verbal working memory (VWM) in RHD individuals, LHD 
individuals and normal aging adults. The only association between discourse 
comprehension and VWM was found in the RHD group on questions requiring 
elaborative inference. VWM capacity was assessed using a modified version of the 
Daneman and Carpenter (1980) reading span task. Lehman and Tompkins (1998) 
evaluated the reliability and construct validity of this VWM test. The test-retest 
results indicate that the VWM measure is fairly stable over time for both non-brain-
damaged individuals and RHD individuals. Based on their results, the authors also 
suggest that, with non-brain-damaged participants, the task can differentiate working 
memory from simple STM when compared with the results from, for example, the 
forward digit recall as described by Wechsler (1987). However, there was a moderate 
relationship between the STM task and the VWM task, which the authors relate to the 
simplicity of the stimuli in the current VWM task. 
The VWM task revised by Tompkins et al. (1994) was also used in a study by 
Harris Wright and Newhoff (2001), where ability to revise inference was examined in 
healthy young individuals. In that study, no relationship was found between 
responses in the inference tasks and VWM measure. The authors propose that the 
task used was not cognitively demanding enough to tax the VWM capacities of the 
young healthy participants. 
 
* 
The studies presented in this thesis investigate the comprehension of more complex 
discourse and interaction in conversation. It is, for example, expected that in 
conversational interaction in discourse, a lack of activation of relevant associations 
with information stored in LTM may result in insufficient retrieval structures causing 
constraints in the LT-WM. The comprehension processes investigated are expected to 
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make high demands on VWM processing in a way that is best described by the notion 
of working memory presented by Kintsch (1998) and Ericsson and Delaney (1999) 
although  Engel et al.’s (1999) view of the importance of attentional mechanisms in 
working memory is acknowledged.  
However, in accepting this notion of working memory, one also acknowledges 
the difficulty of trying to obtain general measures of working memory capacities in 
isolation from other cognitive abilities. Furthermore, evidence from the use of 
neuropsychological models and tests and functional imaging of the human brain and 
single-unit physiology in monkeys has, as described by Duncan (2001) and Kiefer, 
Ahlegian, and Spitzer (2005), contributed to the mapping of cognitive functions and 
an examination of the nature of frontal lobe specialisations. In the adaptive coding 
mode, presented in Duncan (2001), working memory, selective attention and 
executive control are simply three different perspectives on the same underlying 
processing function. Kiefer et al. (2005) conclude that working memory, executive 
control and focusing on semantic retrieval share a common neural substrate and are 
functionally linked. 
Nevertheless, it is presumed that measures of different components of working 
memory can be obtained. In the present studies an adapted version of the Tompkins et 
al. (1994) VWM task is used. This task is, however, considered to tax primarily the 
limited capacity of the STM component of working memory although LTM 
activation is required too. As it is at least partly dependent on the ability to rehears 
and temporarily store verbal stimuli, it is assumed to primarily reveal LHD 
individuals’ VWM deficits.  
The inference tasks used in studies 1 and 2 have been elaborated to induce 
demands on the working memory capacities of the participants. In Kintsch’s (1998) 
model of comprehension, the ability to retrieve stored information is important in the 
process of comprehension. The HERA model (Habib et al., 2003) emphasises the 
importance of the right hemisphere in the retrieval of episodic memories which might 
be especially important in the comprehension of some aspects of the narratives used 
to investigate the ability to make inferences in study 1.  
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1.2.4 Sustained attention 
 
This section brief presents the human attention system and theories of the function 
and anatomical base for the construct of sustained attention and how to measure it. 
The concept of neglect syndrome is also briefly described, considered as a symptom 
of an attentional deficit. 
 
1.2.4.1 Networks in the human attention system 
 
Several models of the human attention system exist. Although these models 
subdivide and label different aspects of attention slightly differently, there is a 
consensus that the human attentional system is made up of several separate neural 
networks with discrete anatomical bases. Following the model presented by Posner 
and Petersen (1990; see also Sturm, 1996; Fernandez-Duque and Posner, 2001), the 
human attention system can be subdivided into three main systems. In this model, the 
ability to achieve and maintain an alert state functions through a fronto-parietal 
system mainly in the right hemisphere. The ability to select which sensory 
information to attend to depends on the right hemisphere’s orienting system. The 
attention systems of intensity in alertness and orienting or selectivity are 
complemented by an executive attention system in charge of effortful control or co-
ordination of cognitive activities.  
According to the model described by Sturm (1996), alertness should be 
subdivided into phasic and tonic alertness. Tonic alertness is the stable basic level of 
activation which only changes slowly and involuntarily. Phasic alertness, on the other 
hand, is the enhanced level of activation that is reached in readiness to respond to 
expected stimuli. Sustained attention or vigilance is the ability to maintain a higher 
level of alertness to detect and respond to sources of information over time. The 
intensity system in alertness can be subdivided into a voluntary, top-down-driven 
system, that is dependent on structures in the precentral gyrus of the frontal lobe and 
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an automatic, bottom-up-driven system that is dependent on parietal lobe structures 
(Fernandez-Duque and Posner, 2001). 
The orienting system for selectivity, as described by Sturm (1996), involves the 
ability to focus on certain features of a task and voluntarily suppress responses to 
irrelevant features. Another aspect of this system is the ability to disengage and shift 
the focus from one aspect to another of the stimuli. A third aspect of the orienting 
system for selectivity is the ability to share or divide the attentional resources between 
two different sources of information. 
In the model as presented by Fernandez-Duque and Posner (2001), the executive 
attention system is anatomically based on distributed structures, such as the anterior 
cinguli and supplementary motor area, orbitofrontal cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex, portions of basal ganglia and the thalamus. The executive system is necessary 
for the allocation of attentional resources. It is essential for planning and non-
automatic processing of stimuli, the ability to switch between different tasks, 
inhibitory control, conflict resolution, and error detection.  
The executive attention system is thought to be regulated by the dopaminergic 
transmitter system and alertness by the noradrenergic system while the orienting 
system is dependent on the cholinergic transmitter system, all of which are ascending 
activation systems arising in the brain stem.  
Still, there are other models of the human attention system and there are no 
clear-cut boundaries between the different aspects of attention. For example, in the 
model presented by Fernandez-Duque and Posner (2001), vigilance and executive 
function interact as a supervisory attentional control that regulates the capacity for 
endogenous modulation of alertness. An inability to maintain an alert state leads to an 
increase in inhibitory failures, which is often considered as a measure of executive 
control (Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, and Yiend, 1997a; Engel, Kane, and 
Tuholski, 1999; Fernandez-Duque and Posner, 2001). It also seems that deficits of the 
executive network can interact with parietal areas and, even in the absence of 
posterior parietal lesions, produce abnormalities in orienting behaviour. Furthermore, 
since alertness may be increased by signals generated internally by the frontal lobes 
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or automatically by external stimuli; in either case, the posterior orienting system is 
also involved.  
Another example of the complexity of the human attention system is Sarter, 
Givens, and Bruno’s (2001) notion that the limbic system and cortical afferent 
projections of basal forebrain neurons provide information about the significance of 
stimuli based on previous experience, motivation and behavioural context. This also 
influences several aspects of the attention system. 
 
1.2.4.2 Sustained attention – the ability to stay alert 
 
The psychological construct of sustained attention, or vigilance, is considered to be a 
basic attentional function that is motivated by stimulus anticipation and important for 
the efficacy of cognitive capacity in general (Sarter et al., 2001). Sustained attention 
or vigilance might be conceptualised as the state of intensified attention or alertness 
necessary for processing intermittent and sometimes infrequent stimuli and the 
maintenance of such alertness over time. In the model described by Sturm (1996), 
vigilance is a special condition of sustained attention where the occurrences of 
relevant stimuli are very rare and unpredictable. Reduced metabolic activity in 
subjects performing vigilance tasks has, as shown by Posner and Petersen (1990) and 
Posner and Raichle (1994), been interpreted as a sign that the individual is 
suspending activity while waiting for low-probability signals to avoid internal 
interference with the detection of the external signal.  
Sarter et al. (2001) also state that human imaging studies have demonstrated that 
sustained attention is associated with activation of the anterior cingulate in medial 
frontal, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortical regions as well as parietal cortical areas, 
primarily but not exclusively in the right hemisphere. However, as the definition of 
sustained attention in relation to other components of the human attention system 
varies, other researchers have claimed that more restricted areas are involved. For 
example, Mirsky, Pascualvaca, Duncan, and French (1999), state that sustaining 
attention is the responsibility of rostral midbrain structures, including the reticular 
formation and midline and reticular thalamic nuclei. Those structures are otherwise 
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often referred to as subserving the arousal component of human attention. Sarter et al. 
(2001) claim that the anterior cingulate in the medial frontal part of the brain is 
associated with a network that subserves sustained attention. Still, this structure is 
more often associated with selectivity and executive attention (Fernandez-Duque and 
Posner, 2001). 
Sarter et al. (2001), claim that the following variables, among several others, tax 
sustained attention performance:  
 
1. Successive, as opposed to simultaneous, presentation of signal and non-signal 
features, 
2. High event rate combined with unpredictability of signal versus non-signal,  
3. Demands on working memory, as occurring in tasks with successive event 
presentation, 
4. Presentation of signals with conditioned or symbolic significance which require 
additional processing to produce an accurate response. Such signals are 
considered to increase the allocation of resources consumed. 
 
A high event rate and spatial uncertainty about the locus of event presentation affect 
the decrease in vigilance. So does the presentation of dynamic, as opposed to static, 
stimuli such as signals with variable salience or duration. This is, according to Sarter 
et al. (2001), partly because the presentation of dynamic stimuli is associated with 
decreased discriminability.  
When it comes to the studies presented in this thesis, these variables have to be 
considered in the processing of discourse. Especially in a conversation, there is a high 
event rate of unpredictable occurrences of relevant versus irrelevant stimuli in the 
form of auditory and visual signals. The frequent occurrence of visual stimuli in the 
form of facial expressions, body posture, gestures and gaze involve a spatial 
uncertainty about the locus of relevant event presentation. The signals are of 
symbolic significance and demands on working memory as well as on the 
simultaneous activation of semantic and episodic memory units are high, as the 
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speakers attempt to interact based on linguistic and social knowledge as well as 
general world knowledge. The signals are also of variable salience and duration as 
information might be presented in the subtle form of a choice of words with certain 
associations, a raised eyebrow or a slight modification of tone of voice. The stimuli in 
conversational interaction can actually be expected to make higher demands on 
sustained attention than an experimental sustained attention task. According to Sarter 
et al. (2001) subjects performing a sustained attention task are aware of what type of 
signal to expect and how to respond in accordance with acquired response rules. 
Expectations concerning the probability of signals and strategies for responding to 
relevant stimuli versus false alarms are developed.  
As stated by, for example, Posner and Petersen (1990), right-hemisphere lesions 
are often associated with impaired performance on vigilance tasks. Because of the 
possible impact of deficits in vigilance or sustained attention on the individuals’ 
ability to comprehend and stay focused and interact in conversation, it is 
hypothesised here that a measure of sustained attention correlates with RHD 
individuals’ performance on tasks that require adequate inferences from complex 
narratives. It is also expected that ability to sustain attention has an impact on the 
performance of individuals in conversational interactions. 
 
1.2.4.3 How to measure sustained attention 
 
As there are no clear-cut boundaries between different aspects of attention, it is 
impossible to construct a task that measures a single component of the human 
attention system in isolation from other components. Nevertheless, both researchers 
and clinicians do try to obtain measures of different aspects of attention with more or 
less established methods. One common way of measuring sustained attention is in 
tasks where the subjects have to stay alert for a long time to detect unpredictably 
occurring signals or changes in pattern and, for example, press a button when a target 
symbol or a change is presented. In study 2 of this thesis the Sustained Attention to 
Response Test is used (SART; Robertson et al., 1997a). According to Robertson et al. 
(1997a), ceiling effects are often seen in sustained attention tasks due to the 
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automatisation of the tasks. In the SART, this is prevented because the automatic 
response set is transferred to the non-targets. This enhances the need for controlled 
processing to avoid producing an erroneous response. Since this task taxes sustained 
attention more heavily, it can obtain a measure of the ability to maintain sustained 
attention in as short a time as approximately four minutes, according to the authors. 
Robertson et al. (1997a) and Manly, Robertson, Galloway, and Hawkins (1999) 
have shown of the SART to predict of everyday attentional failures and action slips in 
patients with traumatic brain injuries (TBI) and controls without brain injury and to 
discriminate between a group of TBI patients and normal controls. The validity and 
reliability of the test have been investigated. Robertson et al. (1997a) analysed the 
relationship between the SART and other tests of sustained attention as well as tests 
of other attentional processes. In particular, they analysed the SART in relation to 
tests where response inhibition is important, such as the Stroop task (Trenerry, 
Crosson, DeBoe, and Leber, 1989), and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Nelson, 
1976). They also compared the SART with the Visual Elevator subtest of the Test of 
Everyday Attention (Robertson, Ward, Ridgeway, and Nimmo-Smith, 1994). On the 
basis of those comparisons, they argue that the SART is sensitive to sustained 
attention and not simply to impaired ability to inhibit a response. The SART results 
were also shown to be stable over time. The potential effects of age, gender and 
education were investigated by Chan (2001) and found to be minimal.  
  
1.2.4.4 Unilateral neglect and attention 
 
Unilateral neglect is a common symptom in the acute stages of brain damage to the 
right hemisphere (Heilman, Watson and Valenstein, 1985; Mesulam, 1985). The term 
refers to a patient’s problems detecting stimuli on the side opposite the site of the 
lesion. These problems can be observed in the neglect of external space or features on 
one side of an object. In severe cases, the patient may be entirely unaware of stimuli 
on the neglected side including his or her own body. The phenomenon may involve 
visual as well as auditory and somatosensory modalities. Although it does occur after 
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LHD, it is usually more persistent and severe in association with temporo-parietal 
RHD.  
Fernandez-Duque and Posner (2001) described the phenomenon of neglect as an 
abnormality of orientation since the subject has difficulty disengaging from cues 
presented on the same side as the lesion in order to respond to stimuli presented on 
the opposite side.  
Lesions in the parietal lobe can influence both the orienting system and the 
alertness system. Dysfunctions in both of these systems might contribute to neglect 
syndrome. Robertson et al. (1997b) showed that there is a strong association between 
performance on various tests of spatial neglect and vigilance performance, as 
measured with an auditorily presented sustained attention task. The results of the 
study of 44 RHD individuals with lesions involving right temporo-parietal regions are 
considered to be evidence of a close link between the presence of visual neglect and 
impaired sustained attention.  
 
* 
In the studies presented here, both ability to sustain attention and VWM are 
considered to be important in comprehension. Basic attentional function is important 
for the efficacy of cognitive capacity in general. Furthermore, it is believed that 
access to and retrieval of episodic memories in the form of stored information about 
personal experience might be important to form an adequate and complete situation 
model as a component of episodic text memory. This may be especially important in 
the processing of information concerning characters’ attitudes and motives, or 
emotionally tinged situations. In study 1, two gross neglect tests are included to 
apprehend symptoms of neglect which could indicate the presence of a spatial 
attentional disorder and also to control for any interference by neglect with the other 
tasks in the study. 
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1.2.5 Pragmatics in discourse  
 
In this section, research on the pragmatic aspects of discourse production and 
conversational interaction between individuals will be presented, along with 
methodological issues. 
The communication disorders described in association with RHD are often 
conceptualised as pragmatic disorders. In addition to problems understanding humour 
and metaphors and making adequate inferences in isolated experimental tasks, 
problems with the production of language such as structuring of discourse and 
conversational interaction, have been described; see Tompkins (1995) and Myers 
(1999b) for an overview.  
Discourse must be coherent to be comprehensible. The listener or reader must be 
able to identify meaningful relationships between the different units expressed in the 
discourse. One way of analysing discourse coherence is the principle of given 
information - new information (Clark and Haviland, 1977). The listener has to make 
out what the given and new information is, identify a referent for the given 
information and then be able to link the new information to that referent. Pragmatic 
competence, as defined by Penn (1999), aids the listener in doing that (see section 
1.1). The speaker uses pragmatic competence to structure and alter the information in 
a way that makes it suitable to what he or she believes about the listener’s knowledge 
of the topic and also to the content of the previous discourse.  
In a review of research on comprehension in discourse, Zwaan and Singer 
(2003) describe the identification of given information. In understanding discourse, 
the listener establishes that the given idea and its referent both refer to the same entity 
in the world. Such co-reference can be signalled by different linguistic devices and 
semantic relations. Definite noun phrases can function as anaphors, which means that 
they refer back to something previously mentioned or at least denoted in the 
discourse. Pronouns may signify their referents ambiguously or unambiguously. A 
pronoun that unambiguously signifies a specific referent is understood more quickly 
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(Frederiksen, 1981). The distance between the pronoun and its referent also 
influences pronoun resolution (McKoon and Ratcliff, 1980). Semantic factors interact 
with surface factors in pronoun resolution (Caramazza, Grober, Garvey and Yates, 
1977). Consider the sentences The bird had noticed the cat. It suddenly flew away 
over the trees. The implicit causality of the verb guides pronoun resolution: general 
knowledge includes the fact that birds can fly, but cats cannot.  
According to Schober and Brennan (2003), one important finding in spoken 
language production studies is that speakers try to produce descriptions or 
expressions for referring that appear to be tailored to the particular person they are 
speaking to. The form and content of the utterances may be based on the speakers’ 
beliefs about the knowledge of the conversational partner or on judgements of his or 
her need for explicit information in the current context (Lockridge and Brennan, 
2002). According to Schober (1998), adaptation to the conversational partner’s 
prerequisites for interpretation relies to a great deal on memory and inference. The 
speaker may make word choices, alter articulatory and prosodic features, adjust 
syntactic structure and select topics based on his or her beliefs about the 
conversational partner or about their common knowledge.  
As described by Schober and Brennan (2003), language processing proceeds in 
parallel automatic and controlled processes. The updating and assessment of the 
conversational partner’s needs for information are controlled and require time and 
effort. When restraints are present, such as reduced attentional capacity or time 
pressure, speakers or listeners may instead rely on fast automatic processes and fail to 
take their partner’s mind and knowledge into account. Furthermore, to adjust 
appropriately, a speaker and an addressee must not only assess each others 
knowledge. As discussed by Schober and Brennan (2003), the speaker must also 
know what the appropriate adjustments are. Speakers who are under a great cognitive 
load, and thus have fewer attentional resources available, might not be able to adapt 
to the conversational partner’s needs. Others might, as a personality trait, be more 
egocentric or they may have reduced general perspective-taking skills. Motivation to 
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adapt to the conversational partner’s perspective is also crucial (Giles, Coupland, and 
Coupland, 1991).  
In natural conversation misinterpretations and failures to adapt to the 
conversational partner are often exposed in or before the next contribution (Krauss, 
1987; Wilkes-Gibbs, 1995). That is, the speaker can often infer from the 
conversational partner’s response how his or her contribution was interpreted. 
Requests for clarification, feedback and backchannel sounds like ‘mm’ or ‘huh’ or 
prosody, as well as body communication such as facial expressions, gaze and body 
posture, signal whether the previous utterances were adapted to the conversational 
partner’s knowledge and need for information. In this way the conversational partners 
collaborate to make the utterances comprehensible. 
In conversation, the participants collaborate in the construction of topical 
coherence; see Levinson (1983) for a discussion of this matter. Since linked 
transitions from topic to topic are preferred, sometimes topics either have to be 
withheld or the participants have to find a way to tie the new topic to the previous 
ones. The closure of one topic is usually a joint decision and preceded by pauses or 
gaps that signal that neither of the participants wishes to develop the topic further and 
there is an opportunity to introduce a new one. An alternative is to mark the transition 
to an unlinked topic in some way, e.g. with the phrase by the way. 
Speakers may revise their utterances when they recognise a misinterpretation by 
the addressee. The speaker might, for example, add more explicit information or 
modify a word choice. Other reasons for the need for repairs include word-finding 
troubles, semantic paraphasias and articulatory errors. In cases of failed adaptation, 
repair organisation might be a question of co-operation between conversational 
partners as the speaker is dependent on feedback from the addressee to be able to 
recognise the need for revision. However, Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks (1977) 
used Conversational Analysis methods (see below) to establish that self-initiated 
repair, where the speaker himself or herself recognises the need for repair and is able 
to perform it is more common and in that sense preferred over other-initiated repair, 
or repair carried out by the conversational partner. Based on their analysis Schegloff 
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et al. (1977) proposed that in normal interaction self-initiated repair is most often 
carried out within the same turn in which the trouble appears. In cases of other-
initiated repair, the problem is most often resolved within three turns.  
Lesser and Milroy (1993) describe one of the major approaches to the study of 
pragmatic aspects of language in discourse as a ‘top-down’ approach. It can be 
described as a linguistic or philosophical approach as it often takes its starting point 
in pragmatic theories like Austin’s (1962) speech act theory. Speech act theory 
emphasises the act that is performed by making a certain utterance, such as the act of 
warning or of requesting. Speech act theory is also concerned with how the speaker 
and listener can relate the semantic and syntactic form of an utterance to specific acts. 
This ‘top-down’ approach works with some kind of organisational principle or 
conversational principle such as the co-operative principle proposed by Grice (1975, 
1978). In Grice’s theory, conversational partners are assumed to apply four different 
maxims in producing and interpreting discourse. The maxim of quality requires the 
speaker to make a contribution that is true; the maxim of quantity requires that the 
contribution not provide more information or less information than what is required 
for the current purpose; the maxim of relevance requires that the contribution actually 
is relevant; the maxim of manner requires clarity, and more specifically, briefness, 
order, and avoidance of obscurity and ambiguity. Speech acts, as described by Searle 
(1979), and relevance, as in Sperber and Wilson’s (1995) theory of relevance, are 
also examples of conversational principles. Attempts are often made to apply those 
theories to the analysed data or to collect data suitable for this kind of categorisation.  
Those approaches, for example, the Gricean maxims that together express a 
general co-operative principle, have been used in several studies of discourse in 
association with LHD, (Ahlsén, 1993) and RHD. For example, Bloom et al. (1999) 
explored the psychometric aspects of a verbal pragmatic rating scale that was 
developed from Grice’s (1975, 1978) maxims. The rating scale was used to assess 
emotional and unemotional narratives in RHD and LHD patients as well as healthy 
normal controls. The authors conclude that the results support Grice’s theoretical 
assumptions that there are distinct pragmatic rules that operate on discourse. Further 
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examples of studies using Grice’s maxims are given in section 1.2.6.1. In their theory 
of relevance, Sperber and Wilson (1995) in their theory of relevance argue that in 
processing information, the human cognitive system aims to gain the greatest 
possible benefit for the least cost in terms of processing efforts. In communication, 
that means that we can expect that everything explicitly or implicitly expressed, or 
not expressed, somehow has relevance. Thus, relevance is the only guiding principle 
that is needed. Relevance theory has also been used in studies of communication in 
RHD (Dipper, Bryan, and Tyson, 1997), and in autism (Happé, 1993). 
However, such ‘top-down’ approaches may be criticised for not enough taking 
account of the collaborative aspect of natural conversation (Leech, 1983). In their 
utterances and pauses, as well as body communication, the conversational partners 
interact in creating coherent conversation. This view of conversation as a joint 
responsibility of both or all conversational partners is especially important in the 
clinical analysis and treatment of communication disorders. 
Compared to the approaches mentioned above, Conversational Analysis (CA), 
which originates in the ethnomethodology tradition, offers a ‘bottom-up’, data-driven 
approach. In this method, attempts are made to avoid preset ideas of what 
communication is. That is, no set of analytic or organisational principles is 
postulated. Instead the methodology inductively seeks patterns and structures in 
naturally occurring data. The CA approach has generated a number of insights and 
detailed descriptions of how common conventions control the conversational 
interaction. For example, principles for the organisation of turn-taking and repair 
have been described by Schegloff (1972), Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974) and 
Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks (1977). Structures for topic manipulation have also 
been described by, for example, Button and Casey (1984), and the use of body 
communication such as gaze and body positioning by Goodwin (1984) and Heath 
(1984).  
CA has been criticised for not considering factors in the external context of the 
conversational interaction (Allwood, 1992). In the urge to avoid generalisations that 
might conceal what actually happens in the interaction, an interpreter, who uses the 
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CA method alone, might not be able to achieve a full understanding of an utterance or 
a pause. Gumperz (2001) instead proposes an interactional sociolinguistic perspective 
on communication. In this approach, it is assumed that the interpretation of utterances 
in communication is always dependent on context-specific background knowledge 
embodied in presuppositions that might shift during the conversational interaction. 
The participants in a conversation constantly generate inferences out of their general 
world knowledge, and their knowledge of the situation and the individuals involved, 
about the intensions of their conversational partners. They also adapt the utterances 
they plan and produce in response to these inferences. In Activity Based 
Communication Analysis (ACA), Allwood (1995) developed a framework that takes 
account of influencing background factors in the actual communicative context. 
Ahlsén (1995) has adapted this framework to the analysis of communication 
disorders. 
Still, the detailed descriptions of conventional conversation structuring generated 
by CA are useful for the understanding and treating communication disorders. 
Different more or less modified versions of CA have also been described as useful 
methods for capturing, describing and understanding the problems that might arise in 
conversational interaction in association with aphasia (Lock et al. 2001; Oelschlaeger 
and Damico, 2000).  
 
* 
Studies 3 and 4 in this thesis focus on the ability to interact in conversation. In study 
3, the perceptions of post-stroke changes in several pragmatic aspects of 
conversational interaction are investigated in groups of brain-damaged individuals 
and their conversational partners. Study 4 comprises four case studies where results 
from both bottom-up and top-down analysis of video-recorded conversational 
interaction are integrated with the results of the cognitive tasks administered in 
studies 1 and 2. ACA (Allwood, 1995; Ahlsén, 1995) is employed in the analysis of 
the conversational interactions in study 4. 
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1.2.6 Discourse production in association with right-hemisphere 
damage 
 
This section presents research about discourse production and conversational 
interaction in association with RHD. There are several fairly anecdotal descriptions 
of excessive verbal behaviour, production of statements that are out of context, 
tangential, irrelevant or inappropriate in the given context in the discourse of RHD 
individuals (Myers, 1999b; Tompkins, 1995). However, quantitative evidence of 
impaired discourse has also been presented, although there are more published 
studies of procedural and narrative discourse than of conversational interaction in 
association with RHD.  
  
1.2.6.1 Narrative and procedural discourse and task-oriented conversation 
 
Problems in adapting to the needs of a conversational partner and understanding the 
implications of discourse have been studied in RHD individuals, following Grice’s 
(1975, 1978) notion of the cooperative principle and conversational maxims (Kasher, 
Batori, Soroker, Graves, and Zaidel, 1999; Rehak, Kaplan, and Gardner, 1992).  
The level of detail in discourse also depends on adaptation to the listener. Script 
knowledge and the ability to produce sufficiently detailed discourse have been 
assessed in association with RHD (Lojek-Osiejuk, 1996); Roman, Brownell, Potter, 
Seibold, and Gardner, 1987). Roman et al. (1987) found that RHD individuals have 
trouble producing verbal scripts of the sequences of steps in common activities, such 
as ‘visiting a restaurant’. Still, as they seemed to be able to judge importance and 
temporal order when choosing between two possible responses, the authors suggest 
that RHD individuals do have preserved script knowledge. Rather, the difficulty of 
the tasks, according to these authors, is evidence of processing deficits such as an 
inability to inhibit personalisation and tangential remarks.  
Problems in using reference have been established in association with RHD. For 
example, deficits in referential cohesion, logical coherence and accuracy of narration 
have been found in RHD stroke patients. In one study by Davis, O’Neil-Pirozzi, and 
Coon (1997), problems in referential cohesion were found in the retelling of auditory-
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verbal presented stories and logical coherence was only impaired in conditions where 
pictures were present. According to the authors, these results point to the multiple 
levels of processing in discourse production. Any explanation of discourse production 
deficits must consider the relationships between possible primary dysfunctions, such 
as difficulties in the processing of coherence in visual stimuli in association with 
RHD, and the particular discourse measure chosen as the dependent variable. 
Lack of consideration of the listener’s familiarity of the referent was also found 
by Brownell et al. (1997), in RHD patients’ use of personal reference. Brownell et al. 
(1997) used stimuli in the form of vignettes describing a conversational situation and 
manipulated the occupational status and familiarity between the characters in the 
narratives. The participants had to choose the most appropriate way for one character 
to refer to another character from among three suggestions.     
In a study of task oriented conversation by Chantraine, Joanette, and Ska (1998), 
RHD individuals had to instruct a research associate on how to display a series of 
visual stimuli in a certain order. Some, but not all, of the ten participants were found 
to have referential and/or other qualitative difficulties. It is important to bear this 
heterogeneity among RHD individuals in mind. Not all of them have communicative 
impairments and not all RHD individuals with communicative impairments have the 
same symptoms.   
 
1.2.6.2 Natural conversation and right-hemisphere damage 
 
In examining pragmatic skills in the spontaneous conversations of RHD individuals, 
Prutting and Kirchner (1987) mainly found deviance in eye gaze, prosodic pattern 
and variation, turn-taking contingency, turn-taking adjacency, and quantity. On other 
parameters, e.g. topic selection, topic introduction, topic change and cohesion, only a 
few of the RHD individuals were found to be deficient. However, all the participants 
were receiving treatment at the time of the study and it is not clear whether the 
treatment focused on any of these pragmatic parameters. 
Management of topics and turns in first-encounter conversations has also been 
assessed: in a study by Kennedy, Strand, Burton, and Peterson (1994), eight minutes 
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of conversation were transcribed turn by turn and each turn was coded to identify 
topic management. No significant difference was found between a group of RHD 
individuals and a group of non-brain damaged-individuals. However, the RHD 
individuals did ask fewer questions than the non-brain-damaged individuals. In 
another study, Kennedy (2000) found that RHD individuals produced larger 
proportions of topic scenes during the termination phase than non-brain-damaged 
individuals. The author suggests that this may evidence a reduced ability to 
understand the conversational partner’s signals of that he or she wishes to end the 
conversation. Topic use in semi-structured conversation has also been investigated, 
for example, by Brady, Mackenzie, and Armstrong (2003). These authors conclude 
that, although the use of main topics did not diverge between a group of RHD 
individuals and a group of LHD individuals, the use of subdivision into sub-topics 
did. The RHD group used fewer subdivisions and also fewer discourse features such 
as repetition, topic shading and fillers, which might function as discourse 
manipulators. This, the authors argue, might explain why a listener may perceive the 
discourse as disorganised and difficult to comprehend. Since all topic elements are 
presented on a similar level of importance, the discourse might be perceived as 
excessive or focusing on minor or irrelevant details. The investigation of topic 
management and coherence in procedural discourse produced similar results, with 
only small differences between RHD individuals and LHD individuals (Brady, 
Armstrong, and Mackenzie, 2005). 
The collaborative planning of a conversation is dependent on the recognition of 
the other participants’ intensions. This was investigated by Hird and Kirsner (2003), 
who analysed discourse structures in natural conversations with RHD individuals. In 
the RHD individuals, a reduced or eliminated use of prosody to guide the listeners 
through a change in discourse structure was found. Furthermore, they did not seem to 
assume equal responsibility for development and maintenance of the discourse 
structure. The RHD individuals introduced fewer topics and gave their conversational 
partners fewer opportunities to elaborate the topics. According to Hird and Kirsner, 
these results might indicate a reduced capacity to maintain intentional focus, as 
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described in work emerging from computer linguistics by Lochbaum, Grosz, and 
Sidner (2000). This kind of impairment, perhaps due to attentional deficits, would 
make it difficult to keep a record of the discourse structure and the relationships 
between the different contributions and their relevance to the discourse. This might, 
according to Hird and Kirsner (2003), explain RHD individuals to tendency to 
‘maintain the floor’ and the reduction of their contributions to marginally relevant 
associations. This in turn might force the conversational partner to compensate by 
taking a more passive role within each discourse segment and simply producing 
feedback. When the impaired speaker runs out of associated ideas, the conversational 
partner is required to take responsibility for the introduction of new topics. 
 
* 
In studies 3 and 4, brain-damaged-individuals’ ability to interact in conversation and 
their capacities for reference use, turn-taking, topic coherence, level of detail and 
prosody in discourse are investigated. Strategies for repair in cases of problems in 
communication and word retrieval difficulties are also investigated. 
 
1.2.7 Summary of theoretical background  
 
Fundamental to the studies in this thesis presented is a view on cognition and 
communication where language, and more specifically pragmatic aspects of 
language, are seen as dependent on, and interacting with, other cognitive aspects as 
well as strategies within and between individuals. Another important element, 
touched upon in the background, is that current models of cognitive processes and 
functions are simply reflections of inferences made from the knowledge we have 
today. Therefore, these models, and the perceptions of the relationships between 
different aspects of cognition, are constantly changing and by no means static. The 
methods used in the four studies were put together and developed from previous 
research on pragmatic deficits in association with RHD and current theories of the 
human mind. 
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Kintsch’s (1998) construction-integration model of comprehension serves as a 
background to the entire thesis but is explicitly discussed mostly in studies 1 and 2. 
The models of sustained attention and VWM, including Ericsson and Kintsch’s 
(1995) and Ericsson and Delaney’s, (1999) notion of LT-WM are relevant in studies 
1 and 2 as well as in the discussion of individual results in study 4. The current 
theories of the cause of pragmatic deficits in association with RHD, especially the 
coarse semantic coding theory (Beeman, 1998), suppression deficit hypothesis 
(Tompkins et al., 1999) and theories about social inference (Adolphs, 1999), will be 
discussed in connection with the results obtained from studies 1, 2 and 4. The notions 
about the pragmatic aspects of discourse production become relevant and will be 
discussed in the light of the method used and results obtained from study 3 and 4, 
where conversational interaction will be investigated. 
 
1.2.8 Outline of the thesis 
 
The four studies that constitute this thesis have been separated into two parts. Part I 
consists of studies 1 and 2, where the pragmatic aspects of comprehension in 
association with acquired brain damage are explored. 
Studies 1 and 2, presented together, are experimental group studies that 
investigate the comprehension of discourse involving a need to revise inferences and 
make inferences about a main character’s attitude and motives. In study 1, the 
performance of a group of RHD individuals is compared to that of a group of LHD 
individuals and a control group on the inference tasks and neglect tests. In study 2, 
the associations between performance on the inference tasks and the results on a test 
of VWM and a task measuring capacity for sustained attention are explored. The 
results from studies 1 and 2 are first summarised and discussed with the presentation 
of each set of results. Part I then concludes with a general and more theoretical 
discussion of studies 1 and 2, where the results will be discussed together and related 
to current research on pragmatic deficits in association with RHD as well as to 
Kintsch’s construction-integration model of comprehension.  
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Part II of the thesis consists of studies 3 and 4 which are more exploratory 
studies where pragmatic aspects of conversational interaction are investigated. 
Study 3 is a group study where the effects of RHD and LHD on pragmatic 
aspects of language and communication are investigated with a questionnaire 
distributed to the brain-damaged individuals and their conversational partners. The 
perception of post-stroke change and the possible negative impact of this change on 
conversational interaction are examined on a number of pragmatic parameters.  
Study 4 consists of four case studies. Individual features and results from studies 
1 to 3 of two men with RHD and two men with LHD are presented and discussed in 
relation to an analysis of video-recordings of their conversational interaction in a 
dyad. In the analysis of the conversational interaction, individual features of the RHD 
individuals are compared to the LHD individuals in terms of word retrieval 
difficulties, turn-taking and repair. Part II of the thesis concludes with a general 
discussion of results of study 3 and study 4. 
The thesis is completed with a brief summary and conclusions about the results 
of the four studies in the thesis and their implications for future research and clinical 
management of pragmatic problems, especially in relation to acquired RHD. 
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2. PART I: DISCOURSE COMPREHENSION  
 
In this part of the thesis, comprehension in the form of ability to make revised 
inference and a type of social inference, inference of a character’s attitude or motive, 
and connection with VWM and sustained attention is investigated. Study 1 and study 
2 are experimental group studies and the results will be presented and discussed 
together.  
 
2.1 Introduction and outline to studies 1 and 2: Inference and 
associations 
 
First the research questions and hypotheses underlying the two studies will be 
presented. In the next section, the subjects and methodology for the data collection 
and analyses used in studies 1 and 2 are described. This is followed by a presentation 
of the results of the comparison between groups, correlation and regression analyses. 
The results will be presented along with brief discussions; a more theoretical general 
discussion will follow. In the general discussion of results of studies 1 and 2, the 
results are discussed in relation to each other and in light of Kintsch’s construction-
integration model as well as current theories of the causes of pragmatic deficits 
associated with RHD. Methodological issues will be critically examined.  
 
2.1.1 Research questions and hypotheses 
 
In study 1 and study 2, the possible associations between the impaired ability to make 
adequate inferences from implicit information in discourse, sustained attention and 
VWM will be explored.  
The studies have two main purposes. In the first study, the ability to infer from 
implicit information in discourse is investigated and the research questions are: 
 
1a) Is it possible to establish a difference in the ability to infer from implicit 
information in verbal discourse, defined as extended verbal expression in speech 
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or writing, between a group of RHD individuals with suspected pragmatic 
language disorders, a group of LHD individuals with subtle language disorders 
and a group of non-brain-damaged individuals? 
 
1b) Are there differences in the comprehension of discourse, depending on the type 
of inference required, between a group of RHD individuals and a group of LHD 
individuals? 
 
It is hypothesised that it is possible to distinguish groups of brain-damaged 
individuals from a group of healthy subjects based on their ability to infer from 
implicit information in verbal discourse. Building on current research, see for 
example Borod et al. (2002) and Brownell and Martino (1998), and theories of brain 
function and cognition, it is also hypothesised that there are qualitative differences 
between the groups of brain-damaged individuals in terms of their comprehension of 
discourse and that RHD individuals will have more problems than LHD individuals 
in comprehending discourse that involves inferences concerning a character’s attitude 
or motive. 
In the second study, the aim is to investigate possible associations between the 
ability to infer from implicit information in verbal discourse and the two cognitive 
abilities – VWM and sustained attention – which might have an impact on discourse 
comprehension. The research questions are: 
 
2a) Is it possible to establish any associations between either sustained attention or 
VWM and the ability to comprehend implicit information in verbal discourse in 
two groups of individuals with either RHD or LHD? 
 
2b) Does any association between RHD individuals’ ability to comprehend implicit 
information in discourse and sustained attention or VWM diverge from the 
equivalent association in LHD individuals? 
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Based on current research and theories of the brain, language and cognition, for 
example, Caspari et al. (1998) and Fernandez-Duque and Posner (2001), it is 
hypothesised that there are associations between discourse comprehension and the 
measures of sustained attention and VWM but that they will diverge between the two 
groups of brain-damage individuals. In the group of RHD individuals, the strongest 
association is expected to be found between sustained attention and comprehension. 
In the group of LHD individuals, it is hypothesised that the strongest association will 
be between VWM and comprehension of verbal discourse.  
 
2.2 Method: Studies 1 and 2 
 
In this section, the study subjects will be described followed by a presentation of the 
experimental stimuli and tasks. After that, the experimental procedures will be 
described. The section concludes with a presentation of the analyses carried out on 
the results; the statistical analyses performed are described separately. 
 
2.2.1 Participants 
 
Studies 1 and 2 include 14 individuals with RHD, 14 individuals with LHD, and 14 
individuals with no history of brain damage or neurological disease (the Control 
group). Tables 2:2:1-2:2:3 display subject data and group means for the three groups. 
Seven women and seven men were included in each group. All participants were 
native speakers of Swedish. The three groups were matched in terms of age, 
educational level and pre-onset reading habits. The participants’ age range was 
between 39 to 80 years (mean: 63.4 years old, S.D.: 11.19). Their educational levels 
were assigned to three different categories: 
Category 1: Compulsory school without subsequent educational achievement (6 
– 9 years in school). 
Category 2: School to certificate level or further education equivalent to at least 
this level. 
Category 3: Higher (university-level) certificate.  
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Information about reading habits – books and other reading material, e.g. magazines 
and newspapers – was collected. The individuals’ reading habits on books are 
considered as a measure of a basic cognitive level and were assigned to five different 
categories according to how many books (fiction and non-fiction), they used to read, 
pre-stroke, during one year:  
 
0 = No books at all; 1 = 1-3 books in a year; 2 = 4-7 books in a year; 3 = 8-13 books 
in a year; 4 = >13 books in a year. 
 
The brain-damaged individuals were recruited from rehabilitation centres in the 
west of Sweden on the basis of the following inclusion criteria: (1) at least six months 
post-onset of the cerebrovascular incident; (2) unilateral cerebral brain damage6 
confirmed by CT or MRI scan or clinical examination; (3) no history of substance 
abuse; (4) no presence of dysarthria, neglect syndrome or visual- or hearing 
impairment, so severe that it cannot be compensated for in the test situation; (5) age 
between 25 and 80 years; (6) native speaker of Swedish; (7) post-cerebrovascular 
incident problems affecting the communication ability. The occurrence of problems 
that was considered to have impact on the communication could either be 
experienced by the individuals themselves or noticed by their communication 
partners. 
The inclusion criteria were distributed to speech- and language therapists 
working in rehabilitation centres in western Sweden. Individuals that were suggested 
as possible subjects were then informed and controlled against the inclusion criteria 
by the test leader. Subjects who fulfilled the inclusion criteria were included in the 
studies and the recruiting ended when there was an equal distribution of individuals 
in the two groups of brain-damaged individuals. Forty-five right- or left-hemisphere 
brain-damaged individuals were suggested as possible subjects. Of these 45 patients, 
                                                 
6 This includes lesions in the diencephalon, and in one case, the pons, as the diencephalon in 
particular is considered to be intertwined with the cerebrum, both anatomically and functionally. 
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17 were excluded for the following reasons: four LHD individuals declined to 
participate; one RHD and one LHD subject were excluded due to severe hemianopia; 
four individuals had bilateral brain damage; two individuals had a damaged 
cerebellum; one individual had suspected dementia; three individuals were either left 
handed or ambidextrous; one individual was too old. The RHD individuals included 
are presented in table 2:2:1. 
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Table 2:2:1: RHD individuals: Subject data and group means 
Subject Sex Age in 
years 
Edu-
cational 
level 
Reading 
habits 
Months 
post-onset 
Site and type of 
lesion according to 
CT/MRI scan or 
clinical examination 
R1    Male 77 2 4 49 CT scan: infarction, 
putamen 
R2    Female 76 3 2 33 CT scan: 
haemorrhage, pons 
R3     Female  75 2 4 59 CT scan: lacunar 
infarctions 
R4    Male 74 1 0 6 CT scan: frontal 
infarction 
R5    Female 69 2 3 6 CT scan: infarction 
capsula externa 
R6     Male 67 2 3 52 CT scan: infarction 
Sylvian fissure, 
towards the basal 
ganglia 
R7    Male 66 3 3 100 CT scan: infarction 
frontal and parietal 
R8    Female 64 1 1 120 CT scan: 
subarachnoidal 
haemorrhage + 
infarction in the basal 
ganglia 
R9     Male 63 1 4 111 CT scan: arteria 
cerebri media 
infarction frontal 
R10   Female  62 2 4 116 MRI scan: 
subarachnoidal 
haemorrhage + 
infarction temporal 
R11  Female 58 3 4 34 CT scan: infarction 
capsula interna 
R12  Male 51 3 3 8 MRI scan: 
infarctions, basal 
ganglia towards 
Sylvian fissure 
R13  Male 45 2 2 11 CT scan: 
haemorrhage  
R14  Female 43 2 4 8 CT scan: 
subarachnoidal 
haemorrhage 
temporal 
Mean 
(S.D.): 
7 female  
7 male 
63.6 
(11.0) 
2.1 
(.73) 
2.9 
(1.3) 
50.9 
(43.9) 
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Among the participants with RHD, the medical charts mention symptoms of 
visuospatial neglect in only four out of the 14 patients. Three additional participants 
stated that they either had had or still had mild symptoms of neglect. 
All the brain-damaged individuals included described themselves as right-
handed. Among the LHD subjects, eight individuals reported some degree of 
persistent sensorimotor dysfunction in the right hand but only two of them perceived 
this dysfunction as so disturbing that they chose to use their left hand in writing and 
test tasks; see table 2:2:2. 
The LHD individuals all performed well on A-ning, a neurolinguistic aphasia 
test developed by Lindström and Werner (1995). That is, the subjects included had an 
A-ning index that was higher 4.75 out of a possible 5.0. One subject was judged to 
perform far above the levels investigated in A-ning by the speech-language therapist 
at the rehabilitation clinic. His language abilities were therefore assessed with a test 
battery designed for the assessment of subtle language disorders, the TBSS (Laakso, 
Brunnegård, Hartelius, and Ahlsén, 2000), instead of the A-ning. All the LHD 
individuals were assessed by experienced speech-language therapists and diagnosed 
as either not aphasic or mildly aphasic at the time of their participation in the study.  
All the brain-damaged participants had been able to return to living with their 
spouses or by themselves after rehabilitation. All brain-damaged individuals, except 
one LHD subject, where able to walk after their stroke rehabilitation. Two LHD 
subjects had been able to return to work with adjusted duties and working hours. 
Three LHD subjects and two RHD individuals were still in post-stroke rehabilitation 
programs and decisions about their future working life were still to be made.  
  
 
Table 2:2:2: LHD individuals: Subject data and group means 
Subject Sex Age in 
years 
Edu-
cational 
level 
Reading 
habits 
Months 
post-
onset 
Site and type of lesion according to CT/MRI scan or 
physical examination 
A-ning 
index  
(max. 5) 
Sensori-
motor 
impairment 
right hand 
L15   Female 80 3 4 16 Clinical examination: Weakness in right side of body and 
anomia 
4.85  
L16  Female 76 2 4 68 CT scan: haemorrhage thalamus and capsula interna  5.0 X 
L17  Female 74 2 0 9 CT scan: infarction posterior  4.83 X 
L18  Female 73 1 3 98 CT scan: infarction frontal 4.80 X 
L19  Male 67 1 4 7 CT scan: infarction lentiformis  4.80 X 
L20  Male 67 2 3 35 CT scan: infarction, temporal and capsula interna 4.80 X 
L21  Male 62 1 1 48 Neuropsychological examination: central posterior lesion 4.90  
L22  Female 58 2 4 16 CT scan: infarction parietal 4.80  
L23  Male 57 2 1 6 MRI scan: infarction temporal-occipital 4.80  
L24  Female 56 3 4 30 CT scan: lacunar infarctions close to thalamus and 
occipital 
4.85 X 
L25  Male 56 3 4 13 CT scan: haemorrhages frontal-temporal-parietal 4.75 X 
L26  Male 54 2 1 62 CT scan: infarctions frontal and temporal 4.80 X 
L27  Male 43 3 4 14 CT scan: haemorrhage 
 
95% in 
TBSS* 
 
L28  Female 39 2 1 11 CT scan: subarachnoidal haemorrhage involving  
Sylvian fissure 
4.8  
Mean 
(S.D.): 
7 female 
7 male 
61.6 
(12.1) 
2.1  
(.73) 
2.7  
(1.5) 
30.9 
(28.1) 
 4.83 
(.06) 
 
Note.* = One subject was assessed with a test battery designed for subtle language disorders (TBSS). In those tests, he successfully performed 95% of 
the tasks.
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The individuals in the Control group were recruited from different educational courses, 
personal contacts and activity groups for elderly people; see table 2:2:3. According to 
self-report, they had no known brain damage or neurological disease and no history of 
substance abuse. 
 
Table 2:2:3: Individuals in the Control group: Subject data and group means 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Individuals were recruited for the Control group until the group was matched to the 
groups of brain-damaged individuals in terms of age, sex and education.  
Of the 23 individuals interested in participating in the Control group, nine had to be 
excluded: four individuals reported suspicion of brain damage; one was not a native 
speaker of Swedish; one was excluded due to a technical breakdown; one due to a severe 
hearing impairment; and two because they were too old.  
Subject Sex Age in 
years 
Educational 
level 
Reading habits 
C29   Male 77 2 1 
C30  Female 74 3 4 
C31  Male 73 3 3 
C32   Male 71 2 1 
C33  Female 70 2 1 
C34  Female 70 2 3 
C35  Female 67 3 4 
C36  Female 68 3 2 
C37  Female 67 3 4 
C38  Male 66 2 4 
C39  Female 63 2 2 
C40  Female 61 1 3 
C41  Male 43 3 4 
C42  Male 39 2 1 
Mean  
(S.D.): 
7 female 
7 male 
64.9 
(11.0) 
2.4 
(.63) 
2.6 
(1.3) 
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2.2.2 Experimental tasks 
 
In this section, the methods and types of stimuli used to collect data on discourse 
comprehension, VWM, possible symptoms of visuospatial neglect and ability to sustain 
attention are described. The experimental procedures will be described in section 2.2.3. 
 
2.2.2.1 Stimuli in discourse comprehension 
 
The Discourse Comprehension task is an adapted and extended version of the stimuli 
used by Tompkins et al. (1994). It consists of eleven short narratives, 61 to 72 words 
long, presented as auditory stimuli and followed by questions about the content (see 
Appendix 1). The stimuli and questions were recorded in a studio, read in a neutral tone 
of voice. The narratives depict fairly everyday situations with interaction between the 
characters and were produced in such a way that they would require elaborative 
inferences generated from the content of the narratives as well as general world 
knowledge for full comprehension.  
After listening to each narrative, the subjects had to respond to three questions 
about the content of the text. The questions can be subdivided into two groups 
depending on whether they are dependent on explicitly or implicitly stated content in the 
narratives: one of the three questions was about facts that were explicitly stated in the 
text; the two others demanded elaborative inference of implicitly stated matters and are 
considered to require more complex cognitive processing. After trying to answer the 
questions from memory, the subjects were allowed to read the texts at their own pace 
and control and change their answers if they so wished. The possibility of reading the 
texts and modifying the responses and the questions about explicitly stated facts were 
considered to be a method of controlling for the possibility that problems producing 
correct inferences might be a consequence of failure of more basic and automatic 
processes, such as automatic activation of the dominant meaning of words or, in 
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Kintsch’s (1998) terminology, comprehension through automatic retrieval structures, 
instead of more compound linguistic and non-linguistic cognitive processing failure. The 
subject’s decision on whether to read the texts and control the responses given might 
also be considered as an indication of insight of his or her own level of performance. 
Six of the narratives depict quite negative, emotionally charged situations such as a 
quarrel between spouses, exam nerves and bullying in a school yard. They were 
worded – for example, by including adjectives and adverbs – such that the context more 
or less consistently induced a specific interpretation of the situation and the characters’ 
attitudes and motives. Two of these narratives involve either an ironic comment or a lie 
which has to be understood as such to make the content coherent. In the remaining five 
narratives,7 the context of the first part of the narrative biases the reader in favour of one 
of the two possible interpretations of an ambiguous word. The final sentence provides 
information that, in accordance with a relevance theory of comprehension (Sperber and 
Wilson, 1995), implies another interpretation of the ambiguous word in order to make 
the last sentence coherent with the rest of the narrative. This means that the context of 
the narrative is only consistent if the correct interpretation of the ambiguous word is 
used. However, as the initial context induced a ‘false’ interpretation of the word, the 
subjects are forced to revise their initial interpretation.  
Described in terms of Kintsch’s (1998) construction-integration model, this task 
requires the following processes: as the last sentence is heard, the new information 
added makes the hitherto coherent situation model inconsistent. In integrating these new 
propositions, the subject has to retrieve the encoded memory of the text base and 
reactivate suppressed nodes in LT-WM. In reading the text, the subject can construct a 
new text base and situation model from the text, without having to retrieve the complete 
text base from memory. However, in the integration process, the subject must still 
                                                 
7 One of the initial six narratives with ambiguous words was excluded as both possible interpretations 
could be applied interchangeably. 
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retrieve information from LT-WM as the short-term working memory capacity is limited 
to dealing with a few active nodes at the time.  
Revising an interpretation in this way is thought to be a controlled, capacity-
consuming process. Since the subject has to assess which of the possible interpretations 
of the ambiguous word is the more relevant in the context, the process is considered to 
involve deductive reasoning, or in Kintsch’s terminology, true inference. 
Because of the inconsistent contexts the questions requiring revised inferences are 
expected to be more difficult than the questions requiring inference of a character’s 
attitude or motive.  
The ambiguous words in the narratives were picked out from a number of 
ambiguous words, categorised based on the frequency of the different meanings in 
spoken language and written texts. Frequency of use was investigated among 9.9 million 
words in concordance in the Gothenburg Spoken Language Corpora and three text 
corpora: Romaner-80, with text from novels, and Dagens Nyheter-87, and Press-76, 
containing newspaper texts (Corpora at Department of Linguistics, Göteborg University, 
2002). In two of the narratives with ambiguous words, the first part of the text induced 
the less frequent denotation of the word and the last sentence forced the subjects to 
revise that inference and choose a more frequent denotation of the word to keep the 
content of the narrative coherent. For example, the interpretation of the Swedish word fil 
as meaning ‘sour milk’ had to be revised in favour of the denotation ‘lane’.  In two of 
the narratives, the first part of the narrative favoured an interpretation of the word with 
the more frequent denotation, for example the denotation ‘book’ of the Swedish word 
bok. This inference then had to be revised and the word had to be interpreted with its 
less frequent meaning: the denotation ‘beech’, (the tree).  In the remaining narrative with 
an inconsistent context, the denotations of the ambiguous word were equally frequent.  
As mentioned above, two of the three questions for each of the eleven narratives 
were worded in such a way that a correct response depended on the subjects’ ability to 
process implicitly stated material in order to comprehend the text. To make it possible to 
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analyse the responses to those questions beyond their demands for processing of 
implicitly stated materials, the questions were categorised according to what kind of 
processing they required for a correct response; see table 2:2:4 for an overview. Ten 
questions on narratives with consistent contexts required coherence inference, or 
bridging inference, through inference concerning a character’s attitude towards 
something or someone or a character’s motives for performing a certain action. The 
information in the text consisted of stated facts about the situation or characters, but was 
also influenced by nuances or shades of meaning in the wording. Eight questions about 
narratives that contained an ambiguous word required a coherence inference through the 
revision of an initial inference.  
Four of the original 33 questions did not fit into this classification. Two of those 
questions did require bridging inferences but without any demand for inference of a 
character’s attitude or motive. The other two questions required both inferences of 
characters’ motives and revision of an initial interpretation.  
Hence, the different questions can be regarded as belonging to one of five different 
categories, four related to implicitly stated information and one to explicitly stated 
material.  
 
Table 2:2:4: Overview of the different types of questions in the Discourse Comprehension task 
 
Questions 
category  
Questions 
about 
explicitly 
stated 
information 
Questions about implicitly stated  information 
Inference of 
character’s 
attitude or 
motive 
Revised 
inference 
Simple 
bridging 
inference 
Both inference of 
character’s 
attitude/motive 
and revised 
inference 
Number of 
questions in 
each 
category 
(n=33) 
 
11 
 
10 
 
8 
 
2 
 
2 
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The consistency and validity of this categorisation was checked by an external, 
independent observer, with a university degree, who analysed the requirements of the 
questions and categorised them according an operational definition scheme as belonging 
to one of the four different categories. The inter-observer calculating point-to-point 
agreement was 83%, which must be considered acceptable. The disagreement was due to 
difficulties with the operational definitions of the different categories, and there was no 
disagreement as to whether a given question required inference of a character’s 
attitude/motive or revised inference. 
To avoid providing the answers within the wording of the test questions, most of 
the questions were open, but for five of the 33 questions, a simple yes or no response 
was sufficient. Care was taken to word the questions in such a way that they would not 
provide information leading to a correct answer, although the question might stimulate 
the participant to make new inferences. During the test procedure, the use of additional 
questions to elucidate unclear points in the responses was avoided.  
Data were collected on spontaneous responses (that is, responses made after the 
subjects had merely listened to the narrative) for further analyse. Data were also 
collected on modified responses (new or modified responses given after reading the 
narrative), although analysis of this data was restricted to a few comparisons to the 
results for spontaneous responses.  
 
2.2.2.2 Stimuli in the verbal working memory task 
 
The verbal working memory measure is a translation of an auditory task that Tompkins 
et al. (1994) had adapted from Daneman and Carpenter’s (1980) Reading Span test. The 
stimuli were 42 simple active declarative sentences based on common knowledge, each 
ending in different common lexical items. The final words consisted of one- to three-
syllable nouns, verbs or adjectives. The subject had to say whether the declarative 
sentences were true or false, and keep the last word of each sentence in memory for later 
recall. 
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The sentences were grouped into sets of increasing length, with three sets at each of 
four levels of difficulty. ‘Level 2’ sets each included two sentences; ‘Level 3’ sets each 
included three sentences, and so on to ‘Level 5’ where each set consists of five 
sentences. The number of words in each sentence was three to five across sets. This is an 
example from Level 2 (set 1): 
  
‘You sit on a chair.’ (Swedish: Du sitter på en stol) 
 ‘Trains can fly.’ (Swedish: Tåg kan flyga) 
 
Subjects responded actively to each sentence immediately after hearing it, judging it as 
true or false. At the same time, they retained the final word of each sentence in each set 
for spoken recall immediately after the entire set had been presented. Subjects had two 
words to recall for each set at Level 2, three words per set at level 3, and so on.  
In the example from Level 2 (set 1), given above, the subject was supposed to 
respond: ‘true’ after listening to the first sentence (‘You sit on a chair’), and then keep 
the word ‘chair’ in mind while listening to the second sentence (‘Trains can fly’), which 
should be followed by the response ‘false’. After that, the subject had to say the words 
‘chair’ and ‘fly’.  
To maximise the need for simultaneous processing and information storage, 
stimulus sentences were constructed so that their truth value was not obvious until the 
final word. Data were collected on both true/false errors and word recall errors, with 
word recall errors providing the primary estimate of auditory working memory. The 
time for task administration was about 5 to 15 minutes as the subjects varied in the time 
they took to produce their responses. 
The adaptation from English to Swedish made it necessary to change some of the 
lexical items due to differences in sentence length and number of syllables. Some of the 
sentences were also slightly modified to avoid confusion about whether the right 
response was supposed to be ‘true’ or ‘false’. 
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2.2.2.3 Stimuli in neglect tests 
 
To assess the possible influence of visuospatial neglect on the performance on the other 
tasks, two gross neglect tests were performed:  
 
Albert’s crossing out test (Albert, 1973) is commonly used in clinical contexts. The 
subject is presented with 2.5-cm-long lines evenly distributed over a 29.6 x 21 cm paper 
sheet, placed in the centre of the subject’s visual field. The subject must respond as 
described in section 2.2.3.4. 
 
Schenkenberg’s line bisection test (Schenkenberg, Bradford, and Ajax, 1980) is also 
common in clinical practice. In this test, 20 lines with varying lengths and positions are 
distributed horizontally on a 29.6 x 21 cm paper sheet.  Again, the subject must respond 
as described in section 2.2.3.4. 
 
2.2.2.4 Stimuli in the Sustained Attention to Response Test (SART) 
 
The Sustained Attention to Response Test (SART), presented in Robertson et al. (1997a) 
and Manly, Robertson, Galloway and Hawkins (1999), consists of a computerised task 
where 225 single digits are presented visually on a screen over 4.3 minutes. Twenty-five 
instances of each digit between 1 and 9 are presented and subjects respond with a key 
press to each one, except the digit 3 where the response should be withheld. The target 
digit (3) is distributed throughout the 225 digits in a pre-fixed quasi-random fashion. To 
enhance the demands for processing the numerical value, rather than searching for some 
peripheral feature of the target, the digits are presented in one of five randomly assigned 
font sizes (48, 72, 94, 100 and 120 points), representing between 12 and 29 mm. Each 
digit is presented for 250 ms, followed by a mask consisting of a crossed-over circle. 
The mask, which is presented for 900-ms, occurs after each digit presentation. The 
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period from digit onset to digit onset is 1150 ms. The reaction times for all key presses 
relative to digit onset are collected, as well as the number of errors out of a maximum of 
25, i.e. pressing the response key on presentation of the target digit 3, and number of 
correct responses out of a maximum of 200, i.e. pressing the response key for any digit 
other than 3. This means that the number of correct responses is not necessarily 
proportional to the number of errors as it is possible to obtain a result with zero errors 
but just 30 correct responses, if the subject hardly ever presses the response key.  
 
2.2.3 Experimental procedures 
 
In this section, the setting and procedures for the data collection are described, along 
with the order of presentation of tasks. 
 
2.2.3.1 Setting and order of presentation of tasks 
 
To make sure the test situation was as comfortable as possible for the participants, they 
were free to choose whether they preferred to perform the tests in their homes or in a 
quiet room at a rehabilitation centre that was familiar to them. Care was taken to avoid 
noises or other disturbing elements when the tests were taken in the participant’s home. 
To avoid results influenced by fatigue, the participants were also free to choose to take 
all the tests on one occasion or to distribute them over two sessions. Except for three 
subjects, all the participants chose to complete the tests in one session and the tasks were 
performed in the following order: the subjects first completed Albert’s crossing out test 
and Schenkenberg’s line bisection test. After that, they completed the SART, then the 
VWM test, followed by the Discourse Comprehension test. Those tests were completed 
within about one hour, depending on variations in how long the subjects needed to 
produce their responses. 
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2.2.3.2 Procedure in Discourse Comprehension task 
 
In the Discourse Comprehension task the participants were seated with a portable tape 
recorder (Sony TCS-580V) with supplementary loudspeakers (Canman SP101) on a 
table in front of them. Each subject decided on a comfortable volume for the output. The 
text cards with written texts in large fonts were placed, upside down, in a pile in front of 
the subjects. The participants were instructed to listen to the narrative and then try to 
answer three questions about the content in the narrative at their own pace. Both texts 
and questions were played back from the tape recorder, except in two cases where the 
subjects were recruited from a planned pilot study. In these two cases, the questions 
were presented aloud by the test leader.  
The subjects were told that some of the answers would be presented explicitly in 
the texts but that they sometimes would be forced to make inferences from the content 
of the texts in order to answer to some of the questions. They were also instructed to first 
try to respond to the questions from memory, but that after that they were free to turn the 
card over, read the content and then respond or, if they so wished, modify or change 
their answers. The two subjects from the pilot study had the texts in front of them while 
listening to the narratives. The occasions when these two subjects returned to the texts to 
respond to the questions were noted as modified responses. All the subjects were told 
that their decision to read the text or modify any answers would be noted but that it 
would not influence their scores. Subjects were given two practice items: one narrative 
with questions about attitude/emotion in a leading character and one narrative where 
correct responses demanded revised inferences. Corrective feedback was given on the 
practice items. During experimental testing, no feedback was given on the participants’ 
performance.    
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2.2.3.3 Procedure in the verbal working memory task 
 
In the VWM test, the stimulus was played back on a portable tape recorder (Sony TCS-
580V) with supplementary loudspeakers (Canman SP101). The volume of the output 
was adjusted to the level each participant found comfortable. Participants were 
instructed to listen to the statements on the tape and, after each one, to say whether the 
statement was true or false. They were also told to keep the last word of each statement 
in mind until after the last statement in each set, when they would be asked to repeat the 
words recalled from that set. The subjects were told that they were free to recall the 
words in any order and at their own pace. Before each set was played back to the 
subjects, a voice on the tape alerted them and informed them of the number of 
statements that would be presented in that set as follows: ‘Now the next three statements 
will be presented’. The test procedure was practised with a three-statement set. 
Corrective feedback was given on the practice item and the participants were informed 
that no feedback on their performance would be given during the experimental testing. 
  
2.2.3.4 Procedure in neglect tests 
 
In Albert’s crossing out test of neglect, the paper is placed centred in front of the subject, 
who is instructed to cross out all the lines on the sheet with a pen. In Schenkenberg’s 
line bisection test, the sheet is placed in the centre of the subject’s visual field and the 
subject is instructed to mark the centre of every line with a pen. 
 
2.2.3.5 Procedure in the SART 
 
In the SART, all digits and masks were presented centrally in white against a black 
background on a computer screen, using a laptop PC (Dell Latitude), running Super Lab 
Pro™ software (Cedrus). The screen was 248 x 185 mm and positioned in front of 
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participants at a distance comfortable to them. Participants were instructed to press a 
selected response button on a Cedrus™ RB-410 response box resolution 1 ms or better), 
with their preferred hand. They were required to respond with the key press as fast as 
they could when a number between 1 and 9 was presented on the screen, with the 
exception of the number 3, which they were not to respond to. They were told that it was 
just as important to avoid pressing the response button when the number 3 was presented 
as it was to respond as fast as they could to the other numbers. Each session was 
preceded by a practice trial of 34 presentations of digits, six of which were 3s. The 
instructions were also presented in writing on the screen: ‘Press as soon as you see a 
digit. Do not press for the number 3’, both before the practice trial and before the 
experimental trial. Before participants started the experimental test by pressing a key, 
they were asked to make sure that they were comfortable with the screen position and 
their own seating. Except for general encouragement and general feedback to comments 
about the difficulty of the task, no feedback was given on the participants’ performance.  
 
2.2.4 Analysis 
 
In this section, the analysis performed on the results is described. First, the analysis of 
the general processing of the data obtained from the various tasks is described and then 
the statistical analysis. 
 
2.2.4.1. Analysis of results  
 
In the Discourse Comprehension task, the number of correct responses was obtained for 
both spontaneous and modified responses. Data on the number of texts that each 
individual read as well as the number of responses that were modified were also 
collected. Both omitted spontaneous responses and incorrect spontaneous responses 
were then classified as inadequate responses. This analysis was done because the 
participants knew that they had the possibility of suspending their responses until after 
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they had read the narratives. An omitted response might be the result of memory or 
comprehension failure or of the subject wanting to make sure that what he/she planned 
to say was actually correct. The inadequate spontaneous responses were classified as 
inadequate due to either no inference expressed or an erroneous inference expressed. 
The procedure with open questions and the avoidance of additional questions meant 
that the different subjects’ final responses to the questions varied in their degree of 
elaboration and specification. In order to judge the responses fairly, an assessment 
scheme was established, stating what information the answers to a specific question had 
to include if they were to be judged as correct. Examples from the assessment scheme 
are provided in Appendix 2. To investigate the consistency of the assessment scheme 
and the scoring of the subjects’ responses, an independent, experienced speech-language 
pathologist did an external analysis of 10% of the subjects’ responses. A calculation of 
the inter-observer reliability, using Cohen’s kappa, resulted in very acceptable 
agreement (k = .832).  
Although the narratives were designed to depict more or less everyday situations 
and correct responses to questions about the narratives relied on general world 
knowledge, some of the questions, especially about narratives 1, 2, 8, 9 and 10, were 
thought to be sensitive to personal experience. To control for the possibility that 
erroneous responses might be due to a lack of personal experience with the contexts 
depicted, an interview was done several days before the test session. The subjects were 
asked questions about their experience of such things as family life, children, pets, 
driving a car and living in a house without central heating. The answers to those 
questions were then compared with the subjects’ responses on the questions about the 
different narratives. No effect of lack of specific personal experience was seen.  
In examining the results of the Discourse Comprehension tasks that required a 
revised inference, the possible impact on results of the frequencies of the different 
denotations of the ambiguous words was analysed. Only responses to questions that 
depended on implicitly stated information were included in this analysis. 
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In the analysis of the results of Albert’s crossing out test, the even distribution 
makes it possible to assess the number of neglected lines on both sides of the midline of 
the paper.   
In Schenkenberg’s line bisection test, each mark’s deviation from the centre of the 
line is measured and the percent deviation score is calculated for each individual by 
means of the formula: 
Measured left half – true half 
Percent Deviation = 
________________________  
 * 100 
                True half  
 
Marks placed to the left of the true half will result in a negative score and marks placed 
to the right of the true half will result in positive scores.  
Only lines located to the left or centred on the midline of the sheet were calculated, 
for a percent deviation score for each subject. The neglect tests were not administered to 
one LHD individual and one individual in the Control group for practical reasons. 
Therefore, the results for one randomly selected RHD individual were also excluded 
from the analysis. 
From the VWM task, two measures were obtained for further analysis: number of 
word recall errors and number of true/false errors. Most of the individuals also reported 
qualitative data on the strategies they used to perform the task. 
Several different measures were obtained from the SART and calculated for further 
analyses: 
 
▪ Mean reaction time in test, 
▪ Difference between mean reaction time in the first and second halves of the test,  
▪ Variations in reaction time during the test,  
▪ Number of correct responses in the first and second halves of the test (responding to 
any digit other than 3),  
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▪ Number of erroneous responses (responding to target digit 3),  
▪ Feedback time.  
 
Feedback time is calculated by subtracting the mean reaction time for four correct 
responses after an erroneous response from the mean reaction time for four correct 
responses before an erroneous response. It reflects the subjects’ attempts to adjust their 
behaviours in terms of pace, meaning that they either slow down or speed up their 
responses to stimuli following an erroneous response. It was not possible to calculate 
Feedback time for all 14 individuals in each group because some either had too many 
omitted responses or made no erroneous responses. 
The results for Variations in reaction time during the test, Mean reaction time in 
test and Difference between mean reaction time in the first and second halves of the test 
were not accounted for in the published studies of Manly et al. (1999) or Chan (2001). 
The analysis of the variance of Mean reaction time in test and the separate analysis of 
the first and second halves of the tests were done because variations in reaction times 
during the test might reflect a deficit in the ability to sustain attention. The measure of 
Variation of reaction time in test is constituted by the variance in the different reaction 
times obtained from 30 measuring points in the test for each individual. In the studies 
mentioned above, only the reaction time before correctly withheld responses, which is 
the mean reaction time for the four continuous correct responses before a correctly 
withheld response, and reaction time before and after erroneous responses were 
accounted for. That procedure was considered somewhat limited as it is sensitive to 
variations in the performance of different individuals. For a subject who makes few 
Correct responses and perhaps also few Erroneous responses as well, there are far fewer 
available measuring points than for an individual with many Correct responses but also 
many Erroneous responses. A mean reaction time calculated on only one or two 
measuring points might not be considered reliable. The measure of Mean reaction time 
in test was therefore calculated for each individual from three continuous reaction times 
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collected from 30 measuring points in the test. The measuring points were decided on 
based on the results of the subject who omitted the most responses. This was done to 
make it possible to collect the same number of measures from about the same places in 
the test for all subjects. This procedure resulted in the calculation of mean reaction times 
from at least 45% of the available data for each individual, which is more than was 
accounted for in the studies mentioned above.  
 
2.2.4.2 Statistical analysis 
 
In study 1, the Kruskal-Wallis test was used to detect any between-group differences in 
spontaneous responses in the Discourse Comprehension task. The results of the 
statistical analyses will be presented on data collected from questions dependent on 
explicit information, from questions requiring inference of a character’s attitude/motive 
and from revised inference. As there were only two questions each that required either 
just Bridging inference or Both inference of motive and revised inference, those results 
will not be presented here. 
On data where the Kruskal-Wallis test indicated significant between-group 
differences, the Mann-Whitney U test was used as post hoc test with an adjusted alpha 
level, based on Bonferroni’s inequality (alpha .05 divided by 3 comparisons = alpha 
.016). On modified responses in Discourse Comprehension where the observations were 
normally distributed and had equal variance, an analysis of variance (ANOVA), and 
Tukey’s HSD post hoc test were performed. The Wilcoxon signed ranks test was used to 
analyse within-group differences in performance on different parts of the SART. 
Since the main purpose of study 2 was to investigate the association of VWM and 
the ability to sustain attention with the performance on Discourse Comprehension, an 
analysis of correlation was performed with Spearman’s rho within the groups. Due to the 
limited sample size, only correlations exceeding /.66/ were considered to reflect an 
association. Correlation coefficients of this magnitude exceed the .01 significance level. 
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Correlation coefficients exceeding /.50/ but not /.66/, and corresponding to a .05 
significance level, are also reported but will be discussed as reflecting tendencies toward 
association rather than associations.  
To examine the relationships between more than two variables at the same time, 
logistic regression analysis and multiple linear regression analysis were done. However, 
multiple regression analysis turned out to be more suitable for these data. The regression 
analyses were performed on results from either the RHD group together with the Control 
group or the LHD group together with the Control group. Scores on the Discourse 
Comprehension task formed the dependent variable and scores on the different measures 
from the SART, that is: Mean reaction time in test, Difference between mean reaction 
time in the first and second halves of the test, Variations in reaction time during the test, 
Number of correct responses, Number of erroneous responses, Feedback time, VWM 
scores and group (RHD, LHD or Control) were entered as possible predictor variables.  
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2.3 Results and discussion: Studies 1 and 2 
 
In this section, the results of the different tasks will be presented, summarised and 
briefly discussed. First, the analyses of the results of the Discourse Comprehension tasks 
will be presented, as those results correspond to the research questions of study 1: Is it 
possible to establish a difference in the ability to infer from implicit information in 
verbal discourse between a group of RHD individuals, a group of LHD individuals and 
a group of non-brain-damaged individuals and are there differences depending on type 
of inference required?  
This will be followed by the presentation of the results of the neglect tests and of 
the analyses of correlation and regression between the results for Discourse 
Comprehension and results for the VWM task and the SART. Those analyses 
correspond to the research question of study 2: Is it possible to establish any 
associations between either sustained attention or VWM and the ability to comprehend 
implicit information in verbal discourse in two groups of individuals with either RHD or 
LHD and are there any differences in associations between the groups? 
 
2.3.1 Group differences in Discourse Comprehension  
 
In the Discourse Comprehension task, the subjects first had to try to answer the 
questions based only on the text they had just heard. After giving their spontaneous 
responses, they were free to read the text and add to or modify their responses. In this 
study, the results for modified responses and responses to questions depending on 
explicitly stated material are considered to control for the possible impact of deficits on 
more basic linguistic abilities and on VWM, as well as to indicate possible insight 
problems. The results on tasks requiring inferences about implicitly stated matters are 
considered to depend on higher-level cognitive processing. The results for questions that 
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depend on explicit information will be presented separately from the results for 
questions requiring inference. 
 
2.3.1.1 Tasks that depend on explicit information 
 
All groups performed well on the questions that depended on explicit information; and 
although the LHD group had somewhat more trouble with spontaneous responses than 
the other groups, no significant difference was found between any of the groups (p = 
.17); see table 2:3:1 for the number of correct responses.  
 
Table 2:3:1: Group results for mean number of correct responses and standard deviation on 
spontaneous and modified responses on questions dependent on explicitly stated matters in Discourse 
Comprehension tasks. 
 Control 
 (n=14) 
RHD  
(n=14) 
LHD 
( n=14) 
Explicit information (max. =11)    
           - Spontaneous responses        Mean:                                                                                                                                   10.21 9.79 8.57 
                                                             S. D:                       .97 1.4 2.95 
            -Modified responses              Mean:                           10.86 10.50 10.64 
                                                            S. D:                     .36 .76 .63 
 
 
The results for modified responses are presented in comparison to the subjects’ results 
for spontaneous responses, as all three groups increased their scores on modified 
responses to some degree. 
All groups benefited from the opportunity to modify their responses after reading 
the narratives. As can be seen in table 2:3:2, the LHD individuals as a group took the 
opportunity to read the narrative and modify their responses more often than both the 
other groups. The difference was not statistically significant for number of texts read (p 
= .218). However, there was a difference in the number of modified explicit responses 
between the LHD group and the RHD group that was close to significant on (p = .019). 
Some individuals in the LHD group seemed to avoid responding to the questions, no 
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matter whether they were about explicitly stated matters or implicit information, if they 
had only listened to the narrative and not yet read it.  
Modification of a response means that the subject has changed it in some way, 
perhaps by adding or changing information. It does not necessarily mean that an 
inadequate response becomes adequate. In the LHD group, 11 individuals modified 36 
responses to questions that depended on explicit information. However, two of the 
individuals in the LHD group produced 18 of these modifications. Furthermore, two 
individuals in the LHD group failed to change 3 of these responses into correct ones. 
 
Table 2:3:2: Group means and standard deviations for texts read and responses changed into correct or 
still inadequate responses related to explicit information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Control group and the RHD group read and modified their responses to about the 
same extent: 9 individuals in the Control group modified 12 responses and 7 individuals 
in the RHD group modified 11 responses that related to explicit information. Members 
of both groups also managed to transform their inadequate responses into correct 
responses. 
 
2.3.1.2 Spontaneous responses to tasks that depend on implicit information 
 
The questions about the content of the narratives were subdivided according to the task’s 
requirement for different kinds of inferences: coherence inference through inference of a 
Subjects n Number of 
texts read 
Number of 
responses 
modified that 
related to 
explicit 
information 
Number of  
responses 
changed into  
correct  
responses  
Number of   
still 
inadequate  
responses 
after 
modification 
  Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. 
Control  14 5.57 4.53 .86 .86 .86 .86 0 - 
RHD  14 4.79 3.53 .71 .91 .71 .91 0 - 
LHD 14 7.29 2.92 2.57 2.90 2.36 2.62 .21 .58 
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character’s attitude or motive or coherence inference through revised inference. Table 
2:3:3 display the results for tasks depending on implicit information and both 
spontaneous and modified responses by the three groups. 
 
Table 2:3:3: Group results for mean number of correct responses and standard deviation on 
spontaneous and modified responses on questions dependent on implicitly stated matters in Discourse 
Comprehension tasks. 
 Control 
 (n=14) 
RHD  
(n=14) 
LHD 
 (n=14) 
Inference of attitude/motive (max. = 10)    
         - Spontaneous responses          Mean:                        9.00 7.29 c† 8.07 
                                                            S. D:                  1.3 1.20 2.13 
          -Modified responses                Mean:                       9.57 7.93c* l*  8.93 
                                                             S. D:              .65 1.27 1.21 
Revised inference (max. = 8)    
         - Spontaneous responses          Mean:                     6.86 4.79 c† 4.57 c† 
                                                             S. D:             1.03 1.81 1.60 
          -Modified responses                Mean:                        7.0 5.43 c* 5.64 c* 
                                                             S. D:             1.11 1.79 1.15 
Note:  c† = Result differs significantly from Control group result at .01 level. c* = Result differs 
significantly from Control group result at .05 level, l* = Result differs significantly from LHD group 
result at .05 level. 
 
 
On modified responses, both the LHD group and the Control group performed 
significantly better than the RHD group on tasks requiring an inference of a character’s 
attitude/motive.  
The tasks requiring revised inference were the most difficult ones for all three 
groups. The Control group managed to perform both kinds of tasks fairly well and their 
performance on revised inference was significantly better than both the RHD group’s (z 
= -3.238, p = .001), and the LHD group’s (z = -3.463, p = .001). The LHD group made 
slightly more inadequate spontaneous responses than the RHD group on this kind of 
task, but the difference was not statistically significant (p = .624). The LHD group’s 
mean score on questions that depend on a revised inference 4.57, compared to 4.79 in 
the RHD group. 
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The RHD group made fewer spontaneous correct responses than either the Control 
group or the LHD group when the task required inference of a character’s 
attitude/motive, and this difference is statistically significant between the RHD group 
and the Control group (z = -3.105, p = .002), although not between the LHD and RHD 
groups ( p= .038). 
Since several individuals in the LHD group performed so much better in their 
modified responses concerning explicit information after reading the texts, the 
spontaneous responses were further analysed: the inadequate spontaneous responses 
were classified as inadequate due to either no inference expressed or an inadequate 
inference expressed; see table 2:3:4. On questions that depended on inference of a 
character’s attitude/motive, 60 responses in total were judged as to be inadequate. Thirty 
of those responses were inadequate due to no inference expressed and 30 due to an 
incorrect inference expressed.  
 
Table 2:3:4: Group results as a percentage of responses where either no inference was made or an 
incorrect inference were made.  
Inference of attitude/motive 
 n=60 inadequate responses 
Control group 
(11 inadequate) 
LHD group  
(20 inadequate) 
RHD group  
(29 inadequate) 
No inference expressed, n=30 3% 53% 43% 
Incorrect inference expressed,      
n=30 
33% 13% 53% 
Revised inference 
 n=105 inadequate responses  
Control group 
(16 inadequate) 
LHD group 
 (45 inadequate) 
RHD group  
(44 inadequate) 
No inference expressed, n= 31 9% 68% 23% 
Incorrect inference expressed, 
n=74 
18% 32% 50% 
Note: Number of inadequate responses within each group in parentheses. 
 
 
The RHD group made a total of 29 inadequate responses to questions depending on 
inference of a character’s attitude/motive, the LHD group made 20 and the Control 
group made the remaining 11. The analysis showed that the RHD group produced more 
incorrect inferences than both the other groups: 53% of the 30 incorrect inferences 
expressed. 
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When it comes to questions that depend on revised inference, the pattern is the 
same. Although the LHD group made slightly more inadequate responses, the RHD 
group produced more of the responses that were inadequate due to an incorrect 
inference expressed. In the LHD group, responses were more often classified as 
inadequate due to no inference expressed. That is, the individuals in the LHD group 
were more likely to suspend their inference until after they had read the narratives than 
either of the other groups. 
On questions that depend on explicit information the LHD group benefited a lot 
from the chance to modify their responses. However, the pattern is different when it 
comes to questions that depend on implicit information. As in questions depending on 
explicit information, the LHD individuals tend to modify their responses to a higher 
degree than both the Control group and the RHD group (see table 2:3:5), although the 
differences were not statistically significant (p= .529). In all three groups, a few 
individuals were responsible for most of the modifications. In the LHD, group 12 
persons modified 52 responses to questions requiring inference. Two persons produced 
28 of these modified responses.  
 
Table 2:3:5. Group mean and standard deviations for texts read and responses changed into correct 
responses or still inadequate responses related to implicit information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eleven individuals in the RHD group modified 27 responses on questions requiring 
inference.  Three RHD individuals produced 17 of these 27 modified responses. In the 
Control group, three persons made 13 of the 17 modifications. 
Subjects n Number of 
texts read 
Number of 
responses 
modified that 
related to 
implicit 
information 
Number of  
responses 
changed into  
correct  
responses  
Number of  
responses  
still 
inadequate  
after 
modification 
  Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. 
Control  14 5.57 4.53 1.21 1.81 .93 1.64 .29 .61 
RHD  14 4.79 3.53 1.93 1.54 1.64 1.28 .21 .58 
LHD 14 7.29 2.92 3.71 4.62 2.48 2.95 1.29 1.90 
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The individuals in the RHD group were more successful than the individuals in the 
LHD group when they actually tried to modify their responses. In the RHD group, only 
two persons failed to modify 3 inadequate responses to make them correct. That is, 85% 
of the modified responses were correct. In the LHD group, eight persons failed to 
change 17 responses into correct ones. This means that only 67% of the modified 
responses correct after modification, compared to 91% of modified responses on 
questions dependent on explicit information. Importantly though, only two persons 
produced 11 of these still inadequate responses. In the Control group, three persons 
failed to modify 4 responses into correct responses to questions requiring inference.  
 
2.3.1.3 Impact of frequency of meaning in revised inference 
 
In tasks requiring revised inference, two different directions of revision were 
anticipated: in two narratives, a less frequent meaning had to be revised to a more 
frequent meaning, and in two narratives, a more frequent meaning had to be exchanged 
for a less frequent meaning. As can be seen in table 2:3:6, the groups produced 
somewhat fewer errors (45 compared to 61 errors) when the revision involved replacing 
a less frequent meaning with a more frequent one than when they had to replace a more 
frequent interpretation with a less frequent one, which could be expected to be more 
difficult.  
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Table 2:3:6: Number of errors produced in spontaneous responses by each group for narratives 
containing an ambiguous word revised in one of two different directions 
Direction of revision 
required 
Number of inadequate responses 
Control 
(n=14) 
RHD 
(n=14) 
LHD 
(n=14) 
Total 
Less frequent meaning 
revised to more frequent one  
(4 questions) 
6  19  20  45 
More frequent meaning 
revised to less frequent one 
(4 questions) 
8  26 27 61 
 
 
However, the difference in the number of errors in the two directions was not 
statistically significant (p = .158) and the material is limited to eight questions in all. The 
patterns within and between the groups are the same regardless of the frequency of the 
meanings.  
 
2.3.1.4 Summary and discussion of results for Discourse Comprehension 
 
Overall, the results obtained are in accordance with the preliminary hypotheses. The two 
groups of brain-damaged individuals and the Control group perform differently on 
Discourse Comprehension tasks. The successful performance by all three groups of tasks 
that depend on explicit information indicates that any problems in tasks that depend on 
implicit information are not due to deficits in more automatic linguistic processing, for 
example, access to the dominant meaning of words. Nevertheless, although the 
difference is not statistically significant, the individuals in the LHD group have more 
problems than either of the other groups with questions that depend on explicitly stated 
facts. All the LHD individuals performed well on a neurolinguistic aphasia test, but in 
the view adopted here of the interaction between different cognitive systems in complex 
cognitive processing, it is not fruitful to try distinguish between problems due to 
restrictions on semantic access and other cognitive problems such as VWM deficits in 
analysing the results of a comprehension task. Compensatory strategies also affect the 
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outcome of tests. The LHD individuals’ responses on questions depending on explicit 
information were facilitated when they had an opportunity to read the texts. In their 
modified responses, the LHD group performed at approximately the same level as the 
RHD group on tasks that depended on explicit information and revised inference and 
slightly better than the RHD group on tasks dependent on inference of a characters 
attitude/motive.  
The RHD group used the opportunity to read the narratives and modify the 
responses about as often as the individuals in the Control group. The difference is that 
the Control group performed well and did not need to modify their responses to the same 
extent as the individuals in the RHD group; their responses were mostly adequate 
already. The significantly poorer results on the tasks among the individuals in the RHD 
group, together with the number of texts read and modified, indicate that they were not 
fully aware that their responses were sometimes inadequate. 
The Control group performed significantly better than both the LHD and RHD 
groups on tasks requiring revised inference. The Control group also performed 
significantly better than the RHD group on tasks depending on inference of a 
character’s attitude/motive. This indicates that, as was hypothesised, there are 
qualitative differences in the comprehension of discourse between the groups of brain-
damaged individuals depending on the type of inference required. That is, the RHD 
individuals have more trouble than the LHD individuals comprehending discourse that 
involves inferences of a character’s attitude/motive, although the difference between the 
RHD group and the LHD group was statistically significant only in their modified 
responses. This result differs from results obtained by Tompkins et al. (1994), where 
RHD individuals performed as well as LHD individuals and healthy controls on tasks 
requiring inference of characters’ attitudes. 
The individuals in the LHD group tended to wait to make their inferences until after 
they had read the narratives to a higher degree than the other groups. However, the 
subjects were told in advance that they would be given a chance to read the narratives 
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and modify their responses. The analysis of the number of modified responses that were 
correct after modification showed that at least two of the LHD subjects had problems 
with revised inference in particular, even when given the chance to read the texts and 
modify their responses. The RHD individuals as a group tended to be able to correct 
their responses to a greater degree than the LHD individuals as a group, at least when 
they took advantage of the opportunity to modify their responses. It is not possible to say 
whether more of the spontaneous responses produced by the LHD individuals as a group 
would have been adequate if they had not been given the possibility to modify them. 
Neither is it possible to conclude whether some of the RHD individuals would have been 
able to improve their results on tasks requiring inference if they had made more use of 
the opportunity to read the texts and try to modify their responses.  
The statistically significant differences between the Control group and the LHD 
group on tasks requiring revised inference reflect the fact that the LHD group performed 
at the same level as the RHD group on those tasks. This is perhaps not surprising since 
these tasks may depend on access to, and flexible processing of, lexical-semantic 
information. Although this represented a complex task for all three groups, the brain-
damaged individuals, irrespective of whether the damage was in the right or left 
hemisphere, might be vulnerable because they lack access to semantic information due 
to ineffective retrieval cues and because of constraints in the form of limited resources 
and inflexibility of basic cognitive functions or of compound cognitive processing.  
When the test material was constructed, the possibility was considered that it would 
be more difficult to change a more frequent meaning to a less frequent meaning than 
vice versa. Even though there was a difference in the number of inadequate responses, 
the results of this study cannot fully confirm that possibility. The difference was not 
statistically significant and the material is very limited. However, it is likely that other 
variables in the texts and questions also influence the difficulty of the tasks. 
Furthermore, the frequency measures collected from the speech and text corpora might 
not reflect a true difference in frequency of use of a specific denotation in real life. It is 
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also very likely that for commonly used words and denotations, frequency of use is less 
important when the word is used in a certain context. Although the inconsistent 
narratives with ambiguous words were worded in a way that made it possible to infer 
both of the possible denotations from the first part of the text, the last sentence’s impact 
on the processing of coherence inferences probably overrules the frequency of use of a 
specific denotation.  
 
2.3.2 Test of visual neglect syndrome 
 
The neglect tests were performed to control for a possible asymmetric disorder in 
visuospatial attention that might indicate a general attentional dysfunction and also 
affect performances on the other tasks. 
 
2.3.2.1 Results on neglect tests 
 
Participants in all three groups all participants handled Albert’s crossing out test well. 
One participant in the RHD group initially omitted two lines at the left of the sheet, but 
noticed and corrected them after the other lines had been crossed out.  
None of the participants omitted any lines in Schenkenberg´s line bisection test. As 
shown in table 2:3:7, all three groups obtained more negative than positive scores, which 
reflects a tendency for all groups to mark the lines to the left of the true half.  
 
TABLE 2:3:7: Group results for calculated percent deviation score, in mean and standard deviation, for 
Schenkenberg’s line bisection test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Control  
(n=13) 
RHD 
 (n=13) 
LHD  
(n=13) 
Percent deviation score    
                                Mean:                                                                                              -0.56 -1.74 -1.10
                                  S. D:                                                 3.04 5.18 3.39 
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The participants in the RHD group, some of them whom manifested persistent 
visuospatial neglect, tended to produce left-of-centre marks to an even higher degree 
than the participants in the other groups, although the difference was non-significant (p 
= .739).  
 
2.3.2.2 Summary and discussion of results on neglect tests 
 
Although only 50% of the participants in the RHD group had or had had symptoms of 
visual neglect, it was expected that they would produce a higher degree of right-of 
centre marks than the other groups. However, the trend in the RHD group to produce 
left-of centre marks instead might be explained by a normalisation in most of the RHD 
individuals and a tendency to overcompensate by some of them: the only subject with 
noticeable problems on Albert’s crossing out test, was the subject who had the highest 
negative percent deviation score of all the participants. The participants who either had 
had fairly transient symptoms of visuospatial neglect or were still experiencing 
symptoms of neglect seemed to be well aware of the deficit. Most of them were several 
years post-stroke and they might have learned to adjust their behaviour. Nevertheless, 
the results on this task indicate that, as a group, the RHD individuals are not affected by 
an obvious neglect syndrome that could be the result of an attentional deficit. 
 
2.3.3 Associations of VWM and sustained attention with results on 
Discourse Comprehension tasks 
 
To analyse the possibility that variations in VWM or sustained attention might be 
associated with the significantly different results in Discourse Comprehension tasks, 
correlation analysis and multiple linear regression analysis were performed, the results 
of which will be presented here. First, between-group differences on VWM tasks and the 
SART will be presented.  
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2.3.3.1 Group comparisons on VWM tasks and SART 
 
Two measures were obtained from the VWM task: number of word recall errors and 
number of true/false errors. The participants in the Control group did not make any 
true/false errors. The individuals in the LHD group made one error, and three RHD 
individuals made four errors. Altogether, true/false errors were so rare that any further 
statistical analyses seemed irrelevant.  
The Control group performed better and recalled more correct words than the RHD 
group and the LHD group (table 2:3:8). 
 
Table 2:3:8: Group results on VWM task 
 Mean 
VWM 
errors 
S.D. Median Range 
Control (n=14) 8.2 4.5 7.5 0-17 
RHD (n=14) 13.1 6.63 13 5-24 
LHD (n=14) 14.1 c 5.1 12 9-23 
Note:  c = Result differs significantly from Control group result at .01 level. 
 
Post hoc tests revealed that only the difference between the LHD group and the Control 
group was statistically significant (z = -2.650, p = .008). The LHD group made 
somewhat more errors than the RHD group although this difference was very small and 
not statistically significant (p = .571). 
Although some of the subjects who performed well on the task reported that they 
managed to recall the words by quiet phonological rehearsal, most of the individuals 
with the best results used a conscious strategy to try to construct a representation, such 
as a verbal sentence or a visual context, that could hold the different items together. The 
subjects who had the most trouble either reported that they had tried to repeat the words 
but had not been successful, or that they had not used any conscious strategy. 
Statistical analysis of the different measurements from SART revealed a significant 
difference in reaction times between groups, and the post hoc test indicated that only the 
differences between the RHD group and the Control group on Mean reaction time in test 
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was significant (z = -3.078, p = .002); see table 2:3:9. (The p-values obtained for the 
other SART measurements varied between .153 and .917.) 
The Control group actually made slightly more Erroneous responses and also 
omitted slightly more responses than the other groups, although the difference was not 
statistically significant (p = .158).  
 
Table 2:3:9: Group results, in means and standard deviations, for SART measures  
 Control  
(n =14) 
RHD  
(n = 14) 
LHD  
(n =14) 
 Mean reaction time in test        Mean:                                                     349.8 470.2 c 427.0 
                                                       S. D.:               64.6 98.8 103.0 
Difference in reaction time between 
the first and second halves of the test     
                                                      Mean:                                                                  
 
 
-17.30
 
 
-24.35
 
 
-18.28
                                                       S. D.:                34.33 61.83 55.10 
Variation in reaction time in the test 
(variance)                                    Mean:                             
 
7738 
 
10764 
 
16078 
                                                       S. D.:              6728 6655 13631 
Number of correct responses  
(max. = 200)                                  
Mean:                              
 
182.7 
 
183.9 
 
187.4 
                                                       S. D.:               16.87 17.20 11.46 
Number of errors  
(max. = 25)                                    
Mean:                               
 
11.36 
 
9.00 
 
10.00 
                                                       S. D.:               4.09 4.98 5.44 
 Control  
(n =12) 
RHD  
(n = 12) 
LHD  
(n =12) 
Feedback time                             Mean:                                   -8.51 -49.84 -55.4 
                                                       S. D.:               53.41 91.03 68.75 
Note:  c = Result differs significantly from Control group result at .01 level 
 
The Control group also had a shorter Feedback time than the groups of brain-damaged 
individuals. That is, they tended to not slow down to the same extent as the other groups 
after making errors on the SART, although the difference in Feedback time was not 
statistically significant ( p= .427). 
As could be expected of a test of sustained attention, all three groups produced 
somewhat slower reaction times on the second half of the test. The RHD group had the 
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largest Difference in reaction time between the first and second halves of the test 
although this difference was not statistically significant within any group (p-values 
obtained were between .124 and .300), or between the groups (p = .917). The slower 
reaction times on the second half of the SART were not reflected in an increase in 
number of omitted responses or erroneous responses.  
 
2.3.3.2 Results of correlation analysis and multiple regression 
 
As the results on revised inference were statistically different for the control group and 
both groups of brain-damaged individuals and the results on inference of a character’s 
attitude/motive were statistically different for the Control and RHD groups, the 
associations between these results and the results on the VWM task and the SART were 
analysed; see table 2:3:10.  
 
TABLE 2:3:10: Correlation coefficients for the three groups between VWM error score and Mean 
reaction time, Correct and Erroneous responses in the SART and spontaneous responses on the 
different Discourse Comprehension tasks. (Statistically non-significant correlation coefficients are 
presented within parentheses.) 
VWM error score Control  
(n =14) 
RHD  
(n = 14) 
LHD 
 (n = 14) 
                   - Inference of attitude/motive  (-.50) (-.23) (-.53) 
                           - Revised inferences  (.02) (-.01) -.65*  
Correct responses in SART    
                    - Inference of attitude/motive  (-.11) (.12) (.26) 
                           - Revised inferences (-.25) .74** (.32) 
Erroneous responses in SART    
                    - Inference of attitude/motive  (-.15) (.38) -.69** 
                           - Revised inferences (-.18) -.60* (-.26) 
Mean reaction time in SART    
                    - Inference of attitude/motive  -.59* (-.40) (.13) 
                           - Revised inferences (-.09) (-.06) (.12) 
 
Note: Negative correlations reflect the inverse association between error scores on VWM measure or 
erroneous responses in the SART and correct responses on Discourse Comprehension tasks.  
** = Values that exceed -.66 are significantly different from 0 (p < .01). 
*   = Values that exceed -.54 but not -.66 are judged to reflect tendencies.  
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In the LHD group, the only association found was a strong tendency to a correlation 
between results on revised inference and results on the VWM task (rSpearman=-.65).8 This 
is also displayed in the scatter plot in figure 2:3:1, which shows the associations between 
the results on revised inference and VWM for individuals in all three groups. 
 
Figure 2:3:1: Associations between results on revised inference and VWM at an individual level in all 
three groups. 
VWM error
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Figure 2:3:1 shows that the individual associations in the LHD group are more uniform 
than it is in the RHD group. 
                                                 
8 When the results from inference of a character’s attitude/motive were included in the analysis, the 
association was statistically significant (rSpearman=-.71), indicating an association between VWM and 
inference tasks in general. There was also a strong association between results on inference of a 
character’s attitude/motive and Erroneous responses in the SART, but as the LHD group and the 
Control group did not differ significantly in this regard, these results will not be further discussed here. 
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In the RHD group, both the results on revised inference tasks and inference of a 
character’s attitude/motive were significantly different from the Control group’s results, 
and therefore an analysis of correlation was performed on both kinds of tasks: there is a 
strong association between results on revised inference and Number of correct responses 
in the SART. Figure 2:3:2 shows that the individuals in the RHD group with a high 
number of Correct responses in the SART also have a high number of correct 
spontaneous responses on tasks requiring revised inference. 
 
Figure 2:3:2: Associations between results on revised inference and Correct responses in the SART at 
an individual level in all three groups. 
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Figure 2:3:2 also shows that the individuals in the Control group generally perform 
better than both groups of brain-damaged individuals on revised inference.  
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In the RHD group, there is also a strong tendency toward an association between 
revised inference and Erroneous responses in the SART but no correlations between 
results on either the VWM task or measures from the SART and results on inference of a 
character’s attitude/motive. 
The only tendency to association seen in the Control group is between Mean 
reaction time in the SART and inference of a character’s attitude/motive. This is 
displayed in figure 2:3:3. 
 
Figure 2:3:3: Associations between results on inference of a character’s attitude/motive and Mean 
reaction time in the SART at an individual level in all three groups. 
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As figure 2:3:3 shows, the results for the individuals in the LHD group are not 
associated at all with Mean reaction time in SART, while there does seem to be some 
tendency toward association for at least some of the individuals in the RHD group. 
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To investigate whether there was any interaction between the different variables 
that could be associated with, or predict the results on the different Discourse 
Comprehension tasks, multiple regression analyses were performed. Except for an 
interaction within the results for the Control group together with the results for the RHD 
group (see below), those analyses revealed the same associations as were displayed in 
the within group correlation analyses. That is, when results for the Controls and the 
RHD group were analysed, results on tasks requiring revised inference can be predicted 
by Number of correct responses in the SART when RHD is present (RI = -7.456 – 1.831 
RHD  + 0.076correct SART, adjusted R2 = 0.58, p= .000), and by results on the VWM task when 
LHD is present (RI = 7.796 – 0.131 VWM - 1.432 LHD,   adjusted R2 = 0.50, p= .000). 
In the RHD group, no significant correlations were found between results on tasks 
requiring inference of a character’s attitude/motive and the measures of basic cognitive 
functions. However, the results of the multiple regression analysis indicated that Mean 
reaction time in the SART and Feedback time predicted results on those tasks (A/M = 
11.833 – 0.009 mean RT + 0.007 Feedback time, adjusted R2 = 0.53, p= .000). That is, if 
Feedback times for two subjects in the Control group or the RHD group are the same but 
Mean reaction time in test is one millisecond slower for one of them, that individual’s 
results on inference of a character’s attitude/motive will decrease by 0.01 points. The 
correlation analysis indicated that the only association between spontaneous responses 
on tasks that require inference of a character’s attitude/motive and Mean reaction time 
in the SART is a tendency within the Control group (rSpearman=-.59, p= .025). No 
tendencies to associations were found between Feedback time and Discourse 
Comprehension tasks in correlation analysis for any group. However, there was a 
tendency to correlation between Feedback time and Mean reaction time in the SART, 
(rSpearman= -.62, p= .033) in the Control group. 
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2.3.3.3 Summary and discussion of results of analysis of associations 
 
In general, the results are in accordance with the hypotheses. As hypothesised, there are 
associations between the measures of VWM and sustained attention and results on 
Discourse Comprehension tasks. There are also qualitative differences between the 
groups of brain-damaged individuals: in the LHD group, results on the VWM task can 
predict results on tasks requiring revised inference. Among the RHD individuals, 
sustained attention is strongly associated with results on tasks that require revised 
inference. On tasks requiring inference of a character’s attitude/motive, there was no 
association with sustained attention in the RHD group; however, vigilance and the 
ability to achieve an alert state might play an important role.  
The associations between results on inference tasks and results on Correct and 
Erroneous responses in the SART indicate that sustained attention does play for the 
RHD group some role in tasks that require revised inference. Robertson et al. (1997a) 
and Manly et al. (1999) only consider the number of Erroneous responses in the SART 
as a measure of sustained attention. However, Chan (2001) found that number of 
Correct responses also discriminated between groups of brain-damaged individuals and 
healthy controls and correlated with other established measures of sustained attention.  
The fact that the Control group performs significantly better than the LHD group on 
the VWM task supports the hypothesis that deficits in VWM play an essential role in the 
LHD subject’s problems in making spontaneous adequate inferences. A significantly 
different result on SART tasks between the Control group and the RHD group is only 
obtained from Mean reaction time in the SART. Although several individuals in the 
LHD group had some degree of persistent sensorimotor dysfunction in their right hand, 
the RHD group had the slowest Mean reaction times in the SART. Mean reaction time 
in the SART might be considered as a measure of vigilance, described as the ability to 
achieve and maintain an alert state in Fernandez-Duque and Posner’s model (2000) of 
the human attention system. Robertson et al. (1997a) consider a faster reaction time 
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before Erroneous responses in the SART to constitute an indicator of declining 
attention. However, the measure Mean reaction time in the SART used here is a measure 
of mean reaction times obtained throughout the entire test and this measure corresponds 
more to a type of vigilance task or test of phasic arousal, as described by Rueckert and 
Grafman (1996), where slow reaction times are considered to be a measure of decreased 
vigilance or arousal. Although the degree of alertness or arousal referred to here is far 
beyond what is measured by gross scales for assessment of overall responsiveness, like 
the Glasgow Coma Scale (Jennett and Teasdale, 1977) or the Reaction Level Scale 85 
(Starmark, Stålhammar and Holmgren, 1988), reduced alertness restricts the ability to 
quickly process any stimuli and this might be one possible explanation of the RHD 
individuals’ performance on the inference tasks.  The RHD group also had the largest 
Difference in reaction time between the first and second halves of the test, indicating a 
difficulty in maintaining the alert state over time.  
In tasks that require inference of a character’s attitude/motive, the importance of 
sufficient vigilance or level of phasic arousal is supported by the results from the 
multiple regression analyses, although the results for individuals in the Control group 
may influence and strengthen those associations beyond what is actually accounted for 
by the RHD individuals (see below). However, neither the Control group nor the RHD 
group is shown to be an important predictor variable in the results from the multiple 
regression analysis. This can be interpreted as indicating that, in predicting results on 
inference of a character’s attitude/motive, Mean reaction time and Feedback time are 
more important predictor variables than whether the individual has right-hemisphere 
brain damage or not.  
However, it is difficult to explain the significance of the variable Feedback time in 
the multiple regression analysis of results on tasks requiring inference of a character’s 
attitude/motive in the Control group and the RHD group. Feedback time might be 
interpreted as a measure of a supervisory component of attention as it reflects an attempt 
to slow down one’s speed on the test after making errors (Manly et al., 1999). This is 
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interesting in itself as Feedback time could therefore be considered as a measure of 
aspects of executive control. As indicated by mean Feedback time, the Control subjects 
in this study do not slow down after making an erroneous response as much as the brain-
damaged individuals do, although the difference between the Control group and the 
groups of brain-damaged individuals was not statistically significant. The tendency 
toward an association between Feedback time and Mean reaction time in the correlation 
analysis for the Control group reflects the finding that short Mean reaction times are 
associated with a tendency to either keep up the high speed or even increase the pace 
instead of slowing down after mistakenly pressing the response key when the number 3 
is presented in the SART.  
It is possible that individuals with short reaction times also have dysfunctional 
executive functions, preventing them from slowing down when they are obviously going 
too fast and making erroneous responses. A deficit like this might also reveal itself in 
inadequate responses to questions that require inference of a character’s attitude or 
motive. It is, however, likely that an association of this kind would be more apparent in 
groups of brain-damaged individuals than in a group of non-brain damaged controls and 
that it would become noticeable in other kinds of tasks too. As a whole, the results for 
estimated ability to sustain attention on a whole in this study are somewhat surprising. 
Although the differences were small and not significant, the Control group seemed to be 
going too fast, making more errors than both groups of brain-damaged individuals, and 
they seemed to be somewhat reluctant to slow down even after making Erroneous 
responses. The Control group also omitted more correct responses. The tendency toward 
an association between Feedback time and Mean reaction time in the Control group does 
not reveal any information about how many Erroneous responses or omitted responses 
these specific individuals produced in the SART. There are no significant associations 
between Feedback time and those measures, which makes it difficult to infer the 
significance at a group level, if any, of the association revealed in the correlation and 
regression analysis. The interpretation of short Feedback time as indicating a deficit in 
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executive function is only relevant if the same individual who has a short Mean reaction 
time and is reluctant to slow down the pace, is actually going too fast and producing 
many Erroneous responses in the SART. Furthermore, several individuals in all three 
groups stated that they strategically pressed the button faster after a number 3 had been 
presented, no matter whether they had made an erroneous response or correctly withheld 
a response. This was done because they did not expect the target to be presented twice 
times in a row. Consequently, low mean Feedback time might reflect an ability to plan 
strategically – another aspect of executive function.  
 
2. 4 General discussion: Studies 1 and 2 
 
In this section, the results of studies 1 and 2 will first be compared and discussed in light 
of current theories of cognition and the causes of deficits in comprehension and other 
dysfunctional pragmatic abilities described in RHD individuals. After that, the results 
will be discussed in relation to the methods and models used in this study.  
 
2.4.1 Results in relation to current theories 
 
Understanding the causes of pragmatic dysfunction requires a holistic and 
interactionistic perspective on the mechanisms involved. Several cognitive aspects may 
be involved and they may interact with compensatory strategies and other factors 
operating within the individual and between the individual and the environment. The 
results of studies 1 and 2 are here discussed against the background of different 
theoretical frameworks in an attempt to broaden the perspective from single mechanisms 
to global processes involved. General alertness and the ability to sustain attention are 
fundamental elements of human cognition. Any dysfunction here might affect more 
complex cognitive processes and possibly also play a role in some of the theoretical 
models proposed to explain pragmatic deficits in association with RHD.  
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2.4.1.1 Sustained attention and theories about pragmatic deficits in RHD 
 
In study 2, associations between the ability to make inferences and attention were 
investigated.  
Both the RHD group and the LHD group in this study had problems with tasks 
requiring revised inference. In the RHD group, these results were associated with 
sustained attention. There was also an indication that problems with inference of a 
character’s attitude/motive for the RHD group, and the Control group, might be 
associated with an attention/arousal component of the attention system. RHD might 
cause attentional deficits – more specifically, deficits in sustained attention and spatial 
orienting – although it is not possible in a test situation to completely separate even 
executive function from other attention systems.  
There is an established view of the right hemisphere as being superior at processing 
the macrostructure of stimuli, leaving the processing of details to the left hemisphere. 
Martin and McDonald (2003) discuss whether the inference problems seen in 
association with RHD result from a general impairment of a right-hemisphere 
processing style that enables the processing of information as a coherent whole. Studies 
by Brownell et al. (1986) and Moya, Benowitz, Levine, and Finklestein (1986) have 
suggested that inference-making in general is impaired in RHD individuals. However, 
when Happé et al. (1999) directly compared ability to generate inferences about mental 
state versus general inferencing ability in RHD individuals, the problem was found to be 
restricted to mental inferences. However, the results of study 1 support the notion that 
the inferencing problem is not restricted to mental inferences. 
Dysfunctional sustained attention or arousal might cause that an individual to miss 
important social cues or signals in discourse that are essential for an adequate 
comprehension of the situation. In light of the construction-integration model of 
comprehension, this will cause a distorted situational model because some associations 
will not be activated or information that might have strengthened an activation enough 
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to take part in the integration process is missing. Consequently, the person’s 
comprehension of the discourse or situation will not be coherent or adequate. 
The association between revised inference and sustained attention in the RHD 
group in study 2 might support the Suppression deficit hypothesis, described by 
Tompkins et al. (1999). A deficit in sustained attention might have impact on the ability 
to revise inferences, as information that would support one interpretation over the other 
might be missing. This would make the suppression process difficult, as several 
meanings might then have the same activation strength. Dysfunctional VWM capacity 
may also have some impact here, but this association was only seen in the LHD group. 
However, based on the stimuli and results of the present study, it is only possible to 
speculate about the RHD individuals’ ability to either activate or suppress meaning. 
Another way of viewing the result might start with Ramachandran’s (1995) 
hypothesised right-hemisphere anomaly detector, combined with a left-hemisphere 
coherence mechanism, as described by Gazzaniga and Cooney (2003). Normally those 
mechanisms bridge most of the gaps that might result from a deficit in sustained 
attention or a normal temporary decline in attention. However, if right-hemisphere brain 
damage is present, problems arise when the missing information depends on right-
hemisphere processing. According to the coarse semantic coding theory described by 
Beeman (1998) and Beeman et al. (2000), the right hemisphere maintains activation of 
many possible meanings for a longer period of time than the left hemisphere when 
processing a word. As a result, the right hemisphere increases the semantic overlap 
among multiple semantic fields. It may also function to maintain activation for 
peripherally related information. That kind of information may be essential for making 
correct coherence inferences out of subtle communication signals, such as certain 
associations with different nuances of the meaning of words. It might also be dependent 
on a functional right-hemisphere processing since the more selective left hemisphere 
semantic processes quickly inhibit information that is not related in an obvious way.  
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The coarse semantic coding theory in combination with Ramachandran’s (1995) 
and Gazzaniga and Cooney’s (2003) theories, might perhaps explain why there are 
significant associations between the measure of sustained attention and results on tasks 
requiring revised inference in the RHD group, despite the fact that there are no 
significant differences between the RHD and Control group’s results on the SART. 
Sustained attention is one important factor in the processing of the tasks, but lapses in 
attention may become critical to processing only in combination with the RHD. In 
general, the RHD individuals need not have poorer sustained attention than the Control 
group to produce significantly less adequate responses in the tasks requiring revised 
inference. The RHD individuals might actually not experience more lapses in sustained 
attention than the individuals in the Control group. Nevertheless, when these, quite 
normal slips of the mind occur in an individual with RHD, he or she cannot compensate 
with an anomaly detector or coherence mechanism in the same way as a healthy 
individual in the Control group might. The RHD prevents the activation of relevant 
information, such as certain word associations, in maintaining the activation of a 
competing dominant meaning of an ambiguous word.  
 
2.4.1.2 Social inference, executive function and right hemisphere hypothesis 
 
It was hypothesised that problems making correct inference of a character’s attitude or 
motive might be the result of an attentional deficit. Sustained attention is considered to 
be a basic attentional function motivated by stimulus anticipation; it is important for the 
efficacy of cognitive capacity in general. It might be essential to the ability to detect and 
select relevant stimuli from among social cues in discourse. Although there were 
indications that level of arousal, as measured by Mean reaction time on the test, might 
predict results on questions requiring inference of a character’s attitude or motive, there 
was no association between the results for these questions and the results for the 
sustained attention task in the RHD individuals. That might be explained by this type of 
  108 
task’s being less cognitively demanding than the tasks that require revised inference; on 
the other hand, there was a strong association between the results on this task and ability 
to sustain attention, that is, Erroneous responses in the SART, in the LHD group, which 
actually had less trouble with that task than the RHD group.  
Since the RHD group has problems managing the tasks that require inference of a 
character’s attitude/motive almost to the same extent as they do in handling the 
questions requiring revised inference, it seems relevant to speculate that there might be 
another reason, more important than limited attentional resources, for their problems 
making correct inferences of a character’s attitudes or motives. The reduced level of 
arousal, as indicated by Mean reaction time in the SART, could of course be expected to 
have some impact on performance on this task, but no such association was reflected in 
the correlation analysis for the RHD group. 
Dysfunctional ability to make what are sometimes called mental inferences, as a 
reflection of ToM, might also be considered as a possible cause of problems with the 
task. According to Siegal and Varley (2002), impaired executive function could cause a 
deficit in ToM. Since this study does not include any specific measure of executive 
function capacity, it is not possible to draw any conclusions about this higher-level 
cognitive function in the subjects in the RHD group. Executive function is usually 
associated with frontal brain damage and only three individuals in the RHD group had 
frontal lesions. On the other hand in the model of the human attention system described 
by Fernandez-Duque and Posner (2001) the executive attention system is claimed to be 
anatomically based on distributed structures including portions of the basal ganglia and 
thalamus. Case reports by Summers (2002) and Rainville, Giroire, Periot, Cuny, and 
Mazaux (2003) concerning individuals with right thalamus damage, or damage 
involving other subcortical structures, have shown deficits in executive function. None 
of the subjects in the RHD group had damage restricted to the thalamus but at least five 
of them have brain damage in close connection with or involving the basal ganglia. On 
the other hand, the results for Erroneous responses in the SART speak against the notion 
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of a general executive dysfunction as a cause of the problems making adequate 
inferences of a character’s attitude or motive. As discussed above, this might be 
considered as more of a measure of inhibitory control, which is also seen as a 
mechanism of executive function. The RHD individuals actually produce fewer 
Erroneous responses in the SART than either of the other groups and there are no 
associations with results on inference of a character’s attitude/motive seen in the 
correlation or regression analyses. 
The fact that tasks requiring inference of a character’s attitude or motive were more 
difficult for the RHD group than for the other groups might fit in with the right 
hemisphere hypothesis of processing of emotional stimuli, as described by Borod et al. 
(2002). According to the right hemisphere hypothesis, the right hemisphere is 
considered more suitable for processing these kinds of stimuli since subtle emotional 
information is often is dependent on non-verbal, visuospatial organisation and synthetic 
and holistic strategies, such as body communication or prosody. Advocates of this 
hypothesis put forward RHD individuals’ deficits in identifying emotion in facial 
expressions and prosody as well as in linguistic stimuli, especially when subcortical 
structures are involved in the damage (Karow et al., 2001). Among the RHD subjects in 
this study, at least 50% have damage to subcortical structures of the right hemisphere.  
Why then would identification of linguistic descriptions of attitudes and motives in 
discourse or an emotional semantic lexicon depend on the right hemisphere when 
language in so many other senses is associated with the left hemisphere? According to 
Adolphs (1999), a ToM approach to social cognition might be applicable when stimuli 
are encoded in language. Nevertheless, it is hypothesised here that when it comes to 
stimuli in the form of implicitly stated material in discourse, the competing view of 
social inference must also be considered. In this latter approach, the ability to recognise 
and reason about other people’s state of mind is apprehended as an example of 
experience projection through simulation. This view also emphasises the role of the right 
hemisphere in the process as the importance of the right somatosensory cortex is 
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acknowledged together with the right and left amygdalae and ventromedial frontal 
cortex. Virtually every concept or word in the semantic lexicon is probably encoded and 
stored with certain emotional and attitudinal information. According to Van Lancker and 
Pachana (1998), there is evidence that the right hemisphere organises its lexicon 
according to contextual, affective and idiosyncratic or personalised principles. In higher 
perceptual functions, the processing of different aspects of, for example, visual stimuli 
and object recognition is dependent on distributed structures within the brain (Gazzaniga 
et al., 2002). In the same way, the activation of a concept, as a referent of a word used in 
discourse, involves not only the activation of the most common or dominant meanings 
of that word. It also includes the activation of various more or less idiosyncratic 
associations. As discussed by Damasio (1999), in recalling an object, associations like 
the sensory and perceptual features as well as relevant motor and emotional reactions, 
some based on the individual’s personal experiences, are also activated in some sense, 
although not all of these activations reach the conscious mind. Perhaps Adolphs and 
Damasio’s (2000) notion of right hemisphere specialisation in interpreting facial 
expressions applies to processing the emotional semantic lexicon as well. In their view, 
there is evidence that the right hemisphere is specialised for representing the body. The 
ability to form a mental somatosensory image can trigger other knowledge, both in 
image form and encoded in language, which makes it possible to understand facial 
expressions and verbal expressions of emotion or attitude. According to Adolphs and 
Damasio (2000), a subject confronted with a facial expression might ask himself or 
herself, ‘how does it feel when my face has that expression?’ In the same way, perhaps 
confrontation with a linguistically encoded presentation of a situation might require a 
response to the question ‘how would I feel in this situation?’  
This notion might be apprehended as invalidating the distinction often made 
between problems with the semantic processing of emotional linguistic stimuli and 
problems of reduced emotional experience in RHD individuals. However, the discussion 
here in no way implies that RHD individuals are impaired in their ability to experience 
  111 
emotions per se. The notion only bears upon lexical-semantic processing, interpretation 
and comprehension of linguistically coded information, and as Adolphs and Damasio 
(2000) propose, facial expressions. 
Furthermore, the comprehension of a character’s attitude or motive might depend 
on efficient access to information encoded in episodic memory. The understanding of 
other people in social interaction is facilitated by personal experience with the situations 
at hand. Adolphs (1999) claims that the bilateral ventromedial frontal cortex may be 
involved in the process of associating elements of the perceived situation with previous 
experience. No effect of lack of specific personal experience was seen in the analysis of 
a possible association between personal experiences of situations depicted in the 
narratives and results on the Discourse Comprehension task. Instead, the reason might 
be that RHD may impair the capacity to retrieve encoded information as described by 
the Hemispheric Encoding Retrieval Asymmetry (HERA) model (Habib et al., 2003). 
This would, of course, affect all retrieval, not only inference of a character’s 
attitude/motive, but this kind of task might be especially sensitive to impairments 
affecting the brains ‘retrieval mode’.  
 
* 
One might infer that a dysfunction in arousal and basic cognitive processes such as 
sustained attention or VWM might have impact on every more complex cognitive 
process, and also be somehow involved in a general coherence mechanism or affect a 
suppression process. However, the methods and stimuli used in these studies do not 
produce results that are sufficient to support the suppression deficit hypothesis. Instead, 
the coarse semantic coding theory, perhaps in combination with Ramachandran’s (1995) 
theory of a right hemisphere anomaly detector, seems to be the most suitable theoretical 
framework to explain the impact of sustained attention on tasks that require revised 
inferences in studies 1 and 2.  
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The RHD individual’s results on tasks requiring inference of a character’s 
attitude/motive are not associated with the measures of sustained attention or VWM 
used, although general alertness my play some role here. Instead, the notion of social 
inference as a process that depends on the ability to simulate other people’s mental 
states, as described by Adolphs (1999) and Adolphs and Damasio (2000), perhaps in 
combination with the HERA model (Habib et al., 2003), might contribute to the 
understanding of RHD individuals’ problems with social inference in written discourse 
and conversation. This, however, remains to be investigated more thoroughly in another 
study.  
 
2.4.2 Theoretical considerations and methodological issues: What is really 
being measured? 
 
Language, communication and cognition in humans are complex matters. In the search 
for knowledge, research in this field is often obliged to construct new models on 
relatively well-established theoretical grounds. New knowledge questions old theories 
and requires new definitions. There are well-established theories and definitions of what 
psychological concepts such as VWM and sustained attention are and how they can best 
be measured. But there are a range of different theories with different views and all of 
them can be questioned in one way or another. The method used in this study might also 
need to be altered and developed in several ways. In this section, the results will be 
discussed in relation to the models and methods used to obtain them. 
 
2.4.2.1 VWM capacity 
 
Given that VWM, at least in the sense of verbal short- term memory, is most commonly 
associated with functions in the left hemisphere, it is not surprising that there is a 
significant difference in performance on the VWM task between the LHD group and the 
Control group. Furthermore, the only strong tendency toward association between the 
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results Discourse Comprehension tasks and the VWM was found for the LHD group on 
tasks requiring revised inference. Stimuli in the form of verbal semantic items might be 
especially taxing for the LHD group. Even subtle language disturbances have an impact 
on semantic activation and on the pragmatic aspects of language. 
The association between VWM and results on the Discourse Comprehension task in 
the LHD group was also to be expected, given the number of inadequate spontaneous 
responses due to no inference expressed. Especially on questions about explicitly stated 
matters, the LHD group made more inadequate responses than the other groups. Several 
individuals in this group took advantage of the possibility of reading the texts and 
modifying their responses. This might be a symptom of poor VWM capacity; it is also a 
conscious strategy for these LHD individuals. Anyhow, it is clear that a cognitive 
function like VWM can influence the comprehension of more complex communicative 
contexts, at least in individuals with LHD. 
So what does the VWM task used really measure? Engel et al. (1999) argue that 
simple digits and word span tasks cannot reliably and consistently predict mainstays of 
more compound cognitive processes such as reading or listening comprehension. In 
everyday skilled performance, such as discourse comprehension, LT-WM might play a 
potentially important role as part of a working memory mechanism. However, in tasks 
where prior knowledge or skills is are excluded, sometimes deliberately, as in laboratory 
and experimental memorising tasks, more general strategies might, according to 
Ericsson and Delaney (1999), come into play, such as the use of a phonological short-
term buffer for rehearsal. Nevertheless, Ericsson and Delaney (1999) do consider that 
Daneman and Carpenter’s (1980) reading span task, being a dual task, is able to measure 
an ability that is fundamentally important to more complex cognition. Significant 
relationships have been demonstrated between this measure and a variety of real-world 
cognitive tasks, e.g. reading comprehension, language comprehension and complex 
learning.  
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No test can measure a function like VWM in isolation. The VWM task used in this 
study depends on access to the verbal semantic system to interpret and respond 
accurately to the stimuli. The task also requires sustained attention as well as orienting 
to the verbal stimuli. Listening to the phrases and selecting the appropriate response at 
the same time as the growing list of words is kept in STM requires an executive function 
such as divided attention. The new information interferes in the memorising process. 
Another element of executive function might be the suppression of irrelevant items in 
the form of words memorised in the previous sets or other unrelated associations. 
However, although sustained attention might be considered an essential mechanism in 
working memory, the VWM task in this study is not thought to measure the same 
mechanisms as the task used to measure sustained attention. This is confirmed by the 
fact that the correlation analysis does not reveal any significant associations between the 
two measures. 
 
2.4.2.2 Sustained Attention to Response Test 
 
The only difference in the results between groups on the SART was on Mean reaction 
time, where the RHD individuals responded significantly more slowly than the Control 
group. This difference may be interpreted as reflecting a general decrease in arousal or, 
as in the model presented by Fernandez-Duque and Posner (2001), ability to achieve an 
alert state, in the RHD group. A deficit affecting the ability to achieve an alert state may 
in itself decrease a person’s ability to grasp and integrate subtle items in discourse in 
order to infer the meaning.  
As argued by, for example, Rueckert and Grafman (1996), reaction time may be a 
critical measure in sustained attention tasks. Increased reaction times usually correlate 
with decreased detection rates, supporting the hypothesis that reaction time also 
indicates a decline in vigilance. Although there is no real difference between groups for 
Number of correct responses in these studies, and the Control group even makes slightly 
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more Erroneous responses than the other groups, the RHD group does show a somewhat 
higher increase in Mean reaction time on the second half of the test than the other two 
groups; still, this difference is not statistically significant.  
One reason for the lack of difference between the RHD group and the Control 
group in terms of number of Correct and Erroneous responses in the SART might be 
that the groups of brain-damaged individuals in these studies present no obvious deficits 
in sustained attention. Symptoms of neglect have been associated with deficits in 
attention systems of orienting as well as sustained attention (Robertson et al. 1997b). 
None of the subjects showed obvious symptoms of neglect in the neglect tasks in study 
1. Another reason might be that many of the brain-damaged individuals in these studies 
reported that they had performed similar tasks in neuropsychological evaluations during 
their rehabilitation, which may give them an advantage over to the control subjects. The 
brain-damaged individuals may also, because of their disability, be more used to 
consciously monitoring and adjusting their behaviour when exterior requirements tax a 
reduced cognitive capacity. Conversely, brain injury might actually prevent that sort of 
adjustment.  
A couple of the younger participants in the Control group said that they were used 
to computer games that offered them ‘more than one life’, that is, more than one chance, 
when they went too fast or failed in the game. This, they said, made them more inclined 
to take the risk of keeping up their high speed even though it resulted in erroneous 
responses. Perhaps that explains at least a small amount of the group’s performance in 
this context. 
Except for increased reaction times, both groups of brain-damaged individuals in 
these studies performed at the same level as the Control group. This differs from the 
results obtained by Manly et al. (1999) and Chan (2001). One possible reason for the 
lack of differences between groups on the SART might be that the task focuses on the 
inhibitory aspects of sustained attention. Although the creators of the SART consider the 
Number of erroneous responses to be a measure of the ability to sustain attention or 
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vigilance, it might actually reflect a capacity to inhibit erroneous activities in action or 
cognition. In that way it may be considered a measure of sustained inhibition. The 
participants in the SART studies cited here had traumatic brain injuries. Traumatic brain 
injuries often involve the frontal lobes and can cause deficits in inhibitory mechanisms, 
which might explain the between-group differences in those studies. However, the 
SART might still measure other aspects of sustained attention. There is a significant 
association in the RHD group between results on revised inference and the Correct 
responses measure in the SART.  
This raises the question of how to apprehend the human attention system and, for 
example, separate a sustained attention system from the system for orienting to stimuli. 
Not only do separate attention systems interact, but it is also impossible to measure one 
attentional function separately from any other in practice. Performance on the SART 
requires basic arousal functions, sustained attention and selective orienting to stimuli. It 
is also dependent on executive functions such as inhibitory control. Compared to the 
study by Chan (2001), the brain-damaged individuals in the present study perform at the 
same level as or somewhat better than the non-brain-damaged subjects. The individuals 
in the Control group in the present study perform as well as or somewhat worse than the 
controls in Chan’s (2001) study. The conclusion would have to be that, as a group, the 
brain-damaged subjects in this study do not really have a deficit in sustained attention, 
as measured by the SART. Although inhibitory control might be considered an 
important symptom of deficits in sustained attention, the SART might be more sensitive 
to symptoms of traumatic brain injury than to symptoms of the type of brain damage 
seen in association with stroke. Only three individuals in the RHD group and three 
individuals in the LHD group had brain damage involving the frontal lobe. The size and 
extent of the brain damage and time post-incident may also be important. Most of the 
subjects in the RHD group were several years post-stroke and they had all been able to 
go back to living by themselves or with their families after rehabilitation. 
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Furthermore, in the SART every stimulus requires some kind of response, as the 
inhibition of an action in the form of a response key press must also be considered a 
cognitive action or response. Perhaps a sustained attention task involving more of a 
selective element in the processing, such as the auditory Elevator counting task in the 
Test of Everyday Attention (Robertson et al., 1994), would better discriminate the RHD 
group from the Control group.  
There was no correlation between results on the SART and spontaneous responses 
in tasks requiring revised inference in the LHD group. One possibility might be that this 
group’s poor VWM overrides any effect of sustained attention on the task results. The 
inadequate spontaneous responses might be associated with the subjects’ being aware of 
their poor VWM capacity. Although a couple of individuals in the LHD group had 
difficulties responding to the inference questions even after reading the texts, the 
possibility of reading the texts and modifying their responses might make the subjects in 
general more inclined to withhold a spontaneous response or to put less effort into it.  
 
2.4.2.3 Discourse Comprehension task 
 
The narratives used in the Discourse Comprehension task were developed as an 
adaptation of a method used by Tompkins et al. (1994). That study found no significant 
differences in the results of a group of RHD individuals, LHD individuals and healthy 
controls on the inference tasks. To increase the demands on cognitive processing, the 
narratives were lengthened and open questions were used. This procedure was 
successful as it made it possible to differentiate the RHD individuals from the non-brain-
damaged controls. In the present study, there were also meaningful associations between 
the results on discourse comprehension tasks and the results of either the VWM measure 
or the measures of sustained attention in the groups of brain-damaged individuals. On 
the other hand, the more complex a task, the more difficult it is to determine what makes 
it difficult to solve. As described in terms of the construction-integration model, there 
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are several different mechanisms that might cause an inadequate response on the 
questions.  
Although they did not refer to Kintsch’s construction-integration model in that 
particular study, Tompkins et al. (1999) would probably be more prone to relate the 
RHD individuals’ problems revising inferences to the integration process of 
comprehension. Ambiguous words are assumed to have both their, possibly conflicting, 
meanings active during the construction process. During the integration process of 
comprehension the more context relevant interpretation is supposed to be strengthened, 
as more nodes will have connections with this interpretation. According to the 
suppression deficit hypothesis, the irrelevant representations activated during the 
construction process are not repressed during the integration process and thus they 
interfere with the appropriate interpretation.  
However, integration is not, according to Kintsch (1998), a sentence wrap-up 
phenomenon. Sometimes the listener or reader uses delaying strategies, or continues 
reading or listening, hoping that the succeeding discourse will clarify any uncertainties. 
In general, though, information is processed as soon as possible. It is likely that the 
correct meaning of the ambiguous word has already been suppressed during the 
completed integration process in the first part of the narrative. This is probable because 
that particular meaning will only become the most context-relevant when the last 
sentence of the text is processed. That is, the context-relevant interpretation might have 
to be reactivated in a reconstruction of the text base and situation model, and this causes 
the stimuli used in this study and any conclusions that can be inferred from the results to 
differ from the results and conclusions of Tompkins et al. (1994). It is possible, that even 
though RHD individuals activate several meanings of an ambiguous word in the context 
of two sentences, they might not do so under more cognitively taxing conditions, such as 
a more comprehensive discourse.  
In the tasks of revised inference tasks used in studies 1 and 2, there was no 
significant difference in errors depending on whether a more common meaning had to 
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be changed into a less common meaning. Kintsch’s (1998) construction-integration 
model may also explain why the frequency of meaning of an ambiguous word is less 
important when the word is presented in context. Although a frequent denotation might 
be more easily accessed in isolation, the presentation in a context overrules any 
frequency effects that might be observed in, for example, a priming task. In the process 
of integration, the nodes that satisfy the multiple constraints of the network become 
stronger and nodes that do not satisfy those constraints become weaker. Nodes that have 
few connections in the network of propositions, or are negatively connected, will be 
suppressed in the process of constraint satisfaction. Hence, any meaning preference is 
dependent on the specific context, not on general frequency of use. It ought not to be 
possible to relate reluctance to revise an initial interpretation to frequency of use of the 
denotation in isolation. 
Some theories hypothesise that RHD might prevent the activation of relevant 
elements, such as emotional or attitudinal aspects, in discourse (see the discussion 
above). This would be considered a deficit originating in the construction phase 
according to the construction-integration model. In the narratives used in study 1, the 
context favours a given interpretation of a specific character’s attitude and/or motive to 
act. This is constructed through the situation described and the words used. The words 
signal what the character’s attitude towards someone or something is, or the motive for 
an action. As the relevant attitude or motive is not explicitly expressed, comprehension 
depends on the words and sentences forming compound cues to retrieve information 
from LTM and to structure LT-WM. According to Kintsch (1998), any inconsistency in 
the text base formed also hinders the building of effective retrieval structures. Even 
though in most cases a word might be linked to its lexical node, LT-WM will be 
fragmented and any item retrieved from that kind of structure will be deactivated as 
there are not enough links to sufficiently strengthen the activation.  
Another limitation on the stimuli used in studies 1 and 2 is that, although efforts 
were made to make the narratives similar in terms of frequency of words used and they 
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are all about equal in length and syntactic complexity, there might still be other aspects 
that are difficult to control for but that might influence the ease of comprehension.  
The construction of the Discourse Comprehension task can be justified and the 
measures of VWM and sustained attention, as interacting cognitive functions, are 
relevant. Nevertheless, in terms of cognitive resources and mechanisms involved, VWM 
and sustained attention are not the only requirements for the tasks. In addition to the 
ability to stay alert and focused on the task, the ability to detect and orient to relevant 
stimuli and suppress irrelevant stimuli is needed. Performance on the task also depends 
on executive function. Measures of the ability to activate, process and suppress certain 
semantic information would also have contributed important information to the 
interpretation of results obtained. It may be inferred from the construction-integration 
model that the processes of construction and integration are dependent on some kind of 
executive functions or supervisory attention in the process of activating and deactivating 
items. On the other hand this supervisory attention or executive function should not be 
visualised as a homunculus or little mind within the mind sorting out which associations 
are most relevant in the context. As has been shown in computerised experiments, 
according to Kimberg and Farah (1993), there is actually no need for a separate central 
executive to account for several typical frontal lobe damage deficits, commonly 
explained as deficits in executive function. The idea of some form of distinct central 
executive, as proposed by, for example, Shallice and Burgess’s (1991) ‘Supervisory 
Attentional System’ has thus been called into question. According to Kimberg and Farah 
(1993), work in several different disciplines, including computation and animal 
behaviour, shows that there is no need to posit a central executive to account for 
complex organised behaviour. In their computer model, the weakening of associations 
among elements in working memory results in impairments on a variety of tasks 
traditionally accounted for by a central executive. Although Kimberg and Farah (1993) 
do not define working memory, their alternative hypothesis postulates that the frontal 
lobes are important in maintaining associations among elements in working memory. 
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Dysfunction then is a consequence of damage to the available knowledge representation. 
The weakening of associations results in a reduced sensitivity to the mutual relevance of 
information and the relations between facts and their contexts.  
 
2.4.2.4 Heterogeneity of groups and multifaceted functions 
 
Research designed to understand the right hemisphere’s role in language and 
communication often involves groups of RHD individuals. These group studies, using 
different methods, sometimes obtain contradictory results. One limitation on these 
studies is that RHD is often the only criterion of inclusion, which might result in groups 
containing both individuals with pragmatic deficits and individuals with no symptoms.  
In this study, only subjects who had, according to themselves or to others, 
experienced communication problems that could be associated with pragmatic or subtle 
language deficits were included. But then there is the problem of defining and 
diagnosing pragmatic deficits. There is no common standard for sufficient pragmatic 
ability. What would be described as dysfunctional pragmatic behaviour in one context 
might be experienced as a personality trait in slightly different circumstances. Pragmatic 
abilities may vary among perfectly healthy and, in other areas, well-functioning 
individuals. In clinical work, in the case of suspected pragmatic deficits in association 
with brain damage, speech-language pathologists are referred to the patient’s subjective 
experience and sometimes to the relatives’ experience of changed communicative 
behaviour on part of the patient.  
Another criticism that often comes up in relation to research on groups of brain-
damaged individuals is the mix of different lesion localisations in the same small groups. 
Working with mixed groups is often a necessity because of the difficulty finding suitable 
subjects for group studies in the research of speech and language deficits. Still, 
sometimes the different effects of diverse lesion localisations within one hemisphere are 
greater than those of localisations in different hemispheres. The groups in this study are 
  122 
heterogeneous, with lesions in different parts of the cortex and also subcortical lesions 
within each hemisphere. This was considered an indispensable adaptation to fulfil some 
of the demands for obtaining generalisable results. On the other hand, apart from the fact 
that a few more of the individuals in the RHD group than in the LHD group have 
subcortical involvement in their brain damage, both groups are heterogeneous to 
approximately the same extent.  
Unfortunately, the available data in medical charts ruled out making more exact 
estimations of lesion size for comparison between the groups. Still, when one works 
with individuals with acquired brain damage who, before their disease, had developed 
well-established complex cognitive functions, like language, completely homogeneous 
groups are impossible to obtain. When it comes to complex human cognition, acquired 
brain damage in one individual cannot always be expected to have exactly the same 
consequences for cognition as it does in another individual, even if the localisation and 
size of the lesion are the same.  
Research on language in RHD individuals has still not been able to attribute 
specific pragmatic deficits to lesions in certain areas or structures within the right 
hemisphere. This is probably not just because of the heterogeneous groups in the studies 
performed.  One reason is of course the lack of established definitions of right 
hemisphere pragmatic deficits. But another important element is the type of symptoms. 
The pragmatic deficits affecting language and communication of RHD individuals must 
be assumed to depend on several different cortical and subcortical structures. Although 
essential structures for executive function in the frontal lobes might be important, there 
are no specific areas associated with pragmatics, corresponding to the frontal and 
temporal areas in the left hemisphere associated with articulation and phonology. 
Another reason for the difficulty relating specific pragmatic symptoms to well-defined 
structures within the right hemisphere might also be the neuroanatomic organisation. 
The right hemisphere is assumed to be more diffusely organised with more white matter, 
more connections between different regions and greater multimodality than the left 
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hemisphere (Gur et al., 1980). This is believed to be one reason why the right 
hemisphere is superior at processing complex emotional stimuli and multifaceted 
interactions in communication (Tompkins, 1995). One can assume that a well-defined 
lesion in one structure within the right hemisphere may result in similar pragmatic 
symptoms to a well-defined lesion in a different region within the hemisphere. 
Furthermore, an utterly important reason for the conflicting results in the research on 
pragmatic aspects of language associated with brain damage is probably the 
phenomenon of pragmatics itself. As Perkins (2005b) describes it, pragmatics is the 
emergent outcome of interactions between several elements within and between 
individuals. The behaviours we identify as pragmatic impairments may be the result of 
deficits in any of the involved elements, in combination with compensatory adaptive 
processes. This means that the same symptom in two individuals might have totally 
different causes while two identical lesions might result in totally different symptoms in 
testing and in conversational interaction. 
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3. PART II: CONVERSATIONAL INTERACTION  
 
This part of the thesis examines study 3 and study 4. In these studies pragmatic aspects 
of language are investigated in the production of speech and comprehension in 
conversational interaction post-stroke. Human behaviour in natural conversational 
interaction can be looked upon as the outcome of pragmatic ability. This is where the 
communicative competence is actualised and applied in everyday life. 
The method used in study 3 involves a questionnaire for the investigation of post-
stroke changes in perceived pragmatic ability and its consequences for communication. 
The presentation of the results from study 3 is followed by the presentation of study 4. 
In this study, four individual brain-damaged subjects are presented as cases. Their 
individual results from studies 1-3 will be presented along with an analysis of their 
video-recorded conversational interaction in a dyad. Part II concludes with by a general 
discussion of results from studies 3 and 4. The thesis then concludes with a brief 
summary of results and conclusions, including implications for further research and 
clinical management of pragmatic language disturbances in relation to RHD. 
 
3.1 Introduction and outline to study 3: The questionnaire 
 
In this study the brain-damaged subjects’ own experience and perception of their 
communicative ability post-stroke is investigated on a group level. This is done by 
means of a number of pragmatic parameters presented in a questionnaire. Since 
communication is a matter involving at least two persons, the questionnaire was also 
distributed to the conversational partners of the brain-damaged individuals. After the 
presentation of research questions and method, results of perceived change will be 
presented and concluded with a summary. This is followed by the presentation of results 
and a summary of reported negative impact from these changes. 
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3.1.1 Research questions in study 3 
 
The aim of study 3 is to map how pragmatic aspects of language might change post-
stroke and the effect of that change on conversational interaction. The research questions 
are: 
 
1.  In what pragmatic areas among those presented in a questionnaire about 
conversational interaction do a majority of the subjects and their conversational 
partners perceive change post-stroke? Are they the same between groups and 
between the brain-damaged individuals and their conversational partners?  
 
2. Are there any differences between groups, or between the brain-damaged 
individuals and their conversational partners regarding the reported degree of 
change in the different areas? 
 
3. Are all changed behaviours perceived as having a negative impact on 
conversational interaction? 
 
4. Are there any differences between groups or between the brain-damaged 
individuals and their conversational partners in the ratings of degree of negative 
impact, measured as frequency of occurrence of a negative impact? 
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3.2 Method: Study 3 
 
In this section, the participants in study 3 are discussed, followed by a presentation of 
the questionnaire used and the analysis performed. 
 
3.2.1 Participants in study 3 
 
Completed questionnaires were collected from all subjects in both groups of brain-
damaged individuals and from conversational partners of 13 of the 14 subjects in each 
group of brain-damaged individuals. The remaining two brain-damaged participants 
(one LHD and one RHD) were not able to provide any conversational partner who was 
able to participate in the study. The conversational partners responded to how they 
perceived the subjects’ conversational abilities. The conversational partners who 
participated were all well acquainted with the conversational style of the subject both 
before and after the stroke. Most of the participating conversational partners were 
spouses or children of the subjects, while some were close friends. The brain-damaged 
subjects were told that they should have a certain conversational partner in mind – if 
possible, the participating partner – when they responded to the questions.   
The main aim of this study was to investigate which pragmatic areas among those 
presented in the questionnaire are most often reported as changed post-stroke and as 
having a negative impact on conversational interaction. Therefore, individuals who 
consistently reported no perceived change on the parameters presented in the 
questionnaire were excluded from further analysis. One criterion for being included in 
these studies was the experience of post-stroke problems affecting communication, 
reported by the subjects themselves or any conversational partner. Still, these reports 
were sometimes given by clinicians or other persons who did not participate as 
conversational partners in the study. Furthermore, even if a change in communication 
was reported, that change was not always covered by the issues in the questionnaire. 
Table 3:2:1 displays data on the included participants on a group level.  
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Some of the individuals who did not report any changes on the parameters included 
in the questionnaire instead reported change in the form of more frequent and more 
explicit verbal expressions of, for example, anger or intolerance in social interactions. 
Changes in general attitude, as expressed in readiness to communicate and use of 
conversational tone, were also reported, along with more frequent experiences of 
difficulties with motor planning of speech.  
 
Table 3:2:1: Group means for personal data of brain-damaged subjects included in study 3 
 LHD subjects’ 
conversational 
partners  
RHD 
subjects’ 
conversational 
partners  
Number 13 9 
 LHD subjects 
  
RHD subjects 
  
Number 13 11 
Sex 
(male/female) 
7/6 5/6 
Age 60.7  
(S.D: 12.11) 
64.8  
(S.D: 10.91) 
Educational 
level 
2.2  
(S.D: 0.69) 
2.2 
(S:D: 0.75) 
Reading habits 2.7 
(S.D: 1.60) 
2.9 
(S.D: 1.38) 
Month post-
onset 
 
26  
(S.D: 21.27) 
53  
(S.D: 42.12) 
 
 
 
The mean time post-stroke for the RHD group is almost 4.5 years, compared to about 2 
years in the LHD group. However, the variation within the RHD group is large and no 
differences between the groups were statistically significant. 
 
3.2.2 Material and method of analysis 
 
The questionnaire was an adaptation of an interview procedure developed by Perkins, 
Whitworth, and Lesser (1997) and introduced in Conversation Analysis Profile for 
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People with Cognitive Impairments (CAPPCI). The CAPPCI was developed for research 
projects that address cognitive impairments in dementia of Alzheimer’s type (DAT) and 
dementia in people with Parkinson’s disease.  
There are several assessment tools for functional communication for the aphasic 
population, e.g. Communicative Abilities in Daily Living (Holland, 1980), the Revised 
Edinburgh Functional Communication Profile (Wirz, Skinner, and Dean. 1990), and 
The Communicative Effectiveness Index (Lomas et al., 1989). There are also tools for 
assessing pragmatic skills in LHD or RHD subjects, e.g. Pragmatic protocol (Prutting 
and Kirchner, 1987), The Right Hemisphere Language Battery (Bryan, 1993) and The 
RIC Evaluation of Communication Problems in Right Hemisphere Dysfunction (Burns, 
Halper, and Mogil, 1985). The choice of an adaptation of the interview questions in the 
CAPPCI was based on the fact that the CAPPCI emphasises both the collaborative 
features of conversation and the impact of non-linguistic cognitive aspects on 
communication.  
As the participating subjects in study 3 were also performing the tasks included in 
studies 1 and 2, a lot of their time and energy was already used up. The 35 interview 
questions in the CAPPCI were therefore transformed into a 25-question questionnaire 
for this study, to make it possible for the participants to complete the form at their 
convenience. The adapted questions are presented in Appendix 3. Eleven questions in 
the CAPPCI were excluded as they are intended for people with dementia or motor 
speech problems as in Parkinson’s disease. The questions in the CAPPCI are meant to 
be asked in an interview with a key conversational partner of the individual with a 
cognitive impairment. The questions therefore had to be adapted to make them more 
suitable for a questionnaire. A version with the same questions intended for the brain-
damaged individuals themselves was also created. One question was added (question 
24).  
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The questionnaire inquires about communicative behaviour in areas such as: 
▪ Initiation and Turn-taking (questions 1 to 6),  
▪ Topic management (questions 7 to 10),  
▪ Repair (questions 11 to 14) and 
▪ Prosody (question 25). 
 
The questionnaire also examines linguistic abilities such as semantic production, e.g. 
Word retrieval (questions 16 to 17), use of pronouns in Reference (question 19) and 
Comprehension (question 18) as well as more complex linguistic abilities such as ability 
to interpret metaphoric meaning, generate inferences and understand and use humour 
(questions 20 to 24). Memory and attention are also addressed (question 15). 
The questions are worded like the following examples: ‘When you speak to your 
friend/relative, are your responses very long and detailed?’ (question 5), or “Do you 
ever stop speaking in the middle of a sentence and leave it unfinished as if you had lost 
the thread or been distracted?’ (question 15). The subjects rated the frequency of 
occurrence of a certain kind of communicative behaviour on a five-point scale. For each 
question, the subjects rated the frequency of occurrence in conversations both as they 
remembered it from the period before they had their stroke and as how they perceived it 
now, after the stroke. Figure 3:2:1 shows an example from the questionnaire intended 
for conversational partners of brain-damaged subjects. The scale runs from Very 
seldom/Never through Rarely, Occasionally to Often and Very often. As the 
communicative behaviours included in the questionnaire are fairly common in natural 
conversations between healthy individuals, the subjects also responded to how often 
they feel that the behaviour in question had a negative impact on their communicative 
ability. It was also possible to add personal comments to the questionnaire. 
The questionnaire forms were either sent to the subjects by mail in advance and 
then collected at the test session, or distributed at the test session and then returned by 
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mail. In this way most of the respondents were given the opportunity to ask about the 
questions at a personal meeting as well as over the telephone.  
 
Figure 3:2:1: Example of question in questionnaire intended for conversational partner of brain-
damaged subject 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Most of the behaviours inquired about in the questionnaire, such as for example: 
interruption of conversational partner’s turn, misperception of intended meaning and 
failure to orient conversational partner to new topics, are quite common in all natural 
conversations. Frequency of occurrence might be an indicator of personality and 
conversational style rather then a measure of deficits in pragmatic ability specifically 
associated with brain damage. Furthermore, both too high and too low frequency of 
occurrence of certain behaviours could have a negative impact on conversational ability. 
In the analysis of the responses to the questionnaires, two measures were used: 
 
1. The occurrence of reported changes in the different areas: To establish which of 
the areas presented in the questionnaire were perceived as most commonly 
 
3. Are there occasions when there is a long pause before he/she answers when you 
address him/her? 
 
Before illness   
  
  Very often Often         Occasionally   Rarely    Very seldom/Never 
 
After illness   
  
  Very often Often        Occasionally   Rarely     Very seldom/Never  
 
Do you find that this has a negative impact on his/her conversational ability since 
he/she was taken ill? 
   
             
  Very often     Often         Occasionally   Rarely   Very seldom/Never 
  131 
affected by the stroke, an analysis was performed of which questions each 
individual and his/her conversational partner had marked as changed. The 
definition of change is that the respondent rates the occurrence of the behaviour as 
being either more or less frequent than before. A change by a single step, for 
example, from Rarely to Occasionally (see figure 3:2:1), or by several steps, is 
considered to be a change. Behaviours that more than 50% of the participating 
individuals in each group reported as changed are regarded as being frequently 
affected.  
 
2. The degree of change in each area: To investigate whether there where any 
differences between groups in reporting the degree of change, the difference in 
changed frequency was compared. For each individual the difference between the 
reported frequency pre-stroke and post-stroke was calculated for each issue in 
each area. For example, if a behaviour is reported to have increased in frequency 
from Occasionally to Very often, it is marked as changed by two degrees; see 
figure 3:2:1 above.  
 
3. The degree of negative impact of changed behaviours on the ability to interact in 
conversation: To investigate which changed issues were perceived as having a 
negative impact on the conversational interaction, further analysis was done on 
the issues that were reported to have changed. In the questionnaire, the 
respondents reported how often, that is, with what frequency, they perceived that 
the behaviour in question had a negative impact on their conversational 
interactions. In analysing the degree of negative impact, only ratings from 
individuals who had reported some degree of change on the issue in question were 
allowed to contribute to the group rating for that particular behaviour. This was 
done in an effort to exclude the negative impact of behaviours that were due to 
personality traits rather than brain damage. To analyse the results on the group 
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level, the ratings of frequency of negative impact in the questionnaire were 
transformed to numerical values: 
 
Very seldom/Never = 0 
Rarely = 1 
Occasionally = 2 
Often = 3 
Very often = 4 
 
Statistical analysis was performed on degree of reported change using the Kruskal-
Wallis test. The Mann-Whitney-U test was used to compare groups of reports of degree 
of negative impact. To avoid type I errors due to multiple comparisons, the alpha level 
was set at 0.01.  
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3.3 Results of the questionnaires 
 
In these sections, the results of the analysis of the data collected with the questionnaires 
will be presented. First, in section 3.3.1, the areas that were most often reported as 
changed, that is, reported as changed by a majority of the brain-damaged individuals and 
their conversational partners will be accounted for. Section 3.3.2 presents the degree to 
which the different areas were changed. Finally, in section 3.3.3, the results of the 
analysis of reports of occurrences and the degree of negative impact of changed 
behaviours are presented. The results of these analyses will be summarised here but 
discussed in more detail in a general discussion, along with the results obtained in study 
4. 
A table displaying the number of reports on each issue for each group as well as the 
group median and range of reported degree of negative impact is given in Appendix 4. 
There was great variation in both degrees and types of reported change on the 
parameters presented between subjects in both groups. Eleven of the 14 participating 
RHD individuals and 13 of the 14 participating LHD individuals reported changes in 
one or more of the behaviours inquired about; see table 3:2:1 above. Among the 
individuals who did not report any change, one of the RHD subjects was backed up by 
the conversational partner, while another of the RHD subjects who reported no change 
had no participating conversational partner. The remaining two subjects were not 
supported by their conversational partners; that is, one LHD subject and one RHD 
subject who did not report any change had conversational partners who actually reported 
a perceived change in one or more of the behaviours investigated.  
All of the 13 participating conversational partners in the LHD group reported 
change in one or more areas. Only 9 of the 13 participating conversational partners of 
the RHD subjects reported change on the issues presented in the questionnaire. 
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3.3.1. Areas of conversational interaction most often changed 
 
In this section, the areas the brain-damaged individuals and their conversational partners 
most often reported as changed are presented.  
 
3.3.1.1 Areas reported as changed by the brain-damaged individuals 
 
The 13 individuals in the LHD group who had reported change reported that their 
communication was changed in several areas after the stroke. See figure 3:3:1, where 
frequencies of reported change are displayed.  
 
Figure 3:3:1: Frequency of reported change in the different behaviours inquired about in the 
questionnaire, as perceived by the LHD individuals. N = 13.  
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Nine of the 13 LHD individuals perceived that that they had an increased tendency to 
produce very short responses (question 6), and lose the thread while speaking (question 
15); they also had more word retrieval problems (question 16) than before the stroke. 
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The other behaviours most often reported to be affected in the LHD group were in the 
Initiation area (questions 1, 2 and 3) and the Repair area (questions 11, 12, 13 and 14), 
together with changed behaviour when it comes to starting new topics in conversation 
(question 7). Most of the LHD subjects felt that they introduced new topics less 
frequently than before, but two of them felt that they did so more often. Changing the 
topic might, of course, be a strategy to avoid word retrieval problems. A majority of the 
LHD subjects also reported having a more monotonous intonation (question 25). Table 
3:3:1 displays the areas reported by a majority of the participants in each group. 
Six of the eleven participants in the RHD group who had reported any changes said 
that Initiation and Turn-taking were affected (questions 2 and 3). Figure 3:3:2 shows the 
number of reports for each issue in the RHD group. The issue of detailed responses 
(question 5) was reported as changed by 7 of the 11 RHD subjects.  
 
Figure 3:3:2: Frequency of reported change in the different behaviours inquired about in the 
questionnaire, as perceived by the RHD individuals. N = 11. 
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Six of the eleven RHD subjects reported an increased tendency to lose the thread and 
more word retrieval problems post-stroke.  
 
Table 3:3:1: Areas where issues were reported as changed in the conversational interaction by > 50% of 
the participating brain-damaged individuals and their conversational partners. 
LHD subjects 
(n = 13) 
RHD 
subjects 
 (n = 11)  
LHD 
conversational 
partners (n = 13) 
RHD 
conversational 
partners (n = 9) 
Attention Attention Attention  
Word retrieval Word 
retrieval 
Word retrieval Word retrieval 
Initiation Initiation Initiation  
Turn-taking Turn-taking Turn-taking Turn-taking 
Topic 
management 
   
Repair   Repair  
Prosody   Prosody  
   Reference 
   Comprehension, 
general 
   Complex language 
comprehension 
 
 
To summarise: most of the participating subjects in both the LHD and RHD groups 
reported change in the areas of Attention, Word retrieval and Initiation and Turn-taking; 
see table 3:3:1 and Appendix 4. The majority of subjects in the RHD group did not 
report any change in the areas of Repair, Topic management and Prosody, as the 
individuals in the LHD group did. 
 
3.3.1.2 Areas reported as changed by the conversational partners 
 
Most of the 13 conversational partners of the LHD group agreed with the subjects’ own 
perception, except that they did not recognise Topic management (questions 7 and 9) as 
an affected area to the same extent; see figure 3:3:3 and table 3:3:1. 
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Figure 3:3:3: Frequency of reported change in the different behaviours inquired about in the 
questionnaire, as perceived by the conversational partners of the LHD individuals. N = 13. 
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Instead they more often report an increased tendency to use circumlocutions associated 
with word retrieval problems (question 17). As many as 10 of the 13 participating 
conversational partners, report changed behaviours in the Initiation and Turn-taking 
areas (questions 2 and 6) and in the Repair area (questions 11 and 13). Six of the 
conversational partners of the LHD subjects also report that the LHD subjects have more 
comprehension failures (question 18) post-stroke. 
A majority of the 9 participating conversational partners of the RHD group agree 
with the RHD subjects in reporting changes in frequency of word retrieval problems 
(question 16) and in behaviours in the Turn-taking area (question 5); see figure 3:3:4 
below. As many as 8 of the 9 conversational partners perceived an increase in word 
retrieval problems in the conversational interaction of the RHD subjects. The issues in 
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the Repair area are, in agreement with the subjects themselves, among those reported by 
less than 50% of the conversational partners of the RHD group. 
 
Figure 3:3:4: Frequency of reported change in the different behaviours inquired about in the 
questionnaire, as perceived by the conversational partners of the RHD individuals. N = 9. 
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The conversational partners of the RHD subjects do not recognise changes in Attention 
(question 15), in the production of circumlocutions (question 17) or in the Initiation area 
(questions 2 and 3) to the same extent as the RHD subjects themselves; see table 3:3:1. 
Instead, a majority of the conversational partners of the RHD subjects report changes in 
Comprehension, especially comprehension in general (question 18), and in the making 
of inferences (question 21). A majority of the conversational partners also report an 
increase in the tendency to use pronouns unclearly (question 19).  
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3.3.2 Degree of change in the different areas 
 
In this section, the degree of change reported by the groups of brain-damaged 
individuals and their conversational partners is presented. The reported change might be 
an increase or a decrease in the frequency of a behaviour. This analysis does not reflect 
whether the change was perceived as having a negative impact on the conversational 
interaction. The results of the analysis of perceived negative impact will be presented in 
section 3.3.3 below. 
As can be seen in table 3:3:2, where the group median and range of reported degree 
of change in each area is presented, several subjects do not report any change. The 
changes are often subtle and the median degree of change at a group level is often 0 
(zero). 
 
Table 3:3:2: Group median and range for reported degree of change in each area. 
Area Subjects Conversational partners 
LHD  
(n = 13) 
RHD  
(n = 11) 
LHD  
(n = 13) 
RHD  
(n = 9) 
Initiation  2 (0–6) 
 
2 (0–9) 3 (0–5) 1 (0–6) 
Turn-taking 3 (0–6) 1 (0–4) 3 (0–5) 1 (0–6) 
Topic management 1 (0–6) 0 (0–8) 0 (0–8) 1 (0–12) 
Repair 3 (0–8) 1 (0–9) 4 (0–9) 0 (0–6) 
Attention 1 (0–3) 0 (0–4) 1 (0–2) 0 (0–4) 
Word retrieval 1 (0–6) 1 (0–6) 3 (0–6) 1 (0–4) 
Reference  0 (0–2) 0 (0–3) 0 (0–3) 1 (0–4) 
Prosody 1 (0–4) 0 (0–3) 1 (0–2) 0 (0–2) 
General 
comprehension 
 
0 (0–2) 
 
0 (0–3) 
 
0 (0–2) 
 
1 (0–3) 
Complex language 
comprehension 
 
1 (0–6) 
 
1 (0–9) 
 
1 (0–5) 
 
2 (0–11) 
Total degree of 
change 
 
20 (1–35) 
 
10 (1–55) 
 
18 (1–37) 
 
7 (2–52) 
 
 
At a group level, the LHD subjects and their conversational partners tend to report 
higher degrees of change in the different areas than the RHD subjects and their 
conversational partners. Still, in the areas of general and complex Comprehension as 
well as Reference, the conversational partners of the RHD group tend to report higher 
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degrees of change. However, the variations within the groups are large. None of the 
differences were statistically significant: the p-values obtained varied between .156 and 
.695. 
 
3.3.3 Degree of negative impact of changed behaviours 
 
In this section, the occurrence and degree of negative impact of the changed behaviours 
reported by the subjects and their conversational partners will be presented. Degree of 
negative impact corresponds to the question about the frequency of negative impact for 
each issue in the questionnaire and is presented here as the median of reported 
frequencies at a group level. In these analyses, only reports from individuals who had 
reported change in each specific area are included. 
 
3.3.3.1 Brain-damaged subjects’ perception of negative impact 
 
In both the RHD group and the LHD group, most of the individuals who had reported a 
change in one or several behaviours inquired about in the questionnaire also reported 
that they perceived a negative impact on their conversational interaction caused by these 
behaviours. The data on reported change and degree of negative impact for each issue in 
questionnaire are presented in Appendix 4.  
 
A majority of the 13 LHD subjects reported negative impacts on the same behaviours 
they reported to have changed. That means that, among the LHD individuals, a majority 
report that issues in Initiation and Turn-taking (1, 2, 3, 6), Attention (15), Word retrieval 
(16), Repair (12, 13, 14) and Prosody (25) have a negative impact on their ability to 
interact in conversation.  
Table 3:3:3 shows the reported degree of negative impact as well as the number of 
reports of change and negative impact. Only issues reported as changed by a majority of 
the individuals in the LHD group and/or the RHD group are displayed. Issues in the 
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Comprehension areas were not reported as changed by a majority in either group of 
brain-damaged individuals. Appendix 4 provides data on all issues in the questionnaire. 
There are small differences in reports of change and reports of negative impact. Not 
all the individuals who reported an issue as changed reported any negative impact of this 
change. For example, in issue number 7 (initiating new topics) and number 11 
(indicating comprehension problems), two individuals who reported the issue as 
changed did not report it as having a negative impact (see Appendix 4).  
The issue with the highest degree of negative impact was latency for response 
(issue 3), which was reported as often having a negative impact on conversational 
interaction.  
In the LHD group, most of the issues are reported as having a negative impact 
occasionally (corresponding to a group median of 2); see table 3:3:3.  
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Table 3:3:3: Number of subjects reporting change (within brackets) and negative impact, as well as 
group median and range (within parentheses) of rated degree of negative impact. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Figures in bold type denote that a majority of individuals in that group reported the issue. 
 
 
As can be seen in Appendix 4 there are also issues that, although not reported as 
changed by a majority of the subjects, still were reported as having a high degree of 
negative impact by most of them who reported the issue as changed. For example, issue 
number 5, production of detailed responses, has a median of 2.5, indicating that the 
subjects who report it find that it has a very negative impact.  
Area Issue Subjects 
LHD  
(n = 13) 
RHD  
(n = 11) 
Initiation  1. Start conversation [9]     8 
md: 2 (1–3) 
[5]     4 
md: 2 (0–3) 
 2. No response [8 ]    7 
md: 2 (0–3) 
[6 ]    5 
md: 2.5 ( 0–4) 
 3. Latency response [7]    7 
md: 3 (1–3) 
[6]      6 
md: 2 (1–4) 
Turn-taking 5. Detailed responses [6 ]   6 
md: 2.5 (1–3) 
[7]     6 
md: 2 (0–3) 
 6. Short responses [9]    7 
md: 2 (0–3) 
[5 ]    4 
md: 2 (0–3) 
Topic 
management 
7. Start new topics [8]     6 
md: 1 (0–3) 
[4]     4 
md: 2 (1–4) 
Repair  11. Indicate 
comprehension 
problems 
[7]     5 
md: 2 (0–3) 
[3]     3 
md: 3 (2–4) 
 12. Initiate self-repair [8 ]    8 
md: 1 (1–3) 
[3]     3 
md: 2 (2–3) 
 13. Successful self-
repair 
[7 ]    7 
md: 2 (2–2) 
[2 ]    1 
md: 0.5 (0–1) 
 14. Repair through 
specifying  
[7]     7 
md: 2 (1–3) 
[4]     3 
md: 3 (0–4) 
Attention 15. Lost thread when 
speaking 
[9 ]    8 
md: 2 (0–3)  
[6]     6 
md: 2 (1–4) 
Word retrieval 16. Word retrieval 
difficulties 
[9]     8 
md: 1 (0–3) 
[6 ]    6 
md: 1.5 (1–4) 
Prosody 25. Monotonous 
intonation  
[7 ]    7 
md: 2 (1–4) 
[4 ]     4 
md: 3 (2–4) 
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Issue number 12, about the initiation of self-repair, and issue number 16, about 
word retrieval, are both reported by a majority of individuals in the LHD group although 
the group median indicates that they rarely find that these issues have a negative impact 
on their conversational interactions (corresponding to a median of 1). 
 
As table 3:3:3 shows, a majority of the RHD subjects agree with the LHD subjects that 
change in Attention and Word retrieval difficulties, as well as some issues in the 
Initiation and Turn-taking areas, have a negative impact on their conversational ability.  
Most of the issues reported by a majority of RHD subjects are said to occasionally 
have a negative impact (corresponding to a group median of 2); see table 3.3.3 above. 
However, issue 16, about word retrieval difficulties, is only reported as rarely or 
occasionally having negative impact (corresponding to a group median of 1.5). Just as in 
the LHD group, some issues are not reported as having a negative impact by all the 
individuals who reported that they had changed.  
There are also several issues that are only reported by a few of the subjects but that 
nevertheless have a high degree of negative impact. Issues that are reported as often or 
very often having a negative impact on conversational interaction include indication of 
comprehension problems (11), repair through specifying (14) and monotonous 
intonation (25), along with comprehension of metaphorical meaning (20) and general 
comprehension (18); see Appendix 4. This means that generally the RHD individuals 
who actually did perceive such changes also found that they had a high degree of 
negative impact on their conversational interaction. The production of circumlocutions 
(17) was reported as changed by five individuals in both the LHD and RHD groups. 
However, while only two individuals in the LHD group reported a negative impact of 
this change, with a median of 0, all five RHD individuals reported a negative impact of 
this change, with a median of 2. 
The only statistically significant difference between groups on reports of degree of 
negative impact is from the change in successful self-repair, question 13 (z = –2.806, p = 
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.005), where the LHD group reported a higher degree of negative impact. Other p-values 
obtained varied between .061 and 1.000. 
 
3.3.3.2 Conversational partners’ perception of negative impact 
 
In the RHD group all conversational partners who had reported changes in behaviours 
also reported that they perceived a negative impact of one or more of these changed 
behaviours on conversational interaction. In the LHD group, 12 of the 13 conversational 
partners who had reported changes claimed to perceive a negative impact by one or 
several of the changed behaviours.  
 
A majority of the conversational partners of the LHD individuals reported that the 
behaviours they had reported as changed had a negative impact on conversational 
interactions. Table 3:3:4 displays the number of reports of change and negative impact 
as well as the reported degree of negative impact on issues reported by a majority of the 
conversational partners of the LHD and RHD groups. 
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Table 3:3:4: Number of partners reporting change (within brackets) and negative impact, as well as 
group median and range (within parentheses) of rated degree of negative impact. 
Area Issue Conversational partners 
LHD  
(n = 13) 
RHD  
(n = 9) 
Initiation 2. No response [10]  10 
md: 2 (1–4) 
[2]     1 
0.5 (0–2) 
 3. Latency response [8 ]    7 
md: 2 (0–4) 
[3 ]    3 
md: 1 (1–4) 
Turn-taking 4. Interrupt others’ turn [7 ]    5 
md: 1 (0–3) 
[ 3]    2 
md: 1 (0–3) 
 5. Detailed responses [8 ]    8 
md: 2 (1–3) 
[5]     4 
md: 2 (0–2) 
 6. Short responses [10]  10 
md: 2 (1–3) 
[4 ]     3 
md: 1 (0–2) 
Repair  11. Indicate 
comprehension 
problems – failure 
[10]   10 
md: 2 (1–4) 
[3]      3 
md: 2 (1–2) 
 12. Initiate self-repair [7]     7 
md: 2 (1–3) 
[2]      1 
md: 1 (0–2) 
 13. Successful self-repair [10 ]   10 
md: 2 (2–3) 
[3 ]    3 
md: 1.5 (1–2) 
 14. Repair through 
specifying  
[7]     7 
md: 2 (2–3) 
[2]     1 
md: 1.5 (0–3) 
Attention 15. Lost thread when 
speaking 
[9 ]    8 
md: 2 (0–3) 
[3 ]    3 
md: 1 (1–4) 
Word retrieval 16. Word retrieval 
difficulties 
[1]   11 
md: 2 (1–4) 
[8]     6 
md: 1 (0–2) 
 17. Production of 
circumlocutions 
[9]    9 
md: 2 (1–3) 
[2 ]    1 
md: 1.5 (0–3) 
Reference  19. Reference failure  [6 ]   6 
md: 1.5 ( 1–3) 
[5 ]    4 
md: 2 (0–3) 
Prosody 25. Monotonous 
intonation  
[8 ]   7 
md: 1 (0–2) 
[3]     3 
md: 1 (1–3) 
Comprehension, 
general 
18. Comprehension in 
general 
[6]    6 
md: 2 (1–4) 
[5 ]    4 
md: 2 (0–3) 
Complex language 
comprehension 
21. Make inferences [4 ]    4 
md: 1.5 (1–3) 
[5]    5 
md: 2 (1–4) 
Note: Figures in bold type denote that a majority of individuals in that group reported the issue as 
changed or as having a negative impact. 
 
 
Most of the issues the conversational partners of the LHD group had reported as 
changed are also said to have a negative impact occasionally (corresponding to a median 
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of 2 on a group level). The area of prosody is perceived as rarely having a negative 
impact on conversational interaction (corresponding to a median of 1 at a group level). 
The majority of conversational partners report a negative impact of change in Word 
retrieval (16 and 17), Initiation and Turn-taking (2, 3, 5 and 6), and Repair (11, 12, 13 
and 14), as well as Attention (15) and Prosody (25). 
The ratings of degree of negative impact for the different issues made by the LHD 
subjects and their conversational partners are similar. However, the conversational 
partners tend to be more concerned about the change in the production of 
circumlocutions associated with word retrieval difficulties than the LHD subjects 
themselves are. The only difference that is close to statistical significance is the lower 
ratings of the conversational partners on the degree of negative impact of the change in 
Prosody (p = .015). Other p-values obtained varied between .139 and 1.000. 
 
A majority of the conversational partners of the RHD subjects report that the changes in 
making inferences (question 21) and word retrieval (question 16) have a negative impact 
on the RHD individual’s interaction in conversation.  
Some issues that were reported as changed by a majority of partners were only 
perceived as having a negative impact by four of the nine conversational partners of the 
RHD subjects (issues 5, 18 and 19). As can be seen in table 3:3:4 above, there were 
several other cases where one or another of the conversational partners did not report 
any negative impact from issues reported to have changed.  
According to the reports of the RHD conversational partners as a group, word 
retrieval problems (issue 16) rarely (md: 1) had a negative impact while the problems 
making inferences (issue 21) occasionally (md: 2) had a negative impact on 
conversational interaction. As can be seen in Appendix 4, detailed responses (issue 5), 
reference failures (issue 19) and general comprehension (issue 18), as well as 
comprehension of humour (issue 22), were also rated as occasionally having a negative 
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impact; nevertheless, more respondents reported changes in these areas than negative 
impacts of those changes.  
The differences in the ratings of degree of negative impact between the RHD 
individuals and their conversational partners were small and not statistically significant. 
The p-values obtained varied between .076 and 1.000. 
When comparing the ratings of conversational partners of the RHD group to the 
ratings of the conversational partners of the LHD group, the latter tend to report a higher 
degree of negative impact on the subject’s conversational ability. The difference was 
close to statistically significant for word retrieval (16) (p = .011). The other p-values 
obtained varied between .056 and .906. 
  
3.3.4 Summary: Change and negative impact on interaction 
 
The results of the questionnaire indicate that regardless of the lateralisation of brain 
damage, there are changes in pragmatic ability manifested in conversational interaction. 
The LHD group and their conversational partners tend to report more marked changes 
more often than the RHD group and their conversational partners. At a group level, the 
changes are often subtle but at an individual level they may have a significant negative 
impact on the ability to interact in conversation. 
A response to the first research question for study 3 can be summarised as follows: 
several areas are reported by a majority of the participants in both the LHD group and 
the RHD group. Both groups report changes in Attention, Word retrieval, Initiation and 
Turn-taking. The changes in Word retrieval and Turn-taking are agreed on by the 
conversational partners of both groups of brain-damaged individuals. In addition, the 
LHD subjects and their conversational partners tend to report more change within the 
Repair and Prosody areas than the RHD subjects and their conversational partners. 
There are also tendencies to differences in the reports of perceived change between 
the brain-damaged individuals and their conversational partners, especially between the 
  148 
RHD subjects and their conversational partners. The most obvious differences were that 
the RHD individuals themselves more often report changes in several issues in the 
Initiation area, and a majority of them also report an increased tendency to lose the 
thread while speaking. The conversational partners of the RHD subjects, on the other 
hand, tend to report changes in general comprehension, and more specifically in more 
complex language comprehension, as well as increased reference failures. 
The answer to the second research question is that although the differences are not 
statistically significant and the variations within the groups are large, the LHD subjects 
and their conversational partners tend to report changes in conversational interaction 
more often, and to a higher degree and they also tend to report more issues as having a 
negative impact than the RHD subjects and their conversational partners do. However, 
the RHD conversational partners tend to report a higher degree of change in the 
Comprehension areas.  
The answers to the third and fourth research questions are that the areas reported as 
changed often also have a negative impact on conversational interaction. The only 
statistically significant difference in rating of degree of negative impact between the 
brain-damaged subjects related to one issue: the LHD subjects rated the degree of 
negative impact from the change in their ability to perform successful self-repairs higher 
than the RHD subjects. The RHD subjects did not even report much change in their 
ability to perform self-repairs successfully. On the other hand, a subgroup of RHD 
subjects did report a negative impact of change in the production of circumlocutions and 
the ability to repair by specifying. They reported that those changes occasionally or 
often had a negative impact on conversational interaction. 
Even though most subjects who reported an issue as changed also reported that 
change as having a negative impact, there were exceptions. Some issues reported as 
changed by a majority of the participants were not perceived as having a negative 
impact by all of them. There are also issues not reported as having a negative impact by 
a majority of the participants that were still rated as having a high degree of negative 
  149 
impact by those who experienced them. The subjects in the RHD group who did report a 
negative impact often tended to report a higher degree of negative impact than their own 
conversational partners and than the LHD subjects and their conversational partners. For 
example, although only reported by a few of the RHD subjects, the degree of negative 
impact of monotonous intonation in the Prosody area and of several issues in the 
Comprehension areas are rated high. That is, subjects who actually perceived an issue as 
changed often tended to perceive it as having a major negative impact on the 
conversational interaction.  
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3.4 Introduction and outline to study 4: Case studies 
 
The results of group studies may give a picture of the effect of brain damage on different 
aspects of pragmatic ability. However, although group results may be more suitable for 
generalisation to a larger population, they can obscure individual results. Therefore, in 
this final study, the group results will be supplemented by four case studies that can 
demonstrate the consequences of pragmatic language impairment at the individual level. 
The cases involve two RHD individuals and two LHD individuals.  
First, the research questions and methodology of study 4 will be presented. After 
that, the individual cases are introduced, and the quantitative and qualitative results of 
their participation in studies 1 to 3 are presented. This is followed by the results of the 
analysis of the video-recorded conversational interaction. These data will then be 
summarised and briefly discussed as examples related to the research hypotheses. Study 
4 concludes with a summary and discussion of the individual features of each of the four 
cases.  
 
3.4.1 Research questions in study 4 
 
The research question in this study is: How does pragmatic language impairment 
manifest itself at an individual level in cognitive tasks and in informal conversational 
interaction?  
From an ethnomethodological perspective, all perception of reality is the result of 
assumptions that are sometimes implicit and often culturally and personally rooted. The 
aim of these studies has been to use an empirical, data-driven point of departure for the 
analysis, at least in part. Nevertheless, it was considered important to make any 
manifestations of implicit assumptions explicit. Based on the bottom-up analyses of the 
video-recordings, but also on the literature on pragmatic language impairment in 
association with RHD and LHD (see section 1.2.6, in part I of the thesis), as well as the 
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results of the cognitive tasks and personal reports in the questionnaire, the following 
three hypotheses or – since no statistical tests of the hypotheses will be done – quasi-
hypotheses were formulated: 
 
1. Although all participants had personally experienced a change in word retrieval 
issues, it was hypothesised that these problems would manifest themselves in 
different ways, in terms of OCM phenomena (see section 3.5.2.2 for a 
definition). It was hypothesised that the two LHD subjects would express their 
word-finding difficulties in a more salient way than the two RHD subjects. 
 
2. Due to the different expressions of for example word retrieval issues, the pattern 
of turn-taking was expected to be qualitatively different for the two RHD 
subjects vs. the two LHD subjects.  
 
3. Finally it was hypothesised that: a) the conversational interaction with the two 
RHD subjects would be characterised by a need for other-initiated repair, and 
b) the interaction with the two LHD individuals would be characterised more by 
self-repair. This hypothesis is also has based on the group results from the 
questionnaire, where subjects in the RHD group and their conversational 
partners said they experienced less change and less negative impact from 
patterns related to self-repair. 
 
3.5 Method: Study 4  
 
Each of the four individuals will be presented and the quantitative and qualitative results 
from the Discourse Comprehension task will be analysed in association with their 
performance on the VWM task and the SART. Some of the personal data have been 
slightly modified; for example, code names have been used to assure the participants of 
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anonymity. The subjects’ results on the questionnaire will also be described, 
supplemented by an analysis of their video-recorded conversational interaction. The 
video-recorded samples are included in study 4 to allow a more data-driven approach, 
and to illustrate the results of the questionnaire used in study 3. 
 
3.5.1 Selection of participants in the case studies 
 
Four cases will be presented here; see table 3:5:1 for personal data. Two of the 
participants have RHD and two have LHD. The participants were selected from among 
the 28 RHD and LHD individuals participating in studies 1 to 3.  
Two of the cases, one RHD and one LHD individual, were selected from among the 
three individuals in each group who had the lowest scores on the inference tasks in study 
1. Thus, they are representative of individuals in their groups who had problems making 
inferences. Of the three RHD individuals who had the lowest scores on inference tasks 
in study 1, Nils was the only one who had the lowest scores both on tasks that required 
inference of a character’s attitude or motive and on tasks requiring revised inference. 
All of the three LHD individuals with the lowest scores on inference tasks, had low 
scores for both types of tasks. Johan was selected because his recorded conversation 
included the topic of rehabilitation post-stroke, which was the dominant topic in the 
recorded conversation with Nils (RHD), and an effort was made to have any background 
factors in the conversational interaction as similar as possible for these two cases. Johan 
does, however, have more obvious phonological and semantic problems in conversation 
than most of the other participants in the LHD group.  
The other two cases, Carl (RHD) and Thomas (LHD), were selected as they, and 
their conversational partners, were as representative as possible of typical responses to 
the questionnaire on the group level. That is, these two subjects had reported change in 
areas where a majority of participants in the groups had reported change. 
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Table 3:5:1: Personal data of cases.  
 Mean 
(S D.)* 
Range
* 
Nils  
(RHD) 
Johan 
(LHD) 
Carl 
 (RHD) 
Thomas 
(LHD) 
Sex Male Male Male Male 
Age 62.6 
(11.4) 
39–80 67 54 74 67 
Educational 
level 
2.1 
(.72) 
1–3 2 2 1 1 
Reading 
habits 
2.8 
(1.4) 
0–4 3 1 0 4 
Month post-
onset 
40.9 
(37.6) 
6–120 52 62 6 7 
Site and type of lesion 
according to CT or MRI. 
CT: In RHa 
infarction in 
Sylvian 
fissure 
towards 
basal 
ganglia and 
caudate 
nucleus. 
MR: In LHb 
infarction 
temporal 
and frontal 
(centra 
semiovale 
down to 
corona 
radiata). 
CT: In RHa 
infarction 
involving 
temporal, 
insula as 
well as 
frontal and 
central 
parts. 
CT: In LHb 
infarction in 
putamen, 
reaching 
towards 
cortical parts 
of the frontal 
lobe 
Note: * = The presented mean, standard deviation and range are for all 24 subjects from both RHD and 
LHD groups. RH a = right hemisphere, LH b = left hemisphere. 
 
All four cases are men. Two of them are at least four years post-stroke. The remaining 
two cases had had their stroke fairly recently. Three of the cases have brain damage with 
frontal involvement and one of the cases from each group also has brain damage 
involving the basal ganglia (table 3:5:1). The results on the cognitive tests from studies 1 
and 2 are presented in table 3:6:1. 
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3.5.2 Methodology in case studies 
 
In this section, the analysis performed in study 4 will be described. 
 
3.5.2.1 Individual cases 
 
For the presentation of the individual cases, personal data and their results on the 
cognitive tasks in studies 1 and 2, and the responses of the brain-damaged individuals 
and their spouses on the questionnaire are compiled. Quantitative and qualitative results 
on the following cognitive tasks will be presented: 
 
1. Spontaneous responses on the Discourse Comprehension task 
2. The VWM task 
3. The Sustained Attention to Response Test (SART) 
 
3.5.2.2 Analysis of conversational interaction 
 
At least 10-minute-long samples of conversational interaction between the brain-
damaged individuals and the test leader were video-recorded. To make the conversations 
as natural as possible, the recordings were made in the homes of the brain-damaged 
individuals during a coffee break while the cognitive tests were being administered. It 
was considered important to let each conversation proceed as naturally as possible. No 
attempt was made to influence the choice of topics. However, it was also considered 
important to achieve a conversational interaction with mutual and equal participation. 
That is, the type of activity that was aimed for was more in the form of a first encounter 
between acquaintances than an interview. The participants were informed that the videos 
would be compared to the results from the questionnaires. The only instruction given 
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was that they were expected to act as they normally did in conversation with a new 
acquaintance. 
The research leader’s participation in the conversational interaction and in the 
analysis of the video-recorded samples calls for conscious control over personal 
preconceived notions in both the interaction and the analysis of the material. To control 
for a possible bias, an analysis of the reliability of the transcriptions and assessments of 
the content of the conversational interaction were performed. Ten percent of the samples 
of the video-recorded interaction from each dyad, randomly picked out, were also 
transcribed by an experienced transcriber. This independent observer was otherwise not 
involved in the project and was naive to the background of the subjects in the 
interaction. The comparison of the transcriptions showed only minor differences, 
primarily in the notation of the start and the end of overlapping speech and gestures. 
Differences in the interpretation of utterances were predominantly seen in the sample 
from one of the participants who tended to articulate unclearly in his rapid speech. The 
same independent observer also analysed the entire samples of analysed video-recorded 
conversational interactions to assess the occurrences of other-initiated repair concerning 
reference to a locative adverb. There was 100% agreement between observers that 
examples of other-initiated repair associated with the use of a place adverb were seen 
only in the discourse samples with the RHD subjects.  
However, the disadvantage of the research leader participating in the conversational 
interaction as well as in the analysis might be considered to be counterbalanced by the 
advantages (Ottesjö, 2005). One of these advantages is the natural background to the 
encounter. The recording of the conversational interaction was not the primary reason 
for the meeting between the brain-damaged individual and the test leader. The 
background activity, the coffee break between tasks, actually provided a natural setting 
for an encounter between the brain-damaged person and a casual acquaintance. Another 
advantage in having the same person who took part in the conversation perform the 
analysis is the inherent knowledge and memory of the situation and the motivations of at 
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least one of the participants, which reduces the amount of interpretation and guessing 
needed in the analysis. Finally, although it might have been preferable to record natural 
conversations between each of the participating brain-damaged individuals and their 
spouses, another advantage of using the same person in all interactions is that at least the 
personality and interaction style of the conversational partner is kept as constant as 
possible. This facilitates the comparison of different samples of conversational 
interaction. 
From the video-recorded conversational interaction, samples about ten minutes long 
were transcribed in standard orthography and analysed. The analysed sample with 
Thomas (LHD) and the test leader was 7.27 minutes long, as Thomas’s wife took part in 
most of the interaction.  
The preferred sizes of samples used conversational discourse analyses varies 
depending on the variable studied. In a study of variations in repair, speaking rate and 
utterance length by Boles and Bombard (1998), 5- to 10-minute samples have been 
found to be sufficient. According to Perkins et al. (1997), a sample about 10 minutes 
long should normally be adequate to look for evidence of behaviour reported in the 
CAPPCI interview, which is the model for the questionnaire used in study 3.  
As the conversational interactions between the four dyads were also to be compared 
to each other, analyses were done to make sure that the context of the interaction was as 
similar as possible and that any background factors that might have an influence were 
considered. To map background factors that might influence the conversational 
interaction, Activity Based Communication Analysis (ACA) (Allwood, 1995; Ahlsén 
1995) was used. In ACA, the goals, roles and other specific features of the individuals 
are compared with the conventional and possible modified goals and features of the 
activity they are involved in. This can highlight and explain both problems and 
possibilities in the communicative context. In this framework, background factors that 
influence or determine the conditions of the communication can be either collective 
activity background factors or individual background factors. The collective activity 
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background factors are composed of features of the interaction type and the actual 
physical context of the interaction. Individual background factors are the social, 
biological, physical and psychological features brought into the interaction by each 
participant. These background factors are believed to influence and determine the 
interaction pattern and the individual means of expression in the interaction, which are 
both considered as behavioural factors.  
The analysed samples were transcribed according to the transcription standards for 
spoken language, Modified Standard Orthography (MSO6) for Swedish language, 
presented in the Gothenburg Transcription Standard (GTS), developed by Nivre, 
Allwood, Grönqvist, Gunnarsson, Ahlsén, Vappula, Hagman, Larsson, Sofkova, and 
Ottersjö (2004) at the Department of Linguistics, Gothenburg University. In accordance 
with GTS, both vocal and communicative non-vocal contributions were transcribed. A 
contribution is defined as ‘a continuous stretch of communicative activity from one 
participant, bounded either by inactivity, or by communicative activity from another 
participant (Nivre et al., 2004, p. 4). This means that in the transcriptions contributions 
from two different participants may either overlap each other or succeed each other. In 
addition to speech, transcribed in modified standard orthography, contributions such as 
laughter, sighing and audible inhalations were transcribed, as were pauses and body 
communication such as gestures. 
From the recordings of Nils (RHD) and Johan (LHD), ten minutes of conversation 
on the topic of their personal experience of rehabilitation was chosen for the analysis. 
Since this topic was dealt with in the first ten minutes of interaction in the recorded 
conversation, the first ten minutes of interaction were also chosen for analysis in the two 
remaining cases, Carl (RHD) and Thomas (LHD).  
In an effort to analyse the samples in a way that would not jeopardise the possibility 
of discovering any interesting patterns in the interaction, the analysis at first proceeded 
in a bottom-up, data-driven manner. That is, the video-recordings were viewed several 
times and transcribed before any decisions were made as to which specific areas were to 
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be analysed in depth. In this way, any salient individual traits could be captured. The 
impressions from these analyses are presented for each case below. The results of the 
bottom-up analysis of the video-recordings indicated that it would be interesting to look 
at strategies used in association with word retrieval problems and repair, and more 
specifically, occurrences of other-initiated repair. 
The research question for study 4 – ‘how does pragmatic language impairment 
manifest itself at an individual level in cognitive tasks and in informal conversational 
interaction’ – includes intent to describe the actual effect of pragmatic language 
impairment on conversational interaction. Hence, it was considered important to look 
into areas that commonly change in association with brain damage. The bottom-up 
procedure was therefore followed by a top-down procedure, where the group results on 
the questionnaire were used as a guiding principle for further analysis of specific areas; 
see table 3:5:2.  
  159 
 
Table 3:5:2: Areas reported as changed in the conversational interaction by > 50% of the participating 
individuals within each group.  
LHD subjects  
(n = 13) 
RHD subjects 
(n = 11 ) 
LHD conversational 
partners (n = 13) 
RHD conversational 
partners (n = 9) 
Attention Attention Attention  
Word retrieval Word retrieval Word retrieval Word retrieval 
Initiation Initiation Initiation  
Turn-taking Turn-taking Turn-taking Turn-taking 
Topic 
management 
   
Repair   Repair  
Prosody   Prosody  
   Reference 
   Comprehension, 
general 
   Complex language 
comprehension 
 
 
The areas of Word retrieval and Turn-taking were reported to be changed by over 50% 
of the participants in each of the four groups of brain-damaged individuals and their 
conversational partners. Therefore these areas were selected for analysis in the recorded 
samples. 
Areas reported to be changed by the four subjects and their spouses are presented in 
table 3:5:3. 
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Table 3:5:3: Areas reported to be changed by the four subjects and their conversational partners. 
Thomas 
LHD  
CP – 
Thomas 
Johan  
LHD 
CP – 
Johan 
Carl  
RHD 
CP – 
Carl* 
Nils 
RHD  
CP –Nils 
Attention Attention Attention    Attention Attention 
Word 
retrieval 
Word 
retrieval 
Word 
retrieval 
Word 
retrieval 
Word 
retrieval 
 Word 
retrieval 
Word 
retrieval 
Initiation Initiation Initiation Initiation   Initiation Initiation 
Turn-taking Turn-
taking 
Turn-
taking 
Turn-
taking 
Turn-
taking 
 Turn-
taking 
Turn-
taking 
  Topic 
manage-
ment 
Topic 
manage-
ment 
Topic 
manage-
ment 
 Topic 
manage-
ment 
Topic 
manage-
ment 
Repair Repair Repair Repair 
(11†) 
  Repair Repair 
 General 
comp-
rehension 
    General 
comp-
rehension 
General 
comp-
rehension 
Reference Reference  Reference   Reference Reference 
Comp-
rehension, 
complex 
languagea 
 Comp-
rehension, 
complex 
languagea 
   Comp-
rehension, 
complex 
language 
Comp-
rehension, 
complex 
language 
Prosody   Prosody     
Note: a = Issue 21 (Inference failure) is the only issue reported in the more complex language area in 
the questionnaire.  
† = Issue 11 (Indicating comprehension failure) is the only issue reported in the Repair area in the 
questionnaire.  
* = Conversational partner not included in the presentation of group results on questionnaire in 
study 3 since she did not report any change in any of the behaviours inquired about in the 
questionnaire. 
 
Among typical areas changed post-stroke in both groups of brain-damaged individuals, 
as indicated by the group results on the questionnaire and the impressions from the 
video-recordings of the four cases, the following areas of conversational interaction 
were analysed: 
 
1. Word retrieval, 
2. Turn-taking and 
3. Repair. 
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In the analysis of these issues, the concept of Own Communication Management 
(OCM), developed by Allwood, Nivre, and Ahlsén (1990), and Allwood, Ahlsén, Nivre, 
and Larsson (2001), was used as a tool to conceptualise and describe the findings. Any 
speaker, whether brain-damaged or not, supervises the planning and implementation of 
his or her speech. The process from thought to speech is managed by different means; 
such features as pausing, hesitation sounds and repetition are symptoms of the planning, 
and sometimes the revision, of a speech plan.  
Speech plan is defined as the planned explicit linguistic manifestation of any 
intended meaning; that is, the plan of how to convey the intended notion or implication 
to the conversational partner by verbal and non-verbal means. An inability to 
successfully implement or revise a speech plan may result in failure to produce the 
message and force the individual to abandon his or her aim of conveying an intended 
meaning.  
Allwood et al. (1990, 2001) supplemented the theories of, for example Levelt 
(1983) and Schegloff (1979) regarding repair issues in oral discourse. Allwood et al. 
(1990) describe communication management phenomena as a set of highly regular 
operations for efficient and flexible speech management. They also find that there is a 
close structural and functional interaction between speech management and certain 
aspects of the management of conversational interaction. This is especially true for turn-
taking and feedback functions in interaction. Furthermore, these authors claim that, 
although it is sometimes appropriate to tie speech or communication management to 
repair and correction, as being related to change in the performance of speech, such a 
narrow characterisation cannot constitute the complex concept of communication 
management as a whole. Change-related phenomena help the speaker to change content 
that has already been produced. The process of change might be elicited by an internal 
feedback process, or by external sources, for example, in the form of other-initiated 
repair. However, aspects of communication management related to the planning, or 
choice, of expressions in speech are also relevant. Such choice-related functions occur 
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before the start of the expression of the main message and are therefore not related to 
change. The function of choice-related phenomena might be to gain time for processing 
in the form of word retrieval, episodic memory search and other speech planning. 
Allwood et al. (1990, 2001) account for an OCM system in units, divided into Basic 
single features and Complex feature combinations. The latter are combinations of basic 
features in the same occurrence. For the purpose of this study, only Basic single features 
will be classified and described, even though the combinations of several features 
commonly occur in natural discourse. Table 3:5:4 displays the Basic single features 
used.  
 
Table 3:5:4: Basic single features of Own Communication Management (OCM) units in discourse 
Basic single features 
Basic OCM expressions Basic OCM operations 
Pause Simple 
expressions 
e. g.: ‘eh’, 
‘äh’, ‘m’, 
‘like’, ‘or’ 
Explicit 
phrases  
e.g.: 
‘What’s it 
called?’ 
Sounds 
 e. g.: sigh, 
hiss, click, 
(Swedish: 
smacka) 
Prolonged 
vowel 
Self-
interruption 
Self-
repetition 
 
 
The single features are described as either Basic OCM expressions or Basic OCM 
operations. Basic OCM expressions are pauses; expressions such as ‘eh’, ‘m’, etc.; 
explicit phrases such as ‘What’s it called?’ and sounds such as sighs, hisses and clicking 
sounds. Basic OCM operations are the lengthening of a vowel, self-interruption and self-
repetition.  
  163 
 
3.6 Presentation of individuals in cases 
  
In this section, the cases will first be presented in comparison with each other. The 
personal data and individual results on the cognitive tasks in studies 1 and 2 and a 
description of the responses to the questionnaire in study 3 will follow for each case 
individually. 
As can be seen in table 3:6:1, Nils (RHD) and Johan (LHD) present several 
similarities with respect to their test results. They both make more errors than the 
average brain-damaged individual on the VWM task and also on the SART. Their low 
scores on the Discourse Comprehension tasks are in fact the very reason they were 
selected as representatives for their groups. Their Mean reaction time in the sustained 
attention task is about the same, although they diverge from each other on Number of 
correct responses in this task. 
  
Table 3:6:1: Individual performance and mean, standard deviation and range of group results on cognitive tasks.  
 VWM 
errors 
(max. 42) 
Sustained 
attention: 
Correct 
responses  
(max. 200) 
Sustained 
attention: 
Errors  
(max. 25) 
Mean 
reaction time 
in SART 
Revised 
inference 
(max. 8)  
Inference 
of attitude/ 
motive 
 (max. 10) 
Explicit 
inform. 
(max. 11) 
Number of 
responses 
modified 
(max. 33) 
Mean (S.D.) 
and range of 
Control 
group  
m: 8.2  
(4.5) 
Range: 0–
17 
m: 182.7 
(16.9) 
Range:  
129–199  
m: 11.4 
(4.1) 
Range: 
 6–18  
m: 350 (64.6) 
Range:  
256–473 
m: 6.9 (1.0) 
Range: 5–8 
m: 9.0 (1.3) 
 Range: 
 6–10 
10.2 (1.0)  
Range: 8–
11 
m: 2.1 (2.4) 
Range: 0–6 
Mean (S.D.) 
and range of 
RHD and 
LHD 
groups* 
m: 13.6 
(5.8 ) 
Range: 5–
24 
m: 185.6 
(14.5) 
Range:  
143–200 
m: 9.5 (5.1) 
Range: 
 0–20  
m: 449 (101.5) 
Range: 
 282–657 
m: 4.7 (1.7) 
Range:  
1–7 
m: 7.7 (1.7) 
 Range:  
3–10 
9.2 (2.3)  
Range: 2–
11 
m: 4.3 (5.5) 
Range:  
0–23 
Nils 
 (RHD) 
21 163 12 466 3 5 11 4 
Johan 
(LHD) 
22 189 11 459 2 (4)a 4 (8) a  2 (11) a  23 
Carl  
(RHD)  
16 143 6 598 1 7 9 2 
Thomas 
(LHD)  
16 158 6 490 6 10 10 0 
Note: * = The presented mean, standard deviation and range on tasks are for all 24 subjects from both groups of brain-damaged individuals.  
a = Results on modified responses on Discourse Comprehension included within parentheses for Johan as he almost always suspended his 
inferences until after reading the narratives. 
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Carl (RHD) and Thomas (LHD) make the same number of errors on the VWM; this 
result is slightly higher than the mean result for the brain-damaged individuals. They 
also produced the same number of errors on the SART. In this case, their 
performance was slightly better than the mean performance of the brain-damaged 
individuals. Their results for explicit tasks and tasks requiring inference of a 
character’s attitude or motive are at about the same level; however, they do deviate 
from each other when it comes to results on tasks requiring revised inference. The 
score for Carl (RHD) is the lowest score of all the participants in the study. The score 
for Thomas (LHD) on these tasks is above the mean score for the brain-damaged 
individuals and actually level with the mean score for the Control group. Both 
Thomas (LHD) and Carl (RHD) have slower reaction times and produce fewer 
correct responses in the SART than the average brain-damaged individual in the 
study, but Thomas (LHD) performs somewhat better than Carl (RHD) on these 
measures. 
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3.6.1 Nils (RHD): Personal data and results  
 
Nils is a 67-year-old man. His personal data are displayed in table 3:5:1 above. 
Nils has completed his compulsory school education followed by two years of 
theoretical studies in secondary grammar school. In his professional life, he mostly 
worked as a foreman and in administration in big industrial companies. Next to 
playing musical instruments, sometimes in public, and listening to music, reading is 
one of his greatest interests and he still reads about 13 books a year, including both 
fiction and non-fiction. Nils has been an active member of various social associations 
and takes great interest in politics. 
About four and a half years pre-test he had a stroke with an infarction in the right 
hemisphere and left hemiplegia including facial paresis. He may have had neglect or 
hemianopia in the initial phase. The CT scan indicated brain damage involving the 
Sylvian fissure and reaching towards the basal ganglia and caudate nuclei. After 
several weeks in post-stroke rehabilitation, he was able to return to his apartment 
where he lived with his wife. 
At the time of his participation in the study Nils was still weak in his left hand 
and he used a walker to walk. His speech was still influenced by a mild dysarthria 
with somewhat imprecise articulation of consonant clusters; his voice quality was 
also affected. There were also noticeable remains of dysphagia. Apart from the 
problems in conversational interaction reported below, he himself reported post-
injury memory failures, resulting in problems remembering people’s names. He also 
experienced difficulty in recognising and naming previously well-known musical 
pieces.  
Nils’ wife perceived that Nils, who always had been, as she described him, ‘a 
hot-tempered and argumentative man’, had become more ‘nice and calm’ after the 
stroke. Nils agreed with this. He felt that since the stroke he did not have the strength 
to live the active life he was used to. Nils also found his impaired mobility and 
dependence on his family disturbing, and worried about the impact on the health of 
his significant others.  
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3.6.1.1 Qualitative data from inference tasks – Nils 
 
Although Nils handled all questions that depended on explicit information in the 
narratives without any hesitation, his scores for both kinds of questions about implicit 
information were among the three lowest results in the RHD group; see table 3:6:1. 
He scored 3 out of 8 on tasks requiring revised inference. The mean score for all 
brain-damaged subjects in both groups was 4.7 (S.D.: 1.7). On tasks requiring 
inference of a character’s attitude or motive, he scored 5/10 (mean for all brain-
damaged subjects: 7.7, S.D.: 1.7). On the few occasions when he took the opportunity 
to read the narratives and modify his responses, he managed to improve his results to 
a mediocre level but only on questions depending on revised inference. His score is 
still among the three lowest in the RHD group for tasks depending on inference of a 
character’s attitude or motive. All the inadequate responses produced by Nils are 
inadequate due to erroneous inference. That is, instead of postponing responses until 
after reading the text, he produced incorrect responses. 
During the test session, Nils seemed to be focusing on the task and listening to 
the narratives. Still, his low scores, in association with his way of responding, 
indicate that he might not be fully aware of his own difficulties in performing in the 
task. He gave 22 out of the possible 33 responses without any hesitation, that is, he 
initiated a response within approximately one second of the end of the question. 
Furthermore, he only took the opportunity to reread a narrative five times and he 
modified his responses to just four questions in all.  
Nils commented during the task that during the period immediately following 
the stroke he often had to reread sections of books or newspapers as he found that he 
lost track of what he was reading. He now felt that he no longer had to do that.  
The inadequate responses he produced to questions depending on inference of a 
character’s attitude and motive might indicate that he does not consider the 
emotional or attitudinal aspects of the narratives. The response ‘She was in a hurry’ 
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to question (1b) about why Asta had run off in narrative 1 is quite possible if one 
passes over the emotionally charged content of the situation described:  
 
1.    The broken vase 
With shaky hands Johan picked up the pieces of the vase she had thrown. There was 
broken glass all over the hall. He listened for any sound from the stairwell. Half an 
hour had passed since Asta had run off. He hadn’t had any chance to explain. ‘If she 
doesn’t come back tonight… or maybe tomorrow, if she doesn’t come back tomorrow, 
I’ll phone mother-in-law’, Johan thought to himself. 
 
 
The thrown vase might indicate anger. The narrative also implies that something had 
happened that needed an explanation. Johan’s thoughts of calling his mother-in-law 
may activate knowledge of common, or cliché, scenarios of couples who have had an 
argument. None of this is reflected in Nils’ response.  
The response ‘She had overslept’ to question (3a) about why the character in 
narrative 3 still had not got up also indicates that any emotional aspects implied by 
the content of the narrative are overlooked. This response might also be a hangover 
from narrative 2, where it is the correct response to question 2a, (all the narratives 
and questions are presented in Appendix 1). 
 
3.   A sunny day 
The sun stood already high above the rooftops when the cat, with its enthusiastic 
purring, once again tried to make her get up and refill its bowl. The blanket she had 
nailed up in front of the window three days ago didn’t succeed in shutting out the 
stinging rays of sunshine. ‘Lovely, a new wonderful day’, she said with a sigh and 
pulled the cover over her head. The letter she had received was still lying torn up on 
the kitchen table. 
 
 
This narrative involves irony in the character’s comment on the weather: ‘Lovely, a 
wonderful new day’. This comment conflicts with the description of her behaviour in 
the narrative: ‘“Lovely, a new wonderful day,” she said with a sigh and pulled the 
cover over her head’. Her words also have to be interpreted in the context of her 
trying to block out the sunlight with a blanket, indicating that she does not appreciate 
the sunny weather. The torn-up letter in the kitchen also implies a negative attitude. 
Nils does not grasp the irony, since he incorrectly responds ‘Yes’ to the question 
about whether the character in the narrative appreciates the beautiful weather 
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(question 3b). His responses to these questions indicate that he has not managed to 
integrate the information in the narrative into a coherent whole, and this results in an 
inadequate inference about the character’s state of mind. Still, it is not possible, in 
light of Kintsch’s (1998) construction-integration model, to come to any conclusions 
about whether he fails to apprehend relevant information about the character’s state 
of mind in the construction phase of the comprehension or if the activation is not 
strong enough to trigger a successful integration process that would guide him to the 
relevant inference. 
It is always possible that the character in this story really is feeling fine and 
enjoying the weather and that she has simply overslept. But in light of Grice’s 
maxims (1975, 1978) and Relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1995), the mention 
of the rather drastic measure of nailing up a blanket in front of the window and the 
letter being torn up means something important and relevant for the situation 
described.  
The next inadequate response to a question that depends on inference of a 
character’s attitude or motive might also be the result of a misinterpretation of a lie 
or ironic comment by the main character, in narrative number 9.  
 
9.   The cat 
The cat stood up on its hind legs and pawed his newly ironed trousers. In the kitchen 
the cat’s owner was clattering about with china and water for the coffee. ‘There, there’, 
Anders muttered and tried to free himself. Now the cat was persistently rubbing 
hundreds of soft hairs against his legs. Anders clenched his jaw as he pushed the cat’s 
wriggling body away from the expensive trousers. ‘That’s a really nice cat you have!’ 
he called out to the kitchen. 
 
 
In this narrative, as in narrative number 3, the main character’s comment about his 
attitude is in conflict with the content of the rest of the story. Nevertheless, Nils 
responded to question number 9a that he believed that Anders appreciated the cat. In 
this case, Nils grasped the irony when he took the opportunity to read the narrative 
and then corrected his response. The second inadequate response Nils gave to 
narrative number 9 is difficult to understand. On the question of what the character 
named Anders wanted the owner of the cat to believe (question 9c), Nils responds, 
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‘that he was going to fetch the cat’. In the narrative, the main character, Anders, 
wants the female owner of the cat to believe that he is content with the behaviour of 
her cat. He wants to make a certain impression, perhaps hoping for a favourable 
development in their relationship. To make the correct inference, you need not only 
to have a theory about one character’s mental state. The comment by the character is 
motivated by a wish for, or an idea about, the mental state of another character. This 
is a tricky question, demanding a complex kind of inference, that requires the 
recursive attribution of mental states. Nevertheless, it was mostly RHD individuals 
who gave inadequate responses to that particular question. Only one individual from 
the Control group and one from the LHD group produced inadequate responses to 
this question.  
This is one of the few narratives that Nils decided to read and also one of the 
four questions that he responded to with latency. Latency in this context means that it 
takes more than approximately two seconds from the end of the question until a 
response is initiated. After reading the text, Nils correctly interpreted the situation 
described and inferred that Anders did not appreciate the cat: ‘He didn’t like it to 
cling tightly to him. He got hair on his trousers.’ Nevertheless, he did not seem to be 
able to use the inference of the main character’s attitude towards the cat to make an 
adequate inference of the character’s motive in lying about his attitude. Actually, 
Nils’ response doesn’t involve any inference of a motive or an attitude. It involves an 
action, ‘to fetch the cat’, which of course might have some relevance in the situation, 
except that Nils does not account for it in his response.  
The remaining five inadequate responses are on tasks requiring revised 
inference. In one case, Nils omits any response. In the remaining four cases, he 
makes the wrong assumption about the meaning of the ambiguous words, for 
example, in narrative number 12: 
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12.   The book/beech (Swedish: Boken) 
He had given her a book/beech (Swedish: bok) on their first wedding anniversary. She 
had been so pleased and had kissed him. After that, she often sat in the garden, looking 
at it. It had turned into a symbol of their marriage, he thought. That was many years 
ago. She was dead now but the book/beech (Swedish: boken) was still there. He 
reached out and touched it. It was so large now that it shadowed the entire lawn. 
 
Nils makes the wrong interpretation of the Swedish word bok (‘book’/‘beech’) 
as meaning that the man had given his wife a book which she had kept all these years. 
In this case, Nils persisted in his initial interpretation even though he took the 
opportunity to read the text. On the question of whether it was a large book/beech that 
she had been given long ago, he comments: ‘Yes, it has to have been a large book as 
it shadowed the entire lawn.’  
Thus, Nils is using the information given in the text in his response but he 
sometimes seems to exclude emotional and attitudinal aspects of the semantics of the 
narratives or fails to integrate information in the narratives with knowledge of the 
world and objects in it.  
 
3.6.1.2 Results on VWM task – Nils 
 
In the task for estimated VWM, Nils produces 21 word recall errors; he also produces 
one of the four true/false errors produced by the RHD group. His results are among 
the three lowest in the RHD group (mean word recall error: 13.1, standard deviation: 
6.6); see table 3:6:2.  
 
Table 3:6:2: Group results on VWM task 
 Mean 
VWM 
errors 
S.D. Median Range 
Control  
(n = 14) 
8.2 4.5 7.5 0–17 
RHD (n = 14) 13.1 6.63 13 5–24 
LHD (n = 14) 14.1 c  5.1 12 9–23 
Note:  c = Result differs significantly from Control group result at .01 level. 
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Nils commented about this task that he used to have a good memory before he had 
his stroke. He gave no report on the strategy he used to remember the words. During 
the task, he sometimes commented on the content before starting to recall the words, 
but when this happened it did not interfere with his ability to recall the words. Three 
of the word recall errors are in the form of semantically related paraphasias such as 
‘tigers’ instead of ‘lions’ or ‘talk’ instead of ‘speak’. Three others are in the form of 
perseveration of words from an earlier set in the task. In the remaining 15 errors, no 
word was recalled. In conclusion, Nils does not have a high-capacity VWM, as 
assessed by this adapted version of Daneman and Carpenter’s (1980) reading span 
test.  
 
3.6.1.3 Results on the SART – Nils 
 
Of all the RHD individuals, Nils has the third lowest Number of correct responses, 
the fifth highest Number of erroneous responses, the third slowest Mean reaction 
time in test, the second highest Variations of reaction times (variance) and the highest 
Feedback time on the SART; see table 3:6:3. 
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Table 3:6:3: Individual results on the different SART measures. Mean scores and standard 
deviations for results on the measures in the Control group are presented within parentheses. 
 Number of 
correct 
responses  
Max. 200 
Number of 
erroneous 
responses 
Max. 25 
Mean 
reaction time 
in test in ms 
Variance in 
reaction times in 
test 
Feedback 
time in 
test* 
Nils 163 12 466.3 18748 –223.5 
Johan 189 11 459.3 41449 –154.2 
Carl 143 6 598 16785 –6.1 
Thomas 158 6 490 32549 – 
Control 
group 
mean 
(range) 
182.7  
(129–199) 
11.4  
(6–18) 
349.8  
(255.5–472.6) 
7738  
(1048–24668) 
–8.5  
(–157.26–
62.05) 
RHD 
group 
mean 
(range) 
183.9  
(143–200) 
9 (2–18) 470.2  
(302.4–657.4) 
10764  
(2011–18449) 
–49.84  
(–49.8–
29.5) 
LHD 
group 
mean 
(range) 
187.4  
(158–200) 
10 (0–20) 426.95 
(281.8–593.2) 
16078  
(1551–41449) 
–55.39  
(–157–35) 
Note: * It was only possible to obtain Feedback time from 12 individuals in each group. 
 
According to the measure used in this study, Nils’ ability to sustain attention is low. 
He might also have reduced general arousal, as indicated by the slow reaction time 
and the wide variability in reaction times during the task. However, the high 
Feedback time indicates that he is able to monitor his behaviour in the task and slows 
down the pace when he goes too fast and makes erroneous responses in the SART.  
 
 3.6.1.4 Responses to questionnaire – Nils 
 
According to Nils’ own responses to the questionnaire and those of his spouse, it is 
clear that both of them are aware of a persistent change in his communicative 
behaviour more than four years after the stroke.  
The total degree of change in the ability to interact in conversation after the 
stroke, as reported by Nils, is 55. This should be compared to the RHD group’s mean 
for total degree of change, which is 13.4 (S.D.: 14.8); see table 3:6:4. (The total is the 
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sum of the degrees of change reported by each group on the 25 issues in the 
questionnaire.) 
The total degree of negative impact of this change, as assessed by Nils is also 55, 
indicating that he perceives most of the changes as having very negative impact on 
his ability to interact in conversation. The RHD group’s mean total degree of 
negative impact is 16.9 (S.D.: 15.8).  
 
Table 3:6:4: Group data for total degree of change and negative impact on conversational ability as 
reported by the individuals themselves and by their conversational partners.  
 LHD (n = 13) RHD (n = 11) 
Total degree of 
change             Mean 
 
17.8 
 
13.4 
S.D. 10.6 14.8 
Median 20 10 
Range 1–35 1–55 
Total degree of 
negative impact    
                         Mean 
 
 
21.2 
 
 
16.9 
S.D. 15.9 15.8 
Median 26 13 
Range 1–55 2–57 
 CP LHD (n = 13) CP RHD (n = 9) 
Total degree of 
change             Mean 
 
17.6 
 
17.0 
S.D. 10.8 18.1 
Median 18 7 
Range 1–37 2–52 
Total degree of 
negative impact    
                         Mean 
 
 
25.9 
 
 
14.8 
S.D. 18.2 17.0 
Median 22 10 
Range 1–71 1–54 
 
 
Nils’ spouse reports a total degree of change of 52. The total degree of negative 
impact on Nils’ ability to interact in conversation as perceived by his wife is 54. Both 
production and comprehension in conversations seem to be affected. 
As can be seen in table 3:6:5, Nils and his wife report change and negative 
impact on conversational interaction related to several of the issues in the 
questionnaire. (The wording of the questions can be found in Appendix 3.) More 
frequent occurrences post-stroke of the behaviour mentioned in the question are 
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denoted with a plus sign (+). Less frequent occurrences post-stroke are denoted with 
a minus sign (–). 
Even though the exact ratings may vary, the couple often, but not always, agree 
on which issues have changed and have a negative impact on conversational 
interaction post-stroke. 
 
  
Table 3:6:5 Degree of change and negative impact of change for issues in questionnaire, as reported by Nils and his spouse (CP). 
Issue in questionnaire Change/ 
Nils 
Change/
CP 
Neg. 
impact/ Nils 
Neg. 
impact/CP 
Issue in questionnaire 
 
Change/ 
Nils 
Change/ 
CP 
Neg. 
impact/ Nils 
Neg. 
impact/ CP 
1. Start conversation –1 0 0 – 15. Lost thread when 
speaking 
+4 +4 4 4 
2. No response +4 +2 4 2 16. Word retrieval 
difficulties 
+4 +3 4 2 
3. Latency response +4 +4 4 4 17. Production of 
circumlocutions 
–2 +1 3 3 
4. Interrupt others’ 
turn 
0 0 – – 19. Reference failure  +3 +2 3 3 
5. Detailed responses +4 –2 0 2 25. Monotonous 
intonation  
0 0 – – 
6. Short responses 0 +2 – 2 18. Comprehension 
in general – failure 
+3 +3 4 3 
7. Start new topics +4 +4 4 4 20. Metaphorical 
meaning – failure 
+4 +4 4 4 
8. Coherence of new 
topics – failure 
+4 +4 4 4 21. Make inferences –3 –4 4 4 
9. Maintain topics 0 +4 – 4 22. Comprehension 
of humour  
–2 –3 4 3 
10. Recurring topics 0 0 – – 23. Use humour 0 0 – – 
11. Indicate 
comprehension 
problems  
+4 –2 4 2 24. Humour 
appreciated by 
others 
0 0 – – 
12. Initiate self-repair +1 0 3 – TOTAL: 55 52 57 54 
13. Successful self-
repair 
0 –2 – 1  
14. Repair through 
specifying  
–4 –3 4 3 
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Issues with high ratings from both Nils and his spouse include tendency to lose the 
thread while speaking (15), word retrieval problems (16), problems initiating a 
response (2 and 3), tendency to initiate new topics (7), ability to introduce new topics 
that are coherent with previous topics (8), ability to repair through specifying (other-
initiated repair, 14), reference failure (19) and both general (18) and more complex 
comprehension (20 to 22). 
Issues they disagree on are the increased tendency to produce short responses (5) 
and to maintain the same topics (9) as well as the decrease in the ability to perform 
self-repair successfully (13), reported by Nils’ spouse. Nils himself instead reports an 
increase in the production of self-initiated self-repair (12). Nils feels that this change, 
or perhaps rather the need for that change, has a real negative impact on his 
conversational interaction. 
 
3.6.1.5 Impressions from video-recorded conversation 
 
The most salient impression from the video-recorded conversational interaction with 
Nils is, in addition to occasional word retrieval difficulties and some slips of 
attention, the high frequency of other-initiated other-repair. Nils often seems to make 
his contributions somehow unspecific. This results in a need for repair through 
requests for clarification from the conversational partner. Word retrieval difficulties 
are sometimes handled by circumlocutions but these are often not successful. There 
are also several occasions of interruptions and overlap on the conversational partner’s 
turn, but, according to Nils and his wife, this was just as frequent before the stroke. 
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3.6.2 Johan (LHD): Personal data and results 
 
Johan is a 54-year-old man. He had completed his compulsory education and three 
years of further medical education. (Table 3:5:1 above compiles personal data on the 
cases.) At the time of his stroke, he was working as a care and social service 
professional. He is interested in the theatre, had acted himself and had been on tour 
with an independent theatre group for a few years.  
He used to read 1 to 3 books a year before his stroke. Since then, he reads about 
one book a year, but he still reads the newspaper every day. 
He had a left-sided infarction involving frontal and temporal as well as 
subcortical structures about five years before participating in the study. At the acute 
stage of his disability, he was diagnosed with global aphasia and oral apraxia. He 
recovered after several months in rehabilitation and returned to living with his family. 
At the time of his participation in the study, he was taking part in an outpatient 
rehabilitation program. His right hand was still weak and he said that he still 
sometimes had subtle word retrieval difficulties and he felt that his speech was 
inhibited. 
  
3.6.2.1 Qualitative data from inference tasks – Johan 
 
Johan had problems giving adequate spontaneous responses in the inference task. 
This is true for questions about explicitly stated information in the narratives as well 
as on tasks requiring revised inference and inference of a character’s attitude or 
motive. His scores on all three types of tasks are the lowest for all participating 
subjects in studies 1 and 2. On tasks that depend on explicitly stated information, he 
produced 2 adequate responses out of a possible 11. The mean score for all the brain-
damaged individuals is 9.2 (S.D.: 2.3), while it is 10.2 (S.D.: 1.0) for the control 
subjects; see table 3:6:1 above. Johan improved his scores markedly when he had 
read the texts. In his modified responses related to explicitly stated information, he 
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scored 11/11. In tasks requiring revised inference, he scored 2 out of 8 in his 
spontaneous responses and on tasks requiring inference of a character’s attitude or 
motive, 4 of 10, which also are among the lowest scores for these tasks. When given 
the opportunity to modify his responses after reading the narratives, he improved his 
score on tasks requiring inference of a character’s attitude or motive to 8 of 10, but 
on tasks requiring revised inference, his score on modified responses was still quite 
low (4/8). 
Johan actually takes the opportunity to simply listen to the questions before he 
reads the narratives as a strategy. His inadequate responses were a result of his 
suspending his responses until after he had read the narratives; consequently, his 
spontaneous responses were often limited to ‘I don’t remember’. He chose to read 9 
of the 11 narratives and modified 23 out of 33 responses, which is the highest 
frequency of modified responses for all the participating subjects. He produced 9 out 
of 33 spontaneous responses (often in form of ‘I don’t remember’) with latency. Two 
responses were produced without hesitation, both of them adequate and in answer to 
questions about narrative number 12, which is the last one. Johan reports that he feels 
that his performance improves with time. This is also reflected in his results, at least 
on the score for modified responses as he almost always prefers to read the narratives 
before trying to answer the questions. 
  
3.6.2.2 Results on VWM task – Johan 
 
Johan’s tendency to suspend his responses until he had read the narratives might be a 
strategy associated with memory failure. It is not possible to infer whether this is due 
to a failure of encoding or retrieval. According to his medical chart, a 
neuropsychological assessment performed shortly before Johan’s participation in the 
study concluded that he was weak in verbal encoding. His result on the VWM test, 22 
errors on 42 tasks, is also among the lowest scores for all the participants; see table 
3:6:2 above. The mean error score among the brain-damaged subjects is 13.6 (S.D.: 
5.8). Among the LHD subjects, one other subject used the same strategy, that is, 
suspending responses until after reading the narratives in the inference. She also has 
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almost the same high error score as Johan on the VWM. A low VWM capacity might, 
of course, interfere with both comprehension and encoding of more complex stimuli. 
Most of Johan’s errors on the VWM task were due to no word being recalled. 
One was an antonym (i.e. the opposite of the correct word, for example ‘hot’ instead 
of ‘cold’) and one was a word from another statement, but not the word that was 
meant to be memorised. 
Johan is well aware of his memory failures and even before starting he stated 
that he did not have high hopes of being able to perform well on this particular task. 
Afterwards, he reported sometimes using a visualisation strategy and sometimes 
trying to memorise the word through silent rehearsal. The latter strategy, he reported, 
did not help him very much as he felt that the questions interfered with this strategy. 
He himself does not feel that he has any trouble responding to the interfering 
true/false questions, although in fact he actually was one of only four subjects who 
made any true/false errors on the task. 
 
3.6.2.3 Results on the SART – Johan 
 
Johan produced 189 Correct responses and 11 Erroneous responses in the SART. 
This is equivalent to the results for the Control group, see table 3:6:3, above. He had 
a Feedback time of –154, the third lowest, meaning that after making erroneous 
responses in the SART, he was able to slow down in order to avoid further mistakes. 
The variance of reaction times in test is 41449, which is well above the results for the 
other participating subjects. This can be interpreted as indicating a fluctuating level of 
arousal. Johan’s Mean reaction time in test is 459 ms, which is quite slow but not 
among the 5 slowest brain-damaged participants in the study. One reason for the slow 
Mean reaction time in test might be that Johan used his left hand to press the 
response button in the task. However, it was five years since Johan had had his 
stroke, and he had become quite skilled in the use of his left hand to compensate for 
his spastic right hand.  
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3.6.2.4 Responses to questionnaire – Johan 
 
According to the questionnaires responded to by Johan and his spouse, they had both 
experienced change and negative impact, especially in the production of language; 
see table 3:6:6 below. 
 Table 3:6:6: Degree of change and negative impact of change for issues in questionnaire as reported by Johan and his spouse (CP). 
Issue in questionnaire 
 
Change/ 
Johan 
 
Change 
/CP 
Neg. 
impact/ 
Johan 
Neg. 
impact/CP 
Issue in questionnaire 
 
Change/ 
Johan 
 
Change/
CP 
Neg. impact/ 
Johan 
Neg. 
impact/CP 
1. Start conversation –1 –1 1 2 15. Lost thread when 
speaking 
+2 0 1 – 
2. No response +1 0 0 – 16. Word retrieval 
difficulties 
+2 +2 1 2 
3. Latency response 0 0 – – 17. Production of 
circumlocutions 
+2 0 0 – 
4. Interrupt others’ turn 0 0 – – 19. Reference failure  0 +1 – 1 
5. Detailed responses 0 –2 – 2 25. Monotonous 
intonation  
0 +1 – 1 
6. Short responses +2 +2 0 2 18. Comprehension 
in general – failure 
0 0 – – 
7. Start new topics –2 –2 1 2 20. Metaphorical 
meaning – failure 
0 0 – – 
8. Coherence of new 
topics – failure 
0 +2 – 2 21. Make inferences –1 0 0 – 
9. Maintain topics –1 –2 0 2 22. Comprehension 
of humour  
0 0 – – 
10. Recurring topics –1 –2 0 2 23. Use humour 0 0 – – 
11. Indicate 
comprehension 
problems 
+1 +1 0 1 24. Humour 
appreciated by 
others 
0 0 – – 
12. Initiate self-repair –1 0 1 – TOTAL: 17 18 5 19 
13. Successful self-
repair 
0 0 – –  
14. Repair through 
specifying  
0 0 – – 
Note: More frequent occurrences of the behaviour mentioned in the question are denoted with a plus sign (+). Less frequent occurrences are denoted 
with a minus sign (–).  
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However, Johan does not seem to feel that these changes have had a negative impact 
on his conversational ability. The total degree of change reported by Johan is 17 
(LHD group mean: 17.8, S.D.: 10.6). The total degree of negative impact he reported 
is only 5 (LHD group mean: 21.2, S.D.: 15.9). Johan has a more positive view of the 
impact of the post-stroke change than his spouse. She reports a total degree of change 
of 18 and a total degree of negative impact of 19, which is more in line with the mean 
result for the LHD group; see table 3:6:4 above, where group data from the 
questionnaire are presented.  
In fact, Johan and his wife disagree about several issues in the questionnaire. For 
example, Johan reports a change in attention (15) and ability to produce 
circumlocutions (17). His wife, on the other hand, reports a change in the production 
of detailed responses (5) and reduced ability to make new topics coherent (8), which 
are issues Johan did not report. Johan’s wife’s report of increased problems in 
making a new topic coherent might be associated with her experience of Johan as 
having a slight increase in reference failures (19).  
However, they do agree on the increased word retrieval difficulties (15), and 
production of short responses (5) and the decreased tendency to initiate new topics 
(7), although Johan’s spouse consistently rates the negative impact from these 
changes higher. 
 
3.6.2.5 Impressions from video-recorded conversation – Johan 
 
In the first part of the video-recorded conversation with Johan, there are several 
instances of word retrieval difficulties. There are also occurrences of phonological 
and semantic paraphasias. There are several instances of a change of speech plan, 
which affects the syntax. This might be a result of word-finding difficulties. At the 
beginning of the conversation, Johan seemed reluctant to keep his turn, producing 
short responses, and he seldom embellished a topic, although he did sometimes 
introduce a new one. The topic of his disability and speaking about his rehabilitation 
seemed to be more motivating, resulting in longer contributions, although they were 
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still affected by paraphasias and self-initiated repair. Towards the end of the analysed 
sample, the speech becomes more fluent and the rate of speech also seems to 
increase.  
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3.6.3 Carl (RHD): Personal data and results  
 
Carl is a 74-year-old man. At the time of his stroke, he was still active as a 
professional driver. He had completed compulsory school and had also attended some 
courses in, for example, sales. (Table 3:5:1 above displays personal data on the 
cases.) He is interested in bee-keeping and gardening, and he used to take a great 
interest in motor sports. He reads newspapers every day and specialist magazines, but 
almost no fiction at all. 
Carl described himself as always being a hard worker and he has several 
children and grandchildren. 
Six month before participating in the study, he had a large right-sided infarction 
in the medial cerebral artery. The CT showed that the infarction involved the insula 
temporally and also reached into the frontal and central parts of the brain. His motor 
abilities were never affected but the medical charts describe reduced sensitivity in his 
left hand and anosognosia in the acute stages of his disease.  
After a short period (10 days) of rehabilitation at the hospital, he returned home 
to live with his wife. At the time of his participation in the study, he stated that he felt 
almost fully recovered and was only aware of small changes in his language ability. 
His rate of speech was fast and occasionally characterised by imprecise articulation. 
 
3.6.3.1 Qualitative data from inference tasks – Carl 
 
In the comprehension task, Carl produced 7 adequate responses out of 10 on tasks 
requiring inference of a character’s attitude or motive. On tasks requiring revised 
inference, he only produced 1 adequate response out of the possible 8. The mean 
score for this type of task among the brain-damaged individuals is 4.7 (S.D.: 1.7); see 
table 3:6:1 above. He actually chose to read 10 of the 11 narratives but only modified 
2 of his responses. Most of the time, he stated that he thought that his spontaneous 
response was the right one. 
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He often reasoned aloud about the narratives when producing his responses, for 
example, narrative number 8: 
 
8. The crack in the forehead/furnace (Swedish: panna) 
The artist had worked on the face of the sculpture half the night. He slept until late in 
the morning, when his wife came in and woke him up.’ I’m sorry, but you have to 
wake up now. They say there is a crack in the forehead/ furnace (Swedish: panna)’, she 
said and pointed towards the hall. He went out to the studio and loosened the cloth 
around the sculpture. Not until then did he notice that the house had already got cold. 
 
 
In response to question 8b, about what had happened during the night, Carl said, ‘the 
sculpture had been cracked… it was in an apartment or a studio connected to it, and 
it ought not to have been pushed in there.’ Nevertheless, he stuck to his first 
spontaneous response, that ‘the sculpture had been cracked’, after reading the 
narrative. 
Question number 12a is another example of Carl sticking to his first 
interpretation of an ambiguous word (see Appendix 1 where the narratives are 
presented). On the question of whether she had been given a large book/beech 
(Swedish: bok) long ago, Carl responded: ‘Yes, as he describes it… but how could it 
throw a shadow over the entire lawn…? It perhaps depends on which angle you hold 
it at…’. Even though Carl seemed to realise the incoherence of the narrative when the 
ambiguous word is interpreted in that way, he still did not revise his interpretation. 
Instead, he came up with a marginally plausible explanation of the stated facts in the 
narrative.  
Carl also produced a few inadequate responses on tasks requiring inference of a 
character’s attitude or motive. On narrative 9, he reasoned about what motive the 
main character might have for his actions (question 9b, see Appendix 1). Carl 
reasoned as follows: ‘… perhaps the cat was lying around somewhere… it doesn’t 
seem as if he removes the cat… perhaps he was waiting for food or something like 
that.’ Although starting up his reasoning with the whereabouts of the cat, Carl gives a 
response that might be coherent with the activity of the cat’s owner, ‘clattering about 
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with china and water’ in the kitchen. However, he does not manage to incorporate the 
attitudinal information about the main character and his relationship to the cat. 
 
3.6.3.2 Results on VWM task – Carl 
 
Carl produced 16 errors in the VWM task, rather more than the mean scores for the 
brain-damaged individuals and the control subjects. His was the fifth highest error 
score for the RHD subjects. One of his errors was due to recalling another word than 
the target in the stimulus sentence, three were words from previous sets and two were 
seemingly unrelated. The remaining 10 errors were due to no word’s being recalled. 
Carl did not report any conscious strategy to remember the words. He sometimes 
reproduced the whole statement in his responses in a corrected form. This directly 
caused at least one of the errors: in the stimulus sentence ‘water is dry’, the target 
word is ‘dry’. Carl reproduced it as ‘water is wet’ (the antonym to ‘dry’) when asked 
to recall the last words of the sentences in that set. He handled the true/false questions 
well. He often made associations with the content of the stimulus sentences but tried 
hard to recall the words before sharing his thoughts. He commented about the task 
that the content was not very interesting and therefore it was difficult to keep in mind. 
 
3.6.3.3 Results on the SART – Carl 
 
Carl produced the fewest correct responses in the SART of any of the RHD 
individuals, only 143. In fact, he had the second lowest score among all participants 
in the study. On the other hand, he only produced 6 Erroneous responses; see table 
3:6:3. These results might be due to Carl’s slow Mean reaction time in test: his Mean 
reaction time, 598 ms, is the highest for all subjects in the study. Mean reaction time 
in test may be interpreted as a measure of level of arousal. The slow reaction time 
caused him to miss several of the targets as well as preventing him from making too 
many Erroneous responses. Carl had the fifth highest Feedback time among the RHD 
subjects, –6.1, and this might indicate a reduced ability to monitor and flexibly adapt 
the pace of his responses in the SART. That is, he did not seem to slow down after 
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making erroneous responses. Carl also had the fourth highest variance in vigilance 
among the RHD subjects, 16785, which might be interpreted as showing that there 
are some fluctuations in his level of arousal. 
 
3.6.3.4 Responses to questionnaire – Carl 
 
In responding to the questionnaire about issues in conversational interaction, Carl’s 
spouse reported no change. In fact, she more or less consistently reported that the 
issues inquired about occurred very rarely or never, both before and after the stroke; 
see table 3:6:7. According to Carl’s medical charts, during Carl’s hospitalisation 
another member of his family stated that after the stroke he had an apparent increase 
in speech production. The total degree of change and of negative impact, as reported 
by Carl himself, is 4 – below the RHD group’s mean for change (13.4, S.D.: 14.8) 
and for degree of negative impact (16.9, S.D.: 15.8).  
 Table 3:6:7: Degree of change and negative impact of change for issues in questionnaire as reported by Carl and his spouse (CP). 
Issue in questionnaire 
 
Change/ 
Carl 
Change 
/CP 
Neg. 
impact/Carl 
Neg. 
impact/CP 
Issue in questionnaire 
 
Change/ 
Carl 
Change / 
CP 
Neg. 
impact/ Carl 
Neg. impact 
/CP 
1. Start conversation 0 0 – – 15. Lost thread when 
speaking 
0 0 – – 
2. No response 0 0 – – 16. Word retrieval 
difficulties 
–1 0 1 – 
3. Latency response 0 0 – – 17. Production of 
circumlocutions 
0 0 – – 
4. Interrupt others’ 
turn 
0 0 – – 19. Reference failure  0 0 – – 
5. Detailed responses +1 0 1 – 25. Monotonous 
intonation  
0 0 – – 
6. Short responses 0 0 – – 18. Comprehension 
in general – failure 
0 0 – – 
7. Start new topics +1 0 2 – 20. Metaphorical 
meaning – failure 
0 0 – – 
8. Coherence of new 
topics – failure 
0 0 – – 21. Make inferences  0 0 – – 
9. Maintain topics 0 0 – – 22. Comprehension 
of humour  
0 0 – – 
10. Recurring topics +1 0 0 – 23. Use humour 0 0 – – 
11. Indicate 
comprehens. 
Problems 
0 0 – – 24. Humour 
appreciated by 
others 
0 0 – – 
12. Initiate self-repair 0 0 – – TOTAL: 4 0 3 – 
13. Successful self-
repair 
0 0 – –  
14. Repair through 
specifying  
0 0 – – 
Note: More frequent occurrences of the behaviour mentioned in the question are denoted with a plus sign (+). Less frequent occurrences are denoted 
with a minus sign (–).  
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Carl feels that he has a slight increase (+1) in the frequency with which he produces 
long and very detailed responses. According to his report, he used to do this 
sometimes before the stroke, but since the stroke the behaviour has become more 
frequent. He reports that this change does have a negative impact on his ability to 
interact in conversation, but only rarely. Carl also reports that before the stroke he 
sometimes started up new topics in conversation, but that now he often does this (+1). 
This, he feels, sometimes has a negative impact. Furthermore, he reports that he tends 
to bring up favourite topics recurrently in conversation slightly more often than 
before (+1), but he does not feel that this tendency has any negative impact on his 
ability to interact in conversation. He used to do this occasionally but he feels that he 
often does so since the stroke. 
Finally, he does notice a change in word mobilisation. Interestingly enough, he 
reports that before the stroke he sometimes experienced word retrieval difficulties, 
but since the stroke he rarely feels that he has problems finding the right word (–1). 
He reports that this change does have negative impact on his conversational ability, 
but only rarely. 
 
3.6.3.5 Impressions from video-recorded conversation – Carl 
 
The most prominent impression of the recorded conversation with Carl is his 
continuing development of new topics and his reluctance to hand over the turn to his 
conversational partner. Although there is an evident thread in his topic development, 
there are occasional reference failures and several instances of other-initiated repair 
in the form of requests for clarification by the conversational partner. At some points, 
he also seems to lose the thread. Carl’s articulation is sometimes slurred and several 
portions of his speech are difficult to understand on the video. It is possible that there 
are occurrences of phonological and semantic paraphasias and there is at least one 
self-corrected semantic paraphasia.  
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3.6.4 Thomas (LHD): Personal data and results  
 
Thomas is a 67-year-old man. He completed his compulsory schooling and used to 
work as a salesman. He is interested in literature, the arts and architecture. Before the 
stroke, he used to read 30 to 40 books a year. He states that he may read about that 
many books now, but that he has trouble concentrating on his reading and often has 
to reread passages to understand them. (Table 3:5:1 compiles personal data on the 
cases.) 
He had an infarction in the left hemisphere six months before participating in the 
study. An MRI scan showed damage within the central parts of the left putamen 
reaching into the corona radiata and also extending from the left lateral ventricle into 
subcortical and cortical portions of the frontal lobe. At first, he experienced right-
sided weakness and aphasia. These problems were quickly resolved and he was left 
with more subtle language impairment. Thomas states that during his rehabilitation 
he felt that he had more word-finding difficulties than the standard aphasia test 
batteries were able to detect.  
After several weeks of rehabilitation he returned to living with his wife in the 
house he built himself. When he participated in the study, he was still experiencing 
some language impairment. He felt that he was still recovering but that the process 
was now much slower. 
 
3.6.4.1 Qualitative data from inference tasks – Thomas 
 
Thomas performed fairly well on the inference tasks. On questions related to 
explicitly expressed information, he scored 10 out of 11 for his spontaneous 
responses.  
He scored 6 out of 8 on tasks requiring revised inference. The mean score for all 
brain-damaged subjects in both groups was 4.7 (S.D.: 1.7); see table 3:6:1. He chose 
to read all the narratives and checked all of his answers but did not modify any of his 
responses. On tasks requiring inference of a character’s attitude or motive, he scored 
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10 out of 10 (mean: 7.7, S.D.: 1.7). His result on these tasks is among the best three 
results for the LHD individuals.  
The two inadequate responses he produced on tasks requiring revised inference 
were both for task 8. In answering the question about what had happened during the 
night, Thomas responded based on an interpretation of the Swedish word panna 
(‘forehead’/‘furnace’) as ‘forehead’. He responded that ‘the head had cracked’. On 
the question of how the sculptor’s wife could know there was a crack in the 
forehead/furnace, he responded: ‘She must have been curious and lifted the veil’. 
He produced 8 of the 33 responses with latency and 5 without any hesitation.  
 
3.6.4.2 Results on VWM task – Thomas 
 
On the VWM task, Thomas produced 16 errors. This is slightly worse than the mean 
results for the LHD group (group mean: 14.1, S.D.: 5.1); see table 3:6:2 above. He 
made one error producing a word from an earlier set. The remaining errors involved 
words that were not recalled. He reported using a strategy of silently repeating the 
words to remember them. 
 
3.6.4.3 Results on the SART – Thomas 
 
On the SART, Thomas produced 158 Correct responses and made 6 Erroneous 
responses, that is, pressing the response button for number 3, when he was not 
supposed to give a response. This meant that he produced fewer correct responses but 
also made fewer mistakes than the mean score for both groups of brain-damaged 
individuals and for the control subjects (table 3:6:3). Actually, his error score on the 
SART is the fourth lowest for the subjects in the LHD group. He had a Mean reaction 
time in test of 490 ms, which is slower than the mean Mean reaction time in test for 
both groups. The slow pace might be a strategy that allowed him to avoid false 
alarms but it also made him miss several responses. It was not possible to obtain a 
measure of Feedback time due to Thomas’s numerous misses. He had a mean 
variance of vigilance of 32549, which is high compared to the mean variance for all 
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three groups (table 3:6:3). It is the third highest variance in the LHD group, and 
might indicate that his level of arousal was fluctuating. 
 
3.6.4.4 Responses on questionnaire – Thomas 
 
Both Thomas and his spouse reported changes and a negative impact of several issues 
inquired about in the questionnaire. Thomas himself reported a total degree of change 
of 29. His wife reported a total degree of change of 21. Their change ratings are 
slightly higher than the mean ratings within the LHD group; see table 3:6:4 above. 
When it comes to degree of negative impact, Thomas reported a total of 31, while his 
spouse reports a total of 25; see table 3:6:8.  
  
Table 3:6:8: Degree of change and negative impact of change for issues in questionnaire as reported by Thomas and his spouse (CP). 
Issue in questionnaire 
 
Change / 
Thomas 
 
Change 
/CP 
Neg. 
impact/ 
Thomas 
Neg. 
impact/
CP 
Issue in questionnaire 
 
Change / 
Thomas 
 
Change 
/CP 
Neg. 
impact/ 
Thomas 
Neg. 
impact /CP 
1. Start conversation 0 0 – – 15. Lost thread when 
speaking 
+2 +2 2 2 
2. No response +3 +2 3 2 16. Word retrieval 
difficulties 
+3 +1 3 2 
3. Latency response +3 +2 3 2 17. Production of 
circumlocutions 
+3 +2 3 3 
4. Interrupt others’ 
turn 
0 –1 – 0 19. Reference failure  +2 +1 2 2 
5. Detailed responses –2 –3 3 2 25. Monotonous 
intonation  
+2 0 2 – 
6. Short responses +2 +1 2 2 18. Comprehension in 
general – failure 
0 +2 – 3 
7. Start new topics 0 0 – – 20. Metaphorical 
meaning – failure 
0 0 – – 
8. Coherence of new 
topics – failure 
0 0 – – 21. Make inferences –1 0 2 – 
9. Maintain topics 0 0 – – 22. Comprehension of 
humour 
0 0 – – 
10. Recurring topics 0 0 – – 23. Use humour 0 0 – – 
11. Indicate 
comprehension 
problems 
0 +1 – 1 24. Humour 
appreciated by 
others 
0 0 – – 
12. Initiate self-repair +2 0 2 – TOTAL: 29 21 31 25 
13. Successful self-
repair 
+2 –2 2 2  
14. Repair through 
specifying  
–2 –1 2 2 
Note: More frequent occurrences of the behaviour mentioned in the question are denoted with a plus sign (+). Less frequent occurrences are denoted 
with a minus sign (–).  
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The most important issues reported to have changed are in the areas of Attention and 
Word retrieval (15 to 17), Initiation (2 and 3) and Turn-taking (5 and 6). Both 
Thomas and his spouse agree on these changes although Thomas tends to rate both 
the change and its negative impact slightly higher than his wife.  
Issues they disagree on include an increase in general comprehension failures 
(18) reported by Thomas’s spouse. Thomas instead reports an increase in inference 
failures (21) and also more monotonous speech (25). In natural conversation, it may 
be difficult to decide whether comprehension failures or misunderstandings are due to 
‘general’ comprehension or ability to make adequate inferences. 
 
3.6.4.5 Impressions from video-recorded conversation – Thomas 
 
In the video-recorded conversation with Thomas, there are several cases of 
difficulties initiating a response when he accepts his turn. However, even though he 
evidently has word retrieval difficulties and produces slow speech with several 
pauses and hesitation sounds, he does extend his turns sometimes using detailed 
responses and he also introduces several new topics. There are also noticeable 
occurrences of phonological paraphasias resulting in self-initiated self-repair.  
 
3.6.5 Results of activity based communication analysis 
 
Considering the collective activity background factors, the goal of communicative 
activity can be described as social interaction for all four dyads. The conventional 
goal in that kind of activity is to get to know each other on a ‘first encounter’ basis, 
e.g. to share thoughts and experiences with a new person. However, the context of the 
activity also involves a modified goal: to record the activity in order to analyse 
conversational interaction in association with brain damage and subtle language 
disorders. This modified goal might put some psychological constraints on the 
interaction patterns. However, none of the participants expressed any discomfort 
about this. All four of them had experienced being assessed in different contexts 
during their rehabilitation.  
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Sub-activities involved in the main activity were (1) having coffee, with the 
conventional goal of constructing a culturally favourable context for social 
interaction; (2) informing; (3) narrating; (4) listening; (5) giving feedback; (6) 
repairing. Those sub-activities were the same for all participants in the dyads. 
The analysis of roles in activity shows that they are modified in this particular 
context compared to the conventional roles where two persons who are unfamiliar 
with each other have a shared responsibility, participating and alternating as sender 
and receiver in the interaction.  
In the modified roles in this particular context, the research leader, as the 
initiator of the meeting and the interaction, and also as someone who has no 
communication disorder, has a greater responsibility for the interaction than the 
brain-damaged individuals. Although the activity is not an interview, the interaction 
patterns might be influenced by the modified goal and roles. In all four dyads, the 
research leader tends to do more of the listening and feedback activities, while the 
brain-damaged individuals hold the floor. In all four dyads, the brain-damaged 
individuals tend to provide more information and talk about personal experiences. 
The research leader occasionally embellishes a topic or introduces new topics.  
The physical circumstances were similar for all four dyads. The brain-damaged 
individual and the research leader were sitting alone, at the kitchen table in the 
subject’s home. The video camera was set up and running.  
In all four dyads, the first part of the testing session had been performed when 
the conversational interaction took place; the testing was to be completed after the 
coffee break. In all four cases, the video-recorded conversation followed a recording 
of social interaction between the research leader, the brain-damaged individual and 
his spouse. 
Individual background factors for the brain-damaged individuals were 
introduced in sections 3.6.1 to 3.6.4, above. They all have communication deficits 
that influence their interaction patterns and individual means of communication. In 
this particular context, all four brain-damaged individuals have the goal of social 
interaction and sharing personal experiences and facts about the world in common. 
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These goals include several sub-goals that are also shared by the brain-damaged 
individuals, for example, making the interaction proceed smoothly, encouraging 
sharing and giving social affirmation, and helping the communication to run 
smoothly by making their contributions comprehensible and unambiguous. However, 
due to the subjects’ communication deficits, the research leader had to take more 
responsibility for these processes in the communication situation, which influenced 
the interaction pattern. All four brain-damaged individuals also shared the modified 
goal of contributing to the making of a video of conversational interaction. The goal 
of learning about facts in the world and getting to know a person might be somewhat 
less prominent for the brain-damaged individuals since this context involves an 
activity with modified goals. The roles of the brain-damaged individuals were 
similar. They were all conversational partners and persons with information to share 
in this specific context. The goal of the research leader was to initiate and maintain 
natural social conversational interaction for research purposes as well as social 
purposes. In this particular context, the impact of status based on cultural patterns – 
an older man in social interaction with a younger woman – might conflict with the 
fact that the younger woman is the research leader, has more education and also 
functions as a representative of the post-stroke rehabilitation facilities, being a 
speech-language therapist. There is also a possible conflict, for both the research 
leader and the brain-damaged individuals, between the role of the research leader as a 
conversational partner and as a researcher studying conversational interaction post-
stroke.  
To sum up, the results of the activity based communication analysis indicate that 
the modified goal of the collective activity background factors and the modified roles 
due to the individual background factors might influence the interaction patterns as 
mentioned above. However, the context for the conversational interaction is similar in 
all four dyads. 
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3.7 Analysis of conversational interaction 
 
In this section the results of the analysis of video-recorded samples of conversational 
interaction will be explored. Results concerning word retrieval will be presented first. 
This is followed by the presentation of the results of the analyses of turn-taking 
patterns and repair issues. 
 
3.7.1 Word retrieval 
 
The results of the analysis of word retrieval difficulties and attentional slips will be 
presented in this section. Only when the speaker uses explicit OCM phrases such as 
‘what is it called?’ is it possible to be certain that any OCM phenomenon is due to 
word retrieval difficulties rather than some other form of processing difficulty 
affecting the production of speech. As it is also presumed that attention in one form 
or another may often be involved in word retrieval or other processing difficulties, no 
attempt is made to separate attentional lapses from word retrieval or other processing 
difficulties here. Still, even though OCM phenomena can often be related to word 
retrieval difficulties in healthy individuals, as well as in brain-damaged individuals, it 
is not possible to infer that the OCM phenomena in the analysed samples are always 
due to word retrieval difficulties alone. Although all of the four individuals reported a 
change in the area of word retrieval, occurrences of OCM phenomena may instead be 
due to such things as a search for a specific episodic memory or the planning of 
discourse structure. Therefore, it often seems more appropriate to talk about OCM 
phenomena as symptoms of general production difficulties rather than strictly word 
retrieval difficulties. Hence, any references to word retrieval difficulties in the 
presentation below are made with this reservation. 
According to the quasi-hypothesis presented above, it was expected that the 
LHD subjects’ word retrieval difficulties would be more obvious than the 
corresponding production difficulties experienced by the RHD subjects. In the first 
section below, explicit symptoms of word-processing problems are presented and this 
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is followed by a presentation of more subtle symptoms of such production 
difficulties. 
A key to the symbols used in the transcriptions is provided in Appendix 5. The 
English translation (E) is given in italics below each contribution in Swedish (S). The 
specific features referred to in the comments immediately connected with the 
transcriptions are, when possible, marked in bold. However, the transcriptions are 
sometimes also referred to and used as examples of features mentioned in another 
section in the presentation. 
 
3.7.1.1 Explicit symptoms of word processing 
 
In the conversational interaction with Thomas, one of the LHD individuals, there are 
several examples of explicit symptoms of word retrieval difficulties. 
The example in contribution (C) 51 below shows OCM phenomena in the form 
of both choice-related and change-related features  
 
Extract 1: Thomas (LHD) 
 
S: 51 $T: själv eh när gäller utseendemässigt med <1  >1 e:h // mas+ man ser eh <2 jo aj+ öh <3 / 
>3 s+ färdiga element som kom eh garderober skåp å sånt  >2 <4 / >4  nog fan var jag å hacka på dom 
här å <5 ändra modell på det också >5 
 E: 51 $T: myself uh when it comes to appearance with <1  >1 u:h // yoc+ you can see uh <2  well 
ah I+ uh <3  / >3 readymade elements that was delivered uh closets cupboards and such >2  <4  / >4  
I bloody well was there and picked on those and <5 change the style on that too >5 
@ <1 inhalation sound: T >1 
@ <2 hand gesture: T showing rectangular form with both hands >2 
@ <3 inhalation sound: T >3 
@ <4 inhalation sound: T >4 
@ <5 laughter: T >5 
 
There is obvious evidence of word-processing difficulties in the video of the 
interaction with Thomas, but he never uses an explicit OCM phrase. There are basic 
OCM expressions such as pauses and simple OCM expressions allowing for further 
processing for word retrieval and planning. There are also basic OCM operations like 
self-interruption and self-repetition. Often, several OCM features are combined. 
The word retrieval difficulties of the other LHD individual, Johan, sometimes 
force him to demonstrate what he means instead of expressing it verbally: 
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Extract 2: Johan (LHD) 
 
S: 158 $J: men sen ä det sen ä det // eh ä det väldigt okej överhuvudtaget med den armen å så / 
men / om jag lägger mej ner å gör armhävningar å så ä det ing+ ä det inga so+ som helst problem 
det enda det ä att  < den dom den handen // så ä sån väldig styrka i dom så att dom // jag ställer 
mej så först va>  
E: 158 $J: but then it is then it is // uh it is rather okej on the whole with that arm and that / but / if 
I lay down and do press-ups and so there is no+ there is no problems what s+ so ever the only thing 
is that < that those that hand // so is such tremendous strength in them so they // I place myself like 
this first see > 
@ <hand gesture starts: J putting his right hand on the table to show the status of his hand > 
S: 159 $P: ja 
E: 159 $P: yes 
S: 160 $J: ungefär så 
E: 160 $J: something like this 
@ <hand gesture continued: J putting his right hand on the sofa, showing the spasticity of his hand 
> 
S: 161 $P: ja 
E: 161 $P: yes 
@ <hand gesture: J showing the spasticity of his hand > 
S: 162 $J: å så gör jag så här 
E: 162 $J: and then I do like this 
@ <hand gesture continued: J showing the spasticity of his hand > 
 
Johan is demonstrating several OCM phenomena, both basic OCM expressions and 
operations such as pauses, hesitation sounds, self-interruption and self-repetition. He 
also often uses circumlocutions and hand gestures to get his message across. 
In the next extract from the video-recorded samples, Carl, one of the RHD 
individuals, shows OCM phenomena that most likely are evidence of word retrieval 
difficulties. Carl is recalling a café that had a doorman whom he knew: 
 
Extract 3: Carl (RHD) 
 
S: 125 $C: utkastare som det heter 
E: 125 $C: chucker-out as it is called 
S: 126 $P: < ja ja > ja just det ja 
E: 126 $P: < I see > yes right 
@ < head movement: P nods 
S: 127 $C: ja / < det // > så det var  [15 // ] 15 jodå 
E: 127 $C: yes / < it // > so it was [15 // ] 15 oh yes 
@ < head movement: C and P turning head towards other room where spouse goes by> 
S: 128 $P: [15 m ] 15 
E: 128 $P: [15 m ] 15 
S: 129 $P: men [16 hur ] 16 
E: 129 $P: but [16 how ] 16 
S: 130 $C: [16 det ] 16det hände på det caféet eller det kunde bli lite väsen 
E: 130 $C: [16 it ] 16 it happened at that café or there could be a bit of a row  
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S: 131 $P: < ja > just det 
E: 131 $P: < yes > right 
@ < head movement: P nods 
S: 132 $C: men då var det ju rä+ roligt na+ [17 namn ] 17 namnsson hette han ja  [18 (…) ] 18   det 
hette han som jobbade vid järnvägen också 
E: 132 $C: but then it was qui+ fun na+ [17 name] 17 nameson was his name yes [18 (…) ] 18  the 
name of him who worked at the railroad too  
S: 133 $P: [17 m ] 17  
E: 133 $P: [17 m ]17  
S: 134 $P: [18 m ] 18 
E: 134 $P: [18 m ] 18 
 
In C127, Carl, who usually has very fluent speech, slows down and actually pauses 
for a moment. Still, he is not willing to hand over the turn. Rather, he seems to be 
engaged in word processing, successful as it appears in C132, where he recalls the 
name of his friend. There are also other occasions in the analysed sample where Carl 
is searching for a name of a person: 
 
Extract 4: Carl (RHD)  
 
S: 95 $C: det (var) man köpte en ba:kelse // eller vad det nu kostade två å0 f+ femti 
E: 95 $C: it (was) you bought a pa:stry // or what ever cost two and f+ fifty 
S: 96 $P: hm 
E: 96 $P: hm 
S: 97 $C: det var rätt mycket då för en kopp kaffe å en bak+ 
E: 97 $C: that was quite expensive then for a cup of coffee and a (pas+) 
S: 98 $P: det var (mycket ja) 
E: 98 $P: that was (expensive yes) 
S: 99 $C: men det var roligt det var musik å sång 
E: 99 $C: but it was fun it was music and singing 
S: 100 $P: ja 
E: 100 $P: yes 
S: 101 $C: å jag tror att han var där eh // en (...) det måste vara harry brandelius 
E: 101 $C: and I think he was there uh // a // (…) it must have been harry brandelius 
S: 102 $P: jaha 
E: 102 $P: I see 
S: 103 $C: han var (...) på den tiden / femtitalet 
E: 103 $C: he was (…) at that time / the fifties 
S: 104 $P: ja 
E: 104 $P: yes 
S: 105 $C: å det var det sa dom också lite skumt det var lite (många) sjömän där / (…)  
E: 105 $C: and that was they said also a little fishy it was rather (many) sailors there / (…) 
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In C95 above, Carl first demonstrates choice-related OCM phenomena in the form of 
a prolonged vowel and pausing, probably related to the processing of episodic 
memory. This is followed the processing of a person’s name in C101. 
There are several occasions with basic OCM expressions in the form of pauses, 
especially preceding names of persons and places, but also on other occasions. See, 
for example, C18 in extract 30, section 3.7.3.2 below, where Carl seems to lose the 
thread of what he was talking about.  
Even though there are choice-related OCM phenomena, predominantly short 
pauses, in Carl’s speech, they are not as prominent as they are in the speech of the 
two LHD subjects, Johan and Thomas.  
In the analysed sample from the conversational interaction with Carl, there is 
only one occurrence of an OCM phrase, ‘What’s it called?’, in association with the 
processing of a place name. Instead, there are several instances of change of speech 
plan and topic; see section 3.7.1.2 below. 
Circumlocution is also a fairly explicit symptom of word processing. In addition 
to demonstrating several obvious OCM phenomena, Johan, one of the LHD 
individuals, also produces obvious circumlocutions: 
 
Extract 5: Johan (LHD) 
 
S: 1 $P: <men vad sa du du hade börjat med / med da+ å jobba med / eller / > med en sån datorkurs 
eller  
E: 1 $P: < but what did you say you had started with / with co+ to work with / or / > with such a 
computer course or 
@ < body movement P sits down at the table> 
S: 2 $J: < nä det > det den eh (vi) går på ett data en data slags eh en slags data 
E: 2 $J: < no it > it that uh (we) are attending an computer a computer kind of uh a kind of 
computer 
@ < head movement: J shakes >  
S: 3 $P: < ja >  
E: 3 $P: < yes > 
@ < head movement: P nods > 
S: 4 $J: å jag det jag gör mest det ä jag sitter å skriver 
E: 4 $J: and I what I do mostly that is I sit and write 
S: 5 $P: < jaha  / [1 så det ] 1 > 
E: 5 $P: < I see / [1 so it ] 1 > 
@ < head movement: P nods > 
S: 6 $J: [1 på den här] 1 < den handen > 
E: 6 $J: [1 on this ] 1 < that hand > 
@ < hand gesture start: J shows right hand> 
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S: 7 $P: <1 <2 ja ja [2 genom å ] 2 >2 >1 
E: 7 $P: <1  <2 I see [2 buy ] 2 >1 
@ <1  hand gesture continued: J shows right hand >1 
@ <2 head movement: P nods >2 
S: 8 $J: < [2 så de+ ] 2 så att jag jag får med den handen så > 
E: 8 $J: < [ 2  so i+ ] 2 so that I I bring along that hand like that > 
@ < hand gesture continued: J shows right hand> 
 
In extract 5 above, Johan wants to specify that the goal of the computer activity is to 
use his right hand but his word retrieval difficulties force him to convey the main 
message in a fragmented way. That is, he specifies that it is a ‘kind of computer 
(course)’, that writing is the main activity and that the purpose of the writing is to use 
his right hand in a motor activity. Several times, he manages to use circumlocutions 
in a way that, for example by contextual references, enables him to get his main 
message across in spite of his word retrieval difficulties: 
 
Extract 6: Johan (LHD) 
 
S: 76 $J: ja det var en grej som / (han) vet inte vad (han) heter / eh / vad det kallas / som dom tar 
pekar på nånting alltså / < pekar på nåt / > 
E: 76 $J: yes it was a thing as / (he) don’t know (his) name / uh / what is it called / as they take 
point to something see / < point to something / > 
@ < hand gesture starts: J points with left hand >  
S: 77 $P: [11 m ] 11 
E: 77 $P: [11 m ] 11 
S: 78 $J: <1 [11 så ] 11 <2 så ä det en dator >2 som / <3 som dom binder också e+ >3 >1 
E: 78 $J: <1 [11 then] 11 <2 then there is a computer >2 as / <3 as they also tie up o+ >3 >1 
@ <1 hand gesture: continued: J points with left hand>1 
@ <2 hand gesture: J moving right hand from left to right in the air >2  
@ <3hand gesture: J placing right hand behind his back >3 
S: 79 $P: ja <1 nä <2 vänta du prata vi >2 prata om det här med virtuell [12 eh ] 12  /> 1 
E: 79 $P: yes <1 no <2 wait you talked we >2 talked about this with virtual [12 uh ] 12 / 
@ 1< hand gesture: P touching mouth then points to J >1 
@ 2< hand gesture stops: J points with left hand >2 
S: 80 $J: [12 just det ] 12 
E: 80 $J: [12 right ] 12 
 
 
In the sequences in extract 6 above, Johan demonstrates choice-related and change-
related OCM phenomena such as basic expressions and operations. There are several 
hesitations sounds and pauses as well as hand gestures and a repetition and also an 
explicit verbal phrase expressing the word retrieval difficulties, ‘what is it called?’ in 
contribution C76. 
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There are no examples of circumlocution in the analysed sample from the 
conversational interaction with Thomas, the other LHD individual. Because of the 
extra time he gains by using several OCM phenomena, Thomas seems to be able to 
handle word processing quite well.  
Carl, one of the RHD individuals, does not use any obvious circumlocutions in 
the analysed sample either. The other RHD individual, Nils, on the other hand, 
demonstrates a need for circumlocutions. In extract 7, below, Nils is trying to 
describe an activity involving gymnastics. The symptoms of word processing in the 
conversational interaction with Nils are more obvious than the possible word retrieval 
difficulties Carl manifests. Nils often shows OCM phenomena related to choice, 
indicating the need for word processing:  
 
Extract 7: Nils (RHD) 
 
S: 60 $P: ja det kan ju inte vara roligt [22 för ledaren heller < > ] 22 
E: 60 $P: well that can’t be fun [22 for the leader either < > ] 22 
@ < laughter: P  > 
S: 61 $N: [ 22nä nä nä nä nä ] 22 det var inget skoj för mej heller men [23 jag ] 23 fick ju <1 tag i 
ett annat va sånt där eh andra eh det var ju eh en sån där gympa eh // <2 >2 så jag gjorde 
andra rörelser du å cykla  å [24 så där va / ja ] 24 >1  
E: $N: [ 22 oh no oh no no ] 22 it was no fun for me either but[ 23  I ] 23 got <1 hold of an other you 
know such a uh other uh one of those gym uh // <2 >2 so I made other movements you and cycled 
[24  and things like that see yes ] 24 >1 
@ <1 hand gesture: N demonstrating with both hands movements involved in the activities 
described >1 
@ <2 click: N >2 
S: 62$P: [23 nä ] 23 
E: 62$P: [23 no ] 23 
63 $P:[ 24 ja ja dom har såna / e1 ] 24 
E: 63 $P:[ 24 I see they have those ] 24 
S: 64 $N: men då jag jag tänkte det eh /// 
E: 64 $N: but then I I thought it uh /// 
S: 65 $P: ja / men annars brukar ni göra så att hon < gör före  å ni gör / likadana > rörelser eller [25 
hur ] 25 
E: 65 $P: yes / but otherwise is the usual procedure that she < demonstrates and you do / 
movements of the same kind > or [25 how ] 25 
@ < hand movements: P both hands up and then moving from side to side > 
S: 66 $N:[ 25 ja hon ] 25 (...) nä < dom ä med hela tiden å [26 gör ] 26 eh visar eller gör [27 öh ] 27  så 
tar vi den >  å  
E: 66 $N:[ 25  yes she ] 25  (…) no < they take part all the time and [26 do ] 26 uh show or do [27  uh ] 
27 then let’s take that one > and 
@ < head movement: N nods > 
S: 67 $P: [26 < ja > ] 26 
E: 67 $P: [26 yes ] 26 
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@ < head movement: P nods > 
S: 68 $P: [27  < ja > ] 27 
E: 68 $P: [27  yes ] 27 
@ < head movement: P nods > 
S: 69 $P: ja just det just det 
E: 69 $P: [3yes right right ] 3 
@ < head movement: P nods > 
S: 70 $N:  å öh[28 gör vi det ] 28  å gör vi det å 
E: 70 $N: and uh [28 let’s do that ] 28 and let’s do that and 
S: 71 $P: [28 ja ] 28 <1 ja >1 <2 men nu fick du mer gå från olika såna tränings eh [29 <3 instrument då 
>3 liksom >2 (...) ] 29 
E: 71 $P: [28 yes ] 28 <1 yes >1 <2 but now you had to move between different such training uh  [29 <3 
instruments then >3 sort of >2 ]29  
@ <1 ingressive >1  
@ <2 hand movement: P pointing circular movements with right hand >2 
@ <3 head movement: P nods >3   
S: 72 $N:[ 29 < ja ja > men jag var ensam ] 29  då den gången 
E: 72 $N: [ yes right but I was alone ] then that time 
@ < head movement: N nods > 
 
In extract 7 above, Nils demonstrates several choice-related basic OCM expressions 
and pauses. He also uses hand gestures to describe his activity. OCM phenomena 
such as hesitation sounds and repetition in the sequence might indicate that Nils is 
having word retrieval difficulties. There are examples of Nils finding it difficult to 
produce effective circumlocutions. He seems to be forced to use a kind of 
circumlocution where he lists parts of the concept he wants to describe. In extract 7, 
he does this in the form of recalling phrases used by the trainer when she is 
demonstrating the activities the participants in the group are to perform (C66 and 
C70). 
 
3.7.1.2 Subtle symptoms of word processing 
 
Own communication management phenomena such as hesitation expressions, pauses 
and operations like self-interruption and repetition as well as occurrences of 
circumlocutions are common and can be considered as obvious symptoms of word 
retrieval difficulties in both brain-damaged and healthy individuals. However, there 
are other symptoms, perhaps more subtle, that may also indicate word-processing 
difficulties. OCM sounds like sighs and clicking sounds may also indicate word 
retrieval difficulties. Audible inhalation is also considered as a more subtle 
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manifestation of OCM. One of the LHD individuals, Thomas, and one of the RHD 
individuals, Nils, both show examples of inhalation sounds as OCM phenomena in 
their videos. 
The pauses with noticeable inhalation occur several times in the video-recording 
with Thomas and always in association with other OCM phenomena: 
 
Extract 8: Thomas (LHD)  
 
S: 120 $P: hur < lång slinga blir det då eller hur långt > blir det om du går en sån  
E: 120 $P: how < long will that track be then or how far > is it if you walk such a 
@ < hand gesture: P pointing movements with right hand> 
S: 121 $T: nä det bli+ brukar bli en halvmil 
E: 121 $T: no it i+ usually is about five kilometres  
S: 122 $P: < ja [9 (…) ]9 > 
E: 122 $P: < yes [9 (…) ] 9 > 
@< head movement: P nods >  
S: 123 $T: [9 (...) ] 9 men men eh / när jag kom < tillbaka eh > / i / återvände till livet i höstas så eh 
E: 123 $T: [9 (…) ] 9 but but uh / when I got < back uh > / last / returned to life last autumn then 
uh 
@ < hand movement: T puts left hand on table > 
S: 124 $P: m 
E: 124 $P: m 
S: 125 $T: fick jag <1 >1 / minska ner <2 till en eh >2 / <3 >3 / till drygt hälften 
E: 125 $T: I had to <1  >1 /  reduce <2 to a uh >2 / <3 >3 / to slightly more than half 
@ <1 inhalation sound: T >1  
@ <2 head movement: P nods >2 
@ <3 inhalation sound: T >3  
 
 
Thomas is demonstrating several other OCM phenomena in C123 and C125 in 
extract 8; he also inhales audibly on two occasions. 
Nils also demonstrates audible inhalation sounds that might be associated with 
word retrieval difficulties on several occasions: 
 
Extract 9: Nils (RHD) 
 
S: 42 $N: < > 
E: 42 $N: < > 
@ < inhalation sound: N > 
S: 43 $P: < ja > 
E: 43 $P: < yes > 
@ < ingressive > 
S: 44 $N:<1 nä nä men det ä ju så man får ju om man ä med så här så får man ju eh man eh vill ja 
u+ eh inte >1 helst inte vara borta men det blir [18  <2 det >2 ] 18 blir man sjuk så kan man ju inget 
göra åt det / 
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E: 44 $N:< 1  oh no but the thing is you have to if you are in on it like this then you have to uh you 
d+ uh don´t want to >1 rather not be absent but it is [18 <2  it >2 ] 18 if you get sick then there is 
nothing to do about it / 
@ <1 hand movement: N right hand tapping on table >1 
@ <2 hand movement: N left hand points towards P >2 
 
In C42 in extract 9, Nils inhales before he is able to initiate an utterance in C44. Basic 
simple OCM expressions in the form of hesitation sounds and change-related OCM 
operations in the form of self-interruption and repetition as well as the tapping on the 
table indicate that he has trouble expressing himself. In C85 in extract 18, presented 
in section 3.7.2.1, common OCM phenomena and audible inhalations again occur in 
the same contribution.  
In next example from the recorded conversation with Nils, he also shows basic 
OCM phenomena in the form of pauses and OCM sounds such as inhaling and a sigh 
in C53. 
 
Extract 10: Nils (RHD)  
 
S: 53 $N: jag vet en gång jag var (...) på gymnastiken å  hon <1 >1 /// <2  >2 å det kom ju å  jag var 
ensam // 
E: 53 $N: there was at one occasion I was (…) at the gym class and she <1  >1 /// <2  >2 and you see 
it was and I was alone // 
@ <1 inhalation sound: N >1  
@ 2< sigh: N >2 
S: 54 $P: var var alla de andra borta 
E: 54 $P: were were all the others absent 
S: 55 $N: ja 
E: 55 $N: yes 
 
Furthermore, he does not finish his contribution and the conversational partner 
initiates other-repair in C54 in the form of a request for confirmation of the inference 
made from the utterance in C53. 
There are also other tokens in conversational interaction that may be 
manifestations of word retrieval difficulties. Although Carl’s speech is more fluent 
and he demonstrates less frequent obvious OCM phenomena than the other three 
individuals, there are sequences with phenomena that may be associated with either 
attentional lapses or word retrieval difficulties or both: 
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Extract 11: Carl (RHD) 
 
S: 6 $C: [1 men det ] 1 (…) jag hade nu / < > nä det var på sah+ nä på östra var jag 
E: 6 $C: [1 but that ] 1 (…) I had now / < > no it was at sah+ no at Östra I was 
@ < Click: C > 
S: 7 $P: m  
E: 7 $P: m 
S: 8 $C: så kom det en tjej som med en vagn (med) (…) ska du in <1 här >1 ja (... ) labbet där [2 / ] 2 
( ...) <2 >2 det ä ju <3 // (...) /// >3 <4 >4  å  jag stod å  tittade på / en pojke där på ett postkontor på 
danska vägen 
E: 8 $C: then a girl came who with a pram (with) (…) are you going in <1 here >1 yes (…) the 
laboratory there [2 / ] 2 (…) <2 >2  why it is <3 // (…) /// >3 <4 >4 and I stood looking at / a boy 
there in a post office on danska vägen 
@ <1 head movement: C nods >1 
@ <2 head movement: P nods >2 
@ <3 Comment: C drinks from coffee cup >3 
@ <4 head movement: P turning head to look into other room where spouse goes by >4 
S: 9 $P: [2 m ]2 
E: 9 $P: [2 m ]2 
S: 10 $P: < m > 
E: 10 $P: < m > 
@ < head movement: P nods > 
 
 
In C6 in extract 11, Carl pauses briefly, probably engaged in episodic memory search 
or word retrieval, he then produces change-related basic OCM expressions and 
operations in correcting the name of the hospital he had in mind. In C8, several 
speech segments were impossible to interpret. The unclear articulation might perhaps 
also be associated with word retrieval difficulties, since it often occurs in association 
with other symptoms of word-processing difficulties in the video-recorded sample of 
interaction with Carl. After he has emptied his coffee cup, Carl seems to lose track of 
what he was talking about and abruptly changes the subject and instead starts to recall 
another, albeit related, incident. Further examples of the two RHD individuals 
tendency to abandon an initial speech plan as well as the intended message will be 
presented below and in section 3.7.3.1. 
In extract 12, Carl shows common OCM phenomena such as pausing in C169 
and on into C172: 
 
Extract 12: Carl (RHD) 
 
S: 167 $C: jag gick en gång jag jobbade som fastighetsskötare här uppe i < / > våran fastighet som 
vi ägde  
E: 167 $C: I once went I worked as a caretaker up here in < / > our building which we owned 
@ < hand gesture: C pointing towards window > 
S: 168 $P: m 
E: 168 $P: m 
S: 169 $C: (...) det var en bost+ / en bostadsrätt [19 å  ] 19 så var det den mitt emot / å  jag hade la bra 
/ jag hade (som extraknäck där jag jobbade mycket ) å  då hade / < bytte soptunnor > 
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E: 169 $C: (...) it was a tenant+ / a tenant-owned apartment [19 and ] 19 then it was the one just 
opposite / and why I had good / I was ( moonlighting there I worked a lot ) and then had / < was 
exchanging the dustbins > 
@ < hand gesture: C sweeping movement with right hand > 
S: 170 $P: [19 < m  >]19 
E: 170 $P: [19 < m  >]19 
@< head movement: P nods 
S: 171 $P: < m > 
E: 171 $P: < m > 
@< head movement: P nods 
S: 172 $C: // det var ett <1 sopnedkast där som det <2 (...) >2  drog ut tunnan å  så la på locket >1  
å  jag vet inte jag fick nån utslag på / 
E: 172 $C: // it was a <1 refuse chute there which it <2 (…) >2  pulled out the bin and then put on 
the lid >1 and I don’t know I got some rash on / 
@ <1 hand gestures: C demonstrating with both hands movements involved in the activity >1 
@ <2  Comment: C mumbling>2 
S: 173 $P: usch då 
E: 173 $P: ugh 
S: 173 $C: på handen lite men jag vet inte vad det var för något om jag hade skrapat // så gick jag 
till sociala huset  
E: 173 $C: on my hand a little but I don’t know what it was if I had scratched // so I went to sociala 
huset 
 
The hand gestures and the pausing might indicate word retrieval difficulties. Carl 
might be searching for specific words as he describes his work with the garbage bin 
in a rather detailed way. There is also a short passage with slurred articulation or 
mumbling which makes the speech impossible to interpret and transcribe. Although 
pausing might be considered as a common OCM phenomenon, the sequence in 
extract 12 above is an example of what might constitute processing difficulties 
although not obviously considered as word retrieval difficulties. They might equally 
well be considered as manifestations of impaired memory or attentional lapses.  
Instead of showing more obvious OCM phenomena such as pausing and basic 
OCM expressions, Carl often tends to change his speech plan: 
 
Extract 13: Carl (RHD) 
 
S: 67 $P: men du hur var det där på sprängkullen innan det blev sån musik eh [10 / innan punkarna 
kom dit ]110 
E: 67 $P: but what was it like there at sprängkullen before it was turned into that music uh [10 / 
before the punks got there ] 10 
S 68 $C: [10 (nä det si+ jag vet inte det siste) ] 10 tror jag inte det har varit det var väl lite / <1 
lu+ (...) >1 det var allt (lite lit+ ) prat också <2 / >2 va jag (...) jag har / i synnerhet nu på många 
år att jag <3 / >3 jag vet inte vissa saker jag vill själv bilda  mej en uppfattning  
E: 68 $C: [10 (no in the en+ I don’t know in the end) ] 10 I don’t think it has been I guess there 
were some / <1 wh+ (…) >1 I guess it was (a little lit+) gossip too <2  /  >2  right I (…) I have / in 
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particular now in many years that I <3 / >3 I don’t know certain things I want to form an opinion 
myself 
@ <1 comment: checking on and touching freezer to the right of the table >1 
@ <2 head movement: P nods >2 
@ <3 clearing throat >3 
S: 69 $P: [10 nä ] 10 
E: 69 $P: [10no ] 10 
S: 70 $P: ja  
E: 70 $P: yes 
S: 71 $C: om jag ser 
E: 71 $C: if I see 
S: 72 $P: var det [11 lite ] 11 
E: 72 $P: was it [11 a little ] 11 
S: 73 $C: [11 stället ] 11 om man ser på atmosfären <  (...) > 
E: 73 $C: [11 the place] 11 if you look at the atmosphere < (…)> 
@< head movement: P nods 
S: 74 $P: hade det dåligt rykte menar du 
E: 74 $P: did it have a bad reputation is that what you mean 
S: 75 $C: ja det hade väl lite sämre 
E: 75 $C: yes I guess it was a bit disreputable 
 
Carl seems to be searching for the right words in C68 in extract 13, as indicated by 
change-related OCM operations like self-interruption and initiations of phrases that 
are abandoned. While using choice-related basic OCM phenomena like short pauses, 
but no hesitation sounds or expressions, Carl continues to speak, initiating one phrase 
after the other before his conversational partner in C73 contributes with a suggestion 
of inference from his utterances in C68. 
Johan’s word retrieval difficulties often force him to change his speech plan: 
 
Extract 14: Johan (LHD) 
 
S: 10 $P: får får du skrivuppgifter eller får du skriva utifrån [3 / ] 3 utifrån dej själv liksom  
E: 10 $P: do do you get writing exercises or do you get to write from [3 / ] 3 from yourself so to 
speak 
S: 11 $J:[ 3 jag ] 3  
E: 11 $J: [3 I ] 3 
S: 12 $J: jag brukar skri+ de+ ja+ eller / ta uppgifter ifrån öh/ ifrån öh/ ja typ eh jag skriver 
om shakespeare å så där 
E: 12 $J: I usually wri+ it+ I+ or / bring assignments from uh / from uh / yes type uh I write 
about shakespeare and so 
S: 13 $P: < m > 
E: 13 $P: < m > 
@ < head movement: P nods > 
S: 14 $J: skriver jag ner eh 
E: 14 $J: I write down uh 
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The example in C12, in extract 14, shows several choice-related OCM phenomena 
such as simple OCM expressions. He also performs change-related OCM operations 
like self-interruption and self-repetition.  
Johan also demonstrates longer passages with consecutive changes of speech 
plan, as in C115 in extract 15. 
 
Extract 15: Johan (LHD) 
 
S: 112 $P: så jag kan <1 tänka mej att det ä väldigt <2 lätt >1 att du tar >2 till den 
E: 112 $P: so I can <1 imagine that it <2 easily >1 happens that you make use >2 of that  
@ <1 head movement: P shakes >1 
@ <2 hand gesture: P demonstrating grip in the air with left hand >2 
S: 113 $J: väldigt lätt ä det 
E: 113 $J: it so easily happens 
S: 114 $P: <1 ja >1 <2 m >2  m // 
E: 114 $P: <1 yes >1 <2 m >2  m // 
@ <1 ingressive >1 
@ <2 head movement: P nods >2 
S: 115 $J: ja så så ä det men eh / det ä så som man drabbas av det det ä bara å  konstatera det 
att eh sen kvittar det vad man säger men // jag tror att det det enda ä för mej det det <1 ä helt 
enkelt å1 binda bak den eller binda fram den så jag inte inte <2 öve+ [16 ö+ ö+  ] 16  >2 <3 nä >1 
kan inte [17  över ] 17  huvudtaget kan jag måste >1 
E: 115 $J: yes that that is what it’s like like but uh / it is the way you are affected from it I I can 
merely state that uh and then it does not matter what ever you say but // I think that the only 
thing for me that that <1 is to simply tie it behind me or in front of me so that I can’t can’t <2 po+ 
[16  po+ po+ ] 16  >2 <3 no >3 can not [17 possibly ] 17  I have to >1 
@ <1 hand gesture: J demonstrating by putting his right hand to his back and then to stomach>1 
@ <2 head movement: J shakes >2 
@ <3 head movement: J shakes >3 
S: 116 $P: [ 16  så att du inte kan ] 16   
E: 116 $P: [16 so you can’t ] 16 
117 $P: [17 nä ] 17 
E: 117 $P: [17 no  ] 17 
S: 118 $P: ja 
E: 118 $P: yes 
S: 119 $J: < sträcka med den > 
E: 119 $J: < reach with this > 
@ < hand gesture: J demonstrating by moving his right hand on the table > 
 
Nevertheless he most often seems to find a way to continue expressing what he was 
planning to say. 
Thomas only shows a few examples of having to change speech plan; see extract 
1 in section 3.7.1.1 above. In C51, Thomas seems to be forced to change his speech 
plan because of word retrieval difficulties indicated by choice- and change-related 
OCM phenomena, but most of the time he actually seems able to fulfil his initiated 
speech plans and convey the intended message. 
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Nils’ word retrieval difficulties also force him to change his speech plan. See, 
for example, C85 in extract 18 in section 3.7.2.1. In that extract, Nils demonstrates 
choice-related OCM phenomena and seems to have difficulty finding the right words 
to get his message across. Nils finally seems to abandon the attempt in C85 and 
instead initiates a related, and previously discussed, topic in C87. 
 
3.7.2 Turn-taking  
 
In this section, turn-taking issues will be analysed. It was hypothesised that the 
patterns of turn-taking would be qualitatively different for the LHD and RHD 
subjects due to their different symptoms of word-processing difficulties.  
 
First, examples of turn transition will be explored. This will be followed by a 
discussion of the tendency to keep their turn, and the length and level of detail of the 
contributions by the four subjects. 
 
 
3.7.2.1 Turn transition 
 
Word retrieval difficulties might affect the ability to accept a turn and initiate a 
response. Both declining a turn and latency of response might be the result of word 
retrieval difficulties. 
There are several indications in the video-recorded material that these problems 
are evident in Johan’s conversational interaction: 
 
Extract 16: Johan (LHD) 
 
S: 8 $J: < så de så att jag jag får med den handen så > 
E: E: 8 $J: so i+  so that I I bring along that hand like that > 
@ < hand gesture continued: J shows right hand> 
S: 9 $P: < ja just det / m1 > /// 
E: 9 $P: < yes right / m > /// 
@ < head movement: P nods > 
S: 10 $P: får får du skrivuppgifter eller får du skriva utifrån [3 / ] 3 utifrån dej själv liksom  
E: 10 $P: do do you get writing exercises or do you get to write from [3 / ] 3 from yourself so to 
speak 
S: 11 $J:[ 3 jag ] 3  
  213 
E: 11 $J: [3 I  ] 3 
S: 12 $J: jag brukar skri+ de+ ja+ eller / ta uppgifter ifrån öh/ ifrån öh/ ja typ eh jag skriver om 
shakespeare å  så där 
E: 12 $J: I usually wri+ it+ I+ or / bring assignments from uh / from uh / yes type uh I write about 
shakespeare and so 
 
In C9 in extract 16, above, the conversational partner leaves the floor open for Johan 
to further develop the topic of his writing exercises. However, Johan does not accept 
the turn and the conversational partner then asks him another question on that topic. 
This pattern repeats itself a few contributions later in C18; see extract 25 in section 
3.7.3.2, below. In C18 the conversational partner again offers the floor and topic 
development to Johan, but he does not agree to embellish on the topic and the 
conversational partner initiates a new topic in C19.  
The need for and benefit of extra time to be able to accept the turn and initiate a 
contribution is demonstrated in extract 15 above. The topic is the use of Johan’s left 
hand to compensate for his weak right hand. Although there is some latency before 
Johan initiates a contribution in C115, he eventually accepts the turn and elaborates 
on the topic. 
In extract 17 below, Thomas has frequent choice-related initial basic OCM 
expressions in the form of pauses, simple hesitation expressions and sounds 
indicating that he sometimes needs extra time for word retrieval and speech planning 
before he can initiate his utterances: 
 
Extract 17: Thomas (LHD) 
 
S:1 $P: <1när ni började bygga här >1 hur <2 hur / hur många var det som höll på å bygga samtidigt 
då >2 // <3 runt omkring här >3 
E: 1 $P: <1 when you started to build here >1 how <2 how / how many were building at the same 
time then >2 // <3 around here >3 
@ <1 hand gesture: P pointing movement with left hand>1 
@ <2 hand gesture: P pointing out through window with right hand>2 
@ <3 hand gesture: P pointing with circular movement with right hand>3 
S: 2 $T: <1 öh m  / dom / <2 det var >2  s+ >1 samtliga / <3 i första omgången för (...) >3 
E: 2 $T: <1 uh mm / they / <2 it was >2 a+ >1 all of them / <3 in the first round because (…) >3 
@ <1 hand gesture: T pointing with left hand towards P >1 
@ <2 head movement:  T shakes >2  
@ <3 hand gesture: T pointing around in the air with left and right hand >3 
S: 3 $P: ja 
E: 3 $P: yes 
S: 4 $T: eh å dom var nog eh f+ färdiga före mej < eh / > 
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E: 4 $T: uh and I think they were uh f+ finished before me < uh / > 
@ < head movement: P nods > 
S: 5 $T: som regel var dom mm var dom gifta nåt nåt eh hade barn redan var <1 några >1  <2  år 
äldre >2 å’ 
E: 5 $T: generally they were mm they were married somewhat somewhat uh had children already 
were <1 a few >1 <2 years older >2 and 
@ <1 head movement: P nods >1 
@ <2 hand gesture: T showing size with both hands >2 
S: 6 $P: < ja > / ja just det 
E: 6 $P: < yes > / right 
@ < head movement: P nods > 
S: 7 $T: (...) 
E: 7 $T: (...) 
S: 8 $P: så ni var < några stycken som var igång här samtidigt > [/ med byggandet ] 
E: 8 $P: so there were < some of you that were in progress here at the same time [ / building ] 
@ < hand gesture: P pointing circular movement in the air > 
S: 9 $T: [ ja ja ja  ja ]  
9 $T: [ yes  oh yes  ]  
 
The initial simple OCM expressions in C2 allow him to indicate that he is accepting 
the offered turn. Still, the conversational partner seems to be ready to hand over the 
floor to Thomas earlier in C1. The second pause in C1 demonstrates some latency in 
Thomas’s turn-taking. This results in the conversational partner’s specifying the 
question verbally and in a hand gesture in C8, uncertain whether the reason for 
Thomas’s hesitation in taking the turn is that he does not understand. In C2, Thomas 
uses simple OCM expressions to show that he wants to keep the turn even though he 
is pausing due to need for word retrieval or other speech planning. 
Both of the RHD subjects, Carl and Nils, apparently have more fluent speech 
than the LHD subjects. Carl seems somewhat reluctant to hand over the turn to his 
conversational partner. He dominates the floor throughout the recorded conversation, 
often interrupting and overlapping the conversational partner’s speech. Neither Carl 
nor his spouse reported any change in frequency of difficulties in the initiation of 
speech or frequency of interrupting. However, if there are any word retrieval 
difficulties this does not show up in latency of response or difficulty initiating 
conversation. The analysis of turn-taking in the sample of recorded conversational 
interaction with Nils shows that he too tends to produce overlaps and interrupt the 
conversational partner but, as reported by both Nils himself and his wife, this is not a 
new post-stroke phenomenon.  
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In the analysed sample, there are also occasions when Nils seems to hesitate to 
accept or elaborate on a turn. 
In the example of latency for response in extract 18, the conversational partner 
offers the floor to Nils by pausing in C80 and C82. However, Nils limits his 
contributions to minimal responses before he takes the floor in C85 by means of an 
overlap with the previous contribution by the conversational partner: 
 
Extract 18: Nils (RHD) 
 
S: 80 $P: <11 ja >1 // ja // <2 >2 ja <3 jag vet ju att dom har ju >3 det ä ju ett  <4 jä+ väldigt tryck 
alltså [33 på >4  //  på dom ] 33 
E: 80 $P: <1 yes >1 // yes // <2 >2 yes <3 I do know that they have >3 it is a <4 gia+ great pressure 
you know [33 on >4 // them ] 33 
@ <1 ingressive >1   
@ <2 inhalation sound: P >2 
@ <3 head movement: P shakes >3 
@ <4head movement: P nods >4 
S: 81 $N: [33< > ja ]33 ja 
E: 81 $N: [33 < > yes ] 33 yes 
@ < inhalation sound > 
S: 82 $P: skulle ju finnas / de skulle ju be+ få eh < vad heter det utvidga > eller det borde finnas fler 
ställen alltså // de kan ju omöjligt på rehab centret hinna med // 
E: 82 $P: there ought to be / they should ne+  let them < what’s it called expand > or it ought to be 
more places you know // they can’t possibly at the rehab centre manage // 
@ < hand movement: P right hand moving up > 
S: 83 $N: < nä > 
E: 83 $N: < no> 
@ < inhalation sound: N >  
S: 84 $P: det ä [34 ett sånt jättestort behov ] 34 
E: 84 $P: there is [34 such a gigantic need] 34 
S: 85 $N: [34 <1 >1nä jag hörde ] 34 jag hörde ju öh det skulle ju bli nåt eh annat dom skulle bygga 
till där på rehab centret <2 dom fick eh nåt för strokedrabbade där upp så att dom liksom slås 
samman >2 jag menar rehabilitering / 
E: 85 $N: [34 <1 >1 no I heard ] 34 why I heard uh there was going to be something uh else they 
were to extend over there at the rehab centre uh <2 they got uh something for people who suffered a 
stroke up there such as they kind of are going to be joined >2 I mean rehabilitation / 
@ <1 inhalation sound: N >1 
@ <2  hand movement: N both hands held up and moving>2 
S: 86 $P: < ja > 
E: 86 $P: < yes > 
@ head movement: P nods 
S: 87 $N: eh det det finns ju eh det var samma när jag kom från < name > 
E: 87 $N: uh there isn’t is there uh it was the same when I got home from < name > 
@ < comment: name of hospital > 
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It is actually possible that Nils is already planning to initiate the new topic in C81, but 
that he is constrained by word retrieval difficulties or having problems initiating 
speech for some other reason. 
 
3.7.2.2 Length and level of detail in contributions 
 
Johan produces several very short responses, especially at the beginning of the 
conversation. This is in accordance with the post-stroke change reported by Johan 
and his spouse. His longer, more detailed responses are often the result of word 
retrieval difficulties forcing him to engage in self-initiated self-repair. More detailed 
responses due to word-processing difficulties can also be noticed as Johan is 
sometimes forced to exemplify, describe or demonstrate instead of producing more 
comprehensive and efficient verbal expressions for what he intends to say; see, for 
example, extract 15 presented in section 3.7.1.2.  
The long and detailed utterances made by Nils, one of the RHD individuals, 
might also often be the result of word retrieval difficulties, forcing him to list and 
exemplify several of the parts included in a superordinate notion that he does not 
have access to; see, for example, C66 and C70 in extract 7 above. Nils also 
sometimes produces very short utterances, seemingly hesitating to elaborate on his 
turn, as in extract 18 above. 
The level of detail in Thomas’s contributions in the analysed sample seems to be 
adequate in the context. However, he and his spouse reported an increase in short 
responses and a decrease in long and detailed responses. 
Carl was described by a member of his family as being unusually talkative post-
stroke, and he also self-reported that his responses were long and very detailed more 
often since the stroke. Carl seldom produces short responses or minimal 
acknowledgement. His narratives are often filled with sometimes unnecessary details. 
These details often seem to lead to topic drift where Carl is led away from the 
initiated speech plan, and seemingly even the intended message, by activating further 
associations. When the example in extract 19 below starts, the previous topic had 
been polite behaviour and how to teach politeness to children. In C32, it suddenly 
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develops into the topic of fear of a specific group of people, punks, who used to visit 
a club at Sprängkullsgatan in Gothenburg; it then turns into the detailed description of 
the background of a planned meeting with a person: 
 
Extract 19: Carl (RHD) 
 
S: 29 $P: nä det gör man inte men man kan ju vara en bra förebild så 
E: 29 $P: no you don’t but you can serve as a good model like that 
S: 30 $C: ja man försöker å så förklara då / så / [5 att ] 5 att det finns en del 
E: 30 $C: yes you try and then explain then / so / [5 that ] 5 that there are some 
S: 31 $P: [5 < m > ] 5 m  
E: 31 $P: [5 < m > ] 5 m 
@ head movement: P nods 
S: 32 $C: för det ä man noga för jag har jag sett på motorpojkar å  pojkar inte vågar åka till / p+ att 
de inte vågar åka å  hämta punkare / på sprängkullsgatan innan de byggde [6 högskolan ] 6 där < > 
E: 32 $C: because that you do make a point because I have I  seen motor boys and boys don’t dare 
to go to / p+ that they don’t dare to go and pick up punks / at sprängkullsgatan before they build 
the [6 university ] 6 there < > 
@ < laughter: C >  
S: 33 $P: [6 ja ] 6 nä just det på sprängkullen ja 
E: 33 $P: [6 yes ] 6 no right at sprängkullen right 
S: 34 $C: (ja)inte gamla sprängkullen det var 
E: 34 $C: (well) not the old sprängkullen it was 
S: 35 $P: [7 men det var inte (…) ] 7 
E: 35 $P: [7 but that was not (…) ] 7 
S: 36 $C: [7 (...) ] 7 dans det var väl  / nä jag var inte å  dansa jag gick inte jag kunde dansa så jag 
gick inte dit så var det en tjej som blev sur / för att jag inte kom in men < (...) (istället) > 
E: 36 $C: [7 (…)] 7 dance it was I guess / no I was never there and danced I didn’t go I could dance 
and such I didn’t go and then there was a girl that got cross / because I didn’t go in but < (…) ( 
instead) > 
@ < laughter: C > 
S: 37 $P: du du vad 
E: 37 $P: you you what  
S: 38 $C: (...) (träffades) 
E: 38 $C: (...) ( met) 
S: 39 $P: du skulle ha gått på sprängkullen  
E: 39 $P: you should have gone to sprängkullen 
S: 40 $C: ja det hon sa det / 
E: 40 $C: yes it she said so / 
S: 41 $P: ni skulle [8 mötas ] 8 
E: 41 $P: you were supposed [8 to meet ] 8 
S: 42 $C: [8 det var ] 8 (en mor) som bjudit hem / två / en till  å  så  mej  
E: 42 $C: [8 it was ] 8 (a mother) who had asked us to her home / two / one other and me 
S: 43 $P: ja 
E: 43 $P: yes 
S: 44 $C: när vi jobba vid järnvägen 
E: 44 $C: when we worked on the railroad 
S: 45 $P: ja ja < > 
E: 45 $P: yes right< > 
@ < head movement: P nods> 
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S: 46 $C: hon jobba själv vid järnvägen  
E: 46 $C: she worked on the railroad herself 
S: 47 $P: < m > 
E: 47 $P: < m > 
@ < head movement: P nods> 
S: 48 $C: vi bodde i gårda gamla gårda  
E: 48 $C: we lived in gårda old gårda 
S: 49 $P: m 
E: 49 $P: m 
S: 50 $C: hon hade (två tj+ ) flickor ja  / det blir ju så  
E: 50 $C: she had (two chi+ ) girls yes  / it is like that isn’t it 
S: 51 $P: m 
E: 51 $P: m 
S: 52 $C: < (...) > 
E: 52 $C: < (...) > 
@ < laughter: C  > 
S: 53 $P: men då då skulle ni mötts på sprängkullen  
E: 53 $P: but then then you were supposed to have met at sprängkullen 
S: 54 $C: ja 
E: 54 $C: yes 
S: 55 $P: < men du [9 hade > kunde inte komma ] 9 
E: 55 $P: < but you [9 had > couldn’t make it ] 9 
@ < head movement: P shakes> 
S: 56 $C: [9det blev inte ] 9 nä det blev jag vet inte vad jag varit ute på 
E: 56 $C: [9 it didn’t come ] 9  no it didn’t come I don’t know what I was up to 
 
In extract 12 presented in section 3.7.1.2 above the sample from the recorded 
interaction with Carl also offers examples of excessive detail. He is initiating a 
narrative about his visit to a medical clinic because of a rash on his hand. The main 
message of the narrative is actually that he went by mistake to a clinic specialising in 
venereal disease. Even though he eventually gets to the main point of his narrative, it 
starts in C167 with a detailed description of how he got the rash in the first place. The 
information about the ownership of the house, the amount of work he did (C169) and 
how the work with the garbage bins was done (C171) is not important for the main 
message of the narrative. In the example in extract 20, Carl is talking about the 
recommended treatment for the rash: 
 
Extract 20: Carl (RHD)  
 
S: 184 $C: frågade doktorn nä det var bara till å tvätta med bristvål [23 det ] 23 var bris tvål fanns inte 
jag har la några provtvålar sen jag / jobbade på snabbgr+ det var en snäll tant som / gav oss 
mej då som prov då när hon skulle sluta  
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E: 184 $C: asked the doctor no it was just to wash with bris soap [23 it ] 23 was bris soap wasn’t to 
be found why I have some sample soaps since I worked at the wholesa+ it was a nice lady who / 
gave us me then as a sample then when she was to leave 
 
Although the details about where and why he had got the soap are in some sense 
related, they are perhaps not fully relevant in this context.  
 
3.7.3 Repair 
 
Word-processing difficulties and strategies to handle these problems might result in 
the need for repair. It was hypothesised that the RHD subjects would show less 
obvious difficulty in managing self-repair than the LHD subjects. The presentation of 
repair issues in the recorded conversational interaction is divided into self-initiated 
repair and other-initiated repair due to the results of the data-driven analysis of the 
video-recordings, which indicate that the pattern of other-repair might be different 
between the four subjects. 
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3.7.3.1 Self-initiated repair 
 
Johan, one of the LHD subjects, often engages in self-initiated self-repair. In extract 
2, presented in section 3.7.1.1, there are both hesitation sounds in the form of basic 
simple expressions and basic OCM operations like self-interruption and self-
repetition. The word-processing difficulties force him to change his speech plan 
several times in an effort to repair and search for an appropriate expression for his 
main message. He also seems to use the possibility of visually demonstrating by 
showing his right and left hands as a supplement to the verbal expressions. See, for 
example, C76–C78 in extract 6, also in section 3.7.1.1 above, where he is able to 
successfully self-repair his discourse even though he sometimes needs other-repair. 
Word-processing difficulties sometimes make the utterances unspecific in a way 
that induces the conversational partner to initiate repair; see section 3.7.3.2 below. 
Thomas, the other LHD individual, also shows several examples of self-initiated 
self-repair through change-related OCM operations in the form of self-interruptions 
and self-repetitions of speech sounds and words. In extract 8, in section 3.7.1.2 
above, Thomas produces examples of self-initiated self-repair. This takes the form of 
specifying in C123. The reformulation in C125 is probably due to word retrieval 
difficulties, forcing Thomas to change his speech plan. In the analysed sample of 
conversational interaction, Thomas successfully performs self-repair. 
Carl, one of the RHD individuals, also sometimes engages in self-initiated 
repair, often successfully: 
 
Extract 21: Carl (RHD) 
 
S: 11 $C: å de har de ju lagt igen (...) det var såna här <1 (tjocka) järndörrar som går så här det hade 
vi i (...) >1 <2  >2 det var en pojk som <3 öppna dörren >3 åt  / för å sticka ut det var en sån här <4 
liten han var väl lite lite högre än bordet >4 å hon eh frun stod i kassan / eller mamma / i 
kassakön jag eh stod också men jag var väl inte / behövde inte stå så / å så tittade jag hela <5 tiden 
>5 på den här  
E: 11 $C: and that have been closed up (…) it was such <1 (thick) iron doors that moves like this 
we had that in (…) >1 <2  >2 it was a boy who <3 opened the door >3 for / to run out it was a like 
about this <4 size he was just a little above the table I guess >4 and she uh the wife was standing at 
the counter / or the mother / in line at the counter I uh was also standing but I guess I was not / 
didn’t have to stand like that / and so I <5 kept >5 watching this  
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@ <1 hand gesture: C showing thickness with both hands >1 
@ <2 head movement: P turning head to look into other room where spouse goes by>2 
@ <3hand gesture: C showing opening door with left hand >3 
@ <4 hand gesture: C showing size with left hand >4 
@ <5 hand gesture: C pointing with left hand >5 
S: 12 $P: m 
E: 12 $P: m 
 
In the example in extract 21, in C11 Carl himself initiates and performs successful 
self-repair in changing the semantic paraphasia ‘wife’ to the more appropriate 
‘mother’. The paraphasia is preceded and followed by the basic simple OCM 
expressions ‘uh’ related to choice and speech planning and the change-related ‘or’. 
He also demonstrates that he is monitoring his speech production in orientation to the 
listener’s perspective by choosing to specify his utterance in changing the phrase 
‘standing at the counter’ to the phrase ‘in line at the counter’. 
Other examples from the conversational interaction with Carl also show that he 
is able to perform successful self-initiated self-repair. In C50 in extract 19 presented 
in section 3.7.2.2 above, Carl uses the change-related self-interruption, perhaps to 
adapt his choice of words from the more casual ‘chicks’ to ‘girls’. 
Several of the examples of self-initiated repair from the conversational 
interaction with Carl are related to change and take the form of substitution of one 
word for another.  
However, instead of engaging in repair sequences, Carl sometimes seems to 
abandon his initial speech plan and sometimes his planned message as well. In C18 in 
extract 30, in section 3.7.3.2 below, Carl abandons the narrative of the encounter with 
a young boy when he fails to recall what was said. Instead of engaging in self-repair, 
he starts recalling a meeting with another young boy.  
There are several examples of Carl abandoning his initial speech plan and 
instead starting to speak about something else. These occurrences may appear in 
association with word-processing failures. In C196 in extract 22 below, Carl seems to 
be planning to talk about something a friend had told him, although this attempt is 
abandoned in C200 where he instead initiates a new topic. 
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Extract 22: Carl (RHD) 
 
193 $P: < jasså du såg  [25 träffade ] 25 honom på > kliniken där  
E: 193 $P: < I see you saw [25 met ] 25 him at the clinic there 
@ < head movement: P nods 
S: 194 $C: [25 ja ] 25 
E: 194 $C:[ 25  yes ] 25 
S: 195 $C: ja 
E: 195 $C: yes 
S: 195 $P: jaha < > 
E: 195 $P: I see < > 
@ < laughter starts: P > 
S: 196 $C: <1 så sa han då träffade jag honom sedan på kvällen>1 <2 så sa han >2 men det var då 
E: 196 $C: <1 then he said then I met him later in the evening >1 <2 then he said >2 but that was 
then 
@ <1 laughter continued: P>1 
@ <2 laughter: C and P}>2 
S: 197 $P: vad lustigt 
E: 197 $P: how funny 
S: 198 $C: gäng ja 
E: 198 $C: gang yes 
S: 199 $P: ja  
E: 199 $P: yes 
S: 200 $C: det hade jag < // > det har jag varit inne på / s+ skogome en gång då fick jag gå å  titta på 
barackerna så jag hitta ut när jag skulle hämta en frisör där en tjej  
E: 200 $C: I had <// > it I have been in at / s+ skogome once then I had to go and look at the 
barracks so I could find my way out when I was to pick up a hairdresser there a chick 
@ < head movement: P nods > 
 
There are no obvious OCM phenomena or other signs of active word processing in 
C196–C198. Still, the preceding sequence, C188–C193, see extract 23, below, 
involves other-initiated self-repair:  
 
Extract 23: Carl (RHD) 
 
S: 186 $C: å  sen / jo så träffa jag // en fångvaktare / 
E: 186 $C: and then /oh yes then I met // a warder / 
S: 187 $P: uhum 
E: 187 $P: uhum 
S: 188 $C: ifrån skogome / han hade en massa <1 pa+ >1 / den träffa jag sen för han jobbade på 
liseberg som vakt där (för jag träffa ...) haft ett gäng <2 med >2 sig dit då va / ifrån skogome  
E: 188 $C: from skogome / he had a lot of <1 pa+ >1 / that one I met later because he worked at 
liseberg as a guard ( because I met …) had a gang <2 with >2 him there then see / from skogome 
@<1 head movement: P nods>1 
@<2 head movement: P nods>2 
S: 189 $P: på liseberg 
E: 189 $P: at liseberg 
S: 190 $C: /n+ / nä [24 nä på där ] 24 
E: 190 $C: /n+ / no [24 no at there ] 24 
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S: 191 $P: [24 < var träffade du honom > ] 24 
E: 191 $P: [24 < where did you meet him> ] 24 
@ < body movement: leans towards P > 
S: 192 $C: på / på det här sociala huset 
E: 192 $C: at / at this sociala huset 
 
Carl’s fragmented utterance in C196 in extract 22 is partly involved in self-repair. He 
is trying to clarify that he had met the same person twice on the same day, once in the 
clinic, and then in the evening at the amusement park Liseberg. After this effort to 
repair and clarify the time and place of the encounter, in C196 and C198 in extract 
22, he fails to account for what the person actually said.  
Nils, the other RHD individual, shows examples of change-related OCM 
phenomena that may be associated with self-repair in his conversational interaction. 
In C44 in extract 9, in section 3.7.1.2 above, he first produces simple basic OCM 
expressions such as hesitation sounds; this is followed by an OCM operation in the 
form of self-interruption and then another hesitation sound and a change of speech 
plan before he successfully completes his contribution.  
In the next example, Nils realises that the conversational partner has 
misunderstood his contribution in C127; see extract 24 below. The OCM phenomena 
in the form of choice-related hesitation sounds and a long pause in C127 indicate that 
Nils might be having word retrieval problems here: 
 
Extract 24: Nils (RHD) 
 
S: 127 $N: men eh  å  <1 där var ju >1 bra dom var ju eh /// det klart det ä ju inte annorlunda än <2 
där >2  än <3 det ä >3 på rehab centret 
E: 127 $N: but uh and <1 that was all right >1 I guess they were uh /// naturally it is not different 
than 2 < there >2  than <3 it is >3 at the rehab centre  
@ <1 head movement: N shakes >1 
@ <2 head movement: N nods >2 
@ <3 hand movement: N pointing with right hand >3 
S: 128 $P: < nä det ä dom räcker ju inte till > // [44 de ] 44 
E: 128 $P: < no it is they can’t manage > // [44 they ] 44 
@ < head movement: P shakes> 
S: 129 $N: [44 nä ] 44 men det ä ju <1 samma >1 eh <2  liksom öh[45 / ] 45 samma // >2 
E: 129 $N: [44no ] 44 but it is isn’t it  <1 the same >1 uh <2  sort of uh [45 / ] 45 the same // >2 
@ <1 head movement: N nods >1 
@ <2 hand movement: N moving both hands in front of him >2   
S: 130 $P: [45 ja ja samma / ] 45   
E: 130 $P: [45 yes yes the same / ] 45   
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S: 131 $P: < typ av > träning  å  [46 så ja ] 46dom har 
E: 131 $P: < type of > training and [46 such yes] 46 as they have 
@ < head movement: P nods > 
S: 132 $N: [46 ja ] 46  
E: 132 $N: [46yes ] 46  
S: 133 $N: det ä samma 
E: 133 $N: it’s the same 
S: 134 $P: ja 
E: 134 $P: yes 
S: 135 $N: ungefär  
E: 135 $N: more or less 
 
Though he initiates repair in C129 in extract 24 above, he is not able to complete it 
successfully. His word retrieval difficulties, indicated by the OCM phenomena and a 
gesture, limit him to repeating the same word. He does not seem to be able to produce 
any circumlocutions either. In C131 his conversational partner performs the repair in 
suggesting an interpretation confirmed by Nils in C132. 
There are also other occasions when Nils seems to abandon his urge to perform 
self-repair; see, for example, extract 18 presented in section 3.7.2.1. In extract 18, 
Nils is initiating and trying to perform self-repair through a change of speech plan in 
C85. He is not successful in accounting for the planned development of the 
rehabilitation clinic and abandons the topic, instead returning to the topic discussed 
before that. 
 
3.7.3.2 Other-initiated repair 
 
The analysis of the video-recorded conversational interactions indicates that, 
although there were sequences of other-initiated repair in all four samples of 
conversational interaction, the occurrences of other-initiated repair differed for the 
two RHD cases and the two LHD cases. Contributions where the conversational 
partner suggests an interpretation of an earlier contribution by the subject were 
collected for comparison.  
 
Those suggestions generally involve: 
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1. a request for confirmation of an inference made about the intended meaning 
of a previous utterance, or  
2. a request for confirmation of an inference made about the intended referent 
of a pronoun or an adverb of place. 
 
In extract 17 presented in section 3.7.2.1 above, there is an example that can be 
considered as a request for confirmation of an interpretation made by Thomas’s 
conversational partner. In this case, in C8 the conversational partner reformulates and 
summarises Thomas’s contributions as a response to the question asked in C1. The 
conversational partner suspects that Thomas did not understand the question as 
intended. This might explain his somewhat unspecific answer. 
In the analysed sample of conversational interaction with Johan, there are several 
cases where the conversational partner requests confirmation of an interpretation. 
There are examples that can be regarded as requests for confirmation of an inference 
made: in extract 25, in C15 and C17 the conversational partner infers from the 
statement Johan made in C12 that he is interested in Shakespeare. This is an inference 
made by the conversational partner based on her knowledge that Johan is interested in 
the theatre and in an attempt to determine the relevance of the information expressed 
in C12. 
  
Extract 25: Johan (LHD) 
 
S: 12 $J: jag brukar skri+ de+ ja+ eller / ta uppgifter ifrån öh/ ifrån öh/ ja typ eh jag skriver 
om shakespeare å  så där 
E: 12 $J: I usually wri+ it+ I+ or / bring assignments from uh / from uh / yes type uh I write 
about shakespeare and such 
S: 13 $P: < m > 
E: 13 $P: < m > 
@ < head movement: P nods > 
S: 14 $J: skriver jag ner eh  
E: 14 $J: I write down uh 
S: 15 $P: <1 <2 m >1 >2 sånt som känns [4  / ] 4 som du ä intresserad av 
E: 15 $P: <1 <2 m >1 >2 such that feels [4 / ] 4 as you are interested in 
@ <1 head movement: P nods >1 
@ <2 hand gesture: P points to J >2  
S: 16 $J: [4 < ja >]4 
E: 16 $J: [4 < yes > ] 4 
@ < head movement: J nods > 
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S: 17 $J: ja 
E: 17 $J: yes 
S: 18 $P: < m >  / m // 
E: 18 $P: < m >  / m // 
@ <head movement: P nods > 
S: 19 $P: du hade ju var inte du så / du / ä skådespelare egentligen (…) 
E: 19 $P: you had hadn´t you weren’t you such / you / are an actor really (…) 
S: 20 $J: < ja> 
E: 20 $J: < yes > 
@ < head movement: J nods > 
 
Again Johan’s word retrieval difficulties force him to give an example (Shakespeare) 
and an unspecific reference, ‘and such’, instead of providing more comprehensive 
information such as ‘I get to choose the topic for my writing myself’. Johan often uses 
the expression ‘and such’ to round off his contributions. The conversational partner is 
not certain that her interpretation is correct and she initiates repair through a request 
for confirmation. This is also provided by Johan, who confirms the interpretation in 
his feedback in C16 and C18. 
In another example from the interaction with Johan, his past as an actor has been 
established and the topic is his interest in the theatre: 
 
Extract 26: Johan (LHD) 
 
S: 24 $J: det ä // men / < det ä inget som jag pysslar med nu i alla fall> 
E: 24 $J: that is // but / < that is not something I do now anyway > 
@ < head movement: J shakes > 
S: 25 $P: < nä > 
E: 25 $P: < no > 
@ < head movement: P nods > 
S: 26 $J: < nä > /// (det ä det inte) 
E: 26 $J: < no > /// ( it is not ) 
S: 27 $P: < // > men du har ett teaterintresse ändå som du / 
E: 27 $P: < // > but you do have an interest in theatre anyhow which you / 
@ < head movement: P nods >  
S: 28 $J: < ja / > jag har men det klart jag har ett teaterintresse visst har jag det /// 
E: $J: < yes / > I have but certainly I do have an interest in theatre by all means /// 
@ < head movement: J nods and shakes > 
S: 29 $P: men du ä ingen < fanatiker / [5 eller ] 5 > 
E: 29 $P: but you are not < fanatic about it / [5 or ] 5 > 
@ < laughter starts: P > 
S: 30 $J: < [5 nä ] 5 det ä jag inte > /// 
E: 30 $J: < [5 no ] 5 I am not > /// 
@ < laughter stops: P > 
S: 31 $J: sen finns detså mycket omkring det alltså / det var så mycket med buss å  med det ena å  
andra å  så där 
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E: 31 $J: there is also so many things involved in that see / it was a lot with buses and one thing 
and another like that 
S: 32 $P: m // 
E: 32 $P: m // 
S: 33 $J: m när allt skulle fungera å så 
E: 33 $J: m when everything had to work and things like that 
S: 34 $P: <1 // >1 mycket fixande runt [6 omkring som var <2 / >2] 6 
E: 34 $P: <1 // >1 a lot of arrangements with other things [6 involved that was <2 / >2] 6 
@ <1head movement: P nods >1 
@ <2 head movement: P nods >2 
S: 35 $J: [6 ja väldigt ] 6 / 
E: 35 $J: [6 yes very ] 6 / 
S: 36 $P: jobbigt å / 
E: 36 $P: tough and / 
S: 37 $J: ja tidlig tids+ / ö+ ödande 
E: 37 $J: yes timely time+ / c+ consuming 
S: 38 $P: ja så ni var ute å  turnerade du var med i någon / < fri grupp [7 eller  ] 7 > 
E: 38 $P: yes so you were out on tour you were a member of an / < independent theatre group [7 or 
] 7 > 
@ < head movement: P shakes and nods > 
S: 39 $J < [7 ja just det ]7 > 
E: 39 $J < [7 yes right ] 7 
@ < head movement: J nods > 
S: 40 $P: å så var det mycke att ligga på landsvägen då [8 (å sånt där) ] 8 
E: 40 $P: and it was a lot about travelling around on county roads then [8 (and such) ] 8 
S: 41 $J: [8 ja ] 8 
E: 41 $J: [8 yes ] 8 
 
Johan’s word retrieval difficulties again force him to make a vague contribution in 
C31 above. The conversational partner has to make an inference from the given 
information in association with general knowledge about life as an actor in an 
independent theatre group and requests confirmation of the suggested interpretation 
in C38 and C41. C34 involves a suggestion of a referent for the expression ‘one thing 
and another’ (C31), which however, is also vaguely defined: ‘a lot of arrangements 
with other things involved’ (S: mycket fixande runtomkring).  
One of the most prominent impressions from the bottom-up analysis of the 
conversational interaction with Carl, one of the RHD individuals, in addition the 
stream of new topics and his domination of the floor, are the numerous occasions of 
other-initiated repair. Carl’s fluent speech, topic development and numerous, 
sometimes irrelevant, details sometimes make it difficult to follow his narratives. 
There are several examples of the conversational partner’s initiating repair. In extract 
19 in section 3.7.2.2 above, the conversational partner initiates repair in C37 with a 
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request for clarification. In C39, a suggested interpretation is presented. Carl 
confirms this in C40, but does not specify it any further. The conversational partner 
makes another, more specified, suggestion in C41. Carl then begins to specify and 
gives several details about who he was supposed to meet in C42–C50. However, this 
is not information requested by the conversational partner, who still seems to be 
struggling with whether Carl had actually met the girl in Sprängkullen or not. In C53, 
the conversational partner again initiates a suggested interpretation, which is 
completed in C55. 
C67 to C74 in extract 13, in section 3.7.1.2, represent another example of other-
initiated repair in the conversation with Carl, due to several abandoned speech plans 
in this case. 
Although Nils, the other RHD individual, often actually recalls the names of 
people and places, his contributions are often unspecific nonetheless: 
 
Extract 27: Nils (RHD) 
 
S: 116 $N: nä nä det ä inte så dom  pratar ju om detta med rehabilitering å  [41 <1 <2 >2 >1  ] 41  å  <3 
hon eh >3 som var där ute på <4 name >4  <5 name >5 (...) det ä så jättefint här <6 va >6 
E: 116 $N:  oh no it’s not like that they talk about this with rehabilitation and [41 <1  <2 >2 >1  ] 41 
and  <3 she uh >3 who was out there at <4  name >4 <5 name >5 (…) it is so very nice here <6 you 
know >6 
@ <1 inhalation sound: N >1 
@ <2 click: N>2 
@ <3 hand movement: N pointing with right hand >3 
@ <4 comment: name of hospital >4 
@ <5 comment: name of doctor >5 
@ <6 hand movement: N both hands moving outwards >6 
S: 117 $P: [41 ja ] 41 
E: 117 $P: [41 yes ] 41 
S: 118 $P: ja // 
E: 118 $P: yes // 
S: 119 $N: så kom vi så fick vi gå en dag i veckan 
E: 119 $N: and then when we got there we could come once a week 
S: 120 $P: på på [42 dagrehabiliteringen där ] 42 
E: 120 $P: at at [42 the day care rehab over there ] 42 
S: 121 $N: [42 ja ja ] 42  men det räcker inte vet du 
E: 121 $N: [42 yes right]42 but it is not enough you know 
 
In this example, Nils mentions the name of the hospital but he does not make it clear 
that he is speaking about the day care rehabilitation centre. The conversational 
  229 
partner makes the inference that this is the case from C119, but initiates repair as a 
request for confirmation of the inference in C120. 
Nils produces other examples of unspecific contributions, probably due to word 
retrieval difficulties: 
 
Extract 28: Nils (RHD) 
 
S: 47 $N: men det ä ju men jag har sett det det ä många som ger fan i å gå dit å det eh det ä ju ont 
om platser också va 
E: 47 $N but it is isn’t it but I have seen it it is many who don’t bother going and it uh there is not 
enough seats in the courses too see 
S: 48 $P: ja då ä det ju synd om dom tar [19 upp en plats  å  inte ] 19 
E: 48 $P: yes why then it is a pity if they take up [19 a seat and don’t ] 19 
S: 49 $N: [19 ja ja ja ja ] 19 men som inte ä så där <1 eh >1 <2 >2 en del eh lägger märke till å  / 
E: 49 $N: [oh  yes oh  yes ]9 but whom isn’t like that <1 uh >1 <2 >2 like some uh notices and / 
@ <1 head movement: N shake >1 
@ <2 clear throat: P >2 
S: 50 $P: m / men menar du att det ä många som har anmält sig å  börjar [20 på en kurs å  så ]20 
E: 50 $P: m / but do you mean that it is many who has registered and starts [20 on a course and 
then] 20 
S: 51 $N: [20 ja < å så ] 20 rätt vad det ä så försvinner dom > då va  
E: 51 $N: [20 yes < and then ] 20 all of a sudden they disappear >  see 
@ < head movement: N shakes> 
S: 52 $P: ja 
E: 52 $P: yes 
 
In this example, in C48 the conversational partner actually seems to have grasped the 
main message in C47. Nevertheless, when Nils confirms the inference in his positive 
feedback in C49 but also produces the adversative conjunction ‘but’ in association 
with an unspecific contribution, the conversational partner has to revise the inference 
made and in C50 requests confirmation of the inference. 
In extract 7, presented in section 3.7.1.1, Nils’ word-processing difficulties, 
indicated by the frequent use of basic OCM phenomena, again result in unspecific 
contributions forcing the conversational partner to initiate repair in a request for 
confirmation of the inferences made. Nils describes his physical training activities. In 
C63 the conversational partner infers from C61 that Nils was using exercise machines 
instead of participating in group training. In C65 the conversational partner tries to 
find out whether this actually is the case or whether Nils was taking a physical 
training program, without machines, on his own. The repair sequence initiated in C65 
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is continued in C71, where the conversational partner explicitly suggests that Nils had 
been using exercise machines instead of the planned group training. Nils seems to 
confirm this in C72.  
There are also other-initiated repair sequences associated with the anaphoric use 
of pronouns and place adverbs. In the example with Johan in extract 29, the 
conversational partner requests clarification and more specific information in C47 
and C49. C47 also involves a request for confirmation of the inference made of 
referent for ‘it’ in C46.  
 
Extract 29: Johan (LHD) 
 
S: 46 $J: men sen ä de / kanske man inbillar sej det också men / jag tror att ett / <1 kans+ >1 // <2 det 
ä en sån känsla jag har >2 / att på nåt sätt de{t] ä / tror jag att eh / men det ä <3 såna de{t] ä såna >3 
känslor det det ä sån // men att det // alltså det skulle vara u+ <4 bidragande orsak >4 orsak att jag 
fick stroken det tror jag faktiskt / men <5 det det det >5 / det säger en del att det <6 ä inte så >6 att det 
ä helt fel å  så där 
E: 46 $J: but then it is / maybe it’s all in my imagination too but / I think that a / <1may+ >1 // <2 it 
is a feeling I have got >2 / that in some way it is / I think it uh / but it is / <3 such it is such >3 
feelings it it is such // but that it // I mean it should be the tr+ <4 contributory cause >4 cause for me 
having the stroke I really think so / but <5that that that >5 / that some say it <6 is not like that >6 
that it is completely wrong and so 
@ <1 head movement: J shakes >1 
@ <2 head movement: J nods >2 
@ <3 head movement: J shakes >3 
@ <4 head movement: J nods >4 
@ <5 head movement: J shakes >5 
@ <6 head movement: J shakes >6 
S: 47 $P: m hur hur tänker du då att att det skulle vara bidragande eh det < livet > menar du 
[9 / ] 9 att det   
E: 47 $P: m but how are your thoughts about this that that it would be contributory uh that < life 
> do you mean [9 / ] 9 that it 
@ <hand gesture: P points to J>  
S: 48 $J: [9 <1 nä >1 ] 9 / <2 ja kanske lite livet också >2 /// 
E: 48 $J: [9 <1 no >1 ] 9 / <2 yes maybe a little that life too >2 /// 
@ <1 head movement: J shakes >1 
@ <2 head movement: J nods >2 
S: 49 $P: på vilket < sätt tänker > du att det skulle vara / 
E: 49 $P: in what < way do you think > that it would be / 
@ <hand gesture: P points with left hand to J > 
S: 50 $J: < nja > // 
E: 50 $J: < well > // 
@ < head movement: J shakes > 
S: 51 $P: det runt < omkring > menar du att vara ute på turné å  [10 så där ] 10 
E: 51 $P: things < involved > do you mean being on tour and [10 things like that ] 10 
@ <hand gesture: P makes circular movements in the air with left hand > 
S: 52 $J: < [10 ja ] 10 > lite grann tror jag men 
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E: 52 $J: < [10 yes ] 10 > a little bit I think but 
@ < head movement: J nods > 
S: 53 $P: m 
E: 53 $P: m 
S: 54 $J: men det ä ett väldigt väldigt eh / speciellt liv 
E: 54 $J: but it is a very very uh / special life 
 
Johan does not successfully clarify matters in C48, and in C51 the conversational 
partner suggests an interpretation which Johan at least partly confirms in C52.  
Except for the example from Johan above, most of the other-initiated repairs due 
to reference use are seen in the interaction with the two RHD individuals. There are 
several examples of this in the recorded conversational interaction with Carl: 
 
Extract 30: Carl (RHD) 
 
S: 18 $C: men jag var på sekunden jag <1 rusa >1 på / så sa du får akta dej så sa // å  det var ungefär 
en pojke i samma ålder / samma längd / som öppna en dörr på ett annat ställe det var också en ung 
mamma / å  jag sa tack <2 å  >2 hon blev så himla förvånad för det  
E: 18 $C: but I was there in half a tick I <1 ran >1 forward / then said you have to watch out then 
said // and it was pretty much a boy in the same age / same length / that opened a door in another 
place that was a young mother too / and I said thank you <2 and >2 she got so very surprised 
because of that 
@ <1 hand gesture: C left hand up showing fist >1 
@ <2 head movement: P nods >2 
S: 19 $P: för [3 att du sa tack ] 3 
E: 19 $P: because [3 you said thank you ] 3 
S: 20 $C: [3 det gör en inte] 3 ja det sa [4 jag ] 4 respekterar det < han ( [5 kommer ] 5ju sn+) > växer 
ju han också han ska väl lära sig  
E: 20 $C: [3 you don’t do that ] 3 yes I told  [4 I ] 4 respect that < why he ([5 will ] 5 soo+) > is also 
growing up he ought to learn 
@ < hand gesture: C pointing with right hand > 
S: 21 $P: [4 nä ] 4 
E: 21 $P: [4 no ] 4 
S: 22 $P: [5 ja ] 5 
E: 22 $P: [5 yes ] 5 
 
In this example in extract 30, the conversational partner requests in C19 a 
confirmation of the inference made from the utterance in C18. Carl uses the pronoun 
‘it’ anaphorically, referring back to his saying ‘thank you’ to the young boy who 
opened the door for him. Even though the pronoun refers to the linguistic entity last 
mentioned, the conversational partner is not certain, probably due to the topic drift in 
C18, and needs confirmation. 
The topic development in the conversation with Carl often results in uncertainty 
about referents of anaphora: 
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Extract 31: Carl (RHD) 
 
S: 104 $P: ja 
E: 104 $P: yes 
S: 105 $C: å  det var det sa dom också lite skumt det var lite (många) sjömän där / [14 (…) ] 14 
E: 105 $C: and that was they said also a little fishy it was rather (many) sailors there / [14 (…) ]114 
@ < head movement: P nods > 
S 106 $P: / [14 var det i vad ] 14 sa du på café oriental eller  
E: 106 $P: / [14 was that in what ] 14 did you say at café oriental 
S: 107 $C: oriental / orientals salonger (…) ja 
E: 107 $C: oriental / orientals salonger (…) yes 
 
 
Although in C105 Carl refers to the café last mentioned, the conversational partner 
again is not sure about the referent and requests confirmation in C106. Given that the 
name of the café was last mentioned 27 contributions earlier in C78, the request for 
clarification from the conversational partner is perhaps not surprising. 
Extract 23, presented in section 3.7.3.1 above, contains another example of 
other-initiated repair from the interaction with Carl. Probably the extra details about 
the line of work of the friend (C188) he met at a clinic causes the conversational 
partner to make an inappropriate inference about the referent of the anaphoric use of 
the locative adverb ‘there’. After the first other-initiated repair in C189, the 
conversational partner again initiates repair in an overlap in C191 and Carl finally 
specifies the referent in C192. In order to make really sure, the conversational partner 
reformulates the utterance in C193.  
The rapid topic development and level of detail induce uncertainty in the 
conversational partner about the main message and the referent being spoken about. 
Moreover, Carl often seems to abandon his own urge to repair and specify his 
contributions: 
 
Extract 32: Carl (RHD) 
 
S: 78 $C: men vi gick på orientals salonger 
E: 78 $C: but we went to orientals salonger 
S: 79 $P: på 
E: 79 $P: to 
S: 80 $C: på kungstorget 
E: 80 $C: at kungstorget 
S: 81 $P: jaha 
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E: 81 $P: I see 
S: 82 $C: då var det andra våningen det var närheten av kungshall 
E: 82 $C: then it was the second floor it was near kungshall 
S 83 $P: det [13 som ä rivet ] 13 nu det huset 
E: 83 $P: that [13 which is torn down] 13 now that house 
S: 84 $C [13 (...) ] 13 /  
E: 84 $C [13 (...) ]113 /  
S: 85 $C: ja nä det blir det var det som brann upp det mesta 
E: 85 $C: yes no it would be it was the one that burned down most of it 
S: 86 $P: jaha 
E: 86 $P: I see 
S: 87 $C: < eller det nä > det (...) (det vara ) det ä kultur i det  
E: 87 $C: < or it no > it (…) (it be) it is culture in that 
@< hand movement: P points towards C > 
S: 88 $P: jaha  
E: 88 $P: I see 
S: 89 $C: det var ju där uppe där gick vi 
E: 89 $C: why it was up there we went there 
S: 90 $P: < där atelieteatern  å  det> låg 
E: 90 $P: < where atelieteatern and that > was 
@< hand movement: P points towards C > 
S: 91 $C: ja där gick vi där uppe på å där var en / rockvaktmästare 
E: 91 $C: yes we went there up there and there was a / cloakroom attendant 
 
Carl leaves it up to the conversational partner to make sure in C90 that they agree on 
the referent. Note that the Swedish preposition used in C78 (‘to’) and in C80 (‘at’) is 
the same (på). While in C79 the conversational partner requests a repetition of the 
name of the café mentioned in C78, Carl instead describes where the café is situated. 
The conversational interaction with Nils, the other RHD individual, also shows 
evidence of the need for other-initiated repair due to reference problems. In the 
example in extract 33 below, Nils had been talking about an activity that occurred in 
a place referred to earlier, but a long time had passed since the actual location was 
mentioned: 
 
Extract 33: Nils (RHD) 
 
S: 12 $N: ja det var så att jag jag <1 brukar gå på jag <bru+ gå på gymnastik där uppe va // <2  >2  å  
så / >1 
E: 12 $N: well it was like this I I <1 usually go to I <1 us+ go to gym class up there see // <2 >2 
and then / >1 
@ <1 hand movement starts: N tapping on table with right hand >1 
@ <2click: N >2 
S: 13 $P: på rehab center 
E: 13 $P: at rehab centre  
S: 14 $N: på rehab center ja 
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E: 14 $N: at rehab centre yes 
@ < hand movement continues: N tapping on table with right hand > 
 
In this and the next example, Nils uses ‘there’ in a way that makes the conversational 
partner request confirmation of the inference made about the referent: 
 
Extract 34: Nils (RHD) 
 
S: 150 $N: nä jag ser ju dom som ä med här < dom har ju tydligen gått där ganska länge också > 
E: 150 $N: no I do see these who are in here < they seem to have been going there for a rather long 
time too > 
@ < head movement: N shakes > 
S: 151 $P: < på [53 < på rehab center > ] 53 
E: 151 $P: < at [53 < at the rehab centre > ] 53 
@ < head movement: P nods > 
S: 152 $N: [53 har de väl ] 53 kommit [54 in ] 54så går de bara på då va 
E: 152 $N: [53 once they have ] 53 come [54 in ] 54 I guess they just keep coming 
S: 153 $P: [54 < ja > ] 54 
E: 153 $P: [54 < yes > ] 54 
@ < head movement: P nods > 
 
Extract 34 above has the same context as extract 33 – that is, the referent was 
introduced some time ago and the conversational partner needs to make sure that it is 
still valid. 
 
3.7.4 Summary: Analysis of conversational interaction 
 
In this section, the results of the analysis of the video-recordings will be summarised 
and discussed, starting with the conversational categories Word retrieval, Turn-taking 
and Repair. In section 3.7.5, the conversational interaction of each individual will be 
summarised and discussed in the light of personal data and his results on the 
cognitive tests. 
According to the first quasi-hypothesis made, the two LHD subjects would 
express their word-finding difficulties in a more salient way than the two RHD 
subjects. This was not entirely confirmed, but other interesting differences were 
found in association with the manifestation of word retrieval difficulties: the results 
do indicate that it is important to consider more subtle tokens of word-processing 
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difficulties, such as short pauses, change of speech plan and topic, click sounds and 
sighing, in association with RHD. 
All four subjects reported that they had noticed a change in the frequency of 
word retrieval difficulties, but there were both similarities and differences in the 
expressions of these problems in terms of OCM phenomena in conversation. All four 
subjects used similar OCM phenomena. The occurrences of basic OCM expressions 
and operations seem more prominent in the discourse of the two LHD subjects, which 
might be the result of more frequent word retrieval problems rather than the result of 
different expressions of symptoms of word retrieval difficulties. One of the RHD 
subjects, Carl, reported a decrease in the frequency of episodes where he had to 
struggle to find the appropriate word, but also a negative impact of this change (issue 
14 in the questionnaire). This is also evident in the recorded conversational 
interaction, where Carl tends to change the subject rather than engage in effortful 
word processing.  
All four subjects use gestures when they have word retrieval difficulties. Explicit 
OCM phrases, such as ‘what is it called?’, were rare, only occurring on one occasion 
each in the samples from the interaction with Johan (LHD) and Carl (RHD).  
However, change of speech plan might be considered a subtle symptom of word 
retrieval difficulties as well as a repair strategy associated with word retrieval 
difficulties. The outcome of this seems to differ in the two groups: while the two 
LHD subjects often seem to be able to initiate and complete or successfully revise a 
speech plan to express what they wanted to say, the two RHD subjects often fail to do 
so. There are several examples from the video-recorded interaction with the two RHD 
subjects where they seem to be abandoning an initiated speech plan, as well as their 
intended message, since they are unable to successfully implement a new plan. The 
LHD individuals also seem to use circumlocutions, when needed, more successfully 
than the RHD individuals.  
Although the two LHD subjects also demonstrate more subtle tokens of word 
retrieval difficulties, such as basic OCM sounds and abandoned speech plans, these 
tokens are very evident in the speech of both of the RHD subjects. There is a risk that 
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these symptoms will not be attended to in a clinical assessment, resulting in an 
overstatement of language ability.  
The second hypothesis was that the pattern of turn-taking was believed to be 
qualitatively different between the two RHD subjects and the two LHD subjects. This 
was also partly confirmed. However, the analysis indicates that word retrieval 
difficulties might affect turn-taking in different ways in different individuals: The 
most prominent impression of the turn-taking pattern actually differs for the four 
individuals and between the LHD subjects and the RHD subjects, but this may not be 
solely due to the site of the brain damage. Latency of response and reluctance to take 
the floor and elaborate on a topic are more prominent in the two LHD subjects than in 
the RHD subjects. The two RHD individuals tended to interrupt more and overlap the 
speech of their conversational partner but, according to the reports in the 
questionnaires, both of them had done this before they had a stroke too.  
Still, there was a change in one of the RHD individuals, Nils, who since the 
stroke has sometimes found it difficult to initiate a response, just like the two LHD 
subjects. Given that the patterns of word retrieval difficulties were as similar as they 
were in the two LHD subjects and Nils, this is not surprising. However, the other 
RHD individual, Carl, does not show any signs of having problems initiating a 
response or elaborating on a topic. Still, this does not mean that turn-taking in the 
conversational interaction with Carl functions satisfactorily. Carl’s long and detailed 
contributions are characterised by quite irrelevant details, which sometimes confuse 
the main message. Still, it is not impossible that these long and sometimes 
excessively detailed contributions are also the result of impaired word processing. 
The other RHD individual, Nils, sometimes produces long and detailed responses as 
well, probably also due to impaired word retrieval; the difference is that, in 
conversation with Nils, there are opportunities for the conversational partner to make 
contributions and elaborate or introduce new topics. Long and detailed responses that 
can be linked to word retrieval difficulties also occur in the discourse of one of the 
LHD individuals, Johan. 
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The third hypothesis was that the conversational interaction with the two RHD 
subjects would be characterised by a need for other-initiated repair and the 
interaction with the two LHD individuals would be characterised more by self-repair. 
This hypothesis was partly verified and the analysis also indicates that there are 
problems in the repair area not captured by the questionnaire: the analysis of the 
recorded samples revealed frequent examples of other-initiated repair in the form of 
requests for confirmation of inferences made by the conversational partner. This issue 
is not properly covered by the questionnaire used in study 3; see the general 
discussion of the results of studies 3 and 4 in section 3.8. There are examples of 
other-initiated repair in the discourse of all four subjects but they are most frequent in 
conversation with Johan (LHD), Carl (RHD) and Nils (RHD). The form of the other-
initiated repair used in the samples means that the subjects only have to confirm an 
inference to be considered as successfully performing other-initiated repair.  
Especially in the examples from the two RHD individuals, the need for other-
repair in this form can be linked to topic development and sometimes to excessive 
level of detail, in particular in the interaction with Carl. It is well known that 
anaphoric pronouns are often introduced without a clear referent in aphasic speech 
(Chantraine et al., 1998). However, in this study, other-initiated repair in the form of 
requests for confirmation of the referent of a place adverb is only seen in the 
conversations with the two RHD individuals.  
All four subjects sometimes engaged in self-initiated repair, often successfully. 
However, failure to implement self-initiated self-repair is seen in the recorded 
samples from both Johan (LHD) and Nils (RHD).  
In the interaction with the two RHD subjects, there is often a need for repair and 
the message conveyed is not always clear to the conversational partner. But instead of 
making successful repairs, the RHD individuals sometimes seem to abandon their 
self-initiated attempts at self-repair. This does not seem to occur to the same extent in 
the samples from the LHD individuals. Furthermore, the production of 
circumlocutions might also be considered as a form of self-repair and there are 
several occasions in the analysed samples of the two RHD subjects where they fail to 
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produce effective circumlocutions. Compared to the two LHD subjects, the same 
OCM phenomena do occur in the self-repair sequences of the RHD individuals, Nils 
and Carl. However, the occurrences of self-initiated repair in the samples from the 
LHD individuals are more salient. This means that the analysis of the video-recorded 
samples does not confirm that the RHD individuals manage better then the LHD 
individuals in making repairs, although this might be indicated by the group results 
on the questionnaire.  
 
3.7.5 Individual features of cases – Summary and discussion  
 
In this section, the results of the analysis of the video-recorded samples for each 
subject will be summarised and discussed in light of the individual results on the 
cognitive tasks in studies 1 and 2, as well as the reports in the questionnaire from the 
individual subjects and their conversational partners in study 3. 
 
3.7.5.1 Nils (RHD): Individual features 
 
The analysis of the conversational interaction shows that Nils presented more obvious 
symptoms of word-processing difficulties than Carl, the other RHD individual, but 
fewer than Johan, one of the LHD individuals. His word retrieval difficulties were 
reported as having a negative impact on his conversational interaction by both Nils 
and his spouse.  
Nils uses the same OCM phenomena as the LHD subjects. The occurrences of 
audible inhalations and the fact that he actually seems to be forced to change and 
abandon his initiated speech plans on several occasions are considered to be more 
subtle symptoms of word retrieval difficulties. In the production of circumlocutions 
Nils, like Johan, sometimes seem to list parts of the concept he wants to describe, but 
he does this in less specifically and less successfully. This is also reflected in the 
responses by Nils and his spouse in the questionnaire. They both report a high degree 
of change and a negative impact of this change on the production of circumlocutions 
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and ability to specify to repair utterances and favour conversational partners’ 
comprehension. 
The analysis of Turn-taking shows that Nils has a pattern of overlapping and 
interrupting his conversational partner’s speech. According to the reports in the 
questionnaire from Nils and his spouse, this is nothing new. He exhibited this pattern 
of interaction before the stroke. In the video-recorded sample, he also demonstrates 
how turn-taking may be affected by word-processing difficulties post-stroke. He 
sometimes seems to have difficulties initiating a response or elaborating on a turn. 
His responses might be shortened due to word retrieval difficulties. The increase in 
the number of short responses was only reported by Nils’ spouse in the questionnaire. 
Nils himself feels that he has increased his production of long and very detailed 
responses, which may sometimes be the result of word-finding difficulties. The 
increase in the number of detailed responses may result from an impaired ability to 
sum up the intended information with a more comprehensive term or to find a 
superordinate concept, forcing Nils to mention several of its parts instead.  
The analysis of the repair area shows that Nils often initiates self-repair, and 
often, but not always, does so successfully. Still, there are several occasions where he 
does not manage self-repair, and this was also reported by Nils’ spouse. He 
sometimes seems to abandon his self-initiated attempts to self-repair and there are 
several occasions of other-initiated repair. The tendency to abandon self-initiated 
self-repair sequences might be an effect of Nils’ reduced ability to sustain attention 
and his reduced VWM capacity. The process of active search for a specific concept or 
word is complex and puts high demands on cognitive resources. An impaired ability 
to sustain attention, and perhaps reduced VWM capacity as well, might result in the 
abandoning of both an initiated speech plan and any intended message. 
The other-initiated repairs in the analysed samples take the form of requests for 
confirmation of an inference made from a previous utterance. Nils has only to 
confirm that the suggested interpretation is the intended one, which he almost always 
does. This suggests that the conversational partner is usually able to follow the 
intended meaning of Nils’ contributions, but sometimes doubts whether the inference 
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made is the correct one. Still, there are occasional misinterpretations and it is not 
always clear that the confirmed suggestion is actually the right one.  
The other-initiated repair in the sample is generally due to unclear use of 
reference and sometimes uncertainty about the main message in a previous 
contribution. As Nils and his wife reported in the questionnaire, since the stroke Nils 
tends to raise new topics in the middle of a conversation. This was also something 
Nils’ spouse and another member of the family spontaneously mentioned as an effect 
of the stroke. The problem seems to be a failure to introduce the new topic and orient 
the conversational partner to the topic by the use of reference. Both Nils and his 
spouse report an increase in failures to orient the conversational partner to a new 
topic, as well as an increase in the occurrence of reference failures, and both find that 
this often or very often has a negative impact on the conversational interaction.  
Both self-initiated and other-initiated repair may be associated with word 
retrieval difficulties for Nils. An impaired ability to find the right words and build up 
the intended meaning in a composite way sometimes results in unspecific 
contributions. The tendency to abandon initiated topics and initiate new topics 
without a proper introduction may make it difficult for the conversational partner to 
follow the thread. The need for other-repair due to reference failure might be the 
result of the sometimes fragmented structure of the discourse, which makes the 
conversational partner uncertain about the intended referent. This type of discourse 
requires the conversational partner, partly through inference, to take on a major 
proportion of the responsibility for the success of the interaction.  
The results of the Discourse Comprehension task also indicated a reduced ability 
to revise inferences, which may be an important ability in everyday conversation. 
Also, the ability to infer the motives and attitude of a conversational partner is 
important in understanding the intended meaning of a conversation. In the revised 
inference tasks, Nils is obviously using the information given in the text in his 
response but perhaps not integrating that information with his knowledge of the 
world and the objects in it. According to his results on tasks requiring inference of a 
character’s attitude or motive, it seems that Nils either does not grasp the emotional 
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or attitudinal information signalled by the words used or fails to use that information 
in a process of integration in building a situation model of the narratives. One way to 
describe this is in terms of the coarse semantic coding theory (Beeman, 1998) in 
combination with a left-hemisphere interpreter, as described by Gazzaniga and 
Cooney (2003). When right-hemisphere processing of semantics fails, not all of the 
relevant aspects implicated by the narratives are activated or retrieved in the 
construction-integration process. The left-hemisphere interpreter might then provide 
more or less plausible explanations in an effort to create coherence.  
Nils’ problems in the Discourse Comprehension tasks and conversation might 
also be viewed as the result of his brain damage, in combination with personality 
traits and the ability to compensate with strategies. Nils used to be a hot-tempered 
man. His impaired ability to sustain attention and reduced alertness may cause him to 
miss important cues in conversation and make it difficult for him to perform effortful 
retrieval processing to aid comprehension and speech production. Still, a hot-
tempered personality combined with attention deficits might make it difficult for Nils 
to establish well functioning compensating strategies. His way of handling the 
Discourse Comprehension tasks and his results on the SART, in combination with the 
results of study 4, indicate that even though he is aware of having problems with 
comprehension and conversational interaction, he has not yet been able to develop 
strategies that work when the problem actually occurs.  
 
3.7.5.2 Johan (LHD): Individual features  
 
The spontaneous impression from watching the video-recorded conversational 
interaction is that Johan understates the negative impact on his conversational ability 
of changes due to the stroke in his responses on the questionnaire. His reports of low 
perceived negative impact make him a bit unusual when his reports are compared to 
the results from the questionnaire on a group level. Still, he often seems to cope with 
his impaired language ability, being able to produce circumlocutions and successful 
repairs. In the recorded sample, Johan seems to have more word-processing problems 
than the most of the other LHD subjects included in studies 1 to 3. He shows both 
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explicit and more subtle symptoms of word-processing difficulties. In his use of 
circumlocutions, he is often forced to list, for example, sub-activities to describe an 
activity. That is, he uses the same circumlocution strategies as Nils (RHD), but does 
this more successfully. He is often forced to change his speech plan but does not tend 
to abandon his intended message as the two RHD individuals sometimes do. The 
reports from Johan and his spouse in the questionnaire also indicate that they do not 
perceive any negative impact of the production of circumlocutions or self-repair. 
Although there is a frequent need for self-repair, Johan seems to manage this well. 
The video-recorded sample shows that turn-taking is affected, as reported by 
Johan in the questionnaire, although he did not report any change in frequency of 
latency for response. Johan sometimes has problems initiating a response and also 
produces several very short responses, especially at the beginning of the recorded 
conversation. This is also in accordance with the post-stroke change reported by 
Johan and his spouse. His longer, more detailed responses are often the result of word 
retrieval difficulties, forcing him to engage in self-initiated self-repair. More detailed 
responses due to word retrieval difficulties can also be noticed, as Johan is sometimes 
forced to exemplify, describe or visually show instead of finding more 
comprehensive and efficient verbal expressions for what he intends to say.  
Johan demonstrates an ability to initiate and perform self-repair successfully. He 
often initiates repairs himself, as indicated by OCM operations such as self-
interruption as well as changes of speech plan and self-initiated rephrasing of 
utterances. However, he sometimes needs help from his conversational partner. 
According to his report in the questionnaire, Johan felt that he initiated self-repair 
less often now than before the stroke. This seems to indicate that he feels that he 
ought to initiate self-repair more often than he actually does. Although this report was 
not confirmed by Johan’s spouse in the questionnaire, it might be the case that the 
occurrences of other-initiated repair in the recorded samples are the result of such 
abandoned attempts at self-repair. Most of the other-initiated repair in the video-
recorded sample was in the form of requests for confirmation of an inference made. 
That is, Johan’s word retrieval difficulties sometimes made his contributions 
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unspecific and the conversational partner needed to make sure that the intended 
message was correctly interpreted. Johan might have felt that before the stroke he 
would have continued to act on his urge to make his intended message clear until no 
other repair was needed. However, there are also occurrences of other-initiated repair 
due to the unspecific use of pronouns. Johan’s spouse reported that his unspecific use 
of reference had increased, but Johan himself did not report any awareness of this. 
Johan’s results on the VWM test indicated that he had low VWM capacity, while 
his results on the SART may indicate fluctuations in arousal. Such impairments 
might, of course, affect the conversational interaction and comprehension in 
inference tasks even though sustained attention, as measured with the SART, was 
equivalent to that of the control group. Johan reports a change in his ability to make 
inferences, although he does not feel that this change has a negative impact on his 
conversational ability. In performing the inference tasks, and in conversation as well, 
he takes his time. The strategy used in the inference tasks, of suspending his 
interpretation until he is given the chance to see the information again helps him to 
manage explicit information and inferences of a character’s attitude/motive. Johan’s 
reduced VWM capacity may restrain his ability to produce appropriate responses in 
tasks requiring revised inference. Even though he has frequent word retrieval 
problems in conversation, Johan has developed strategies to manage them, like 
circumlocution, that seem to work well for him. 
 
3.7.5.3 Carl (RHD): Individual features 
 
Carl reported that he experienced less struggle to find the right words post-stroke than 
he did before. In the analysed sample, his speech is characterised by a stream of 
related associations. It is possible that this is a strategy, perhaps unconscious, to avoid 
effortful word retrieval processing. Instead of engaging in effortful word processing, 
Carl seems to abandon his initiated speech plan, perhaps because he is unable to 
suppress the related associations evoked by his own narratives. Although he 
sometimes pauses, he does not seem to use choice-related OCM phenomena to the 
same extent as the other three individuals. Carl’s brain damage has frontal 
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involvement. Frontal brain damage is often associated with disinhibition. 
Nevertheless, in his results on the SART, Carl does not produce too many Erroneous 
responses, which would have been expected if he was having trouble inhibiting 
responses. However, his reaction time is slow and he misses several correct and 
erroneous targets in the SART. Furthermore, other measures from the SART indicate 
that he has a reduced ability to monitor and flexibly adapt the pace of response in the 
SART; his vigilance also seems to fluctuate. A restriction in flexibility was also 
reflected in Carl’s performance on the Discourse Comprehension task, where he 
performed fairly well in his spontaneous responses on the tasks requiring inference of 
a character’s attitude or motive but had great trouble with the tasks that required 
revised inference. This is in accordance with the results from Champagne et al. 
(2003), who found problems with flexibility when evaluating executive function in 
two RHD individuals. Even though he often chose to read the narratives, with the 
intention of checking his responses, he usually decided that his initial responses were 
correct. The stream of related associations was also evident in the performance on the 
VWM task, where the content of the task released several associations that were 
irrelevant for the completion of the task. 
The most prominent impression of Carl’s turn-taking is his domination of the 
floor. One way of dominating the floor is his stream of associations, leading to 
sometimes overly detailed narrative and rapid topic development. The change in 
frequency of long and very detailed responses and the initiation of new topics were 
two of the few issues that Carl reported had changed and had a negative impact in the 
questionnaire. The conversational partner gets little opportunity to make contribute or 
to elaborate on the initiated topics. This tendency in conversational interaction with 
RHD individuals has been discussed by Hird and Kirsner (2003) as a possible 
symptom of attentional deficits. It is also possible that the excessive level of detail – 
sometimes as a result of a stream of associations, sometimes in itself generating new 
associations – might be the result of impaired word processing. Instead of being able 
to inhibit irrelevant associations and slow down to make a more effortful search for 
the relevant associations, Carl seems to be constrained by left-hemisphere processing 
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of semantics with fast activation and selection of closely related concepts at the 
expense of a thematically more comprehensive and coherent perspective.  
In the Discourse Comprehension task, although Carl uses general world 
knowledge in his reasoning, he sometimes fails to incorporate relevant aspects of the 
semantics of the narratives into his inferences. One might speculate that his 
sometimes inadequate responses are the result of a left-hemisphere interpreter 
(Gazzaniga and Cooney, 2003), making the picture coherent in the absence of 
relevant activations that could have been provided by right-hemisphere processing of 
semantics.  
Carl often performs self-initiated self-repair successfully, but he sometimes 
seems to avoid engaging in repair and abandons the initiated speech plan or intended 
message instead. The other-initiated repair in the conversational interaction with Carl 
is often due to uncertainty about reference use and the intended message, which is 
often related to the rapid topic development and level of detail. Word-processing 
difficulties might be involved in some way.  
Carl’s loquacity may be a personality trait, although it seemed to have increased 
since the stroke, as reported by both Carl himself and another member of the family. 
It is likely that the brain damage interacts with Carl’s personality, producing the 
results seen in inference tasks and conversational interaction. Neither Carl nor his 
spouse reports any change in the comprehension areas of the questionnaire. Even 
though he actually took the opportunity to read the narratives in the Discourse 
Comprehension task, Carl was not able to increase the production of appropriate 
responses on tasks requiring revised inference. His reasoning about the plausibility of 
different interpretations shows that he is aware of the problem, but he does not seem 
to be able to stay focused on the task at hand. He often produces irrelevant 
associations or opts for the response he gave first. Some of his verbosity in 
conversational interaction might be the result of a non-functioning strategy to avoid 
effortful cognitive processing in relation to word retrieval difficulties, and some of it 
might be explained by an intensified personality trait. However, even though the 
reports from the questionnaire indicates that Carl is somehow aware of the negative 
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impact of his verbosity, he does not seem to be developing any functional strategies 
to aid conversational interaction.  
As with Nils, the other RHD individual, conversational interaction with Carl 
requires the ability to generate inferences and keep track of the fragmented discourse 
structure. Carl’s speech and interaction might be described as typical for frontal brain 
damage, but it is important to keep in mind that both the participating LHD 
individuals also had frontal involvement in their brain damage. 
 
3.7.5.4 Thomas (LHD): Individual features 
 
Thomas has low VWM capacity, as shown by the test in study 2. He may also have 
fluctuations in his level of arousal. Furthermore, he has word retrieval problems, but 
in the analysis of his conversational interaction, he seems to be able to handle these 
difficulties quite well by using OCM phenomena. He demonstrates obvious as well as 
more subtle manifestations of word retrieval difficulties, needing extra time for word 
processing, but manages to get his intended message across most of the time. His 
need for extra time is also evident in the latency in initiating responses and he also 
uses OCM expressions to indicate that he is willing to accept a turn, and also to keep 
and elaborate on his turn. Thomas also has an ability to successfully initiate and 
perform self-repair. The rare occurrences of other-initiated repair take the form of the 
conversational partner rephrasing a preceding utterance to make sure that the 
inference made is correct. On one of these occasions, this is probably due to a 
suspected comprehension failure by Thomas, whose response to a question is 
somewhat unspecific.  
Although the sample did not show any evidence of problems performing self-
repair, the results of the analysis of the recorded interaction are very much in 
accordance with the reports of change in the questionnaire. Still, Thomas and his 
spouse rated the degree of change and the negative impact very high compared to the 
other participants in study 4. Although problems in the areas of word retrieval and 
turn-taking are evident in the sample, Thomas seems to manage very well when he is 
given some extra processing time. It is possible that time since onset may play a role 
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here. At only six months post-stroke, Thomas and his wife are probably very aware 
of the changes and still struggling with how to manage these new situations.  
The results on the SART may indicate that Thomas has a poor ability to sustain 
attention. It is possible that this is a strategy he used to avoid making erroneous 
responses. In conversational interaction, Thomas makes use of extra time for 
processing, a strategy that seems to function well for him. Even though Thomas does 
not respond with latency too often in managing the Discourse Comprehension tasks, 
he took the time to read most of the narratives and check on his responses. It is most 
likely that his performance on the tests and in conversational interaction is the result 
of interaction between personality traits, brain damage and strategies to compensate 
for deficits caused by the brain damage. 
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3.8 General discussion: Studies 3 and 4  
 
The results of the questionnaire in study 3 show a tendency toward more reports of 
change and of a higher degree of negative impact of this change from LHD subjects 
and their conversational partners than from the RHD individuals and their 
conversational partners. This indicates that pragmatic language deficits are more 
common and induce more problems in association with LHD than in relation to RHD. 
The time post-onset in the RHD group tended to be longer than in the LHD group, 
but the difference was not statistically significant. It is possible that it was difficult 
for some individuals in the RHD group, and their conversational partners, to evaluate 
any change since a longer time had passed since the onset. They had also had more 
time to adapt to the circumstances and develop strategies that might compensate for 
any negative impact induced by the change. The report by one of the LHD subjects in 
study 4, Thomas, who had had his stroke recently, in combination with the results 
from the analysis of the video-recorded conversational interaction, indicates that time 
since onset might affect the perception of change and negative impact. On the other 
hand, one of the RHD subjects in study 4, Carl, had experienced a comparable time 
since onset but did not report as much change and negative impact. The implication 
of studies 3 and 4 is that, although pragmatic language disturbances affecting the 
conversational interaction tend to be more common following LHD, they may 
nevertheless be just as severe in an individual with RHD.  
In this section, the results of the questionnaire in study 3 and of the analysis of 
the individual subjects’ conversational interaction in study 4 will be discussed in 
relation to each other and to current theories about the effect of pragmatic language 
disturbances on conversational interaction. 
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3.8.1 The need to assess conversational interaction 
 
Both the two LHD subjects and the two RHD subjects and their spouses reported 
word retrieval difficulties in the questionnaire, and such problems were evident in the 
analysed samples of conversational interaction, where the same types of OCM 
phenomena were present. However, the occurrence of more subtle symptoms of 
OCM and word-processing difficulties in the two RHD subjects needs to be 
considered. Such symptoms can easily be overlooked in the clinical assessment of 
language ability in association with brain damage. The two RHD subjects’ tendency 
to abandon urges to self-repair or circumlocutions in association with word-
processing difficulties and reference failures is not easy to detect with traditional 
aphasia tests. Tasks in these traditional tests are often restricted to requirements for 
convergent processing in focusing on the denotative, central meanings of words in 
both naming tasks and picture description tasks. Nevertheless, these kinds of 
difficulties do have a negative impact on conversational interaction. The fact that 
RHD individuals might be able to name objects and activities in a clinical naming 
task, or perhaps even able to provide a comprehensive and coherent verbal account of 
the content in a picture description task or recall the content of a text, does not reflect 
their actual pragmatic ability. An on-line, more complex, conversation makes other 
demands on pragmatic ability. The results of study 4 indicate that, when analysing 
discourse in association with RHD, it is important to also consider less obvious 
symptoms of word-processing difficulties. For example, short pauses, sighs, clicking 
sounds and changes of speech plan or topic might mistakenly be perceived as 
reflecting an attitude towards the situation rather than processing difficulties. 
The assessment of language abilities in association with RHD, or other brain 
damage often associated with pragmatic impairment, such as traumatic brain damage, 
frontal brain damage in general and progressive brain damage, therefore requires 
analysis of the subject’s conversational interaction with casual acquaintances as well 
as the involvement of conversational partners who are familiar with the brain-
damaged individual. However, it is likely that the everyday, natural conversational 
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interaction between a brain-damaged individual and his or her spouse makes fewer 
demands on the pragmatic ability of the brain-damaged individual than 
conversational interaction with a stranger, or topics that involve new or unusual 
pieces of knowledge. Demands on the conversational partner increase when reference 
use is uncertain or the brain-damaged individual is not able to fulfil his or her speech 
plan or is forced to abandon the intended message. 
Hird and Kirsner (2003) discuss RHD subjects’ impaired ability to assume equal 
responsibility for the development of the discourse structure. In their study, impaired 
use of prosody was detected, as well a pattern of topic development that indicated 
that their RHD subjects might have attentional impairments. Those impairments 
resulted in a disrupted capacity to keep a record of important properties and their 
relationships to each other in the discourse. The results of the analysis in the present 
study, for example, the notion of strategies associated with word-processing 
difficulties and the need for other initiated repair in association with reference use, 
also make the impact of the conversational interaction on the conversational partner 
quite obvious. This kind of conversational interaction requires the conversational 
partner to make effortful inferences. If the partner is well acquainted with the brain-
damaged individual and hence shares a large amount of knowledge with him or her, 
the bridging inferences will be easier to make, and any change in pragmatic ability 
might not be apparent, or at least, not seen as symptoms of a communication 
impairment. Still, any decrease in the brain-damaged individual’s ability to express 
an intended message also increases the burden on the conversational partner in the 
interaction. The awareness of such impairment in association with brain damage will 
increase the conversational partner’s ability to compensate for and facilitate the brain-
damaged individual’s communicative efforts. For example the conversational partner 
can help induce structure when needed. The role of the conversational partner in 
communication with individuals who have aphasia in association with LHD is well 
established, at least among most speech-language pathologists (Kagan, 1998; Booth 
and Swabey, 1999; Laakso and Klippi, 1999; Oelschlaeger and Damico, 2000; Lock 
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et al., 2001). It is important to also examine effective strategies that can be used by 
RHD individuals and their conversational partners to facilitate discourse.  
 
3.8.2 Interaction between conversational partners 
 
The brain-damaged subjects and their conversational partners do not always perceive 
the same issues as having changed or as having the most negative impact. Perhaps the 
diverging ratings here mirror the different perspectives of the person with pragmatic 
language disturbance and their conversational partner. All conversational interaction 
demands the cooperation of the individuals involved. However, problems with repair, 
word retrieval and comprehension, and topic management place obvious restraints on 
the conversational interaction of both partners. Monotonous intonation, which is an 
issue the brain-damaged individuals focused on a lot when rating negative impact, 
might not raise evident obstacles to conversational interaction. The absence of voice 
timbre might not even be noticed by the conversational partner. Still, it restricts the 
brain-damaged individuals’ ability to fully express themselves in social interaction. 
With a few exceptions, the RHD individuals seem to be more concerned than, or 
at least just as concerned as, their conversational partners with the problems affecting 
their interaction in conversation. Since the literature describes RHD individuals as 
sometimes experiencing anosognosia, it would not have been surprising if the RHD 
subjects’ conversational partners had perceived a greater negative impact than the 
brain-damaged subjects themselves. LHD is not associated with anosognosia in the 
same way as RHD is. However, it is possible that, since the left hemisphere is more 
associated with language, the LHD individuals’ conversational partners are more 
used to the thought that the brain damage could result in language and 
communication disorders. This might make it easier for them to perceive and express 
their perception of a negative impact on the conversational interaction in a way that 
the conversational partners of the RHD subjects did not. Reports of limited perceived 
negative impact might be a consequence of solidarity with the brain-damaged partner, 
but there is no reason why the conversational partners of the RHD subjects should 
feel that more than the partners of the LHD subjects. It is more likely that the RHD 
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subjects’ problems in conversational interaction may be difficult to identify, 
especially since most of these individuals and their conversational partners did not 
receive any information about possible language and communication deficits 
associated with RHD. The nature of pragmatic problems, especially when they are 
subtle, can make them difficult to pin down and describe. The lack of information 
and terminology might make it difficult to analyse and get the hang of exactly what is 
going wrong in the conversational interaction. The LHD subjects’ ability to 
apprehend and describe their problems might make it easier for their conversational 
partners to identify and report what actually happens in conversation.  
There are also several disadvantages with questionnaires as compared to 
personal interviews. It is not always possible to be certain that the respondents have 
understood the questions or how to fill in the form. The responses must also be 
assumed to be sincere without any opportunity to establish trust in the contact 
between the respondent and the researcher. Furthermore, valuable information and 
nuances may never be captured.  
The disagreements, even though sometimes subtle, between the brain-damaged 
individuals and their conversational partners on what issues cause the largest negative 
impact on conversational interaction also have implications for the treatment of 
pragmatic language disturbances. They point to the importance of careful and 
comprehensive mapping of the conversational interaction between specific dyads in 
order to pinpoint which areas ought to be the target of treatment. They also make it 
apparent that language disturbances and communication problems are not isolated to 
the brain-damaged individual, but are shaped by the interaction between the brain-
damaged individual and his or her conversational partner(s).  
 
3.8.3 The issue of repair 
 
Neither the RHD subjects nor their conversational partners focused on Repair issues 
to same extent as the LHD subjects and their conversational partners. This might not 
be surprising since LHD is more associated with language disturbances than RHD. 
Still, it is important to bear in mind that the LHD subjects included in this study all 
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performed well on a standard aphasia battery. Obvious inappropriate semantic 
paraphasias were rare but there were several occurrences of phonemic paraphasias in 
the video-recorded speech samples of the subjects in both groups. Given that no 
formal assessments have been done of the RHD subjects’ word retrieval ability, it is 
not possible to compare the word retrieval problems in the two groups. Still, both 
groups, and their conversational partners, agree that increased word retrieval 
problems have the greatest negative impact on the subjects’ conversational 
interaction. Furthermore, the conversational partners of the RHD subjects report an 
increase in, and also a high degree of negative impact from, comprehension 
problems. Nevertheless, the Repair area is not cited as a trouble spot very often by the 
RHD subjects and their conversational partners. A change in the frequency of Repair 
issues is reported but not to the same extent as the changes in Word retrieval and 
Comprehension. The RHD subjects are sometimes more concerned about the 
negative impact of repair issues than their conversational partners. The questionnaire 
responses show that a majority of the RHD subjects try to correct mistakes in their 
own speech or specify information (questions 12 and 14) to about the same extent as 
before and with about the same success (question 13). Most of the RHD subjects also 
seem to produce circumlocutions in association with word retrieval problems to the 
same extent as before the stroke (question 17).  
At a group level, the conclusion to be drawn from the questionnaire in study 3 
would be that RHD subjects generally do not have any problems with repair in 
conversational interaction. Still, the results of the case studies indicate that there 
actually are problems related to repair and also that different strategies are used in 
association with word retrieval difficulties by the RHD subjects and the LHD 
subjects.  
The issues in the questionnaire are worded to explore any change in frequency of 
behaviours by the brain-damaged individual. That means that changes in the 
behaviour of the conversational partner in the interaction are not really reflected in 
the responses to the questionnaire. The brain-damaged individual might initiate and 
successfully perform repairs to the same extent as before the stroke, although the 
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need for repair may have become more frequent. The conversational partners might 
automatically assume the most of the responsibility for initiating and making repairs. 
In some cases, they may not even perceive a need for repair, using their ability to 
make bridging inferences due to their familiarity with the topic. Such changes would 
not be reflected by the questionnaire used in this study. 
The two LHD subjects and the RHD subjects managed repairs differently; in 
fact, the LHD subjects often seemed to self-repair more successfully than the RHD 
subjects. This was not reflected in the group responses to questions 11 to 14 in the 
questionnaire, which are the questions considered to cover the Repair area. These 
results indicate that the questionnaire does not fully address the issue of repair, 
especially other-initiated repair. One question that might be relevant is whether there 
is a change in the frequency of the need for other-repair post-stroke.  
The questionnaire has one question about the ability to specify when the 
conversational partner needs it (question 14, see Appendix 3). In the group results 
from the questionnaire, this issue was not reported to have changed by most of the 
RHD subjects and their conversational partners. However, among those subjects for 
whom a change was reported, several of them rated the negative impact of this issue 
as high. The change in the production of circumlocutions was also reported to have a 
negative impact by all the RHD individuals who reported it to have changed. 
Furthermore, several occasions when other-initiated repair was induced in the 
conversational interaction with the RHD individuals in study 4 related to reference 
use. This issue was covered in the questionnaire (question 19), and it was one of the 
issues where at least 50% of the conversational partners of the RHD individuals 
participating in that study reported change.  
Another possibility is that the need for repair might not seem to have changed or 
to have a negative impact on conversational interaction if the brain-damaged subject 
himself or herself does not perceive and express any such change. It might be 
difficult for the conversational partner to perceive and analyse what is actually 
happening in the interaction. Perhaps the partner sees the forced choice of other 
words than the preferred and intended ones in a response as reflecting a 
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misinterpretation of the question due to comprehension problems. Or maybe a 
comprehension failure is sometimes apprehended as a change of topic; perhaps the 
maintaining of a topic or a long detailed response actually camouflage word retrieval 
problems.  
 
3.8.4 Processing of semantics and topic management 
 
It is often claimed that aphasics are able to compensate for their language 
impairments by means of their pragmatic ability. The LHD subjects in study 4 do 
experience several cases of word-processing difficulties and they seem to be able to 
handle them well, either by taking extra processing time or by using circumlocutions 
to facilitate the conversational partner’s ability to generate inferences of the intended 
message. The results of the questionnaire in study 3 showed that the LHD subjects as 
a group were more concerned about the negative impact of the change in frequency 
of successful self-repairs than the RHD subjects. A majority of the LHD subjects’ 
conversational partners also reported a negative impact of the change in frequency of 
circumlocutions among the LHD subjects. 
The RHD subjects in study 4 also seem to sometimes benefit from extra 
processing time and sometimes try to use circumlocutions. But they also have a 
tendency to abandon an initiated message. The importance of the ability to sustain 
attention and stay focused on the intended message and to maintain effortful 
cognitive processing in relation to word retrieval difficulties needs to be considered 
here. 
The tendency to abandon an initiated message might also be associated with the 
notion of the different modes of processing semantics in the two hemispheres. 
According to Beeman (1998) and Beeman et al. (2000), several of the symptoms of 
impaired language ability seen in association with RHD can be explained by the 
coarse semantic coding theory. In this theory, left-hemisphere processing of 
semantics is characterised by activation that rapidly restricts access to one possible 
concept. Right-hemisphere processing, on the other hand, maintains the activation of 
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several, more diffusely localised areas for a longer period of time, which might allow 
the activation of, access to, and integration of several less closely related concepts. 
One might hypothesise that circumlocutions benefit from right-hemisphere activation. 
RHD might result in an impaired ability to produce efficient circumlocutions because 
of the loss of activation of relevant associations, and thus circumlocutions might be 
inefficient. When right-hemisphere activation of semantics is impaired, semantic 
processing might be characterised by the left hemisphere’s rapid activation and 
inhibition. This kind of processing could result in the activation of less relevant 
associations, leading further and further away from the first initiated topic, or in the 
abandonment of an attempt to produce a circumlocution. The coarse semantic coding 
theory was proposed primarily to explain the impaired ability to make inferences and 
comprehension (Beeman, 1993), but it might perhaps also be suitable to consider in 
association with word retrieval difficulties in conversational interaction.  
One of the RHD subjects, Carl, in study 4 produced speech that was 
characterised by topic drift, excessive detail and unclear reference use. Carl often 
seemed to, almost automatically, abandon his initiated speech plans and intended 
messages; even though he sometimes showed signs of word-processing difficulties, 
he seemed to have trouble inhibiting irrelevant associations and slowing down so he 
could make a more effortful search for the relevant concept. This might be partly 
explained by the frontal involvement of the brain damage, but it could also be 
considered as a symptom of a left-hemisphere mode of semantic processing. Carl also 
reported in the questionnaire that since the stroke he had experienced fewer word 
retrieval difficulties, which does not necessarily mean that he finds it easier to 
express himself post-stroke. He also reported an increase in the frequency of long and 
very detailed responses and in the initiation of new topics, and this was something he 
reported as having a negative impact on his conversational interaction. The other 
RHD subject, Nils, does actually sometimes try to produce circumlocutions in 
association with word-processing difficulties. The problem is that he seems to have 
trouble finding appropriate or functional substitutes. On several occasions, Nils also 
seems to abandon his attempt to produce effective circumlocutions or even an 
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intended message. According to Beeman (1998), it is possible that the right-
hemisphere mode of semantic processing is especially important in the effortful 
search for appropriate concepts and words when the rapid and more automatic left-
hemisphere semantic processing is not sufficient, and this might of course also be 
evident in conversation. 
These results may also be interpreted in the light of Hird and Kirsner’s (2003) 
discussion of the possibility that a reduced capacity to maintain intentional focus 
would make it difficult to keep a record of the discourse structure and the 
relationships between different contributions to the discourse. This might, in their 
view, result in a tendency on the part of the RHD individual to ‘maintain the floor’ or 
a reduction of his or her contributions to marginally relevant associations. In this 
study, such an impairment might explain the production of long and detailed 
responses. That is, when the intentional focus is lost, a somewhat relevant association 
with the previous topic induces the initiation of a new topic. Furthermore, a stream of 
associations, closely connected to the topic at hand although perhaps less relevant to 
the intentional goal of the discourse, might be apprehended as prolonged maintenance 
of the topic. It comes down to whether the associations produced and expressed by 
the brain-damaged subject are perceived by the conversational partner to be related 
and relevant to the topic at hand. The production of long and detailed responses 
(question 5), or the lack of them, might also be considered as a Topic management 
issue when perceived as a question about the tendency to not only keep one’s turn for 
a longer time but also to be willing to dwell on the present topic. Change in this 
regard was reported by a majority of conversational partners of the LHD group as 
well as by the conversational partners of the RHD group and by the RHD subjects 
themselves. 
 
3.8.5 Comprehension in conversation 
 
A majority of the conversational partners of the RHD group report that general 
comprehension and inference making had changed. Furthermore, a majority of the 
conversational partners report that the change in inference making has a negative 
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impact in the conversational interaction. Several, but not the majority, of the 
conversational partners of the LHD group also report changes in the frequency of 
comprehension failures in general. Some of the brain-damaged individuals 
themselves, in both groups, do recognise comprehension failures in general as well as 
complex language comprehension to have been affected by the stroke, and a few of 
the subjects in the RHD group report a high negative impact of this change.  
The tendency for the RHD subjects and their conversational partners to disagree 
about changes, for example in comprehension problems, might be a symptom of lack 
of insight among some of the RHD individuals. The analysis of the samples of video-
recorded conversational interaction with the four cases did not provide enough 
opportunities to study comprehension in conversational interaction more closely. The 
results of studies 1 and 2 do show that comprehension is impaired in both groups. 
The discrepancies in the reports from the questionnaire show that this is sometimes 
perceived as a bigger problem by the conversational partners than by the brain-
damaged individuals themselves. This may be because the brain-damaged individuals 
perceive other communicative problems to be more limiting or perhaps because they 
are simply not aware of the lost nuances and missing inferences. 
 
3.8.6 Individual subjects’ pragmatic ability 
 
Both the RHD subjects and the LHD subjects as a group reported in study 3 that 
losing the thread while speaking had a high degree of negative impact on their 
conversational interaction. Three of the four individuals in study 4 also rated an 
increase in attentional slips as having a negative impact on their conversational 
ability. All four subjects in the case studies also had impairments in the area of VWM 
and attention or arousal. This, along with the results of studies 1 and 2, emphasises 
the impact of the interaction between attentional and other cognitive systems in 
pragmatic language disturbances. In the vocabulary of Perkins (2000), the pragmatic 
disturbances observed in these studies are considered as compound (or complex) 
pragmatic disabilities due to disturbances in both linguistic and non-linguistic 
cognitive systems. 
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In the analysing the results in studies 1 to 4 on an individual level, it is possible 
to see the outcomes as consequences of the interaction between pre-stroke personality 
traits, brain damage and functional or non-functional strategies employed in an effort 
to handle the deficits caused by the brain damage. This is perhaps best seen in the two 
RHD individuals, where an inability to sustain attention may interact with personality 
traits and hinder the development of useful compensatory strategies. Although at least 
one of the RHD subjects, Nils, was aware of the negative impact of changes in 
comprehension on his conversational interaction, this did not help him to employ 
functional strategies to deal with the problem when it occurred in the inference tasks. 
The interaction between several different factors in association with brain damage is 
also seen in one of the LHD subjects, Johan. His strategy of waiting to respond until 
after he had read the narrative resulted in low scores for tasks that depend on explicit 
information and inference of a character’s attitude/motive. This kind of strategy 
might also explain the low number of correct responses in the SART for Thomas, the 
other LHD subject. Both LHD subjects take their time in conversational interaction, 
which is a strategy that affects Turn-taking patterns but at the same time seems to 
result in their getting their intended messages across.  
The results of studies 3 and 4 are highly dependent on the specific individuals 
who took part. Especially when it comes to pragmatic performance in conversational 
interaction, the results of any analysis depend on individual traits. The individuals in 
the case studies were chosen as being somehow representative of the group results in 
studies 1 to 3. Still, there are several individuals in the RHD group who have less 
obvious pragmatic problems than the two who took part in study 4. One of the 
participating LHD subjects, Johan, was also one of the subjects who had the most 
apparent semantic problems in the conversational interaction. The results of study 4 
are an outcome of the aim to describe the consequences of pragmatic language 
impairment in the individual. This means that the results of this study cannot be 
generalised to a whole population of LHD or RHD individuals. However, they may 
serve the basis of further research and as guidance in understanding the problems of 
other RHD and LHD individuals. 
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4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
In this part of the thesis, first a short summary of the most important results of all 
four studies will be given. This will be followed by a presentation of avenues for 
future research and clinical implications of the results of this thesis. 
 
4.1 General summary 
 
The notion that communication emerges through the interaction of language-specific 
and non-linguistic cognitive processes, as well as through interaction between 
conversational partners and the use of compensatory strategies, is fundamental to this 
thesis. Although current views of the relationships between linguistic and non-
linguistic aspects of communication may diverge, it has become clear that RHD can 
result in deficits that have a serious negative impact on communication for the 
individual and his or her conversational partners.  
The aim of studies 1 and 2 was to investigate the associations between the ability 
to generate inferences from implicit information in discourse, sustained attention and 
VWM in two groups of brain-damaged individuals. One implication of the results is 
that different types of inference, and the type of content in the discourse, may tax the 
ability to make inferences differently in brain-damaged individuals, depending on the 
site of the lesion. This variation may be explained by altered requirements of 
processes involved in comprehension. 
The results indicate that it is possible to discriminate between groups of brain-
damaged individuals and a group of healthy controls based on their ability to infer 
from implicit information in verbal discourse. Though it is not possible to entirely 
separate language from other cognition, or basic cognitive functions from higher-
level cognitive functions, the results of this study indicate that it is possible to relate 
RHD individuals’ problems with tasks that require revised inference to their ability to 
sustain attention. This makes sustained attention relevant to the understanding of 
pragmatic deficits in association with RHD, although in these studies, it is not 
considered to be a single sufficient factor. In the LHD group, on the other hand, 
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performance in the Discourse Comprehension tasks tended to be associated with 
VWM capacity. 
It is also inferred that problems with alertness, sustained attention and VWM 
might also affect the strategies used to perform the tasks.  
Theoretically, deficits in sustained attention might also explain RHD 
individuals’ problems in making adequate inferences of a character’s attitude or 
motive. However, no associations were revealed between measures of sustained 
attention and results on this task. Instead, there were indications that alertness, as 
measured by reaction times, might be somehow involved.  
The results obtained in studies 1 and 2 only concern the ability to generate 
adequate inferences of meaning and understand narratives. Still, it is possible that 
misinterpretations and inadequate inferences can explain some elements of the 
dysfunctional interaction described in relation to RHD, for example, off-topic 
comments.  
The main aim of studies 3 and 4 was to investigate the impact of impaired 
pragmatic ability on conversational interaction. 
The questionnaire distributed to a group of brain-damaged individuals with 
either LHD or RHD and their conversational partners showed that there are wide 
variations among individuals in both groups. More individuals in the LHD group and 
among their conversational partners than in the RHD group and their conversational 
partners perceive a change in frequency of behaviours affecting conversational 
interaction. Furthermore, more of the different behaviours inquired about in the 
questionnaire are perceived to have changed and to have a negative impact by most 
of the LHD subjects and their conversational partners than is the case with most RHD 
subjects and their conversational partners. Still, on an individual level, there are 
several RHD individuals who perceive more changed behaviours and a higher degree 
of negative impact than several of the LHD individuals. These results indicate that 
site of lesion is not the determining factor when it comes to pragmatic language and 
communication disturbances and ability to interact in conversation. 
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The pragmatic areas in conversational interaction that were reported as changed 
and as having a negative impact by a majority of the brain-damaged subjects in both 
groups are Attention, Word retrieval, Initiation and Turn-taking.  
The brain-damaged individuals and their conversational partners do not always 
agree on which areas have changed and which areas have the largest negative impact. 
This indicates that it is important to map the perception of the conversational 
interaction of both the brain-damaged individual and his or her conversational 
partner. Any diverging perceptions might mirror their different perspectives and all 
conversational interaction depends on the co-operation of the individuals involved. 
The disagreement is greater between the RHD subjects and their conversational 
partners than between the LHD subjects and their conversational partners, which 
might reflect a lesser degree of insight into impaired pragmatic ability in RHD. The 
area of Comprehension, and more specifically, more complex aspects of language 
comprehension tended to be reported most often as having changed and as having a 
negative impact by the RHD subjects’ conversational partners.  
Neither the RHD subjects nor their conversational partners focus on Repair 
issues to same extent as the LHD subjects and their conversational partners. It is 
believed that, as discussed by Hird and Kirsner (2003), the conversational partners 
might automatically take over the greater part of the responsibility for conversational 
interaction; they may not even perceive a need for repair, using their ability to make 
bridging inferences due to their familiarity with the topics discussed. Even though 
such compensatory efforts in conversational interaction may be cognitively 
demanding on the conversational partner, those changes would not be reflected by the 
questionnaire used in this study.  
The cases in study 4 show that individual features such as pre-stroke personality 
traits and communicative style interact with post-stroke deficits and compensatory 
strategies in the comprehension and conversational interaction of the brain-damaged 
individual. The two RHD individuals in study 4 did not seem to have the kinds of 
functional strategies to handle their comprehension and speech production problems 
that the two LHD individuals had. Lack of insight might be involved, but the results 
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also show that being aware of one’s problems is not sufficient to allow one to develop 
and employ strategies to compensate for them. 
In study 4, the analysis of the video-recorded conversational analysis made it 
clear that problems in the production of discourse, for example word-processing 
difficulties, were more salient in the interaction with the two LHD individuals than 
with the two RHD individuals. However, importantly, it was shown that both RHD 
and LHD subjects also demonstrated more subtle symptoms of processing 
difficulties. 
The results also reveal that turn-taking patterns are affected by individual traits 
as well as by brain damage. One conclusion from the study is that impaired word 
processing, for example, might change turn-taking patterns in different ways. That is, 
such problems might not simply create a need for more time to be able to make a 
contribution, with the result that the individual is sometimes obliged to turn down an 
offer to take the floor, or to elaborate on a topic. The need for extra processing time 
might also result in longer contributions, affected by self-repair. But impaired word 
processing can also result in turn-taking patterns where the brain-damaged individual 
dominates the floor, producing a stream of associations and making it difficult for 
any interaction with the conversational partner to come into play. The excessive level 
of detail and changes of topic sometimes seen in association with RHD might be 
either a conscious or an automatically triggered strategy used in association with 
word retrieval difficulties. 
It was also shown that, although there are instances of other-initiated repair in 
the interaction with the LHD subjects as well as the two RHD subjects, other-initiated 
repair due to impaired reference, especially in the case of place adverbs like ‘there’ or 
‘here’, is only seen in the interaction with the two RHD individuals. This might be 
linked to topic development and the sometimes excessive level of detail. Even though 
the RHD individuals often made successful self-repairs, they sometimes seemed to 
have more trouble with self-repair than the two LHD subjects. The occurrences of 
self-repair in the two LHD subjects were more salient and, in the end, often more 
successful. The RHD subjects, on the other hand, tended to abandon self-initiated 
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self-repair, for example when they failed to produce circumlocutions; sometimes they 
did not even engage in the repair process at all, unless requested by the 
conversational partner. These findings also indicate that the questionnaire used in 
study 3 needs to be further developed as there are problems in the repair area that it 
does not capture. 
 
4.2 Implications for further research 
 
The results of studies 1 and 2 indicate that it is relevant to search for a possible cause 
of at least some RHD individuals’ problems in comprehension and other pragmatic 
deficits in the functioning of different attentional systems. Arousal and sustained 
attention might be considered as basic functions relevant to any complex cognitive 
process, and it is probably wise to have a clear picture of these basic functions in any 
individual who is included in a study of pragmatic performance in association with 
RHD. Measures of more basic cognitive functions should be complemented with 
measures of higher-level functions like executive functions. But, as recently 
discussed by Martin and McDonald (2005), sustained attention might be crucial in 
any process requiring executive function.  
The human attention system and more complex cognitive functions are 
compound matters. As it is not obvious how they should best be analysed and 
described, it is important that the models and methods used be well defined and 
reliable, or at least that the researcher be well aware of the pros and cons of the 
theoretical framework used.  
It is likely that the SART, used in study 2 to obtain a measure of sustained 
attention, is more sensitive to attention deficits in relation to traumatic brain injury 
than in relation to stroke. The inhibitory aspect of sustained attention, as measured by 
the SART, is probably more affected by frontal lobe lesions, although this needs to be 
further explored in studies comparing the SART to other tests of sustained attention 
in association with stroke. 
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The results of study 2 indicate that the ability to sustain attention in itself may 
not be sufficient to explain the difficulties making inferences. Instead, the ability to 
sustain attention needs to be viewed as incorporated in other cognitive functions and 
mechanisms, theoretically described as, for example, coarse semantic coding theory 
(Beeman, 1998), a left-hemisphere interpreter (Gazzaniga and Cooney, 2003), and 
Ramachandran’s (1995) right-hemisphere anomaly detector. 
Now, the results in the RHD group on tasks requiring inference of a character’s 
attitude or motive could not be related to any of the cognitive functions measured, 
although level of alertness most likely has a great impact. One implication of this 
might be that we should search for the possible cause in another, at least theoretically 
separate, cognitive mechanism. Another implication of the results of this study is that 
it would be worthwhile to further explore the functions of semantic processing, 
especially of the emotional and attitudinal aspects of words, in association with RHD. 
Furthermore, theories of social cognition as presented by Adolphs (1999) and 
Adolphs and Damasio (2000), and the HERA model as presented by Habib et al. 
(2003) might provide a promising framework for future studies of social inference in 
association with RHD.  
Kintsch’s (1998) construction-integration model provides a framework for this 
thesis. It is considered as a functional theoretical tool in the analysis of 
comprehension in association with RHD. The model makes it possible to analyse and 
describe the different processes required in comprehension. It was used here as a 
basis for discussing the different requirements for making adequate inferences of a 
character’s attitude or motive and revising inferences made earlier. However, due to 
the method and stimuli used in these studies, it was not possible to establish which 
phase of the comprehension process was involved in any impaired ability to generate 
inference. To do that, the stimuli used would have to be supplemented with, for 
example, other measures of the subject’s ability to flexibly activate and suppress 
several meanings of ambiguous words and of emotionally tinged words. The 
construction-integration model might therefore serve as guidance in the construction 
of a methodology and stimuli in future research. Furthermore, this model was found 
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to highlight the role of different attentional processes and the significance of 
mechanisms such as retrieval and encoding in the process of comprehension.  
The results of studies 3 and 4 also indicate that research on pragmatic 
disturbances should include an analysis of conversational interaction and involve the 
conversational partners of the brain-damaged individual. One issue that might be 
interesting to look into is strategies associated with word processing in RHD. Further 
research in this area might shed more light on the processes involved, both those 
causing the impairment and the strategies that might compensate for the impairment 
and facilitate communication.  
The results of study 3 show that, on a group level, brain damage to either 
hemisphere may result in subtle communication deficits that have a negative impact 
on the conversational interaction. Although only a few of the individuals included in 
the study had been diagnosed as mildly aphasic, in a clinical setting, both most of the 
brain-damaged individuals themselves and their conversational partners perceived a 
negative impact of their deficits. The distribution of an adapted questionnaire might 
make it possible to grasp several aspects of the pragmatic ability affected by brain 
damage. Furthermore, there is a need for incidence data on pragmatic communication 
disturbances in association with both RHD and LHD. To obtain reliable data on the 
occurrence of pragmatic deficits in such a study, it is important for the questions 
asked to be relevant for patient groups with more subtle symptoms. The questionnaire 
used in study 3 needs to be further adapted and tested. Structured interviews, as 
presented in the CAPPCI (Perkins et al., 1997), might be one way of finding the right 
questions to ask, while factor analysis of larger quantities of data could refine the 
instrument. 
In the end, group studies can provide a lot of important information about 
cognitive functions in association with brain damage, but they need to be 
complemented with case studies. Given that pragmatic abilities are dependent on 
various cognitive functions, and also on personal traits and strategies employed, it is 
most likely that pragmatic deficits associated with RHD manifest themselves in 
different ways. That makes it even more important to base any conclusion concerning 
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such deficits on research with patients whose cognition and pragmatic function have 
been carefully analysed and described.  
 
4.3 Clinical implications  
 
One important implication of the results of studies 1 and 2 is that tasks used to assess 
the ability to generate inferences in discourse have to be well defined with respect to 
the demands they make on the processes involved. For example, the results of study 1 
and 2 indicate that complex tasks requiring revised inference may capture problems 
in both RHD individuals and LHD individuals with subtle language disorders. 
Nevertheless, these problems might have different causes in the different individuals. 
It might be more important to assess the ability to generate social inferences, which 
requires other kinds of inference tasks, and in part involves other cognitive processes, 
in RHD individuals than in LHD individuals. These problems might be best 
understood as symptoms of a different kind of impairment than the one that underlies 
other inference problems.  
The pragmatic deficits seen in association with RHD are often referred to as a 
cognitive-communicative impairment. The connection between cognition and 
communication is still more often acknowledged in the case of RHD than in 
association with LHD and aphasia. But since this connection is not always made 
explicit in clinical settings, physicians, nursing staff and rehabilitation team members 
are often uncertain about the role of speech-language pathologists in the management 
of RHD patients. In addition to all the individuals who suffer from traumatic brain 
damage and neurological diseases, every year about 25,000 to 30,000 individuals 
suffer from stroke in Sweden (Socialstyrelsen, 2000). It is difficult to estimate how 
many of the individuals with RHD actually suffer from communicative impairments 
related to cognitive-linguistic deficits. However, there is no doubt that RHD 
individuals with pragmatic deficits tend to be under-referred to speech-language 
pathologists. The speech-language pathologist most often becomes involved because 
the patient has a swallowing disorder or motor speech disorders. As discussed by, for 
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example, Lehman-Blake, Duffy, Myers and Tompkins (2002), there is a need for 
standard terminology and increased knowledge about those issues among clinicians. 
Furthermore, the effects of  more subtle communicative difficulties can be difficult to 
observe in a hospital setting. Pragmatic deficits are often not really noticed, even by 
family members, until the RHD individual has left the hospital. The nature of the 
pragmatic problems in communication also makes it clear that it is necessary to 
involve the conversational partners in the assessment of the brain-damaged 
individual’s pragmatic ability, partly to get a picture of individual traits present 
before the disease. The assessment also needs to be performed or followed up some 
time after the initial rehabilitation phase.  
The results of this study do not present any clear-cut implications for the 
assessment and treatment of pragmatic deficits in association with RHD. The 
indications from this and other studies that non-linguistic areas, such as arousal and 
sustained attention, are involved highlight the importance of teamwork in the 
assessment and clinical management of these patients. 
In line with Myers (1999b), the results of the studies presented here indicate that 
in addition to an assessment of the ability to make more elaborate inferences in 
comprehension, semantic processing needs to be assessed with tasks that require the 
activation of a wide range of alternate meanings and associations with a single 
concept. This might be done with open-ended questions about more complex matters 
and situations and word classification, including word meanings involving emotional 
or attitudinal aspects. To get a clear picture of a brain-damaged individual’s 
pragmatic ability, it is also necessary to assess the ability to interact in conversation 
with strangers as well as with familiar conversational partners. A complete 
assessment of the ability to interact in conversation would also have to include 
several different situations that make different demands on the ability to flexibly 
adapt to the needs and expectations of conversational partners. It is also important for 
the clinician to be alert to less obvious and more subtle symptoms of possible word-
processing difficulties. Even short pauses and other basic OCM expressions such as 
sighing and clicking sounds might be considered as symptoms of processing 
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difficulties in association with more subtle language disturbances. Furthermore, an 
increase in changes of speech plan and topic drift post-stroke might be a symptom of 
a pragmatic language deficit. 
Several English-language assessment protocols and tools for pragmatic or 
cognitive-communicative deficits associated with RHD have been published (e.g. 
Burns et al., 1999; Myers, 1999b; Schneider et al., 1999). The problem with some of 
the existing assessment batteries is that they are not totally abreast of current research 
on language and communication in association with RHD. There is also a Swedish 
test battery, developed for assessment of high-level language: Testbatteri för subtila 
språkstörningar (TBSS) (Laakso et al., 2000). This test battery includes tests of 
comprehension of ambiguous words and metaphors and ability to generate inferences 
from implicitly expressed information in discourse. Unfortunately there is no control 
over the types of inference required and processes involved, but the tasks primarily 
require bridging inference without any requirement for social inference. An English 
test battery published by Bryan (1993), the Right Hemisphere Language Battery, has 
been translated and adapted in Swedish by Hofling and Saldert (1998), but the test 
was not found to be totally reliable or sufficient. This test battery also assesses the 
ability to infer from implicitly stated matters in discourse, and some of the tasks 
involve emotional content.  
Since the processes underlying different aspects of pragmatic deficits in 
association with RHD are not always clear, task-oriented therapy – focusing on a 
specific task and addressing the symptoms – is common. Nevertheless, as discussed 
by Myers (1999a), process-oriented treatment is often preferable as it is believed to 
generalise to other tasks more than task-oriented therapy does, since any given 
process may affect several aspects of communication. Process-oriented therapy often 
involves facilitation techniques in which the disrupted processes are stimulated. 
Working with process-oriented therapy means that the clinician has to have a theory 
of the nature and cause of the pragmatic deficit. A problem with inference of, for 
example, attitude or motives or with emotionally tinged discourse needs to be 
managed differently if it is caused by a general attentional disorder or by an impaired 
  270 
ability to process this specific type of semantic content. Myers (1999a, 1999b) and 
Tompkins (1995) present several different methods and therapy tasks for both task-
oriented and process-oriented approaches. Treatment in the form of training programs 
for attentional deficits does exist, some in computerised versions, and some have also 
been evaluated with varying results; see, for example, Sturm (1996) and Palmese and 
Raskin (2000).  
In order to manage specific communicative interaction problems, these problems 
can be mapped in a patient and his/her communication partner through interviews and 
videotaping of the interaction. This makes it possible to adjust the training to cover 
strategies that are relevant to that particular dyad. There is, however, a great need for 
treatment studies to evaluate different kinds of speech and language therapy for RHD.  
In any case, until the pragmatic deficits associated with RHD are well 
understood, an important task for speech-language therapists must still be to inform 
the brain-damaged individual and his or her presumed communication partners, such 
as family members, the rehabilitation team and nursing staff, of these potential 
problems. This is especially important since a patient’s misinterpretation of 
emotionally and attitudinally tinged communication might lead to his or her 
‘insensitivity’ being understood as a personal characteristic instead of a symptom of 
impairment. Strategies used in association with word retrieval difficulties might also 
be mistaken for expressions of personality or attitude. In addition, impaired 
comprehension in general, which makes it difficult for the RHD individual to 
assimilate information and follow instructions, can interfere with the rehabilitation 
process. Well-informed communication partners can also aid in conversational 
interaction and comprehension by using facilitating and compensating strategies. 
After all, good communication is not a one-person affair. 
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APPENDIX 1: Narratives 
 
Categorisation of questions: 
A/M – Inference of a character’s attitude/motive 
BI – Bridging inference 
RI – Revised inference 
M + RI – Both inference of motive and revised inference 
E – Explicit 
 
 
 1.  Den trasiga vasen 
Johan plockade med darrande händer upp skärvorna efter vasen hon kastat. Det låg glasbitar i hela 
hallen. Han lyssnade utåt trapphuset. Det hade gått en halvtimma sedan Asta rusat iväg. Han hade 
inte fått någon chans att förklara alls. ‘Om hon inte kommer tillbaka i kväll... eller kanske imorgon, 
om hon inte kommer tillbaka imorgon så ringer jag svärmor’, tänkte Johan.  
 
1a. Vem var Asta? (BI) 
 
1b. Varför hade Asta rusat iväg? (A/M) 
 
1c. Vem tänkte Johan ringa? (E) 
 
 
Eng: 1.  The broken vase 
With shaky hands Johan picked up the pieces of the vase she had thrown. There was 
broken glass all over the hall. He listened for any sound from the stairwell. Half an hour 
had passed since Asta had run off. He hadn’t had any chance to explain. ‘If she doesn’t 
come back tonight… or maybe tomorrow, if she doesn’t come back tomorrow, I’ll phone 
mother-in-law’, Johan thought to himself. 
 
1a. Who was Asta? (BI) 
1b. Why had Asta run off? (A/M) 
1c. Whom was Johan going to phone? (E) 
 
 
 
 2.   Filen  
Lisa var väldigt hungrig. Hon hade försovit sig och blivit sen till frukostmötet. Nu hade hon svårt att 
bestämma sig för vilken fil hon skulle ta. Den hon brukade välja var kanske inte den bästa så här på 
morgonen. ‘Nej, nu prövar jag en annan’, sa hon till sig själv, ‘den kanske är snabbare’. Hon kastade 
en blick i backspegeln samtidigt som hon satte på blinkersen. 
 
2a. Varför var kvinnan sen? (E) 
  
2b. Varför ville hon pröva en annan fil? (M + RI) 
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2c. Var någonstans var kvinnan när hon skulle välja fil? (RI) 
 
 
ENG: 2. The sour milk/the lane (Swedish: Filen) 
 Lisa was very hungry. She had overslept and was late for the breakfast meeting. Now she 
had difficulties in making her mind up about which sour milk/lane (Swedish: fil) she 
should take. The one she usually chose might not be the best one in the morning. ‘No, now 
I will try another one’, she said to herself, ‘that one might be quicker’’. She glanced in the 
driving mirror as she started the flasher. 
  
2a. Why was the woman late? (E) 
2b. Why did she want to try another sour milk/lane (Swedish: fil)? (M + RI) 
2c. Where was the woman when she had to choose a sour milk/lane (Swedish: fil)? (RI) 
 
 
 
3.   En solig dag 
Solen stod redan högt på himlen när katten med ett entusiastiskt spinnande ännu en gång försökte få 
henne att kliva upp och fylla på matskålen. Filten hon hade spikat upp framför fönstret för tre dagar 
sedan lyckades inte stänga ute de stickande solstrålarna. ”Underbart, en ny härlig dag”, suckade hon 
och drog täcket över huvudet. Brevet hon fått låg fortfarande sönderrivet på köksbordet.  
 
3a. Varför hade hon inte klivit upp ännu? (A/M) 
  
3b. Uppskattade hon det vackra vädret? (A/M) 
 
3c. Vad försökte katten göra? (E) 
 
 
ENG: 3. A sunny day 
The sun stood already high above the rooftops when the cat, with its enthusiastic 
purring, once again tried to make her get up and refill its bowl. The blanket she had 
nailed up in front of the window three days ago didn’t succeed in shutting out the 
stinging rays of sunshine. ‘Lovely, a new wonderful day’, she said with a sigh and 
pulled the cover over her head. The letter she had received was still lying torn up on the 
kitchen table. 
 
3a. Why hadn’t she got up yet? (A/M) 
3b. Did she appreciate the beautiful weather? (A/M) 
3c. What was the cat trying to do? (E) 
 
 
 
4.    Bandet 
Musiken dånade i högtalarna på bilen. Han förstod inte hur hon kunde tycka om den sortens band. Själv 
avskydde han dem. ”Du kan väl följa med dit och titta i alla fall”, hade hon bett honom. När de kom 
fram hade hon på något sätt lyckats övertala honom att gå in ensam. ”Ta tio meter av den vävda 
sorten”, ropade hon innan dörren till butiken slog igen efter honom. 
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4a. Vad ville kvinnan att mannen skulle göra? (RI) 
 
4b. Varför var han irriterad på kvinnan? (E) 
    
4c. Vad var det för sorts band de skulle titta på? (RI) 
 
 
ENG: 4. The band/braid (Swedish: Bandet) 
The music roared out of the loudspeakers of the car. He didn’t understand how she could 
like that kind of band/braid (Swedish: band). He himself hated them. ‘Can’t you at least 
come along and look’ she had asked him. When they arrived, she had somehow managed 
to persuade him to go in there by himself. ‘Get ten metres of the woven type’, she called 
out to him just before the door to the shop shut behind him. 
 
4a. What was it the woman wanted the man to do? (RI) 
4b. Why was he irritated at the woman? (E) 
4c. What kind of band/braid (Swedish: band) were they going to look at? (RI) 
 
 
 
5.     Att skriva 
Minutvisaren på klockan i skrivningssalen hade plötsligt tagit ett skutt framåt. Runtomkring honom 
raspade flitiga pennor mot pappersark. Peters eget blad lyste alldeles vitt. I fickan brände den lilla 
lappen med alla de viktiga årtalen. Vakten hade gått varvet runt och satt sig på sin plats därframme 
igen. Peter lutade sig mot ryggstödet och handen sökte sig ned mot byxfickan. Hans fingrar slöt sig 
om det lilla varma pappersarket.  
 
5a. Vad skulle Peter göra med lappen han hade i byxfickan? (A/M) 
 
5b. Vad gjorde vakten? (E) 
 
5c. Hade Peter kunnat svara på några frågor ännu? (BI) 
 
 
ENG: 5. Writing 
The minute hand on the clock in the examination hall had suddenly leaped forward. All 
around him busy pencils scraped over sheets of paper. Peter’s paper was all shiny white. 
Inside his pocket, the little note with all the important dates was burning. The invigilator 
had completed his round and sat down on his seat at the front again. Peter leaned against 
the back of the chair and his hand found its way down into the pocket of his trousers. His 
fingers closed around the little warm piece of paper. 
 
5a. What was Peter going to do with the note he had in the pocket of his trousers? (A/M) 
5b. What was the invigilator doing? (E) 
5c. Had Peter been able to answer any of the questions yet? (BI) 
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7.    Mössan 
”Va' fin du är idag”, sa Ove och klappade henne hårt på huvudet. Den nya yllemössan var varm och 
det kliade. Karin vågade inte svara. Det var sent i oktober men höstsolen värmde bra ännu. 
Runtomkring dem stod de andra barnen i en tät ring. De var barhuvade och flinade åt henne. 
Plötsligt satt mössan i Oves hand och han viftade triumferande med den mot kamraterna vars skratt 
nu ekade över skolgården. 
 
7a. Var det mycket kallt ute den dagen? (E) 
  
 
7b. Varför tog Ove Karins mössa? (A/M) 
 
7c. Hur hade Karin det med sina klasskamrater? (A/M) 
 
 
ENG: 7.     The cap 
‘Well, you look nice today’, Ove said and patted her hard on the head. The new woollen 
cap was warm and it itched. Karin didn’t dare to respond. It was late in October but the 
autumn sun was still warm enough. Around them the other children stood in a close 
circle. They were all bare-headed and they sneered at her. Suddenly the cap was in Ove’s 
hand and he waved it in triumph at his friends, whose laughter now echoed over the 
schoolyard. 
 
7a. Was it very cold outside that day? (E) 
7b. Why did Ove take Karin’s cap? (A/M) 
7c. How did Karin get along with her classmates? (A/M) 
 
 
 
8.    Sprickan i pannan 
Konstnären hade arbetat med ansiktet på skulpturen halva natten. Han hade sovit till långt in på 
förmiddagen när hans hustru kom in och väckte honom. ”Förlåt, men nu måste du vakna. De säger att 
det är en spricka i pannan”, hade hon sagt och pekat ut i hallen. Han gick ut i ateljén och lossade på 
duken runt skulpturen. Först nu kände han att det redan hunnit bli kallt i huset. 
 
8a. Varför sov mannen så länge på morgonen? (E) 
 
8b. Vad var det som hade hänt under natten? (RI) 
      
8c. Hur visste hustrun att det var en spricka i pannan? (RI) 
 
 
ENG: 8. The crack in the forehead/furnace (Swedish: panna) 
The artist had worked on the face of the sculpture half the night. He slept until late in the 
morning, when his wife came in and woke him up.’ I’m sorry, but you have to wake up 
now. They say there is a crack in the forehead/ furnace (Swedish: panna)’, she said and 
pointed towards the hall. He went out to the studio and loosened the cloth around the 
sculpture. Not until then did he notice that the house had already got cold. 
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8a. Why did the man sleep so long in the morning? (E) 
8b. What was it that had happened during the night? (RI) 
8c. How did the wife know there was a crack in the forehead/ furnace (Swedish: panna)? 
(RI) 
 
 
 
9.   Katten 
Katten ställde sig på baktassarna och sträckte sig mot hans nypressade byxben. I köket skramlade 
matte med porslin och kaffevatten. ”Så, så”, muttrade Anders och försökte göra sig lös. Katten strök 
nu ihärdigt av sig hundratals mjuka hårstrån mot hans ben. Anders bet ihop käkarna samtidigt som 
han sköt bort den slingrande kattkroppen från de dyra byxorna. ”Det är verkligen en trevlig katt du 
har!” ropade han ut mot köket.  
 
9a. Uppskattade Anders katten? (A/M) 
 
9b. Vad höll kattens matte på med? (E) 
  
9c. Vad ville Anders att matte skulle tro? (A/M) 
 
 
ENG: 9. The cat 
The cat stood up on its hind legs and pawed his newly ironed trousers. In the kitchen the 
cat’s owner was clattering about with china and water for the coffee. ‘There, there’, 
Anders muttered and tried to free himself. Now the cat was persistently rubbing hundreds 
of soft hairs against his legs. Anders clenched his jaw as he pushed the cat’s wriggling 
body away from the expensive trousers. ‘That’s a really nice cat you have!’ he called out 
to the kitchen. 
 
9a. Did Anders appreciate the cat? (A/M) 
9b. What was the owner of the cat doing? (E) 
9c. What did Anders want the mistress of the cat to believe? (A/M) 
 
 
 
10.    Masken 
Hon såg masken på en gång när hon kom ut. Den var nästan helt grå och låg på den jordiga marken 
nedanför kökstrappen. Det var fullt med leksaker på gräsmattan fast klockan bara var tio på 
förmiddagen. Hon ropade på sonen som kom springande med sitt plastsvärd. ”Kan du inte ta reda på 
den där?” bad hon. Pojken tog upp masken och satte den på sitt ansikte innan han omfamnade sin mor. 
 
10a. Vad tror Du fanns på masken så pojken kunde sätta den på sig? (RI) 
 
10b Varför ville modern att han skulle ta reda på masken? (M + RI) 
 
10c. Vilken tid på dagen var det? (E) 
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ENG: 10. The worm/mask (Swedish: mask) 
She saw the worm/mask as soon as she came out. It was almost all grey and lay beneath 
the kitchen stairs on the ground that was soiled with earth. There were plenty of toys on 
the lawn although it was only ten in the morning. She called out to her son who came 
running with his plastic sword. ‘Can you please take care of that?’ she asked. The boy 
picked up the worm/mask (Swedish: mask) and put it on his face before hugging his 
mother. 
 
10a. What do you think there was on the worm/mask (Swedish: mask) so that the boy 
could put it on himself? (RI) 
10b. Why did the mother want him to take care of the worm/mask (Swedish: mask) 
(M+RI) 
10c. What time of the day was it? (E) 
 
 
 
11.  I tullen 
Hon följde efter strömmen av människor som passerade under den gröna skylten i tullen. Där 
framme kunde hon se en uniformerad tjänsteman. Svetten fick tejpen att skava mot huden i midjan 
och de små lätta plastbehållarna kändes blytunga. Hon hade tagit en rymlig tröja på sig men tyckte 
nu att den tydligt putade ut i midjan. Hon drog in magen och fixerade utgången med blicken när hon 
passerade tulltjänstemannen.  
 
11a. Varför svettades kvinnan? (A/M) 
    
11b. Var någonstans var hon? (E) 
       
11c. Varför hade hon en rymlig tröja på sig? (A/M) 
 
 
ENG: 11. In the customs office 
She followed the stream of people passing the green ‘Nothing to declare’ sign in the 
customs office. Up front she could see a uniformed official. Her sweat made the tape 
irritate the skin around her waist and the small plastic containers felt as heavy as lead. 
She had put on a roomy sweater but now she thought it was bulging over her waistline in 
an obvious way. She pulled in her stomach and looked fixedly at the exit as she passed the 
customs officer.  
 
11a. Why was the woman sweating? (A/M) 
11b. Where was she? (E) 
11c. Why did she have a roomy sweater on? (A/M) 
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12.   Boken 
Han hade givit henne en bok på deras första bröllopsdag. Hon hade blivit så glad och kysst honom. 
Sedan hade hon ofta suttit i trädgården och tittat på den. Den hade blivit som en symbol för deras 
äktenskap, tyckte han. Det var många år sedan. Hon var död nu men boken fanns kvar. Han sträckte ut 
handen och rörde vid den. Den var så stor nu att den skuggade hela gräsmattan. 
 
12a. Var det en stor bok hon hade fått för länge sedan? (RI) 
     
12b. Vad hade hon gjort när han gav henne boken? (E) 
 
12c. Var hade de gjort av boken när hon fått den? (RI) 
 
 
ENG: 12.  The book/beech (Swedish: Boken) 
He had given her a book/beech (Swedish: bok) on their first wedding anniversary. She had 
been so pleased and had kissed him. After that, she often sat in the garden, looking at it. It 
had turned into a symbol of their marriage, he thought. That was many years ago. She 
was dead now but the book/beech (Swedish: boken) was still there. He reached out and 
touched it. It was so large now that it shadowed the entire lawn. 
 
12a. Was it a large book/beech (Swedish: bok) she had been given long ago? (RI) 
12b. What had she done when he gave her the book/beech (Swedish: boken)? (E) 
12c. What had they done with the book/beech (Swedish: boken) when she got it? (RI) 
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APPENDIX 2: Examples of assessment scheme for Discourse 
comprehension  
 
 
 
Question 1a): ‘Who was Asta?’ requires bridging inference and integration of information. 
 
Adequate responses require an inference of the relationship between the main characters, integration 
of information in the discourse through bridging inference (for example ‘call mother-in-law’ and the 
expectation that ‘she might come back tonight’) and knowledge of the world (for example that 
misunderstandings and disagreement might affect a relationship).  
 
It should be clear from the response that the main figures have some kind of close relationship. 
 
Examples of correct responses: wife / fiancée / common-law spouse / girlfriend / the woman of the 
house. 
 
 
Question 1b): ‘Why had Asta run off?’ requires bridging inference, integration of information and 
inference of attitude/motive.  
 
The understanding of the motive requires the integration of information in the discourse through 
bridging inference (for example ‘With shaky hands’, a broken vase, ‘hadn’t had any chance to explain’, 
she had ‘run off’) and insight into the attitudes and emotions of the main characters (for example, that 
anger can result in a broken vase). 
 
It should be clear from the response that some kind of conflict has come up between the main figures. 
 
Examples of correct responses: they had had an argument / she was angry / she had thrown the vase. 
 
 
Question 1c): ‘Whom was Johan going to call?’ (Adequate information is explicitly expressed in the 
discourse.) 
 
It should be clear from the response that the person Johan was planning to telephone had some kind of 
family relationship with Asta/Johan. 
 
Example of correct responses: mother-in-law/ Asta’s mother / the parents-in-law. 
 
 
Question 2a): ‘Why was the woman late?’ (Adequate information explicitly expressed in the 
discourse). 
 
The question inquires about the reason why she was late rather than a motive for her action, which is 
explicitly expressed in the discourse. 
 
It should be clear from the response that the woman was late because she had slept too long. 
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Examples of correct responses: she had overslept. 
 
 
Question 2b): ‘Why did she want to try another sour milk/lane (Swedish: fil)?’ requires bridging 
inference, integration of information and inference of motive (a correct response also might require a 
revised inference).  
 
For the correct inference of motive, the integration of information in the discourse and knowledge of 
the world through a bridging inference is required. To make the last sentence totally coherent, a 
revision of an ambiguous word is required. (Might include inference of attitude/motive as in ‘she was 
pressed for time/in a hurry’, but that is not necessary for producing a correct response.) Inquires about 
the motive for trying another kind of sour milk or lane (Swedish: fil). 
 
It should be clear from the response that the woman wanted to save time by changing lanes in a traffic 
situation. Responses like ‘she was fed up with the one she usually took/the old one’ are thus not 
acceptable.  
 
Examples of correct responses: to get there faster/it was faster/there was a lot of traffic. 
 
A response like ‘she was in a hurry’ must be judged in relation to responses to question 2c to find out 
whether the subject means sour milk or a lane in a traffic situation. 
 
 
Question 2c): ‘Where was the woman when she had to choose a sour milk/lane (Swedish: fil)?’ 
requires bridging inference, integration of information and revised inference.  
 
The right inference requires integration of information in the discourse and knowledge of (traffic in) 
the world. To make the last sentence coherent, an erroneous interpretation of an ambiguous word must 
be revised. 
 
It should be clear from the response that the woman is in a ‘traffic situation’ rather than in a ‘food 
situation’. 
 
Examples of correct responses: in a street / on the road / in a car / out in the traffic / in another lane. 
 
 
Question 11a): ‘Why was the woman sweating?’ requires bridging inference, integration of 
information and inference of attitude/motive.  
 
A correct response requires bridging inference through the integration of information in the discourse 
and knowledge of the world. An adequate response requires an inference of attitude/motive through a 
physical expression (she is perspiring). 
 
It should be clear from the response that the woman is nervous or that she is trying to smuggle 
something (or both). A response that simply states that she had a thick sweater on is not enough if it 
does not include information about why she had it on (that is, that she was trying to smuggle 
something). 
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Examples of correct responses: she was nervous / afraid to get caught / was going to smuggle 
something. 
 
 
Question 11b): ‘Where was she?’(Adequate information is explicitly expressed in the discourse.) 
 
It should be clear from the response that she is about to cross a border, in the customs office or that she 
is in a situation associated with travelling. 
 
Examples of correct responses: in customs / at the border / in an airport / at a ferry terminal / on a 
station / she went under the green sign. 
 
 
Question 11c): ‘Why did she have a roomy sweater on?’ requires bridging inference, integration of 
information and inference of motive. 
 
An adequate response requires integration of information in the discourse and knowledge of the world 
(for example, that small plastic containers taped to the body might imply smuggling), for the right 
inference of motive. 
 
It should be clear from the response that she is hiding something or that she is trying to smuggle 
something (and thereby implicitly expressed that she wants to hide something). 
 
Examples of correct responses: to hide what she was trying to smuggle / because she was smuggling 
something. 
 
 
Question 12a): ‘Was it a large book/beech (Swedish: bok) she had been given long ago?’ requires 
bridging inference, integration of information and revised inference.  
 
For coherence, the correct response requires integration of information in the discourse and 
knowledge of the world and bridging inference as well as the revision of an erroneous interpretation of 
an ambiguous word. 
 
It should be clear from the response that it was not very big or that it was a sapling. 
 
Examples of correct responses: No / it was a sapling / it was a young beech. 
 
 
Question 12b): ‘What had she done when he gave her the book/beech?’ (Adequate information is 
explicitly expressed in the discourse.) 
 
Some kind of reaction or action by the woman or some kind of reason why she got the beech should be 
explicitly stated in the response. ‘Sitting in the garden with it’ is not accepted if the responses to 
questions 12a or 12c indicate that the subject had interpreted the ambiguous word (Swedish: bok) as 
meaning a book. 
 
Examples of correct responses: kissed him / planted it / she was glad / it was their wedding anniversary 
/ she had put up with him a whole year  
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Question 12c): ‘What had they done with the book/beech when she got it?’ requires bridging 
inference, integration of information and revised inference.  
 
An adequate response requires integration of information (for example, that she had sat in the garden 
looking at it and that it shadowed the lawn) and knowledge of the world as well as revision of an 
erroneous interpretation of an ambiguous word. 
 
It should be clear from the response that it is something that is planted or can only be kept in the 
garden. Just ‘she had kept it’ is not acceptable. 
 
Examples of correct responses: they planted it / it was out (in the garden). 
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APPENDIX 3: Questions in the questionnaire  
 
1. Do you usually take the initiative and start a conversation with your friend/relative? 
 
2. Do you ever fail to initiate a response when it is your turn to speak? 
 
3. Are there occasions when there is a long pause before you answer when your 
conversational partner addresses you? 
 
4. When you speak to your friend/relative, do you occasionally interrupt him/her? 
 
5. When you speak to your friend/relative, are your responses very long and detailed? 
 
6. Do you restrict what you say to minimal or very short responses? 
 
7. Do you introduce new topics in a conversation? 
 
8. When you introduce a new topic, does your friend/relative ever have trouble seeing 
how it fits in with previous topics? 
 
9. Can you continue talking about the same topic for a long period of time? 
 
10. Do you have favourite topics that you repeatedly bring up in a conversation? 
 
11. Sometimes we get the impression that we don’t really follow what a conversational 
partner is talking about. When that happens to you, do you usually say something or 
indicate that you can’t really follow what your friend/relative is talking about? 
 
12. When you make a mistake in your speech, do you try to correct yourself? 
 
13. When you try to correct your speech, can you manage it by yourself, without help 
from your conversational partner? 
 
14. Can you specify what you mean if your friend/relative does not understand? 
 
15. Do you ever stop speaking in the middle of a sentence and leave it unfinished as if 
you had lost the thread or been distracted? 
 
16. Do you sometimes have to struggle to find the appropriate word when you are going 
to speak? 
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17. If you can’t find the appropriate word, do you try to describe what you mean? 
 
18. Do you ever have difficulties understanding what your friend/relative says? 
 
19. Do you ever use words like he/she, it and here/there without your conversational 
partner understanding who or what you are referring to? 
 
20. Do you sometimes take things literally and therefore misunderstand them?  
Example: If someone asks you to ‘just hold on a minute’, would you think that he/she 
meant literally 60 seconds? 
 
21. Can you ‘read between the lines’ and understand what people really mean? 
 Example: If someone says ‘It is really hot in here’, would you understand that they 
wanted someone to open a window? 
 
22. Do you sometimes miss the point of a joke? 
 
23. Do you think you have a sense of humour? 
 
24. Is your humour appreciated by others? 
 
25. Do you think your speech sounds flat or monotonous? 
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APPENDIX 4: Reported change and degree of negative impact in study 3 
 
Number of subjects and conversational partners reporting change (within brackets) and negative impact as well as median and 
range (within parentheses) of rated degree of negative impact. Figures in bold type denote issues that were reported by a majority 
of the subjects and/or their conversational partners. 
 
Area Issue Subjects Conversational partners 
LHD  
n = 13 
RHD 
n = 11  
LHD 
n = 13  
RHD 
n = 9  
Initiation  1. Start conversation [9]     8 
md: 2 (1–3) 
[5]     4 
md: 2 (0–3) 
[6]     6 
md: 2 (1–3) 
[4 ]    2 
md: 1 (0–2) 
 2. No response [8 ]    7 
md: 2 (0–3) 
[6 ] 5 
md: 2.5 ( 0–4) 
[10]  10 
md: 2 (1–4) 
[2]     1 
0.5 (0–2) 
 3. Latency response [7]    7 
md: 3 (1–3) 
[6]      6 
md: 2 (1–4) 
[8 ]    7 
md: 2 (0–4) 
[3 ]    3 
md: 1 (1–4) 
Turn taking 4. Interrupt others’ turn [6 ]   6 
md: 2 (2–3) 
[1 ]     1 
              (1) 
[7 ]    5 
md: 1 (0–3) 
[ 3]    2 
md: 1 (0–3) 
 5. Detailed responses [6 ]   6 
md: 2.5 (1–3) 
[7]     6 
md: 2 (0–3) 
[8 ]    8 
md: 2 (1–3) 
[5]     4 
md: 2 (0–2) 
 6. Short responses [9]    7 
md: 2 (0–3) 
[5 ]    4 
md: 2 (0–3) 
[10]  10 
md: 2 (1–3) 
[4 ]     3 
md: 1 (0–2) 
Topic management 7. Start new topics [8]    6 
md: 1 (0–3) 
[4]    4 
md: 2 (1–4) 
[5]    5 
md: 2 (2–3) 
[3 ]     3 
md: 2 (2–4) 
 8. Coherence of new 
topics 
[3]    3 
md: 2 (2–3) 
[2]     1 
md: 2 (0–4) 
[5]     5 
md: 2 (1–4) 
[3]      3 
md: 1 (1–4) 
 9. Maintain topics [6]     5 
md: 1.5 (0–3) 
[2]     2 
md: 2.5 (2–3) 
[5 ]    5 
md: 2 (1–3) 
[4 ]     4 
md: 1.5 (1–4) 
 10. Recurring topics [4]     3 
md: 1.5 (0–2) 
[1]     0 [3]     3 
2 (1–3) 
[3 ]    2 
md: 1 (0–2) 
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Repair  11. Indicate compreh. 
problems 
[7]     5 
md: 2 (0–3) 
[3]     3 
md: 3 (2–4) 
[10]   10 
md: 2 (1–4) 
[3]      3 
md: 2 (1–2) 
 12. Initiate self-repair [8 ]    8 
md: 1 (1–3) 
[3]     3 
md: 2 (2–3) 
[7]     7 
md: 2 (1–3) 
[2]      1 
md: 1 (0–2) 
 13. Successful self-
repair 
[7 ]    7 
md: 2 (2–2) 
[2 ]    1 
md: 0.5 (0–1) 
[10 ]   10 
md: 2 (2–3) 
[3 ]    3 
md: 1.5 (1–2) 
 14. Repair through 
specifying  
[7]     7 
md: 2 (1–3) 
[4]     3 
md: 3 (0–4) 
[7]     7 
md: 2 (2–3) 
[2]     1 
md: 1.5 (0–3) 
Attention 15. Lost thread when 
speaking 
[9 ]    8 
md: 2 (0–3)  
[6]     6 
md: 2 (1–4) 
[9 ]    8 
md: 2 (0–3) 
[3 ]    3 
md: 1 (1–4) 
Word retrieval 16. Word retrieval 
difficulties 
[9]     8 
md: 1 (0–3) 
[6 ]    6 
md: 1.5 (1–4) 
[1]   11 
md: 2 (1–4) 
[8]     6 
md: 1 (0–2) 
 17. Production of 
circumlocutions 
[5]    2 
md: 0 (0–3) 
[5]     5 
md: 2 (1–3) 
[9]    9 
md: 2 (1–3) 
[2 ]    1 
md: 1.5 (0–3) 
Reference  19. Reference failure  [6]    6 
md: 2 (1–3) 
[3]     3 
md: 2 (1–3) 
[6 ]   6 
md: 1.5 ( 1–3) 
[5 ]    4 
md: 2 (0–3) 
Prosody 25. Monotonous 
intonation  
[7 ]    7 
md: 2 (1–4) 
[4 ]     4 
md: 3 (2–4) 
[8 ]   7 
md: 1 (0–2) 
[3]     3 
md: 1 (1–3) 
Comprehension, 
general 
18. Comprehension in 
general 
[5]    5 
md: 2 (1–3) 
[2]      2 
md: 3.5 (3–4) 
[6]    6 
md: 2 (1–4) 
[5 ]    4 
md: 2 (0–3) 
Complex language 
comprehension 
20. Metaphorical 
meaning 
[3]    3 
md: 2 (1–2) 
[2 ]     2 
md: 3 (2–4) 
[3]    3 
md: 2 (1–3) 
[4 ]    3 
md: 1.5 (0–4) 
 21. Make inferences [4]    3 
md: 1.5 (0–2) 
[3]    3 
md: 2 (1–4) 
[4 ]    4 
md: 1.5 (1–3) 
[5]    5 
md: 2 (1–4) 
 22. Comprehension of 
humour  
[2 ]    2 
md: 1.5 (1–2) 
[2 ]    2 
md: 3 (2–4) 
[2 ]    2 
md: 1.5 (1–2) 
[4 ]   4 
md: 2 (1–3) 
 23. Use humour [5 ]    4 
md: 1 (0–2) 
[4 ]    4 
md: 2 (1–2) 
[3 ]    3 
md: 1 (1–3) 
[2 ]   1 
md: 0.5 (0–1) 
 24. Humour appreciated 
by others 
[2 ]    2 
md: 2 (1–3) 
0 [2 ]    2 
md: 1.5 ( 1–2) 
[1]     1 
                (1) 
 
  XVI 
APPENDIX 5: Key to the symbols used in the transcriptions 
 
 
Each contribution line starts with an indication of whether the contribution is in Swedish (S) or 
English (E). This is followed by a number indicating the number of the contribution in the whole 
transcription of that specific conversation. 
 
Dollar sign $ indicates that the line is a contribution line and is followed by the initial of the brain 
damaged individual (T, J, N and C) or P for the conversational partner. The contribution lines are 
numbered according to their place in the entire transcription. 
 
Angle brackets < > signify contributions that are commented on. The comment is presented below 
the contribution on a comment line indicated with @. 
 
@ indicates a comment line. The comment is presented within angle brackets. The comments are 
numbered when the contribution is associated with more than one comment. Comments might, for 
example, describe gestures, speech on inhalation (ingressive), own communication management 
expressions and other activities that are considered important in that particular sequence of 
interaction. 
 
Square brackets [ ] signify overlapping speech and are numbered when speech overlaps on more 
than one occasion in that particular contribution. 
 
Parentheses enclosing three dots (…) indicate speech that could not be transcribed due to limited 
audibility. 
 
Parentheses ( ) indicate that the transcriber is uncertain about the interpretation of the enclosed 
passage of speech. 
 
Plus sign + signifies that the word is interrupted. 
 
Colon : signifies that the vowel is prolonged. 
 
The slash symbol / is used to indicate length of pauses. A short pause the length of a short word is 
denoted with one slash symbol (/); three slash symbols (///) signify a pause with a duration of 
several seconds, and two slash symbols (//) signify an intermediate pause. 
 
 
